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ABSTRACT
My dissertation is an intellectual history of "phenomenology," as it came to be
understood within architectural discourse during the Cold War. The principal thesis is that
contacts with phenomenology were at the crux of the 1970s shift from modernist to postmodemist
thinking in architecture. I support this thesis through critical analyses of the work of Emesto
Rogers, Charles Moore, Christian Norberg-Schulz, and Kenneth Frampton, who are largely
credited with introducing phenomenology to architecture, and with the expansion of the debates
on Postmodem architecture to include issues of human-environment relations, Stich as the social
function of traditional building practices, and place-bound identity politics.
At present their invocations of phenomenology are often charged with a naIve
essentialism generally understood to be inconsistent with postmodern thought. This dissertation
takes issue with that simplistic view by providing a more complete account of their contributions
to architectural thinking. It situates each author in the context of the historical emergence of a
new type of architectural avant-garde practice, that of the historian, which to this day has received
little scholarly attention. I argue that they are important transitional figures, whose work is
enframed by both the closing stages of a postwar modernist understanding of architecture and the
opening stages of postmodernist epistemologies.
Around their interest in phenomenology cohered an intellectual formation that I call the
anti-avant-garde, to situate it within the 1970s debates concerning the terms of architectural
avant-gardism. The anti-avant-garde opposed the autonomy of practice or theory, charging
equally against the fonnalism of neo-avant-garde architects such as Peter Eisenman, and against
the self-sufficiency of theory proclaimed by critical historians like Manfredo Tafuri. Instead, the
anti-avant-garde asserted a theory of "authentic" experience, in which theory and practice became
indistinguishable. I argue that this put the anti -avant-garde in the contradictory position of having
to efface its own theorizing. This dissertation critically evaluates the anti-avant-garde9 s full
impact in architectural thinking and pedagogy by laying bare its theoretical program.
Thesis Supervisor: Mark Jarzombek
Associate Professor of History and Architecture
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation investigates the emergence and career of the idea of
"phenomenology" as it came to be understood within architectural discourse. As a theory
that privileges "experience" over theory, phenomenology's rise to currency in the 1970s
is as spectacular as its eclipse in the mid 1980s. The writings of Emesto Rogers (1909 -
1969), Christian Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000), Charles Moore (1925-1993), and Kenneth
Frampton (b. 1930) came to represent the backbone of the new fOnTIS of theorizing made
available to architects through phenomenology. These authors ~;vere part of a singular
generation of architects who reinvented themselves as historians in order to reflect upon
ways of overcoming the various problems they perceived in postwar Modem architecture.
Taken together, their work questioned modernism's claims to autonomy from culture and
history, and made non-modem architecture available to modem architects in entirely new
ways. Phenomenology appeared to them as a potentially liberating re-framing of the age-
old dyad of "man" and his environment. Through phenomenology, they emphasized the
"unity" of individual and world, and called for a new architecture that would be sensitive
to the "identity" of both. But by the nineteen eighties they were undercut from theory,
accused of the very essentializing and totalizing principles they had once charged
modernism of.
Phenomenology's ramifications within architectural discourse are daunting in
scope. It exists both inside and outside of the academy, somewhere between publications,
academic genealogies, built projects, discursive practices, and personal friendshipso In
order to identify what gives coherence to this intellectual fonnation, this dissertation
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moves between intellectual history and social academic history. It follows the principal
lines of the architectural debates through which phenomenology made its appearances in
academic reality, and discusses them as a function of the broader historical circumstances
that drew the two disciplines into proximity against their multiple, and often a -
synchronous internal revisions.
The architectural trajectory of phenomenolo~yduring the 1970s appears to be
both the enabling element and the foundational rift between the worlds of theol)' and
practice in architectural thought. But the architectural invocations of phenomenology
were also part of a broader longstanding current that pitted the mind against feeling, on
account of the belief that it was inconsistent with wann emotions necessary to bring
"life" into architecture. During the 1970s, in the context of a renewed interest in
scholarly rigor and accountability, the successful invocation of phenomenology in
defense of this more general pre-existing anti-intellectualism gave rise to the architectural
anti-avant-garde, as I will call it. Using phenomenology as a badge of academic
credibility, this movement dumbed down architectural education in order to protect the
discipline's modernist ideology from the economic, political, and scholarly threats it
came to face during the Cold War. Thus, modem architecture preserved both its myths of
fa(tical alterity to culture, and of an essential origin to aesthetic creation, through a new
discourse of authenticity, which claimed the "purity" of feelings to be impervious to
modernity's alienating complexity. Posing as the antithesis of avant-garde attempts to
elevate the understanding of modernity through reason, the modem anti-avant-garde
walked hand in hand with the critics of modernism. The anti -avant-garde devised what
we now call a "phenomenological approach" to architecture, a fonn of anti-
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intellectualism premised on claims about the primacy and universality of corporeal
experience that relegated the intellect to a secondary status in the process of
understanding reality. This line of reasoning often degenerated into a simple demotion of
intellectual work on the grounds that it was "relative," and into attempts to de-
problematize the politics of practice by ridding it of theory. Paradoxically, out of these
efforts to unbind reflection from practice came a literature that had to disguise its
sophistication in order to remain credible. The aim of my dissertation is to give a
historical account of this discourse that will reveal the deep impact of its shallowness, as
well as the superficiality of its most profound arguments.
The architectural custom of identifying academicism w!m meaningless fonnalism,
and sensualism with the elan vital of engaged and creative practices, extends its roots
well into the nineteenth century, and is correlative with the origin of modem architecture.
As early as the 1880s, Heinrich Wolfflin (1864-1945), often credited as the father of
modern architectural history, regarded academe as a mental abstraction that, like reason,
impinged on "living reality.'7 Thus, he expunged scholarly conventions from his essays in
an effort to emulate the direct experience of art in writing. Between the world wars, Sir
Herbert Read (1893-1968), the British art critic and historian largely responsible for
introducing art in education as a fonn of psychological self-discovery, made the reaction
against abstraction in architecture correlative with a "new humanism" that promised to
"liberate" humankind from the cerebralism of functionalism. 1 Indeed, what at first glance
appears to be a force that aims to crack open the disciplinary limits of modern
architecture5 reveals itself under further scrutiny to act as a bonding agent that holds the
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discipline together. The constant calls for experiential transgressions of the discipline can
in fact be said to define the field of modem architecture according to the logic of various
syntheses between aesthetics and psychology. Most recent among these unions was that
created from the introduction of phenomenology within architectural discourse after
World War II, which gave a new lease on life to the ideology of a liberalizing self-
consciousness achieved through aesthetic experientialism. Yet, unlike previous syntheses,
this one claimed to be "post-modem," holding up certain works of architecture and
philosophy as creations of "emancipated" individuals, who had allegedly transcended all
the various crises of modernity. Contrary to this assertion, I will argue that the tenns on
which these works were celebrated, either as exemplifying pure creations of an essential
Self (individual or collective), or as paradigms of radical otherness to modern culture,
bespoke their modernist character and avant-gardist pretensions.
Method
In holding up immediate experience as a realm beyond discourse, Modern
architectural discourse hides behind its own creation. This would seem to make the
critical efforts of the intellectual historian almost worthless from the start. No matter
how many layers one pulls away, there will always be another discursive mask claiming
to make visible what is just beyond it. The ghost of pure experience is only perceivable
when draped with the sheet of discourse. Can one ever be convinced that there are no
ghosts? I have found Mark Jarzombek's critical historiography to be a useful method to
address this question. What I find special about it is that unlike the history of philosophy
(or any other history that I am aware of for that matter), critical historiography does not
I See Sir Herbert Edward Read, 'fA New Humanism," in The Architectural Revie»', n. 78 (October 1935)..
In his Art and Society, (London: Farber and Farber, t 936), Read went as far as to define modern art as the
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try to cover up the fact that it cannot answer the question from within or without the
structure of the disciplinary knov/ledge it seeks to historicize. It does not tty to read the
contours of the bed sheet to see how accurately it confonns to the shape of a "nonnal"
ghost, nor does it tl)' to lift the blanket to see if there is "something" underneath it.
Instead, it enters into the microscopic fibers of the cloth to understand how it is knitted
together. In other words, as opposed to looking at discourse from the outside, through the
window of disciplinary knowledge, it enters into the interlacing intellectual strands that
make up discourse and traces the various ways in which they have been knotted together
in history.
From this perspective, whether or not ghosts (or immediate experiences) exist is
the less important question. My dissertation does not (indeed, cannot) judge the veracity
of claims made about experience. Instead, following critical historiography, it considers
another set of questions valuable to the writing of history, such as: Why, and at what
points, did architecture and phenomenology require each other in order to uphold their
claims about the liberating power of aesthetic experience? How did each discipline
rearticulate its discourse to accommodate the other? What did architecture and
philosophy stand to gain or loose by investing themselves in a common discourse? These
questions can only be answered through a history that works within the intersections of
architecture and philosophy. Therefore, I endeavor to engage the discourse in its
hybridity, attempting to delve into it without disciplinary preconceptions about what
constitutes the historical "evidence" of the idea in question. In doing so, I find that the
articulation of ideas about liberating immediate experiences was not always limited to the
letters printed on books. It was not only intellectual, but also aesthetic. At times, some
"sensuous correlative, equal and opposite, to intellectual abstraction" (pp 273-4).
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believed it to be expressed directly thro~gh certain images, such as those found in
Christian Norberg-Schulz's carefully arranged photographic narratives, or those reveries
descrired by Gaston Bachelard as "poetic images." Others considered it to be self -evident
in the material appearance of certain buildings, a view shared by Kenneth Frampton with
regards to structural expression in architecture, and by Enzo Paci in relation to
contemporary interpretations of traditional structures. Still others found evidence of
emancipating experiences in the practices of certain architects and philosophers deemed
to be enlightened, which, as it turns out, Charles Moore and Martin Heidegger believed
themselves to be. Failing to fully substantiate their claims about experience, they flooded
the discourse with expressions that asserted, but could never demonstrate, to have
sunnounted modernity. In other words, what made these "things" (texts, images~ people,
etc.) into "relevant evidence" was their persistent employment as such by many people
when attempting to convince others of the existence of experiences prior to reflection.
This dissertation is therefore part "sociology of ideas" part intellectual history. By
default, it is a history of the academy, for it is in universities that both architects and
philosophers alike fonn and disseminate their worldviews.
These postwar intersections between phenomenology and architecture were made
possible by the workings of psychology within both disciplines during the frrst half of the
twentieth century. Jarzombek's The Psychologizing ofModernity (2000) has made
significant inroads in understanding how the discourse of liberating aesthetic experience
had become established by the 1930s as a foundational myth of modern architecture. To
expose this fabrication, Jarzombek had to go beyond a pure history of psychology, to
bring to light the repressed interdisciplinary nexus of texts, images, histories, theories,
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personalities, and truisms that supported it. The power of that discourse, argued
Jarzombek, came from the clarity of its promise (freedom through selfconsciousness)
and the ambiguity of its methods? which enabled the incorporation of psychology into
multiple Uhost" disciplines.. Contact with psychology had a double
prl..>gressive/conservative effect on modem art, architecture, and their history. On the one
hand, it allowed the avant-garde to challenge established disciplinary conventions by
holding them against the criterion of emancipation. Yet, on the other hand, it failed to
make explicit its own discursive protocols, producing instead a normalizing avant-
gardism that worked only to identify those aesthetic expressions that fitted accepted
standards of what "liberated egos" should produce. To support this, there emerged a new
type of self-confident history writing, which equated the "primariness" of the historian's
experience of art and architecture to a sign of the alleged "authenticity" of the works
themselves. Jarzombek critiqued that bond between historian, architecture, and architect
by making explicit what it concealed, namely, a set of assumptions about the liberating
potential of a psychologized self.
Critical Position
Also at stake in this dissertation, then, is the nature and fate of avant-gardism after
World War II. Mter Renato Poggioli's famous Teoria dell' arte d' avanguardia (The
Theory of the Avant-Garde, 1962. English translation, 1968), and Peter BUrger's
important Theorie der Avantgarde (Theory of the Avant-Garde, 1974. English
translation, 1984), a new interest in the historical avant-garde emerged among architects
who looked to movements like Russian Constructivism as the last confmnation of an
organic link between architects and progressive politics. Manfredo Tafuri pinpointed the
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schizophrenic character of the 1970s avant-garde revivals, tom between a nostalgia for all
essential culture and the anti-historical need to destroy it.2 Here the role of historians
cannot be overlooked, for it was the inner contradictions of modem historiography that
eventually tripped modernism up, and that gave postmodem thinking its first triumphs.
The difficulty is that the "postmodem" Iabel is still in contention between those that
wrote what is essentially a modem architectural history, and those that critiqued it. On
the fOffiter camp, historian/architects like Christian Norberg-Schulz, Kenneth Frampton,
and Charles Moore, attempted to cover over the fundamental ambiguity between
experience and cognition that is at the heart of the modern crisis of authenticity, insisting
that architecture was the path to wholesomeness. On the other side, critical historians
like Manfredo Tafuri, put that ambiguity at the center of their questioning, arguing that
attempts to cover it up were ideological, and that the task of history was to expose the
constitutive function of inauthenticity in modernity.3
These two approaches to the writing of history disputed the territory forsaken by
the modern avant-garde, namely that of raising the self-consciousness of society to
prepare it for a possible resolution to the crisis of modernity. Each block reacted
differently to their disenchantment with the failed promise of the avant-garde. The flTst
group (Rogers, Moore, Norberg-Schulz, Frampton, et.al.) assumed a modernist position,
which I will call the anti-avant-garde, claiming that they c;ould fulfill the promise of
2 Tafuri, Manfredo. HtEuropean Graffiti.' Five x Five =Twenty-five." In Oppositions, n. 5 (Summer 1976),
Translated by Victor Caliandro.
3 For a discussion ofTafuri's role in transforming the discipline of architecture see Joan Ockman.
"Postscript: Critical History and the Labors of Sisyphus," in Architecture, Criticism, Ideology, 00. Joan
Ockman, (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1985), and Paul Jay, "Critical Historicism and the
Discipline of Architecture," in Threshold: Journal of the School ofArchitecture, University ofIllinois at
Chicago, pp 28-34. For a critical analysis of the work ofTafuri (which provides a chapter-by-chapter
analysis of Theories and History ofCriticism, 1968) see Helene Lipstadt and Harvey Mendelsohn, ,
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unitYe They mirrored the avant-garde's aesthetic of intellectual ascension above the
cultural horizon4 with a new aesthetics of descent into the "roots" of culture. The second
group (Tafuri, Jarzombek, Wigley, et. al.) was properly postmodern on account of its
methods. It remained suspicious of any claims to unity, but nevertheless endeavored
towards raising self-awareness, mixing historiographical rigor with political and
philosophical watchfulness in attempts to discover new ways to achieve objective
knowledge.
The "anti-avant-garde" demoted all intellectualist pretensions as signs of false
avant-garde elitism, and chastised architects for dishonestly suggesting that they could in
any way "elevate" their modem aesthetics above the nonn of bourgeois mediocrity. For
them, the duty of historians was to make people see that avant-garde subjectivity was a
source of egoism and selfishness which led directly to the modem disbandment of
community, the hypostatization of the lonely consumer as a paradigm of citizenry, and to
the horrible tyranny of sameness ruling under industrial capitalism. To bypass what they
regarded as the irreversibly "alienated" subject, the anti-avant-garde discovered a new
anonymity in aesthetic creation, in which authenticity was coaxed out of "collectives,"
variously idealized as "participatory architecture," "traditional architecture," "rooted
architecture," or what Christopher Alexander would call "ego-less and timeless
arc:~:~Q:c;ture."The undergirding promise was that if architects could be "in touch" with
the collective, then their buildings would provide "richer" experiences than "banal"
modem structures. But the architect could not, by defmition, assume complete
"Philosophy, History, and Autobiography: Manfredo Tafuri and the "Unsurpassed Lesson" ofLe
Corbusier," in Assemblage, n. 22 (December 1993), pp 58-103.
4 I borrow "aesthetics of ascension" from Adnan Morshed who's insightful dissertation "'The Aviator's
(Re)Vision of the World: An Aesthetic of Ascension in Norman Bel Geddes's Futurama" (Ph.D. Diss.:
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authorship over the "communal" work. Having evacuated architects of responsibility for
their works, it fell upon these historians to provide evidence of the healing power they
projected upon buildings. But never able to find an individual that would attest to having
being cured of alienation by a building, these historians had to offer their own
subjectivity in example.
Anti-avant-garde historians had to devise ways to assert that the buildings they
selected in their histories could make people "feel" connected to history, community,
spirituality, and Self -i.e., they could in other words "cure" the splinterings of modernity.
Thus, they had to produce, through their books, the same aesthetic of liberated experience
that came to characterize the modem avant-garde's mystique of purity. Indeed, they
assumed the role of modem avant-garde artists, engaging in phe nomenology as one dips
the brush in paint, to add color to the canvas of their existing discourse. But the fluid
complexity of phenomenology dripped through architectural discourse in sometimes
unintended ways. Phenomenologists, especially in the United States, began second
guessing the aesthetics of architectural historians to gain control over architectural
discourse. Some philosophers, like Karsten Harries? even became architectural historians
of sorts, and others like Edward Casey attempted to re-align phenomenology with neo-
avant-garde architects like Peter Eisenman and Bemand Tschumi. And so, to trace the
intellectual lines that make up the architectural illustrations of emancipating immediate
experience, this dissertation enters into the history of phenomenology's unfolding ideas
from within its intersections with architectural discourse.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001) identifies the reliance of the avant-garde on a discourse of
aerial vision.
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To write a history of these anti-avant-garde historians is to necessarily write
against the grain of their work, for it was premised on their self-confident claim to see
beyond history, and past the complexities of modernity. I endeavor to bring to light the
contradictions they had to camouflage in order to project their modernist certainty in
dealing with aesthetic matters. Perhaps the most important contradiction was that to
express their liberation from modernity they had to abide by the canon of modem
architectural discourse, which since Wolffiin had equated the historian's ability to speak
the Truth with his ability to exhibit sufficient self-confidence to dispense with the nonns
of academicism and "freely experience" architecture.
Beginning with Tafuri in the 1970s, postmodem architectural historians have
attempted to critique these de-theorized histories and de-historicizcd theories of
architecture. In the United States, critical historians from Stanford Anderson and
Anthony Vidler, to Mark Wigley and Mark Jarzombek, have tried to satisfy the need for
self-knowledge by shifting the emphasis away from utopian dreams of overcoming the
complexities of modernity. Instead, they proposed a type of historiographical self-
awareness that moved in concentric circles around the paradoxes of modem life. They
tried to compensate for their inability to answer these contradictions by undertaking to
answer second order questions about the origin and career of these unresolved "blind
spots," as Tafuri liked to call them. In my mind, these types of projects contributed to
understanding by showing the relevance of certain "blind spots" to our contemporary
situation and to our present commitments. Understanding their logic helps us deal with
them, without trying to negate them. Just like when we come to accept our own mortality
our life rather than loosing meaning gains it, critical historiography comes to live with the
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incompleteness of modernity and post-modernity and can thus positively transfonn it. In
that way, it works towards the promise of enlightened freedom made by the modem
avant-garde, but remains weary of its own politics, assumptions, and objectivity.
My critique of the anti-avant-garde exposes the sites it constructed out of
intersections between architecture and phenomenology around an object for which there
is no documentation: experience prior to reflection. I work henneneutically around this
"blind spot" in order to understand the function of these constructions within postwar
architectural discourse. I identify four such sites of intersection, each of which serves as
the focus of a chapter. Yet, it would be misleading to think of them in isolation, give n
that they always appear interrelated in discourse, and that they help support each other.
My argument is that each of these constructions obscured its groundlessness in
order to appear as a stable framework within which to accumulate political, social,
economic, and aesthetic gains. In other words, they were ideological constructions used
as means of advancement by people. But their effectiveness on the cultural field came at
the price of a deadly weakness at their intellectual center. The Achilles' heel of the anti-
avant-garde was its claim that it could defeat modernism with a chimera for which it
could ultimately produce no evidence.
To see that weakness and to continue to ignore it, or even worst, to try to cover it
up, is for me to operate in bad faith. But the cover-up was, and continues to be,
enonnously successful in architecture. The anti-avant-garde, in its multiple disguises and
permutations within architectural culture, continues to act as a catch basin for all
disillusionment with modernism, while serving to prolong and even accentuate the crises
on which it feeds. In order to appear in the mantle of "resistance," it perpetuates t~le
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modem myths of an essential origin to aesthetic creation and of a radical alterity to
culture. To hide its complicity, the anti-avant-garde must resist all attempts either to
historicize it or to theorize it. Its defense mechanism is historiographical vagueness,
which remains hidden behind the cunning simplicity of its discourse. Although contacts
with phenomenology initially aided in sustaining this elusiveness, they eventually
exposed it, as the 1980s generation of scholars pushed the received understandings of
phenomenology through deconstruction.
On the surface, anti-avant-garde architects and historians paid lip service to
Husserl's dictum to "search for ultimate foundations." But unlike HusserI, who could
never conclude his search, or Heidegger who's questioning led him to the "groundless
abyss" of ontological difference, the anti-avant-garde architect/historian always came out
of his or her individual dig claiming to have "felt" the bedrock of existence. The problem
was one of corroboration. Just as some have come to believe in the image of the
backlight tunnel as proofof near death experiences, others believed in the image of the
hut as proof of "rooted" existence. Phenomenologists often contributed to these myths by
remaining at arms length of architectural discourse. They sometimes certified the
"authenticity" of certain architects with a wink and a nod, expecting to be paid back in
kind with a boost in popularity outside of philosophy. Other times however,
phenomenologists made legitimate attempts to engage the discourse of architecture,
where they left their indelible mark.
Content
In chapter 2, entitled "Emesto N. Rogers and Enzo Paci: Tradition as Life-
World," I discuss the role of Enzo Paci, the noted Italian philosopher, in bringing
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phenomenology to the heart of the postwar debates that took place during the 1950s in
and around the Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (ClAM). Paci helped
lift the modernist ban on non -modem architecture, by openly interrogating what he saw
as the self-imposed formal limits of modernism. By playing on the anxieties of postwar
architects who could no longer ignore the failure of modem architecture to renew either
society or itself, Paci persuaded architects that infusing its aesthetic forms with "the
living flux of experience" could revitalize modernism. The touchstone of this promise
was, of course, an always-inaccessible pre-reflexive experience. To cover this over, Paci
actively promoted the work of the Milanese architects Antonio Banfi, Ludovico
Belgiojoso, Enrico Peresutti, and Emesto Rogers (whose finn was known as the BBPR),
as examples of liberated egos in touch with the "life-world." Paci encouraged architects
to follow the example of the BBPR, and discouraged them from philosophical or
theoretical speculation, arguing that too much thought would "abstract" them from
"authentic" experience.
I argue that Paci's sponsorship of partial engagements with his philosophy reveals
not only a type of anti-intellectualism caught the folds of his thinking, but also the
tendentious nature of his proposition. He encouraged the instrumentalization of
phenomenology that would immediately take place under Rogers's pen, first in his
famous journal Casabella Continuita, then in the reports on education that circulated
through ClAM around the world. Rogers aestheticized Paci's "life-world" as "tradition,"
and prescribed the introduction of traditional styles in design as a way to re-connect the
avant-garde with the "collective." So long as architects towed the line of tradition, the
"authenticity" of their "feelings" was taken for granted. I contextualize the willingness of
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both Paci and Rogers to aestheticize and conceal the negative core of their discourse
within the context of the postwar reconstruction and its politics. For instance, I discuss
how the significance of the building industry to the postwar national economies forced
modem architects to have to compete with the mass appeal of popular architecture. Paci
and Rogers rose to the top of architectural culture because they assisted in fitting the old
modem ideology of progress to the new economic demands of the 1950s.
Chapter 3, entitled "Charles W. Moore: From Bachelard to the Poetic Image,"
discusses the development of the anti-avant-garde in the United States first through the
teachings of Rogers's business partner, Enrico Peresutti, and then through Peresutti's "the
family," an infonnal academic network established by his foremost student and leading
Postmodem architect, Charles Moore. The anti-avant-garde flourished under
McCarthyism, which was not just a communist witch-hunt but also a broader cultural
censorship of discordant voicesc "The family" dropped the modem avant-garde's social
revolutionary rhetoric, pledging instead that architecture, in caring for people's body,
could elevate their "soul." In essence, the anti-avant-garde capitulated to the McCarthyite
culture of consent, withdrawing architecture's claims to the political sphere, so as to
establish their hegemony in academia. McCarthyism had an inverse effect on
Phenomenology. The demand that philosophers "speak the truth" cast phenomenologists
to the margins of academe for their suspicions of objectivity. Phenomenologists like
Karsten Harries, who needed interdisciplinary assistance to get established within the
American academy, gave their support to the architectural anti-avant-garde, and
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contributed enonnously to the idea that architecture was spiritual nourishment "at least as
likely to edify as philosophy."s
The architectural reception of Gaston Bachelard towers over the multiple
interdisciplinary bridges made during the 1970s. Inspired by Bachelard's writings on
"poetic images" as "spontaneous commitments of the soul," Charles Moore and others
alleged that "images" were the spiritual fusion of people and architecture in "fulJ body"
pre-rational experiences. Moore's enonnously influential books defended the primacy of
a sensualist epistemology, purporting that one could know architecture "directly,"
"innocently," and without intellectual effort. I argue that these beliefs about
architecture's ability to transmit knowledge a-linguistically and universally were
equivalent to the fonnal universalism of earlier modernisms. It was an ideology that
facilitated the work of postmodem architects, who by the early 19808 could claim to
empathize with all "places," and thus legiti mate their emerging global practices.
I focus on the dissemination of this new cult of innocence through American
architectural education. With the help of phenomenology, the anti-avant-garde turned
architectural pedagogy into a journey of "retuming'9 to "original" child-like experiences.
One could tum to hundreds of educators who, like foot soldiers, carried that trope
forward. Along with John Hejduk, Christopher Alexander, and Earl Morsund, Dalibor
Vesley, professor of architecture at Cambridge University, invoked phenomenology as
the "hygiene of the modem mind.,,6 Anti-avant-gardists decried the 1970s
intellectualization of architecture as "rootless" abstraction, arguing that semiotics and
5 Karsten Harries, "Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture," in Perspecta: The Yale Architectural
Journal, v. 20, (1983), P 20.
6 Dalibor Vesely, "On the Relevance of Phenomenology," in Form; Being; Absence: Architecture and
Philosophy: Pratt Journal ofArchitecture, v. 2, (New York: Rizzoli International Press. t 988), p 59.
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linguistics missed the a-rational and sensual way in which, they believed, buildings
communicated. But, as critical historians began to emphasize scholarly accountability,
the anti-avant-garde had to pass off its experientialism as a "study" of the "living past." I
argue that the tum towards history ensnared the anti-avant-garde in a discursive tangle
from which it could no longer free itself with appeals to the alleged liberating power of
aesthetic experiences. By the 1980s poststructuralists could see that the anti-avant-
garde's '-freely exploratory" practice had come at the price of restricting a "freely
exploratory" theory, which might have exposed its politics.
In chapter 4, entitled "Christian Norberg-Schulz: The Genesis of Genius Loc; and
it fonnulation as Alethe;c Image," I concentrate on the career and work of Christian
Norberg-Schulz, the famed Norwegian architect and historian who is widely, albeit
erroneously, credited with first introducing phenomenology to architecture during the
1970s. Norberg-Schulz frrst came to architectural prominence with Intentions in
Architecture (1965), a staunch critique of modern "theory-free" approaches to design.
But by the 1980s, he had come to denounce theory as a "rootless abstraction" that severed
the architect's attunement to local building traditions and to the regi on's nature. Therein
lies the contradiction of his career. Indeed, I argue that Norberg-Schulz salvaged the
demise of ClAM functionalist ideology by refonnulating the claim that the "inner truth"
of architectural shapes could be disclosed immediately in visual perception. He remained
convinced that "authentic" buildings expressed their "inner function," but for him that
expressive function was dictated by nature, not man. His famous theory of Genius Loci
contended that nature itself called forth certain self-evident images of Truth, which he
termed aletheic images in reference to Heidegger's nomenclature for pre-reflexive
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experiences. For Norberg-Schulz, the aletheic image was so palpable in visual
experience, that he unproblematically conflated it with his own photographs of
landscapes and buildings, putting forth the illustrations of his books as evidence of its
existence.
I contextualize Norberg-Schulz's assertion that the authority of these images lies
uniquely in their ''truth content." Because of the tendency of the aletheic image to foil all
attempts at contesting its claims to Truth with its own totalizing immediacy, I have
attempted to de-stabilize its self-referentiality by tracing its indebtedness to historical
visual and textual discourses outside itself. Norberg-Schulz's theory of the aletheic
image, or Genius Loci, is said to have developed exclusively from his readings of Martin
Heidegger's henneneutic ontology. Contrary to this belief, I demonstrate the centrality of
postwar America's architectural discourse for its conception. Norberg-Schulz's thinkLllg
was shaped by his early involvement in ClAM under Siegfried Giedion, and then by his
experiences as a visiting professor at MIT in 1973, where he worked closely with Kevin
Lynch and Georgy Kepes, and where he began his serious SbJdy of Heidegger~ Norberg-
Schulz infused the American methods of urban and topographical analysis, with
Heidegger's notion that Truth could be immediately given in aletheic experiences. Thus,
he turned an open-ended set of analytical tools into a taxonomy of visual diagrams, which
he equated to transcendental essences. Norberg-Schulz's images vastly influenced
architectural education during the 1970s and 1980s. They were emulated in designs as
symbols of authenticity. Yet, the discourse on perception that Norberg-Schulz deployed
did not (and could not) provide evidence as to the aletheic images's claims to Truth.
30
Ultimately, the Image itself stood as its own evidence, grounding itself in its own
immediacy, and obscuring its discursive lineage.
Chapter 5, entitled "Kenneth Frampton: The Ideology of the Tectonic Aesthetic,"
examines Frampton's invocation of phenomenology in support of his theory of Critical
Regionalism. Frampton's influential theory premised the "critical" nature of an
architect's practice on his or her ability to aestheticize the collective pre-reflexive "v/ill to
make" of a "rooted" community (its morals, laws, social arrangements, and political
institutions). Following the tradition of British exceptionalism, Frampton wrote the
history of Modem architecture as an opposition between British and Continental ways of
thinking about architecture. On the one hand he presented Augustus Welby Pugin's as
the origin of a British inspired architecture "rooted" in culture and Myth, and on the other
hand he assigned the origin of avant-gardiste "alienating abstractions" in Jean Nicolas
Louis Durand, whom Frampton made exemplary of a universalizing, French rational
mind. Frampton extended the logic of this binary equation to encompass the struggle for
local identity before what he saw as the equalizing pressures of global capitalism.
Although 11e turned to Paul Riceour's henneneutic phenomenology as an explanation of
how two competing systems of legislating society could work towards reconciliation, he
obviated Ricoeur's fundamental description of communication as a reasoned process of
"explanation and understanding" of otherness. For Franlpton, what brought two people
together was not the recognition of each other's irreducible uniqueness, as in Ricoeur's
model, rather, he asserted that it was an ineffable reciprocity of feeling towards a
particular aesthetics of "making." What would otherwise be described as the affinity
created by Bourgeois taste, was, for Frampton, the shared mythic roots of a common
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culture. Hence, I argue that although Frampton demonized corporate and Fascist
architecture for "distorting culture," his thinking unreflexively advanced similar
falsifications.
Although every chapter hinges upon a single phenomenological re-articulation of
an architectural concept, there are some important distinctions between them. Different
cultural, geographical, temporal, and disciplinary contexts divide the first chapter from
the others. A full generation separates Emesto Rogers and Enzo Paci from the architects,
historians and philosophers discussed later. Their writings came in the immediate wake
of World War II, as a reaction to the failure of the partisans to bring about the complete
revolutionary transfonnation of society ala Marx. Rogers and Paci remained a reference
for those who would later argue the need to open Modernism to non -modernist
architecture, even by those who did not share their politics. Charles Moore claimed to be
a-political (or sometimes an American Democrat), Christian Norberg-Schulz was a
Norwegian conservative who loathed Marxists, and Kenneth Frampton is a British New
Leftist proud of his Marxism. Regardless of their politics, they were all part of the same
architectural discursive sphere, often meeting at conferences and round tables. Moreover,
they shared a common disillusionment with postwarmodemization, and collectively
turned to phenomenology as the "cure" to that disenchantment. Although their work
pretended to restore health to society it in fact only covered up the symptoms, and
prolonged the life of modem essentialist myths.
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ERNESTO N. ROGERS AND ENZO PACI:
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I. Introduction: Between Idealism and Realism
A. The relationship between Enzo Pacl and Ernesto Rogers
At a time when Italy'S aesthetic and philosophical disciplines seemed completely
under the spell of Benedetto Croce's (1866-1952) Idealism, it seemed rather implausible
that phenomenological thinking, although popular in France and Gennany, would ever
make inroads south of the Apennines. And yet, the multiple collaborations between
Emesto Rogers (1909-1969), a famed rationalist architect active from the 1930s to the
1960s, and Enzo Paci (1911-1976), a prominent phenomenological philosopher, were
central in real1iculating the nature of architectural thinking away from Croce. I Moreover,
their radical fonnulations about the need to JX>liticize, historize and socialize architecture
posed a real challenge to more conventional Modernisms. Although the demise of Croce
changed received understandings of the relationship between architecture's aesthetics and
its social function, the intellectual culture and major players that brought this cha.,ge
I It is unclear when and where Enzo Paci met Emesto Rogers, but what is certain is that, after World War
II, the two men were already very close friends. In a personal interview with Francesca Paci, Enzo Paci's
daughter, held in Milan on June 1st, 2000, Rogers, fled to Switzerland from 1943 to 1945, and according to
Francesca Paci (personal interview held in ~filan on June 1st , 2(00) Paci was sent to a concentration camp
in Poland.. Francesca Paci recalled that her father would spend long evenings at Rogers's house and vice
versa. The two men would show up together at each other's house unexpectedly for either lunch or dinner.
They would meet with other musicians and poets in Milan's piazzas and hold long discussions until late at
night.. The debates were quite heated sometimes. One night, Mrs. Paci remembered, the police arrested
them for public disturbance. They often met over meals at each other's home, traveled together, and
discussed the present state and possible future of Italian culture. Perhaps their common suffering and exile
during the Fascist period brought them together initially, but the reasons for their prolonged relationship
had clearly more to do with each of their common goal to help resolve the problems they identified in their
respective disciplines and in their common culture. Rogers found the philosophical tiller in Paci that would
help him finesse the direction of his intellectual research, and allow him to orient his international
magazine, Casabella Continuittl., with a precise criterion. Paci discovered in Rogers a high profile figure of
Italian architecture with an international audience. Casabella was, for Paci. a welcomed opportunity to
extend the cultural visibility of his phenomenology, to gain a strategic flanking position against the Idealist
front of Benedetto Croce. From the exchanges between Paci and Rogers resulted an ambiguous inter-
disciplinary reality. where aesthetic practices came to the service of philosophy and vice-versa.
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about have been largely overlooked. Emesto Rogers, for instance, was instrumental in
this paradigm shift. Nonetheless, his most important contributions to architectural culture
have remained largely in the shadows, especially in Anglo-American circles, where
critics from Reyner Banham to Kenneth Frampton have shaped his image into a
reactionary apologist of populist kitsch, and made him into an outcast from the very
Modernist canon he helped forge.
Rogers's involvement in the Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Modeme
(ClAM), and his parallel career in writing, deeply transfonned Modernist architectural
discourse, laying the ground work in the 1950s for the 1970s emergence of a variety of
Postmodemist aesthetics, such as Charles Moore ironic treatment of classical motifs, and
Christian Norberg-Schulz's methodical incorporation of natural landscapes as a source of
fonnal inspiration in design. The intellectual path that led Rogers to question the
modernist rejection of non-modem architecture is inseparable from Paci's
phenomenological project. Both Rogers and Paci were committed to interdiscipJinarity
and convinced that both mental and material labor were aspects of a more comprehensive
life-project that suffused intellect and matter 'Nithin an "original" experiential immediacy,
and out of which allegedly sprung the progressive ethical tendencies of social aIld
political commitment.
Rogers and Paci called upon architects to let their subjective egos and their
objective works "emerge" out of a uprimordial" realm of immediacy that Paci called
"life-world" and Rogers described as "tradition." For them, the belief tha t concepts were
different from materials, or vice versa, accounted for the loss of meaning and direction
that Modernism was experiencing in the postwar, as well as for architects' inability to
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control technology and to check the irrational dark side of enlightenment reason. The life-
world, Rogers and Paci thought, was a structure structuring the core of both subjectivity
and objectivity in history, a process of perpetual synthesis and disbandment upon which
the being of all materials and concepts rested. They correlated the "crisis of reason"
discussed by postwar intellectuals with a dismembennent of old fonns in the life-world,
and were earnestly convnnced that a New Reason and a New Architecture would emerge
in the next synthesis of the life-world.
The question of course was how the new synthesis would fonn itself in the
present, and if the agency of people could encourage or delay it. This was not a self-
evident process to most architects, so Rogers and Paci attempted to demonstrate it
through their own practices presenting their own work as "liberated" from both the
philosophical crisis of reason they identified with Croce, and the fonnal
"mummification" of Modem shapes into architectural styles, which they believed was at
work in functionalism.
B. The Phenomenological challenge to Idealism.
"Not since Goethe," stated Stuart Hughes speaking of Benedetto Croce, "had any
single individual dominated so completely the cultule of a major European country.,,2
From Antonio Gramsci's (1891-1937) political philosophy to Bruno Zevi's (1918-2000)
architectural history, Italy began its post-war intellectual life under the aegis of Croce.
He was editor of La Critica, an outspoken dissident against Fascism, a government
Minister, and a Senator. He was one of the initiators of Latin Marxist studies --although
he found Marx to be detenninistic, and therefore at odds with his own commitment to
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freedom. From his initial speculations on aesthetics, he would widen his scholarly work
to produce a systematic philosophy, the ptilosophy of spirit, whose principal tenets on
aesthetics were eventually embraced across cultural practices. His influence even
extended to the English speaking world through the acceptance of many of his theories by
R.G. Collingworth. By the late forties, however, it was clear that the experiences of the
war, and the series of structural changes of the period immediately following the war,
were beginning to break Croce's hegemony. With the end of the war came a greater
inter-dependence between European nations on all levels of culture, along with an
internationalist spirit which would bring other continental intellectual trends to Italy.
The end of the war also brought ;vith it a series of political accusations against
Croce, including a series of shocking revelations about his previous allegiance to the
Fascist regime, and about his later attempt to distance himself from Fascism by editing
the content of his early essays so as to manipulate their meaning. Critics like Chester
McArthur Destler depicted Croce as a nationalist that ridiculed pacifism, and that was
openly against democracy, humanitarianism, and socialism. His philosophy was seen as a
spring of proto-fascist ideology. For example, his Fiiiosofia della Practica (1908),
where he assimilated thought to action in order to explore the philosophical aspects of
will, action, and success, was read as a justification of the use of force in politics. In the
same vein, his espousal of Giambattista Vieo's (1668-1744)3 theory of power and the
state, and of the latter's notion or recurrent barbarism, was now understood as granting
philosophical dignity to the use of force to resolve public issues. Croce's crilics
2 H. Stuart Hughes~ Consciousness and Society (New York: 1958), p 201.
3 Giambattista Vico was an Italian philosopher who~smajor work, La Scienza Nuova (1725, The New
Science) attempted to bring together the systematic analytic methodology of the social sciences and history.
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emphasized that between 1914 and 1919, he reasserted the amorality of politics and
economics, and stressed that force alone was the basis of the state, of international law,
and of all other types of law and right. Moreover, they argued, even after the Matteotti
assassination by the Fascist regime, which Croce would later denounce, he gave
Mussolini his vote as senator in the ensuing motion ofconfidence. 4
In contrast to Croce, the spirit of commibnent left over from the war experience
boosted the popularity of "engaged" intellectuals, especially of those involved in the
Resistance Movement. This was the case of Jean Paul Sartre for instance, who was at this
time propelled to the level of cultural stardom.5 It was in this context that Robert
Caponigri, a minor philosopher and Croce scholar, assessed the state of Italian post war
philosophy to fmd the towering figure of Croce challenged by the rising presence of
French Existentialism.6 According to Caponigri, existentialism first entered Italy through
the attempts of Italian philosophers to "be fashionable" by joining the pan-European
Paris-born intellectual fad.? He argued that after this initial phase, Enzo Paci's
His goal was to create a single comprehensive science for the interpretation of humanity. Today, Vieo is
often credited as the founder of cultural anthropology.
4 see Chester McArthur Destler, "Benedetto Croce and Italian Fascism: A Note on Historical Reliability:t
published in The Journal ofModern History, n. 4, v. 24 (December 1952), pp 382-390~
Sartre's philosophy was central in shaping how many intellectuals of the postwar, including Enzo Paci
and Emesto Rogers, understood social commitment. World War II, and the subsequent liberation and the
reconstruction of France, had occasioned a change in Sartre's social philosophy. His previous conception
of individual freedoms conflicting in the social field yielded to the existentialist notion of a "pact of
freedoms." In this latter articulation our choosing our own freedom meant choosing freedom for all our
fellow beings. The liberation of human existence went from an escape into the world of beauty and art to a
form of commitment to the social cause of revolution in the interest of the least free members of society.
6 Caponigri also notes the presence of a third movement Actualism, a dissolving formation out of which
new trends are emerging such as Christian Spiritualism, and Neo-Scholasticism (a sort of Italian 'New
Criticism'). See A. Roben Caponigri, "Italian Philosophy, 1943-50," in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, n. 4, v. 11 (June 1951), pp 489-509.
7 As evidence of this, he argues that it is sufficient to note the fact that the existentialism of Kirkegaard, of
Nietzsche, and of Heidegger, had its roots in spiritual crises which left Italian culture untouched~ In
addition, French existentialism was similarly rooted in a historical experience which Italy did not share.
Moreover, one has to consider the fact that the new-idealistic movement governed Italian speculation for
the first half of the twentieth century. See A. Robert Caponigri 9 "Italian Philosophy, 1943-50;' in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, n. 4, v. 11 (June 1951)
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hybridizing philosophical m~thod could be counted as an "original" Italian development,
given that Paci had placed phenomenology inside the larger construct of Crocean
Idealism. 8 Caponigri credited Paci with superlative "speculative power" for trying to
establish a relationship between existentiaiism and the historicism of Italian Idealism. A
goal that Caponigri found ironical, given Croce's own criticisms of existentialism. "He
[Paci] is convinced that the problems most intimate to historicism can be solved by the
insights of existentialism, that historicism implies existentialistic premises, and that
making these explicit destroys, not historicism, but only its panlogistic fa~ade." 9
Despite Caponigri's astonishment, Paci continued to assert his view of
phenomenology as the necessary existential ground of idealism, and, by extension, of all
aspects of Italian culture previously under the spell of Croce. He thus confronted
idealism outside of philosophy proper, in (Jther areas of study. Paci flooded the journals
of other disciplines with his points of view, a tactic that afforded him a quick rise to
cultural prominence. In particular, he became actively involved Casabella Continuita,
the international architectural journal headed by Emesto Rogers.
The fact that Rogers welcomed Paci to his editorial board can in part be explained
in relation to the contemporary structural transfonnations of the Italian academy. The
architectural profession was being "intellectualized" in part by the closing of the Beaux
Arts academies and their integration with the university system. This brought about a
shift in recruiting strategies for architecture professors, whose value was now estimated
8 A. Robert Caponigri, "Italian Philosophy, 1943-50," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, o. 4,
v. 11 (June 1951), p 504.
9 Ibid. P 507.
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on the basis of their cultural production (i.e. books, articles).lo The members of the
Architectural academe found themselves having to compete for a readership that would
legitimize their institutional positions.
The new structure of architectural education in Italy would palpably change the
scope and ambition of architectural projects and publications. The editorial staff that
Rogers hired for Casabella Continuita soon succeeded in establishing the journal as
Italy's standard-bearer of the modem movement and its heritage. Rogers' pre-war
reputation as a socially responsible rationalist architect, or in the words of Reyner
Banham as "the hero-figure of European architecture in the late Forties and early
Fifties," I I gave the journal an almost instant credibility before a European audience
eager to rebuild the continent according to a loosely defined modem humanism.
The very real problem of reconstruction centered these debates on the relation of
Modem architecture to existing historical city centers. This put into question
Modernism's claim to be a break with history, and required a new analysis of the fonnal
language of Modernism, a new understanding of Modernism's dependence on the
tradition of enlightenment reason, and for a clarification of the social andcultural
responsibility of Modem architects. Paci and Rogers, met these challenges by attacking
Croce's philosophy, which they identified as the source of all of Modernism's false
10 Jean-Louis Cohen, La Coupure Entre Architectes et lntellectuels: Ou Les Enseignements de l'ltalophilie,
(Paris: L'Ecole d'architecture Paris-Villemin, 1984), p 130-131.
II "Without realizing what we were doing, we built up a mythical [Italian] architecture that we would like
to see in our own countries, and architecture of social responsibility -stemming, we believed, form such
political martyrs as Persico, Banfi, the younger Labo -and of formal architectonic purity-stemming from
Lingeri, Figini, Terragni. This architecture, socially and aesthetically acceptable to men of goodwill, we
saw embodied in the Milanese BBPR parnership, of which the first B was the martyred Banft, the terminal
R was Emesto Rogers, the hero-figure of European architecture in the late Forties and early Fifties."
Reyner Banham, "Neo-Liberty: The Italian Retreat from Mod~rn Architecture," in The Architectural
Review, n. 746 (March 1959), p 231.
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claims. Instead, they introduced phenomenology as a new way of thinking mut how
Modem architecture L.l1volved history. They provided a compelling analysis architectural
of fonn as the expression of Tradition, an empowering understanding of reason as
emerging through practice, and a persuasive ethics for an engaged architectural practice
that could give a sense of collective purpose to a war torn Europe.
II. Rogers and Pacl Politicize Postwar Architecture
A. The post war critique of Idealism's lack of political commitment
Croce's ascension to the pantheon of philosophy began with his work as a
historian of the city of Naples. His dissatisfaction with this field lead him to a closer
study of the nature of history, and in particular to the question of whether history was an
art or a science. This research ultimately lead him to his first ruminations on aesthetics
published as The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General,
now considered his most influential early work.
The connection ofThe Aesthetic (as it would come to be known) to the tradition
of Idealism, from Kant to Vico, is obvious. Croce began his systematic philosophy of the
mind, or Philosophy of Spirit, by distinguishing between the intuitive knowledge of
things in their particularity and the logical knowledge of general concepts. The
functioning of the mind was thus divided in two stages: The flTst aesthetic (or theoretical)
stage, and the second dependent logical (or practical) stage. In the first stage, Intuition,
which is he regarded as the mind's faculty of expression, grasped the otherwise inchoate
jumble of sensorial stimuli, and expressed them as a particular form, making the world
appear coherent to the perceiving subject. For Croce, this activity expressed the subject's
"categorical freedom." Croce proceeded to make art and intuition id enticai to each other,
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as fonus of aesthetic world making. Aesthetic activity was thus limited to expressive
acts, such as intuition and art, and was the pre-condition for any abstract conceptual
process. Only after the particular elements of the world had beell expressed into
understandable fonns could the subject use his or her conceptual or logical powers to
extract general principles from the particulars.
Intuition and reason were 'theoretical' powers, on which a person's 'practical'
powers were based. Croce divided this second practical stage into two more sub-stages:
the economic and the mornl. In the economic the subject tried to achieve what he or she
had fITst intuited, and in the moral stage he or she distinguished between what ought and
what ought not to be wanted. This is why, for Croce, aesthetic expression was, insofar as
it was pre-practical, also a-moral. l2 Morality was a choice between particular choices
that existed, and this meant that morality could not be present until aesthetic intuition has
done its work. Even though individuals could not help themselves from intuiting certain
aesthetic visions, like killing someone, they could refrain from putting them into practice.
That decision was, for Croce, a moral problem.
Although from 1925 to 1943 Croce had lead the intellectual resistance to Italian
Fascism, after the war he retreated to a relatively conservative and static political
position. The 19408' and 1950s' dernands for a greater degree of social responsibility
12 As a further corollary of his initial argument Croce concludes that there are no fundamental rules for the
creation of art. The argument that art and exp~-essionare fundamentally the same, apparently commits
Croce to the view that any expression is art, or that any object could be art. To prevent this, Croce
emphasizes human agency as a basis of judgment: Since art involves freely creative human exprefsion.
then it is, first, different from nature. Second, if art is expression, then what makes an object art, is not its
physicality, but its expressive content, or its ability to unify particulars into a coherent form. This last point
would become the extraordinarily influential view that a work of art is an "organic unity" -it is the origin,
for instance, of Bruno Zevi's "organic architecture," which stood less for an art that followed from a
"natura"" expression of architectural form and function (as in the American organic architecture of Frank
Lloyd Wright and Louis Sullivan), and more from a conception of the mind's behavior.
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made it difficult for intellectuals to accept a philosophy where morals were absent from
aesthetic fonns of expression. Paci and Rogers joined in the critique of Croce's inability
to incorporate the Fascist and Nazi experience into Itis historicist vision. Croce would
defend himself by claiming that the political content of his work was often missed. He
argued that because he aimed to affect the outcome of politics as a whole, he kept himself
from addressing the obviously political:
Do [my critics] believe that I was not engaged in politics when writing, for
example, my History of the Kingdom ofNaples, [a work] which would
never have been born without my political passion for the past and the
present? Do they think I would have behaved more usefully if I had
intruded among the politicians or [engaged in] the daily political chase? ...
In fact my book penetrates minds and souls and I see it continually
recalled... in the problems that concern Italian life and the conditions of
Southern Italy. And that is ... [the nature] of my best and most enduring
"political work.,,13
B. Pacl's engaged life-world vs.Crace's a-political aesthetics
Paci's critique of Croce's ethical claims regarding aesthetic expression came first
in the fonn of a corrective. In Esistenzialismo e Storicismo (Existentialism and
Historicism, 1950), Paci argued that Croce's theory of spirit could be accepted as more or
less nonnative. However, its conception of the origin of spirit was flawed. It was true,
as Croce claimed in relation to the second practical stage of the nind, that utility was at
the moment of emergence of spirit, but for Paci, phenomenological description proved
that spirit rested on an existentialist basis: the dawn of the spirit lied where there was no
spirit, where there was only tile pure possibility of existence. Paci went deeper into the
concept of utility to prove his point. He charged that Croce's notion of spirit was an
attempt to absorb utility into the absolute principle of self-consciousness without
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recognizing that utility lied beyond it. Utility, argued Paci, was an existential and a-
rational element that had to stand at the basis of every construction, not just those of the
mind.14 In this way, Paci inserted his phenomenology inside Idealism, not as a simple
part of Croce's philosophy, but as its necessary foundation.
Paci would later work out his differences with Croce in the pages of Casabella
presenting architects with a new possibility for a moral and ethical practice. As in his
earlier critique of Croce's Spirit, Paci returned to the principle of utility to argue his case.
The definition, in early Crocean aesthetics, of art as an autonomous, theoretical,
disinterested and a-moral fonn of the spirit put into question whether architecture, with
its necessarily utilitarian aspects, was an art or not. Later in life Croce had argued that
there was not such a radical break between the aesthetic and the utilitarian, but that issues
of function were actually contained in aesthetic foons. Paci however, found that both of
Croce's positions sublimated function into the expressive fonn. For Paci, utility was a
constitutive part of a pre-existing mondo della vita, which he defmed as Husserl's
Lebenswelt (life-world). Therefore, any authentically new creation, being by definition
called forth by the life-world itself through life-projects, would necessarily have utility at
its origin. Even though Croce created an antithesis where what was functionally
utilitarian could not be art, and what was beautiful could not be functional, Paci argued
that Croce's conception of the beautiful contained the utilitarian and the ethical in
sublimated fonn, because utility was at the origin of any project. It was an existential
pre-existence. Croce's misunderstanding of utility made him ignore the socia -historical
relationships which structured and limited all aesthetic fonns, and which gave art its
13 Benedetto Croce as quoted in Edmund E. Jacobitti, "Hegemony Before Gramsci: The Case of Benedetto
Croce," in Journal ofModern History, o. I, v. 52 (March 1980), p 82.
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moral content. Croce's original sin, to continue with Paci's objections, was to separate
vital experience from aesthetic fonn. Fonn could only be born out of "authentic" lived
engagements with the life-world:
If by experience that is historical, natural, social, and so on, one
understands the contained [contenuto] and by style rhythm and measure,
which give a spatial constructive architectural order to experience, one
understands fonn, the result is that a new fonn, which has an authentic
aesthetic value, can only be born if one returns to the contained and in that
we are immersed making new and living experience. 15
Thus, Paci offered the possibility of a moral architectural practice at the price of
each architect's commitment to a new kind life project: immediacy in experience. Paci's
structure of lived experience described the relationship between nature and aesthetic
forms, or between the life-world and architecture. To live authentically meant to engage
in life projects, to create the new, according to the structure of the "life-world." The
problem, cautioned Paci, was that people were used to experiencing the world through
concepts. They constructed a-priori abstractions, or pre-judices, that kept them from
living on the plane of immediacy. They therefore failed to fully experience the life-
world. Because they fell short of living "authentically," they missed the world in its full
complexity and inter-connectedness.
Paci encouraged architects to suspend abstract scientific prejudices and to fully
experience the life-world as "the living flux of experience."16 He argued strongly against
theorizing experience, and proposed instead that it should simply be ~'felt." Theory, for
14 Enzo Paci, Esistenzialismo e Storicismo, (Milano: Mondadori, 1950), pp 32-75.
15 USe per esperienza storica, naturale, sociale, e cos} via, si intende it contenuto e se per stile ritmo e
misura, che danno un ordine spaziale costruttivo architettonico alIa esperienza, si intende laforma. ne
risulta che una nuova foma, che abbia un valore estetico autentico, PUQ nascere soltanto se si ritoma al
contenuto e in esso cisi immerge facendone nuova e viva esperienza." My translation. Enzo Paci, ,
"L'architettura e iI mondo della vita," in Casabella Continuitd, n. 217 (December 1957), p 54.
16 Ibid~ P 54.
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Paci, was an abstraction that removed the architect from the life-world. This anti-theory
position would become a central theme in the career of phenomenology within
architectural discourse. In the 1970s, Charles Moore, Christian Norberg-Schulz, and
Kenneth Frampton would return to the claim that theory "alienated" architects from
reality in order to oppose the neo-avant-garde's claims about architecture's autonomy.
The touchstone of all this opposition, of this anti-avant-gardism, was a belief in the
emancipating power of immediate aesthetic experiences. For these anti-avant-garde
architects and historians, "true" experiences of tile world would reveal the avant-garde's
"defonnation" of culture, and open people to an "authentic" knowledge of reality. By
demoting theory, they empowered prnctice as the source of a much-desired new
epistemology. The paradoxical downside of these interdisciplinary intellectual exchanges
between architecture and philosophy was that this contributed to the de -intellectualization
of architectural practice. Indeed, Paci discouraged architects from getting too involved in
philosophy. Architects, he argued, didn't need refined philosophical logic to objectively
know how to live authentically. They required only their subjective experiences. The
task of the architect, insisted Paci, wasjust to be experientially open to the life-world, for
then the life-world itself would call the architect's life-work in the direction of the new.
For Paci, the life-world itself tended towards forms, not only spiritual fonns as in Croce's
thinking, but also towards corporeal, natural fonns.
The separation of the architect's subjective experience from the analytic methods
and academic rigor of philosophy encouraged, needles to say, the projection of Selfhood
as the ultimate ground for validation, and the camouflaging of a wanting objectivity
behind the veils of artistic confidence. The ideological nature of Paci's notion of
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experience became evident in his directives to architects. Valid new architectural styles,
Paci declared, could only be born out of the architect's union with the life-world, out of
the moment where individuals could no longer distinguish themselves from the world:
It is nature itself, it is the materials themselves, the geographical and social
environment of which we make lived experience, in which we identify
ourselves, which move in us and which we move in that nature and that
environment, until the point where we no longer know if it is nature and
history that search for new fonns in us, or if it is us who search the fonns
towards which nature and history seem to be directed. 17
c. The life-world as origin of Objectivity and Subjectivity
Paci's understanding of the life-world was deeply indebted to the work of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). Paci often turned to the French phenomenologist
to describe it as an ambiguous realm, where neither subject nor object was clearly
identifiable, and where both were intimately fused. As early as 1933, Merleau-Ponty's
interpretation of new developments in the empirical field of the behavioral sciences, and
more particularly in the field of Gennan Gestalt psychology, lead him to attempt an
approach to the phenomena different from the strict division between subject and
object. 18 He brought phenomenology to psychology with a tactic not dissimilar to Paci's
approach to architecture. He claimed that phenomenology did not invade psychology,
17 Ibid. p 54.
18 Merleau-Ponty was interested in liberating empirical psychology from the tradition of "critical"
philosophy in the early stages of his career. In a short grant proposal submitted to the Caisse National des
Sciences on April 8 1933,entitled "Study Project on the Nature of Perception (1933):' Merleau-Ponty
makes a case for a new study of perception in light of the new findings of "Gestalt''t psychology and
neurology. The experiments conducted in these two different fields suggest for him that th~ body is indeed
productive of sense-knowledges that are independent of intellectual elaborations. This puts into question
the tradition of critical philosophy, which from Descartes to Kant conceived of sensations as an incoherent
set of data which is mediated and structured by the mind. His essay from the following year, entitled 'lhe
Nature of Perception," (1934) rejects psychology's Kantian or neo-Kantian epistenlology (and by extension
also of Croce's epistemology), whereby perceiving consists of applying intellectual interpretations to
sensations or sensory signs. He objects to the description of perception either as a "brute given" or a
"construction," and argues that both empiricism and critical philosophy construct facts for which there is no
tangible evidence in perception.
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but revitalized it: "It is a matter of renewing psychology on its own terrain," he wrote, "of
bringing to life the methods proper to it by analyses which fix the fundamental essences
such as 'representation,' 'memory,' etc.,,19
Merleau-Ponty was interested in Gestalt psychology because it supposed a radical
break with previous theories of perception and therefore implied a new theory of
knowledge. He believed that the experiments of Gestalt psychology invalidated the
Kantian paradigm that perception depended on the intellectual capacity of memory,
knowledge, and judgment to organize a chaotic ensemble of multi pIe sensorial inputs.
Instead Gestalt posited that the body spontaneously organized the perceptual field into
wholes containing "supposed" elements, and v/hich were contained within larger wholes.
Influenced by Gestalt psychology, Merleau-Ponty argued that the recogrtition of fonn did
not exclusively depend on the imposition of concepts themselves onto the material world;
''there is no matter without fonn: there are only organizations, more or less stable, more
or less articulated.,,2o For him, objects did not stand out because of their "meaning," but
because they possessed special structures which made them identifiable as "figures"
against a "ground.,,21 By the same token, he maintained that space "is not the occasion of
a judgment, but the cause of a neural process of which we know only the conscious
19 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Study Project on the Nature of Perception (1933)," in Merleau-Ponty:
Perception, Structure, Language, 00.. John Sallis, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), 7-8 ..
20 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Nature of Perception (1934)," in Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure,
Language, 00.. John Sallis, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), P 13.
21 It is important to note two things at this point: first, Merleau-Ponty's structural mode of thinking does not
refer to structures as first principles. Second. presence is not at the center of his theory of perception ..
Merleau-Ponty integrates the Gestalt structure vertically into non-causal superstructures, resulting in a
vertical structural composition of specific strata of phenomena and behavior, which itself is based on a
structural genesis. Thus, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the real appears as a description of structures.
Structure itself is a fundamental reality because, for anything to appear, it must differentiate itself from its
context. Structure is degree and direction of differentiation in experience.. Thus, figure and ground embody
a "primordial difference" which structures the experiential world. The formation of sense is a continual
structuring, or transformation ..
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outcome, in the fonn of an impression of depth.,,22 All this suggested, for Merleau-
Ponty, that the Kantian distinction between the world of things and an immanent
consciousness needed to 1le revisited.
During the mid 1930s, Merleau-Ponty studied Edmund Husserl's
phenomenological method in search for alternative models for understanding objectivity
and subjectivity. In Husserl's intentionality of consciousness he found an entirely new
philosophy of perception, "a theory of knowledge absolutely distinct from that of Critical
thought," because it did not rely on a parallelism between internal and external worlds,
between the conceptual and the material, as the basis for its epistemology. But
reconciling Gestalt psychology with Husserl's phenomenology was not easy. Husserl had
criticized Gestalt as a theory of pre-given wholes which repeats atomism on a higher
level. To counter this claim, Merleau-Ponty argued that the foonation of the Gestalt
themselves concerned the organization of both internal and external worlds. As such,
Merleau-Ponty though that it disclosed the functioning of Husser)'s life-world
[Lebenswelt].23
A Gestalt, argued Merleau-Ponty, was a "structure of structures" that extended
physiologically into the anatomical structures of the brain, creating an internal horizontal
relation between specific milieus (or worlds) and corresponding (bodily) behaviors.
Merleau-Ponty was interested in the Gestalt because he thought trlat it foiled attempts to
make it into something either purely subjective or objective. Thus, the Gestalt provided
an insight into a dimension of immediacy, that had structure and fonn, meaning and
22 Maurice Merteau-Ponty, ''The Nature of Perception (1934)," in Merteau-Ponty: Perception, Structure,
Language, 00. John Sallis, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), p 15.
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sense, but that was prior to either subjectivity or objectivity. Therefore, for Merleau-
Ponty, structure and fonn were neither subjective not subjective, neither things nor ideas.
They emerged in the life-world, which he viewed as a process of self-organization of
experiential, linguistic and actional fields that was independent of preexisting princ iples,
and was prior to individual events and separate elements.24
With La Structure du Comportement (1942) Merleau-Ponty subjected the concept
of immediacy to a radical reinterpretation by claiming that the meaning, the structure, and
the spontaneous arrangements of parts, all lied at the origin of experience. He established
the identity of internal and external worlds in the experience of Gestalten. Because the
Gestalt did not appeal to a-priori reason to explain itself (Le. showing itself was identical
with articulating itself), Merleau-Ponty concluded that rationality and subjectivity arose
within experience itself. He identified the fonnation of the Gestalt with the spontaneous
structuring of an experiential field where the "I" appeared, under certain conditions, and
never in full control of the process.
If with his concept of the immedz3tely experientiable life-world, Merleau-Ponty
had put into question the existence of a centering consciousness so dear to the tradition of
metaphysics, then, thought Paci, the life-world, radically understood in tenns of
structures and Gestalts, also undennined Croce's idealism (where phenomena found their
23 To construct this new understanding of the Life-world.. Merleau-Ponty had to move away from the
phenomenology of Edmund Hussert, whose work had initially turned Merleau-Ponty to phenomenology.
Husserl never really gave credit to these new sciences. He only spoke of them to criticize them.
24 This idea of the Life-world has been criticized for not completely resolving Husserl'8 descriptinn. It can
be said that Merleau-Ponty concretizes Husserrl's "Logos of the aesthetic world" and shifts the
transcendental dimension to a pre-egological region. See, for example Bernhard Waldenfels, "Perception
and Structure in Merleau-Ponty," in Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure, Language, 00. John Sallis,
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), pp 21-38.
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culmination in a pure presence for a consciousness which \vas present to itself).25 Thus,
Paci used the notion of life-world to mount his attack of Croce in the pages of Casabella
Continuita, and to offer the promise of a renewed architectural practice. If architects
could only shed Idealism, and gain access to the structure of the life-world, then, he
argued, a new architecture would emerge in "natural hannony" with both the
environment and humanity. The problem for architects of course, was that access to the
life-world came at the price of abandoning reasoned analysis, and suspending critical
inquiry into the methods employed in the quest for authentic experience.
Paci's writings picked up the language of contemporary architectural
conversations about how to reconcile the pressing needs of expanding populations and
the limited environmental resources of the world. Since the ClAM vm on ''The Core of
The City" held in Hoddesdon (1951), modem architects had been debating ways to
rethink functionalism in terms of a more complete understanding of the material and
emotional needs of individuals. Paci's understanding of the life-world allowed Emesto
Rogers to distinguish himself from other senior participants at the congress. Even the
title of his address, 'The Heart: Human Problems of Cities," bespoke his belief in a realm
of existence, prior to subjectivity and objectivity, within which the common fonns of
humanity and world disbanded and re-synthesized in the course ofhistol)'. The task of
the architect, he argued echoing Paci, was to give expression to the new synthesis of
modernism, which he saw coalescing in the aftennath of the collapse of functionalism's
ideals. To feel the new synthesis, architects had to "take in" the full reality of the life-
world, and this, he argued could be done by looking "inside" and "feeling" how the life -
25 By questioning subjective consciousness, Merleau-Ponty risked sacrificing individual agency. He tried to
address this problem in his last, unfinished work, Le Visible et L'invisible.
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world emerged within. Rogers thought that his experientialist ''functional method" was
at the "root of our creative process," and could therefore be worked by any architect
anywhere, regardless of culture and education. It resolved the contradictions faced by
ClAM as it sought to preserve its ideology of universality in a world political context
marked by the divisions of national wars of independence, and Cold War politics:
In ClAM, our responsibilities for town planning now extend from one
extreme of the globe to the other, from cultural stratification to the historic
present, each distinct and often contradictory. [... ]
In spite of differing cultural and economic conditions, everyone can profit
to a certain extent by technical progress in order to embrace the widest
horizon of experience; but the sources of artistic expression always remain
to be found within the depths of each of us. 26
FIG: Conversation between senior members and student
members at ClAM 8. From left: Unidentified Student,
Maekawa, Rogers, Sert, and unidentified student. From
ClAM 8, The Heart of the City: Towards a Humanization
of Urban Life, ed. J. Tyrwhltt, J.L. Sert, E.N. Rogers,
(New York: Pellegrini and Cudahy, 1952), p 37.
Rogers was respected among the young generation of architects attending ClAM
for willingness to engage in dialogue with junior members.v' His commitment to
26 Emesto N. Rogers, "The Heart: Human Problem of Cities," inC/AM 8, The Heart of the City: Towards a
Humanization of Urban Life, ed. J. Tyrwhitt, J.L. Sert, E.N. Rogers, (New York: Pellegrini and Cudahy,
1952), 70-72.
27 I learned this from Vittorio Gregotti, who belonged to the generation immediately following Rogers's,
and who worked with Rogers as part of the editorial board of Casabella in the 1960s, during an interview I
conducted in Milan, Italy, on June 30 2000. Parts of that interview were published as "Interview with
Vittorio Gregotti: The Role of Phenomenology in the Formation ofthe Italian Neo-Avant-Garde," in
Thresholds, n. 21 (Fall 2(00), pp 40-46.
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education led him to be a part of the Commission on education at ClAM VIII, where he
successfully furthered his agenda to combine empirical research with "more unprejudiced
adventures of fancy. ,,28 Rogers believed that international architecture had to be
"personified in the individuality of the artists and characterizes itself in local genius." 29
These words would later echo in the writings on Genius Loci of Christian Norberg-
Schulz, a young student of Siegfried Giedion who was present at the meetings as
representative of the Norwegian ClAM youth group, and who would later tum to
Heidegger's phenomenology in search for the key to achieving the type of "authentic"
experience required by Rogers of good architects.3o The belief in the ability of local
genius to give character to "universal" architecture made an impact in the younger
generation, which began to split from the old modernist guard of Le Corbusier, and
become concerned with issues of identity, scale, and meaning. Paci's writings about
humanity and world in terms of the life-world, were aimed at encouraging this new
generation to break away from the modernist canon and search for new kinds of
architectural practices that would release the creative potential that he felt was locked in
the structures of the life-world. By 1953, ClAM IX's attempted to widen its scope under
the theme of "Habitat" to incorporate some of the youth groups's concerns about how to
best design the environment for human society. But the seed of dissent had been planted.
After the congress, Alison and Peter Smithson, Jacob Bakema, Aldo van Eyck, and other
28 Ernesto N. Rogers. "The Heart: Human Problem of Cities," inC/AM 8, The Heart of the City: TO'K'ards a
Humanization ofUrban Life. 00. J. Tyrwhitt, J.L. Sert, E.N. Rogers, (New York: Pellegrini and Cudahy,
1952), p 71.
29 Ibid. P 71.
30 Norberg-Schulz published some of the proceedings from ClAM in his publication TEAM. He was
particularly interested in the views of the commission on education at ClAM VIII, which he published as
Walter Gropius, Emesto N. Rogers, C. van Eesteren, S. Gideon, Serge Chermayeff, Jaqueline Tyrwhitt. ,
"C~\18, Commission 3: Report on Architectural Education," in TEAM: Collaboration ofYoung
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young members rejected the mechanized functionalism of ClAM's Athens Charter and
emphasized instead the primacy of human experience as the basis for urban planning.
These young ClAM groups rejected Rogers, who had done so much to further
their position, as part of the old guard. His "betrayal" of the Modernist canon9 as Reyner
Banham would charge, also earned Rogers the denunciation of his own generation.
Feeling akin to the revision of Modernism being carried out by emerging architects,
Rogers attempted to continue the project of ClAM. He joined Jacob Bakema, Alfred
Roth, John Voelcker, and Andre Wogensky in a committee to plan the next ClAM XI
meeting at Otterlo in 1959. But Rogers was isolated in his belief that the synthesis of
local and universal building methods was a modernist project, for which modern
architects were responsible. Only 43 participants attended ClAM XI. Most of the leaders
of the 'old guard', including Le Corbusier, Siegfried Giedion, Walter Gropius, Jose Luis
Sert and J. Tyrwhitt, were conspicuously absent. And yet, their bedrock modernist belief
that the avant-garde architect had to break free from the strictures of the present in order
to move society forward, was sustained precisely in Rogers's emancipating
experientialism, which posited that architects could liberate themselves from the
conventions of modernism by reaching into their innennost depths and "feeling" the life-
world.
D. Paci's life-world as Roger's Tradition
Paci and Rogers understood culture as an expression of the life-world. Therefore,
every moral engagement with cultural activities (such as architecture) required, first and
foremost, a correct experience of the life-world. Rogers shared Paci's conviction that an
Architects and Artists, n. 2 (February 1952), ed. Christian Norberg-Schulz and E. Neuenschwander, (Oslo:
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architect's ability to engage culture politically and morally rested on his or her capacity to
fully grasp the life-world. The revision of Modernism required, for them, the ability of
the young generations to understand the need to re-think subjectivity and objectivity in
terms of the life-world. Having in a sense given up hope on their own generation, both
men became deeply committed to the education of young architects. Rogers presided
over CIAM'[; commission for education, and Paci mentored young architects -such as
Vittorio Gregotti (b. 1927)- at the university.
Rogers translated "life-world" into "tradition," a word that fit more smoothly into
the discourse of architecture. Rogers's Casabella editorials (written between 1953 and
1964) are best described as a relentless attempt to redefine the architectural meaning of
"tradition." If the present world was th~ compounded result of accumulating
interpretations of historical presents, he argued, the present material world in a sense
"contained" history. For Rogers, tradition was the intersection of that material-histllry
with human activity as tradition, a sphere that, like Paci's life-world, preceded both
subjectivity and objectivity. Thus, no object or person was simply a static thing. The
identity of every-thing was de-stabilized by history, which revealed all entities as
processes of change. Short of ascribing a progressivist fe/os to tradition, Rogers argued
that it "tended" towards new expressions of itself. This arg'~_nent led him to assert that
the postwar reconstruction had to respond to the evolving demands of tradition, and not
just to the subjective fantasies of Modem architecture.
For Rogers, then, the task ahead of the new generation of architects was clear: to
give fonnal expression to the present tendencies of tradition in order to contribute to the
Printed at Statens hAndverks, and distributed by Christian Norberg-Schulz, 1952).
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evolution of world history. Rogers thought that by attending to needs of tradition to
resolve itself in ever-new fonnations, vchitects would be acting out their ethical
commitment to both the material and the conceptual worlds. New architecturnl fonns,
Rogers insisted, were "responsible" only when they interpreted the past (as contained in
the present) and projected it onto the future. This kind of responsibility required that the
architect help create new fonns by working from within tradition. To work within
tradition meant that architects could not remain exclusively concerned with either
materials or ideas. The}' had to reach deeper and discover the plane of experiential
immediacy that was tradition. Rogers felt that architects could achieve this by limiting
their design interpretations to place specific building fonos, by literally "using" the
materials that were already "there'" and thinking "through them." In order to participate in
tradition, Rogers concluded, architecture had to be built. By building, architects could
participate in the continuous historical reshaping of the world. This, for Rogers, was
"true" progress. To ignore history or building, the conceptual or the material, was to fall
into the myth that the present existed outside of the past-present-future tradition-
continuum:
By drawing the greatest possible energy from everything surrounditg us,
we ~avor the creative process of our works which, far from negatively
conditioning those [works1already present, reinforce them, for we are
building a bridge between tf~;~ past and the future. The future partly
depends on us, just as we partly depend on the past: tradition is this
perpetual flow and to be modern means to feel oneself consciously a part,
an active part 1 of this process. Those who do not feel in this way are not
fully responsible "moden." artists and might simply be defined
"contemporary", which means that it belongs to our age only in the
56
chronoloyical sense, without having sensed and expressed its deepest
content.3
E. Tradition as ethical cultural progr~~ ~s
To give expression to tradition was, following Rogers, to help move the wheels of
progress. He understood traditional practices and modem technologies as the dialectical
poles in the equation of "cultural" progress.32 The true emancipation of society, he
argued, could not take place just through technological advance. Both poles had to move
forth in history. Thus, the responsibility of architects to tradition, expressed their
commitment to the progressive evolution, not just of Modernism, but of humanity.
Rogers extended his analysis of progress to deliver one of his strongest criti cal
blows to the Modem movement. In his eyes, the "crisis' of rationalism was the result of
a misguided conflation of architecture with science mId technology that overlooked
tradition. The crisis, he argued, was not a function of the collapse of the democratic
conceptions that had allegedly stood as the ideological scaffolding of rationalism --
rationalism's success under fascism attested to this fact. 33 Rather, Modernism ~s crisis
was the result of its break with tradition.
Rogers considered that this break with tradition was not an ontological trait of
Modernism. Rather, it was the result of a premature economic success that encouraged
technological development over research into production and life. This tendency now
threatened the very existence of Modernism. In the absence of history, Modernism had
degenerated into a fonnalism and routine professionali.sm devoid of political content ..
31 My translation from Ernesto Nathan Rogers, nTradizione e ;\rtualita nel disegno." inZodiac, n. i ( 1957),
~ 272. See also the general discussion of Tradition in pp 95 -102, 247-251, 269-274.
2 Ezio Bonfanti and Marco Porta, Citta, Museo e Achitettura: II Gruppo BBPR nella cult14ra
architettonica ita/iana 1932-1970, (Firenze: Vallechi. 1973)~ pp 82-83.
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Rogers argued that the possibility of progress resided in a historically aware architecture
that moved forward together with society and culture. Architecture could not claim to
free the people alone; to do so would be to idealistically sidestep tradition. Only when the
people were delivered from oppression could they develop an architecture expressive of a
free society.
With his phenomenological revision of the concept of tradition, Roger's offered
an alternative to collective involvement in aesthetic expression. "Culture," he afftrnled,
was the union of the historical, the social, and the technical. "Our European history, if it
is to continue its evolution progressively, must aim to transfonn all policy into culture
and to base its actions on the necessity of this culture." 34 Rogers thus premised the ethical
responsibility of Modem architecture upon each architect's commitment not to other
individuals, but to culture and tradition.
Enzo Paci's reinterpretation of Marx through phenomenology, added the critique
of bourgeois culture to Roger's notion of cultural progress. Paci returned to Husserl's
subjective concreteness of lived experience (as a force opposing the abstract objectivity
and reified knowledge of the sciences) and combined it with Marx's critique of the
abstract and reified social exchanges resulting from capitalist fonns of production. The
result was an equation where the sum of science, technology, and the division of labor
were equally destnJctive to the proper individuation of the subject. Paci argued for a
return to a non-alienated subject, a subject that could "found" the scientific praxis
destined to alienate him or her. The dominant theme in Paci's union of Cfusserl and Marx
33 For a defense of this position see GuiJio Carlo Argan would have it in his article on uMarcel Breuern
34 Emesto N. Rogers t "The Phenomenology of European Architecture," in A New Europe, ed. Stephen R.
Graubard, (Boston: HoughtC'n Mifflin Company, 1964), p 438.
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was the refusal of the universe of science and technology, and the reaffinnation of
philosophy as capable of generating a univocal sense of the world. 35
In contrast to Paci, Rogers did not discard science and technology wholesale, they
too had to be integrated into new fonn. Architecture could only give new meaningful
sense to the world by incorporating and transfonning all aspects of reality. In one of his
later editorials entitled "Appunti suI Fenomeno Architettonico" [Notes on the
Architectural Phenomenon] Rogers attempted a more complete rendering of what he
meant by architecture's ability to give sense to the world. 36 Architecture, he wrote, was a
''tendency'' towards historical unity of all the elements that constituted it, namely: the
designer's intentions, the cultural and socio-political historical climate in which he or she
operated, the architectural object, and the society that used the object. Architecture
existed between subject and object as both and neither. For Rogers, this expanded field
of architecture had the capacity to synthesize the dialectically opposed forces of science
and technology, with their tendency towards specialization and individuation, and art,
with its tendency towards collectivity, creating "true cultural progress." But this could
only be achieved if everyone lived self-consciously as "totally free" and "totally social"
individuals. Tacitly evoking Sartre's notion of political commitment expressed through
action, Rogers described synthesis as the only "authentic" architectural action. By
expressing its own synthetic essence, architecture became the vehicle necessary for a
self-conscious, and therefore free society. It served as the interface uniting two opposing
35 Salvatore Veca. uFilosofia Italiana e Marxismi Eterodossi," in Filosofia Itali&l1a e Fiiosofie Straniere nel
Dopoguerra. 00. Pietro Rossi and C2rlo Augusto Viano, (?: SocietA Editrice II Mulino, 1991 ).~ P 295
36 Emesto N. Rogers, "Appunti Sui Fenomeno Architettonico. 11," in Casabella Continuita. n. 266 (August
1962), pp 1-3.
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forces "one centrifugal that will go from each individual to all the others, and the other
centripetal that from all the others should go to the singular." 37
Rogers' article struck against the founding myths of modernism's social contract
by shifting the possibility of immediate identification between subject and object from
the social to the individual. In modem times, he argued, the immediate identity between
architectural and social fonns is no longer available, possible, or even desirable since it
led too easily to totalitarian impositions. In clear reference to the later fascist life of
Italian rationalism, Rogers eannarked the experience of the war as a turning point in
tradition. Appealing to Sartre's existentialism, he argued that the only alternative left
was individual self-consciousness, and a commitment to the social expressed through
action. If each individual developed himself as a member and a reflection of his or her
collectivity, then he or she would at the same time open him or herself towards the
collective 'other' and it would in tum be open to him.
Rogers believed that a new type of architectural design experience, one in which
the architect surrendered to the demands of tradition, could provide the kind of social
cohesion needed for cultural progress. Rogers shifted intentionality out of both subject
and object and into the middle realm of tradition (or life-world). He turned architecture
inio the medium necessary for achieving a collective self-consciousness, a common
identity. Thus, collective emancipation came at the price of a new impotence in critical
interpretation. To be responsible, the architect had to withhold from imposing his own
ego against the flow of tradition:
37 Ernesto N. Rogers, "Appunti SuI Fenomeno Architettonicoo 11," in Casabella Continu;to. n. 266 (August
1962), P 2.
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In architectural action, as in political and social instances, egocentric
individualism can only lead to disintegration and it is therefore necessary that
personal forces instead of closing themselves in, as self-exaltation or
exhibitionism, flow into the personality of the work. [...] It is evident that the
personality of the work and the personality of the artist are symmetrical
definitions of a same reality, but I think it convenient to insist on the different
accentuation, because the result is undoubtedly conditioned by the differing
intentionality with which it is addressed from the start. 38
III. Spontaneous collectivity
A. Theorizing Tradition as the experiential union of Individual and
collective
Art, architecture and nature were for Rogers expressions of the same
phenomenon: tradition. As such, the responsibility of the architect extended beyond mere
buildings to the entire territory or landscape. Therefore, both architecture and the
environment had to be cared for by hwnanity and made to serve the needs of tradition as
they evolved in time. Roger's tradition as life-world gained impetus as a way to address
the problems associated with postwar reconstruction. In light of the mass migrations of
low-income workers, the Milanese architectural profession was called to achieve a new
hannony between the rising population and the existing landscape. In the pages of
Casabella, Rogers beckoned Italian architects to open themselves up to tradition, and to
let it guide the transfonnation of the real. Otherwise, he cautioned, Italians would fail to
express the true dimensions of their present, and therefore would tum into a spiritually
bankrupt nation.39
38 My translation from Emesto N. Rogers. "Appunti SuI Fenomeno Architettonico. Itt' in Casabella
Continuitd9 n. 266 (August 1962), P 2.
39 Emesto N. Rogers, "Homo Additus Naturae," in Casabella Continuitd, n. 283 (January 1964). pp 2-3.
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Fig: The members of the BBPR group In their Milan studio. From left to
right Ludovlco Belglo)oso, Enrico Peresuttl, Ernesto Rogers, and Antonio
Banfl. From Ezlo Bonfanti and Marco Porta, eltts, Musso e Achltettura: II
Gruppo BBPR nella cultura archltettonlca Italiana 1932-1970, (Flrenze:
Vallechl, 1973), p Iv.
By appending "Continuita" to the title of Casabella Rogers highlighted the
philosophical problem of the new, and gave it a phenomenological twist. Historians to
date have chosen to discuss the new title of the magazine as invoking the extension of the
pre-war rationalist project, which Rogers and his business partners Antonio Banfi,
Ludovico Belgiojoso, and Enrico Peresutti (who were know as the BBPR group) had
helped forge. This is in part true, but what becomes clear from Rogers regular editorials,
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and from his buildings, is that by "continuita" he meant something far more expansive
and profound than mere allegiance to a stylistic movement. He was taking a philosophical
stance on how architects should relate to the existing and to history, that was on the one
hand, self-consciously at odds with Croce, and on the other hand, decisively privy to
Paci's conception of how history is "authentically lived" in the plane of the life-world.
The 1950s debate over the relation of architecture to history was in part a new
fonnulation of an earlier conflict between Roman and Milanese architects over the
lessons of vernacular or "spontaneous" architecture. The exhibition of photographs on
rural Italian architecture that Giuseppe Pagano, Rogers's antecessor as director of
Caabella, put on view at the 1936 Milan Trienale set the initial positions of the debate.40
While the Milanese saw the photographs as a lesson in rationality, the Romans read them
as a way to advance totally detenninate fonnal techniques.. 41 After the war, Rogers
rekindled the debate with new tenninology, but his audience was no longer limited to
Italy. The second half of the 20th century witnessed a veritable explosion of interest in the
study of vernacular architecture, which would challenge the assumptions of a field
dominated by Gennany since the 1850s. The wholesale revision of dates through
40 In 1929 and 1930 Eduardo Persico and Giuseppe Pagano assumed the positions of director and editor-in-
chief of Casabella respectively. Their objective was to help advance a resolutely modem Italian
architecture. To this end they keept a close look on every European progressive tendency. From the start
L~asabellawas a forum open to both built projects and intellectual efforts. Architects such as Persico were
published next to historians such as Giulio Carlo Argan and Lionello Venturi, or the writer Carlo Levi.
Persico and Pagano's stewardship also made the magazine into the main venue for the dissemination of
Italian Rationalism, as initiated by the 1926 nlanifesto of the famous Gruppo 7 -which was formed in 1926
by seven students from the Scuola Superiore di Architettura del Politecnico in Milan, including Giuseppe
Terragni, Guido Frette, Ubaldo Castagnoli, Sebastiano Larco, Carlo Enrico Rava, Luigi Figini and Gino
PollinL In addition to Casabel/a, the international importance of rationalism was also due to the Gruppo 7"s
exhibitions (Stuttgart, Werkbund exhibition of 1927, and Rome, MJ.A.R. 1928), competitions, and
writings. See Vittorio Gregotti, New Directions in Italian Architecture, (New York: George Braziller,
1968), pp 13-16. When the BBPR group was founded in Milan in 1932, they presented a joint written
introduction referring to their support of the Gruppo 7's manifesto and of the Modem movement.
41 Jean-Louis Cohen, La Coupure Entre Architectes et lntellectue/s: Ou us Enseignements de I'ltalophi/ie..
(Paris: L'Ecole d'architecture Paris-Villemin, 1984), p 114.
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dendrochronology put into question the early work of Georg Landau, whose reading of
Gennanic house types as expressions of folk culture, set the pattern for his many
successors in Gennany, Austria and Switzerland. Groups and societies sprung up. The
Gennan Arbeitskreisfur Hausforschung (1950) and the British Vernacular Architecture
Group (1954, publishing since 1970 the only international journal on the subject,
Vernacular Architecture) were followed in the USA by the Vernacular Architecture
Forum (1979). Rogers brought this new interest on the vernacular to bear on the Modem
tradition, and challenged architects to take command of this more extensive field of
building practice. By 1964 the relevance of the vernacular to the Modem tradition was so
accepted that New York's Museum of Modern Art, would fmally give a green light to
Bernard Rudofsky's exhibition of photographs "Architecture Without Architects.,,42
Pagano's "Spontaneous architecture" of the 1930s became a part of Rogers' more
expansive 1950s conceptual ensemble called tradition, which encompassed all the
physical and conceptual materials present in the physical world, and was supposed to
detennine how people experienced them. Tradition was a sort of middle realm, this side
of the subject object split, which gave temporal coherence to objective reality, and to
subjective and collective experience. Rogers accused Unational-popular" architects, who
claimed to return to the roots of the vernacular, of being fonnaiists and of mummifying
tradition. They failed to grasp that tradition was not just a series of historical fonns.
Tradition, contended Rogers, had two components: The first was Uvertica)" and "static,"
attached to places and to their internal coherence; the second was what he called
"circular" and "dynamic," connecting all phenomena through human exchange. Because
42 See the exhibition catalogue Bernard Rudofsky, Architecture Mithout Architects: A Short Introduction to
Non-Pedegreed Architecture, (New York: Museum of Modem Art, distibuted by Doubleday, c1965).
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new populists architects only copied the fonnal vocabulary of the vernacular, charged
Rogers, they failed to renew it by integrating it into the evolving total history through the
selective mediation of culture. Rogers argued for a Pacian "synthesis" of meanings and
fonns guided by tradition: a force-field with one vector emanating from the "people" and
another returning to them.
Rogers proposed the synthesis of tradition in contradistinction to Croce's a-moral
aesthetics, which were defended at the time by architectural historians such as Bruno
Zevi and others. Rogers made it clear that this kind of aesthetic practice was all about
politics and ethics. The architect had a "mora)" responsibility to tradition. Only through
tradition could he or she be simultaneously committed to the collective subjectivity of
"the people," to objective reality, and to his or her own subjective interpretations. The
task of the architect was to synthesize tradition, or the life-world, to capture the Truth of
his or her lived history.43
B. Existentialist underpinnings to the notion of Tradition as
collectivity
The appeal of Rogers' theory of architectural experience as collective
consciousness can be best understood against the background of Sartre's popular
existentialism, which emphasized the immediacy of bodily experience as the source of
one's consciousness of the collective.44 In the years immediately following World War
43 Emesto N. Rogers, "Le Responsabilita Verso La Tradizione~'1 in Casabella Continuita~ n. 202 (August-
September 1954), p 1-3.
44 Manfredo Tafuri, a member of the generation following Rogers', would later speculate that post-war
architects too easily contlated knowledge with action in their search for alternative epistemologies that
could help culture move beyond the crisis of reason. He contends that because of their self-imposed ethics
of social responsibility they colluded theory and practice failing to see their dialectical relationship. Tafuri
holds Heidegger accountable for what he views as an epistemological fallacy. Thus, Tafuri flattens the
early dialogue of architectural discourse with phenomenology under the shadow of Heidegger, and casts it
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II, Sartre's philosophy was a breath of fresh air for those architects looking to trdllscend
what appeared at the time as the bankrupt tradition of enlightenment reason. In L'Etre et
Ie neant (1943) Sartre emphasized the activistic features of human existence based on the
free nature of consciousness, which he also referred to as the "for-itself." The "for-itself'
was not an Idealist consciousness of pure presence, for which all of reality appears
unifonnly, it was a consciousness that was deeply bound up in the world, and which did
not entirely define human beings. The absolute freedom and responsibility of
consciousness was, according to Sartre, the foundation of human existence, and each
individual's being was ultimately derived from his of her bodily action. Unlike Martin
Heidegger, Sartre's reworking of Husser)'~phenomenology gave a great deal of attention
to how bodily experience made an individual's "for-itself' encounter its own self and that
of others, thus entering into a conflict among incompatible freedoms. 45 Through this
in terms that would only become current twenty years later (Le. as the search for architecture's being).
1 afuri is right in pointing out that the war experience conditions the response of architects to the reality
they encounter after 1945, but the figure around which they rally is Sartre, not Heidegger. See Manfredo
Tafuri, History ofItalian Architecture: 1944-85, trans. Jessica Levine, (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1989),pr 1-11.
Although Heidegger and Sanre owe much to Husserl's phenomenology, it is necessary to point out that
both were original thinkers who contested Husserl's philosophy and moved phenomenology in their own
unique directions. In the case of Heidegger" differences with Husserl are worked out in various places, but
most poignantly in his discussion of Realism and Idealism in section 43, Dasein, Wor/dhood, and Reality,
in Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers,
1962), pp 244- 256. Heidegger studied Logische Untersuchungen independently since 1909., hoping for a
chance to work directly with Husserl. By the time he met Husser) however, he had already completed his
studies in Freiburg, had been admitted to the faculty as a Privatdozent, and was an accomplished scholar in
his own right. Nonetheless, his attraction to Husserl was mutual. The older scholar" having just arrived at
Freiburg, was looking for new students and colleagues to work with. Moreover, Hussert's recent tum
towards the more idealistic form of phenomenology expressed in his Jdeen had left him practically isolated.
In 1922 Husserl invited Heidegger to collaborate with him on an article on phenomenology for the
Encyclopaedia Britannica. It is clear from the successive drafts that in the course of these years Heidegger
moved away from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Their collaboration extended until 1927 when
Husserl concluded (in a letter to Roman Ingarden dated December 26, 1927) that Heidegger had failed to
grasp the meaning of the phenolnenological reduction. Husserl remained erroneously convinced that he
could educate Heidegger, and in fact ~ubmitted his name to the university of Freiburg as his only qualified
successor. After 1960 Heidegger took a renewed interest in phenomenology, and went as far as to conclude
his private seminar (conducted in his house in Freiburg-lahringen in J973) with the claim that his
Utautological" thinking came closer to the original sense of phenomenology than Husserl's transcendental
phenomenology.
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drama of incompatibility, a new being emerged in Sartre's philosophy: the "for-others,"
whose being was a function of action.
Action, then, was the root of collectivity. Through action each individual could
discover and experience otherness. But not every action was conducive to the opening of
each human towards the other. Only committed action lead to fonns of collective
Sartre put forth different objections to Husserl in the course of his career. Raymond Aron, fellow studert at
the ecole norma/e introduced Sartre to Husserl in 1932. Like Heidegger, Sartre was interested in
transcending the opposition between idealism and realism, and to affirm, at the same time, the sovereignty
of consciousness. Sartre credited Husserl's idea of the intentionality of consciousness with the capacity of
purging consciousness from the encroachment of the world. This, for Sartre, was not yet a full fledged re -
conciliation of subjective freedom and objective thingness but it opened the possibili ty of escape from the
conflation of matter and consciousness. The encounter with Husserl marked a turning point for Sartre, and
yielded works like La Nausee (1938), and L'Etre et el neanl (1943). Specifically, Husserl's transcendental
reduction showed Sartre that the ego was constituted by the acts of free consciousness, that the imagination
was irreducible to any kind of perception which might enmesh it in the world of causality, and that the
magic of the emotions was not a fatal threat to subjective fre edom, but rather the subject's own willful
doing, for which he or she was fully responsible.
Although Sartre embraced the above mentioned aspects of Husserl philosophy he was also critical of
Husserl. For instance, Sartre's disqualified phenomenology as foundation to existential ontology. In "La
Transcendance de l'ega" (Recherches Philosophiques9 1936) Sartre critiqued Husserl's conception of the
pure ego in an attempt to improve Husserl 's fundamental conception of phenomenology, and to free it from
"unnecessary encumbrances." In L'EIre el Ie neant (Par~:,: Editions Gallimard, 1943). Sartre claimed that
Husserl failed to carry out his original conception of phenomenology because:
1) His Berkeleyan idealism interpreted Being and the transcendent objects of intentional
consciousness as non-real (pp 24.28)
2) Husserl succumbed to "pure immanentism" by not escaping the "thing-illusion"
3) Husserl remained at the level of functional description which encased him in a mere account of
appearances as such and makes him incapable of moving into "existential dialectics. n
4) Husserl was a ·'phenomenalist" (phenomeniste) rather than a phenomenologist.
5) Husserl gave & caricature of genuine transcendence, which according to Sartre should pass beyond
consciousness into a world and beyond the immediate present into a past and future.
6) Like Kant, Husserl fell into solipsism by introducing the hypothesis of the transcendental subject.
7) Husserl did not take sufficient account of refractoriness (coefficient d'adversite) in our immediate
experience.
8) Husserl mistakenly thought that an eidetic phenomenology of essences could lay hold of freedom.
For Sartre on the other hand. freedom was identified with consciousness and with an existence that
was at the root of all human essence.
In "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi" (Societe Francaise de philosophie. June 2. 1947) Sartre
claimed that although Husserl provided an exhaustive description of consciousness. he never asked the
question of the being of consciousness, nor of the being of the world. Husserl never returned from the
epoche to the world.
Sartre also critiqued Heidegger. He accused Heidegger of bad faith because, although he claimed to go
beyond idealism, he ended up in a pseudo-idealism, and because he limited the ability to experience an
other's conscious act to the notion of death. Sartre also critiqued Heidegger for 1) having eliminated
Descartes and Husserl's consciousness from Dasein, 2) for grounding the concept of 'nothing' on the
experience of anxiety rather than on the negative element in human spontaneity., 3) for the insufficiency of
his hermeneutic descriptions which passed over the fact that man was not only a being with a
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solidarity. In Critique de La raison dialectique (1969) Sartre described the transition from
the individual to the collective through a non -empirical phenomenological analysis of
praxis, which concluded that only a-priori and apodictic experience could lead to
committed action. Because apodictic experience was tightly bound to the world of
history Sartre argued that it contained the world's necessity and universality. Therefore,
it could not degenerate into a Husserlian pure consciousness. Through this fonn of
immediate experience, explained Sartre, the dialectics of necessity entered the very
structure of individuals, beginning with their material needs. Thus, it was at the level of
this very special kind of experience, at the level of necessity and utility, that the bond
between individual and collective was first made.46
Sartre's apodictic experience of the world of history had obvious echoes in
Rogers' emphasis on the authentic experience of tradition. For Rogers, tradition was a
life-world that contained world history, that structured the existing, and that projected
itself into the new as it re-structured itself. In light of Sartre, it is not difficult to see
Rogers' insistence that architecture be "connected't' to tradition as a call for an "engaged"
architectural practice. Rogers wanted to innervate architecture with world history in
order to make architecture a vehicle for apodictic experience that would guide humanity,
following Sartre's logic, towards universality and collectivity.
comprehension of being. but a being whose projects produced ontic changes in the world, 4) for his
Ereoccupation with death as man·s only authentic project.
6 Sartre claimed that a new "critical dialectical reason" emerged out of apodictic experience and stood
against Marx·s "dogmatic dialectics." He rejected the metaphysics of dialectical materialism while
accepting Marx' s conception of the class struggle.
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c. Rogers's Tradition In practice: social housing as collectivity
Understood from the perspective of the post war socio-economic climate it is easy
to see how Rogers' theories acquired such popularity. They appealed to the very real
need to rebuild a sense of collectivity into a social fabric torn by war (especially in Italy
where World War n exacerbated existing class differences), and to legitimate
architectural practice politically. Rogers' discussions of architecture as a condenser of
collectivity were particularly popular in relation to social housing. It was through his
pronouncements on this topic that Rogers first entered the heated European architectural
and urban planning debates of the 1950s. Here, Rogers came head to head with the some
of the young disillusioned members of ClAM, who after the eighth meeting at
Hoddesdon (1951), had broken away with the "old guard" and founded the loose
association of like minded emerging architects known as Team X. Some of the English
members of this society were especially opposed to Rogers, in particular Alison and Peter
Smithson, who were also members of the British Independent Group with architectural
historian Reyner Banham.47 Like Rogers, the Smithsons were concerned with how the
new could be inserted into the old. However, they did not share Roger's understanding of
architecture as being structured and structuring a historically unfolding tradition. In their
eyes, people's "patterns of use" and "networks of sings" made up the structure of the
existing and they should not be disrupted by the new. Their reasoning was closer to the
47 The Independent Group was founded in 1952 within the London Institute of Contemporary Art (leA)
and included architect Alison Smithson (1928-94), architect Peter Smithson (b. 1923), architectural
historian Reyner Banham (1922-88), artist Eduardo Paolozzi (b. 1924). and the an critic Lawrence Alloway
among others.
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emerging structuralism of linguistics and the social sciences, than to Rogers'
interpretation ofphenomenology.48
The Smithsons' read Rogers' emphasis on tradition as the very mummification of
fonn that Rogers opposed. In tum, Rogers identified the Smithsons with the type of
uncommitted relation with the real that they repudiated. For Rogers~.theIndependent
Group stood for a type of anns length relation to the life-world, which translated into a
regressive reluctance to engage and transfoon the existing aging fabric. Rogers believed
that architecture's synthesis of tradition was the condition of possibility for the existence
of collectivity. For the Smithsons on the other hand, collectivity preceded architecture,
and stood threatened by new construction.
48 In asserting that the Smithsons did not share Rogers·s understanding cf phenomenology, I am going
against the claims of Sarah Williams Goldhagen that Sartre's existentialism was foundational to the
Smithson's understanding of how peop:e should become more self-conscious of reality. Her claim that
Sartre's existentialism had suffused itself so much within the British cultural milieu that the Smithsons
(even though they never read Sartre) had just learned it by osmosis from Dubuffet, is not tenable. The
tradition of British empiricism, or even the contemporary theories of '~ownscape"urban design
promulgated by the Architectural RevieKl in those days placed a similar emphasis on experiential
awareness, and were far more current than Sanre in the architectural circles of the day. Goldhagen's
analysis risks making everything under the sun appear as existentialisrrt. See Sarah Williams Goldha gen..
"Freedom's Domiciles: Three Projects by Alison and Peter Smithson," in Anxious Modernisnls:
Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture. 00. Sarah Williams Golhagen and Rejean Legault..
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) pp 75-96. For a more complete account of the Smithsons's intellectual
debts see Annit Pedret's "The Collaborations of the Smithsons with the Independent Group and the
Emergence of Team 10,H in Tra guerra e pace: societd, cultura e architettura nel secondo dopoguerra. 00.
Patrizia Bonfiazio. Sergio Pace. Michela Rosso and Paolo Scrivano (Milan: Franco Angeli. 1998).. pp 242-
250, and "ClAM and the Emergence of Team 10 Thinking, 1945 - t959" (Ph.D. diss.• Massachusetts
Institute of Te.chnology, 2001), pp i 37-139.
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Fig: Elevation and view of the Borgo San sergio quarter In Trieste,
designed by Ernesto Rogers (within the BBPR studio) In Collaboration with
A. Badalottl In 1955. From Ezlo Bonfanti and Marco Porta, e/tts, Museo e
Achltettura: II Gruppo BBPR nella cultura archltettonlca Itallana 1932-1970,
(Flrenze: Vallechl, 1973), illustration # 243.
The international controversy regarding Rogers' views on tradition only helped
the success of Rogers' finn in the sector of social housing during the period immediately
following the war. Between 1943 and 1963, the BBPR studio designed fourte en low-
income housing districts in the periphery of major metropolitan centers to accommodate
the massive numbers of poor workers fleeing the hardships of the rural areas, and give
new homes to waves of immigrants from Eastern Europe.V In the Borgo San Sergio
Quarter (Trieste, 1955), which Rogers designed single handedly, we fmd a concrete
49 These projects include: Project of houses in wood for war victims, 1943, unbuilt; workers' housing
quarter in Via Alcuino in Milan, for the Societa Generale Immobiliare, 1945; urban planning of the INA-
Casa quarter of Cesate in Milan, 1951 (the BBPR also designed some of the housing blocks and the school;
Low income housing for INA-Casa in Albizzate, 1953; Low income housing for INA-Casa in the towns of
Baggio, Casorate Sempione, Gambolo, Gazzada Schianno, Pinerolo Po, and Sedriano, 1953; Low income
housing quarter in the Borgo San Sergio for the workers of EPIT industrial zone, 1955; Steel workers
housing quarter in Sesto S. Giovanni, Milan, 1957; Steel workers housing quarter called "La loggetta,"
Napoli, 1957; Workers housing quarter called "Moriggia" in Gallarate, 1957; Low -cost housing quarter
called "Gratosoglio" for 20.000 inhabitants, Via Missaglia, Milan, 1963. For descriptions of each project,
see Ezio Bonfanti and Marco Porta, Citta, Museo e Achitettura: Il Gruppo BBPR nella cultura
architettonica italiana 1932-1970, (Firenze: Vallechi, 1973).
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example how Rogers interpreted tradition in architecture. Rogers claimed the project
gave 'coherence' to the collectivity of workers because it was a unitary synthesis of the
Italian "civic, economic, and living traditions." Although the buildings did not offer
direct references to regional architectural elements of the past, Rogers argued that the
relationship of all the elements in the composition to one another followed a traditional
Italian settling pattern:
''The essential inspiration of tllis complex is founded on the contemporary
interpretation of the Italian tradition that at the heart of cities has always
given -and must continue to give- particular expression where the social,
ethical, cultural, and spiritual contents of the community have their
concrete manifestation in the aesthetic and practical tenns of the buildings
which represent them. [..] Thus are established three urban-architectural
nuclei: The square of the church, the square of the cinema-theater
(assembly hall) with cafe and bar, and the square of the administration and
the market. ,,50
The experience of tradition through architecture was opposed, for Rogers, to
solutions that emphasized fonnal mimesis such as, for instance, the famous Tiburtino
Quarter (Rome, 1950) of Ludovico Quaroni and Mario Ridolfi (executed with the help of
Carlo Aymonino, Mario Fiorentino, and Carlo Melograni). The Tiburtino Quarter
proposed a ration~l orthogonal disposition of dense blocks together with architectural
references to the rural vernacular. Rogers considered the Tiburtino project to be an
exemplary "'mummification" of tradition.
~o "L'ispirazione essenziale si questa insieme efondata sulrinterpretazione attuale della tradizione italiana
che al cuore delle cittA ha sempre datto -e deve continuare a daT6-particolare espressione oode i contenuti
sociali. etici, culturali e spirituali della communita abbiano la loro concreta manifestazione nei tennini
estetici e pratici degli edifici che Ii rappresentano. [... ] COSt si stabiliscono tre nuclei urbanistico-
architettonici: la piazza della chiesa, la piazza del cin ema-teatro (sala di reunioni) con cam e botteghe, la
piazza dell'amministrazione e del mercato." My translation. Emesto Rogers as quoted in: Ibid. p A72.
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Fig: Site plan of the TlburtJno quarter designed by Ludovlco Quaronl and
athena In Rome, 1850. From Manfredo Tafurl, LlltJevlco Qusronl II /0
svlluppo dfIIl'IItchlt.tlura modems in flails, (Milano,: Edlzionl dl Comunlti,
1884). p 127.
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Fig: View of the Tlburtlno quarter designed by Ludovlco Quaronl and
others In Rome, 1950. From Manfredo Tafurl, Ludovlco Quaronl e 10
svlluppo de/l'archltettura moderna In /tal/a, (Milano,: Edlzlonl dl ComunltS,
1964), p 128.
Itmust be noted that Rogers's opinion has prevailed in architectural criticism to
date, albeit as a result of different analyses. As early as 1964 Manfredo Tafuri, saw
Quaroni's attempt to create a new architectural language, recognizable by the displaced
rural masses, as a derisive pandering to vernacular tradition. For Tafuri, Quaroni
belonged to a series of bourgeois architects seeking to sugar coat the bitter pill of
modernity." Later, Tafuri would extend his condemnation to all architect-intellectuals
claiming commitment with the masses. 52 In 1968, Vittorio Gregotti accused Quaroni and
51 Manfredo Tafuri, Ludovico Quaroni e 10 sviluppo dell'architettura moderna in Italia, (Milano.: Edizioni
di Comunita, 1964), pp 90-100.
52 "Once these intellectuals had defined their positions, they became politically committed in the manner of
Sartre; they chose to identify the destiny of their technique and language with that of classes that had
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Ridolfi's attempt to relate !o the popular language of architecture of trying to "preserve
the social structure and underdevelopment.,,53 For Gregotti, only Rogers's refusal to
separate theory from practice, and his conception of history as an unfolding dialogue
between the artist and the already, was a form of progressive protest against the narro\v
mindedness of the profession.54 Closer to the present, Jean-Louis Cohen, writing in 1984,
considered the Tiburtino Quarter a failed attempt to elaborate a new language that could
be identifiable by its inhabitants. The result was, for Cohen, an "awful pastiche" of
vernacular elements.
No one supported Rogers' notion of architecture as collective consciousness in
print as strongly as Paci. One year before R·oger's death, Paci wrote the first history of the
BBPR.55 The architecture of Roger's partnership was" for Paci, an exemplary
individualization of the collective horizon. In the Quartiere di case operaie (Legnano,
1939) the collective was allegedly individualized through particular attention to the
specific customs of the region. Paci saw collectivity arising from the individual, once he
or she had been situated through architecture in the context of more general conditions.
Collectivity was not as an abstract entity, but rather something that emerged out of the
tangible and specific "ways of life" architecture enabled. For Paci, the aochitecture of the
suddenly come to the fore, and that were enriched by a "loser's" past that enabled them to emerge as the
beCirers of new "purities." It mattered little that this identification strongly resembled a cathartic bath, that
the intellectuals' exploration of these traditions hid a masochistic need to identify themselves with the
losers, that their search for roots in the peasant hearth assuaged the anxiety of disorientation experienced
through contact with mass society. They could not know tha.t, even though they thougu that they were
acting like the Magi and were presenting their own engagement as a gift to the newly elected. their
message was being dictated by the language of a plan whose docile tools they had become."
See Manfredo Tafuri, Jlistory ofItalian Architecture: 1944-85, trans. Jessica Levine, (Cambridge, MA:
MIT press, 1989), pp 10-11.
S3 Vittorio Gregotti, New Directions in Italian Architecture, (New York: George Braziller, 1968), p52.
54 But Gregotti immediately adds that the failure of the group to pro~e a concise pedagogy meant that its
effects were in the end damaging to the modem movement, "particularly in view of the frivolously pleasing
nature of some examples." See: Ibid. p 58.
55 See Enzo Paci. "Continuita e coerenza dei BBPR;t in Zodiac, n. 4 (1968), pp 82-115.
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BBPR expressed its synthetic and poetic power by making its function explicit -or by
"tending" towards its function.
Fig: Plan of the Quartiere dl case operaie (workers housing project) In
Legnano, designed by the BBPR studio In Collaboration with A. Badalottl In
1955. From Ezlo Bonfanti and Marco Porta, Cltts, Museo e Achltettura: II
Gruppo BBPR nella cultura architettonlca Italiana 1932-1970, (Flrenze:
Vallechl, 1973), p A 37, figure 3.
Fig: View of the Quartiere dl case operale (workers housing project) In
Legnano, designed by the BBPR studio In Collaboration with A. Badalottl In
1955. From Ezlo Bonfanti and Marco Porta, Cltts, Museo e Achitettura: II
Gruppo BBPR nella cultura architettonlca Italiana 1932-1970, (Flrenze:
Vallechl, 1973), p A 37, figure 4.
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IV. Tradition Theorized as Concrete (non-abstract) Reason
A. Sartre: Reason originates In experience
The 1930s reception of Giuseppe Pagano's "spontaneous architecture" in Milan
had already established the inherent rationality of construction. However, after the war
the tradition of enlightenment reason that had given philosophical foundations to
modernism's rationalist claims was showing signs of exhaustion. The irrationality of
World War nmade the wide public aware of the crisis of reason which philosophy had
been proclaiming since the end of the nineteenth century. In the 19508, then, the problem
of building a new architecture became linked to the more general problem of the
possibility for a new reason. Existential phenomenology made the emergence of that new
reason rest on a new epistemology and a new theory of perception, which questioned the
critical idealist trndition's insistence on the mind -world split.
Both post-war architects and philosophers, found themselves searching for a new
epistemology that would not be dependant on the enlightenment notion of disembodied,
ever-present reason. Here, Sartre demonstrated the vitality of phenomenology when in
Gennany, principally because of Martin Heidegger's early allegiance to the Nazi party, it
"seemed to have become a matter of past record, to be left to the historians of
philosophy.,,56 In Critique de La raison diaLectique, Sartre proposed a critical dialectical
reason founded on direct and everyday experience, against the more "dogmatic
dialectics" of Marx. Much like Merleau-Ponty, the experience Sartre described was a-
priori and apodictic, and contained necessity and universality. Just as Paci found utility
at the origin of spirit, Sartre discovered the dialectics of necessity in the very structure of
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individuals (beginning with their material needs), and thus located the origin of reason in
experience. The promise of these claims was that if people could experience immediacy,
they would gain access to new fonns of non-subjective, non-objective reason.
B. HU8serl: Reason Is an "understanding IntultlonP'
Phenomenology's origin is tied to the crisis of reason. Edmund Hussed's
founding of phenomenology with his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy, 1913] came as a response to the perceived
meaninglessness and irrationality of the sciences. Husser)'s reservations with regards to
reason, as expressed in the Ideen, were not the result of the irrationality of World War I.
The Great War occurred more than seven years after his original conception of the
project. Rather, Husserl's attempt to arrive at the foundations of science was motivated
by a perception (broadly shared b}' the Gennan intelligentsia of the period57) that
technology alone could not offer a guarantee for a meaningful existence, and that, on the
contrary, it could very easily coUapse into a regressive barbarism. Husserl saw his return
to the roots of philosophy, his "radicalism", as a way to prevent the further degeneration
of the sciences. Herbert Spiegelberg boiled down Husserl's critique of Modem science to
two arguments:
( I ) The degeneration of science into an unphilosophical study of mere
facts, as exemplified by positivistic science, which Husserl held
responsible for the fact that science had lost its significance for man's life
as a whole, and for his life purposes in particular; (2) its 'na turalism, '
S6 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, (The Hague, Boston ..
and London: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1982), p 473.
57 For a good overview of 19th century perspectives of the regressive potentia) of technology see Pick,
Daniel, War Machine: The Rationalization ofSlaughter in the Modern Age. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993).
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which had rendered science incapable of coping with the problems of
absolute truth and validity. 58
Husserl, who was originally trained as a mathematician and a physicist, was ftrst
attracted to philosophy as a means to solve some of the deficienc ies that he perceived in
the foundations of mathematics. In his view the sciences had become un -scientific: They
had degenerated into a study of mere facts that could no longer cope with problems of
absolute truth or validity. Their reliance on "mere experimentation" as a foundation to
their truth claims was lacking insofar as they presupposed an essence of phenomena that
they did not call into question. He argued:
Individual existence of every sort is, quite universally speaking,
'contingent.' It is this; in respect of its essence it could be otherwise. Even
though defmite laws of Nature obtain according to which if such and such
real circumstances exist in fact then such and such definitive consequences
must exist in fact, such laws express only de facto rules which themselves
could read quite otherwise.59
This fundamental irrationality was at the root of both the sciences' inability to
deal with moral questions of right and wrong, and of their generalized lack of
significancee The so-called exact sciences had failed to be rigorous insofar as they had
neglected a clarification of their basic concepts and immediate phenomena. Philosophy
was to undertake that task. Husserl was convinced that by treating philosophy in the
manner of the deductive sciences he could provide a philosophical analysis of their
foundations and rescue them from their fallen state of mere un-philosophical
58 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, (The Hague. Boston.
and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1982), p 66.
59 Edmund Hussert, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenonlenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy.
Vol. II, tran. F. Kersten. (The Hague; Boston: Hingham. MA : Martinus Nijhoff. distributors for the U.S.,
and Canada. Kluwer Boston. 1982.), p 7.
79
experimentation. Measurements of the factual world needed to be Ugrounded" in an
understanding of Uessences":
[The scientific investigator of Nature] observes and experiments; that is, he
ascertains/actual existence according to experience; for him experiencing is a
grounding act which can never be substituted by a mere imagining. And this is
precisely why science of matters offact and experimental science are equivalent
concepts. But for the geometer who explores not actualities but "ideal
possibilities," not predicatively fonned actuality-complexes, but predicatively
formed eidictic affair-complexes, the ultimately grounding act is not experience
but rather the seeing ofessences.60
This insight into the essence of phenomena was what, for Husserl, would
differentiate Phenomenology as a "rigorous science" from all the other sciences. It was
an insight that could only be gained through reason. But reason not in the anti-emotional
intellect (Verstandt), but as understanding intuition and comprehensive wisdom
(Vernunft). This more expansive sense of "ratio" held its indebtedness to Kant. But it
must be clarified that Husserl, although convinceq."ofthe absolute primordiality of reason
as the way by which we make judgments and asses our beliefs -- a conviction that pitted
him against contemporary irrationalists --, refused to give up the world of immediate
experience to sheer abstractions -- a refusal that clearly differentiated him from the
eighteenth century's rationalists.
Even though Husserl's phenomenology had developed into a school of thought in
its own right (mostly in Gennany), it drew the attention of post-war European thinkers
only as a result of Sartre popularity. For Sartrc, Husserl's refusal to relinquish the mind
to immediate experience meant that he had not fully grasped the origin of reason.
Reason, thought Sartre, could only come out of an apodictic, immediate experience of the
60 Ibid. P 16.
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world, not out of a Husserlian pure consciousness.61 Therefore, Sartre's search for
authentic experience became that of reconciling the subjective tJour-soi) and the
objective (en-soi). For him, this reconciliation was called for by our experiences of
freedom and of the "Thing." Freedcm was the solitary experience of total responsibility
that came with the unannounced presence of consciousness. The "Thing" impinged on
that freedom by trying to convert the subject into a "thing-like" existence.
c. Pacl: the new originates In "authentic" experience and Is formed
through technique
Paci brought Husserl's Lebennvelt and Sartre's search for the reconciliation of
subjectivity and objectivity directly into architectural discourse as the pre-condition for
the emergence not only of a new reason, but also of a new architecture. In his Casabella
article "L'architettura e il mondo della vita" he emphasized the need to reconcile man and
nature. The fundamental hindrance holding back the new fonns of reason was that human
beings, as Husserl indicated, did not usually live authentically. They were, as Marxists
61 The process of Sartre's disqualification of phenomenology as a foundation to existential ontoiogy
follows:
In "La Transcendance de I"ego" (Recherches Philosophiques, 1936) Sartre critiques Husserl's conception
of the pure ego in an attempt to improve Husserl"s fundamental conception of phenomenology and freeing
it frorrj unecessaryencumbrances.
In L"Etre et Ie neant he claims Husserl failed to cany out his original conception of phenomenology
because: 1) His Berkeleyan idealism interpreted Being and the trascendent objects of intentional
consciousness as non-real" 2) Husserl succumbed to "pure immanentism" by not escaping the "thing-
illusion". 3) He remained at the level of functional description which encased him in a mere account of
appearances as such and made him incapable of moving into "existential dialectics:' 4) Husserl was a
"phenomenalist'" (phenomeniste) rather than a phenomenologist. 5) He gave a caricature of genuine
transcendence "'which should pass beyond consciousness into a world and beyond the immediate present
into a past and future. 6) Like Kant. Husserl fell into sofipsism by introducing the hYlXlthesis of the
transcendental subject. 7) He did not take sufficient account of refractoriness (coefficient d- adversite) in our
immediate experience. 8) Husserl mistakenly thought that an eidetic phenomenology of essences could lay
hold of freedom. In contradistinction to Husserl. Sartre identified freedom with consciousness and with an
existence that is at the root of all human essence.
In "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi n (Societe Francaise de philosophie, June 2 1947) Sartre
claimed that although Husserl provided an exhaustive description of consciousness" he never asked the
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would say, alienated from the world. Paci blamed the human reliance on a-priori
scientific abstractions (which Husserl referred to as the 'natural atitude') for people's
failure to experience the world in its full complexity and interconectedness. Architects,
according to Paci, had to suspend judgement to experience the life-world fully, in
accordance to Husserl's "bracketing.",62 Valid architectural styles could only be born out
of an intense contact with the life-world in which "we no longer know if it is nature and
history that search for new fonns in us, or if it is us who search the fonns towards which
nature and history seem to be directed.,,63 The life-world tended towards fonns. These
were not only conceptual fonns, stated Paci in clear opposition to Croce's thinking, the
question of the being of consciousness. nor of the being of the world. Husserl never returned from the
epoche to the world.
6 Husserl saw his uphenomenological reduction" as his great contribution to philosophy's ability to break
free of reification. Husserl was fighting against unverified and unverifiable umelaphysical nonsense,"
which he liked to call "the spell of science" (i.e. reification). This spell was characteristic of the Unatural
attitude" in theory and praxis, which Husserl equated to the scientific interpretation of the world. On the
one hand, the "natural attitude" was a pre-philosophical attitude inasmuch a~ it wasn't concerned with
reflecting on the conditions of existence on a rational basis. It was the common standpoint of existence
when relating to matters of fact. processes, practical aspects, values, other persons~ social institutions. and
cultural creations. On the other hand, the "scientific attitude" narrowed the range of human experience by
negating the subject in order to objectify nature as a field of study detached from human concerns.
Considering neither attitude was concerned with a radical questioning of il~ own presuppositions, neither
was deeply philosophical. The inability to see a third alternative beyond these two attitudes drove people
to relinquish their cognitive potential to empirical science in search of meaning. But the latter's un-
philosophical ground~was inherently incapable of carrying out its assigned task. Thus. people were kept
from a '-correct" and umeaningfur' experience of the life world. The third alternative attitude could on~y
be uncompromisingly philosophical. If philosophy insisted on limiting itself in any way by the irrational
premises of either of the two pre-philosophical attitudes. then it would never grasp the full range of
dimensions of experience. Only through ""phenomenological reduction" -- through the suspension of the
natural and scientific attitudes --could philosophical reflection break through this spell and achieve the true
philosophical attitude. By reduction Hu~serl was referring to a kind of mathematical bracketing, which
allowed the nlath~matician to put a particular expression in hsusptnsion" while the rest of the equation was
investigated. In the ldeen~ Husserl describert his reduction as a two step process. First. it entailed a
reduction from particular facts to general essences (Eidictic reduction). that dropped all references to the
individual and particular. Second, it involved the phenomenological reduction proper where consciousness:
1) suspended belief in existence (this, again. would be a bracketing, not a denial); 2) directed a glance
through reflection at what was left of the phenomenon in all its aspects in order to Uintuit" its essence
(sosein), without attention to its existence (dasein). In this manner, Husser) could examine all areas of the
world of things divested of their reality claims. He could thus reach back to the source of all knowledge. to
the "wonder of all wonders:' to the hidden acts and achievements of consciousness.
63 Enzo Paci. "L'architettura e iI mondo della vita:' in Casahel/a Continulto. n. 217 (December 1957). p 54.
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life-world also tended towards corporeal, natural forms. The immediate experience of the
life-world was significant therefore both to philosophy and to architecture.
Croce of course also considered foons (whethermaterial or conceptual) to be
organic syntheses. The two philosophers disagreed in relation to exactly what was
synthesized and how. For Croce, what was synthesized was a disjointed set of particular
sensorial inputs, and what synthesized it was the mind's intuitive or theoretical power.
For Paci, what was synthesized was a life -world, but this synthesis occurred this side of
subject and object divisions, beyond the power of the mind. Paci understood synthesis as
the authentic relation between humans and their world, something !hat could only be
immediately experienced in life projects. More precisely, the synthesis could only be
experienced through authentic life projects.
Paci felt that architectural design and philosophical thinking shared the common
problem of how to give birth to the new.64 The tension between pennanence and
emergence, between the existing and the possible, required that architects and
philosophers synthesize the multiplicity of existing languages and needs. For Paci, this
synthesis could only be achieved through the production of fonn, that is, through
technique. Fonn was the mutation, production, and insertion of the possible in the real.
As such, it continuously appealed to a pre-existing foundation: the life-world. The
pressure of the novum-y of the possible, was legitimated and called t:-Jrth by the life-world,
which was none other than the changing relationships between the lives of human
subjects and their world, between social lives and their changing nature. In both
64 See the article by Paci's most eminent student Salvatore Veca. "Un Filosofo e l'Architettura: Enzo Paci.,"
in CasabelJa, special issue "Casabella Cinquant'anni 1928-1978." n. 440-441 (October-November 1978),
pp 73-74.
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architectural and philosophical projects the new emerged in organic relation to the
existing life-world of functions that constituted a social life. Because these functions
renovated themselves over time, they disaggregated old fonns and called forth new
(architectural or philosophical) synthesis or fonns. New architecture and new philosophy
would be born, to follow Paci, out of the ambiguous and immediate zone between the
subjective and the objective through technique, which was their living synthesis.
D. Function separates "Inauthentic" technology from "authentic"
technique
But Paci was careful to d~fferentiatetechnique from the alienated and alienating
sphere of technoloJY. When he wrote the first history of the BBPR, he used his article as
an opportunity to introduce architects to some of the themes in his recently published
Funzione delle Scienze e Significato dellPUomo 65 (1963). Paci argued that functionalism,
understood as the dynamic and organic synthesis of the problems that make up each
project, was ~he "coherence" of the BBPR's work. "Function," Paci continued, if
understood broadly, was not the type of abstract rationalistic fonnula that dominated
science and technology. It was the field where reason met technique, collective objectives
met particular goals, and invention met the existing.
Architecture, explained Paci, concretized function and rendered it poetic. It
allowed people to experience the insertion of the individual in the collective drama ()f
mankind, and made individuals feel life and death as part of nature and of the dia!ectic of
history. Through Paci, function in architecture acquired moral overtones. It was the
6:) The book" which was published in English as The Function of the Sc;enc('s and the Meaning ofMan.
trans. Paul Piccone " (Evanst\)n~ IL: Norwestem University Press, 1972). undertakes a synthesis between
Husserl's philosophy of the life-world and Marxism.
84
"reason" of rationalism because it enabled the moral values of rationality and objectivity
to be rendered concrete in construction. Because rationality and objectivity tended
towards the truth of the life-world, architectural functionalism was a concrete, and
therefore moral expression, of that tendency towards the truth. Paci' s definition of
function allowed him to defend the BBPR's neo-liberty as a coherent functionalism.
Functionalism was so open and dialectical, that its concrete architectural expressions
would by force be formally multiple, but, they would all coherently express the same
moral tendency, the same idea: the authenticity of the life-world.
Fig: Tomb of the italian poet Rocco Scotellaro In Tricarico, designed by the
BBPR In collaboration with Carlo Levi In 1957. From Ezlo Bonfanti and
Marco Porta, cme, Museo e Achltettura: II Gruppo BBPR nella cultura
architettonlca Itallana 1932-1970,(Flrenze: Vallechl, 1973), figure 249.
Paci ultimately argued that reason, function, and architecture all tended towards a
common (Husserlian) telos: harmony. Reason, or the conceptual, met architecture, or the
concrete, in the field of function. Function was the dynamic synthesis, which he called
"coherence," of the conceptual and the material synthesis performed again and again in
history. As such, it brought things and reason into alignment with the needs of life. It
85
brought the past into the present and made it meaningful. Paci turned to the BBPR's
Tomba di Rocco Score/larD (Tomb of Rocco Scotellaro, 1957) to offer an example:
The memory of the dead, the 'monument', becomes the reason to live for
the living, born anew from the past in the work of the present, which is
present insofar as it is life of the past in us, life of tradition within the
renewal of man according to clarity and truth, according to the teleological
idea, not of an abstract reason, but of a living reason.66
There was also an understanding of architectural "coherence" as synthesis in the
thought of Rogers, but it was not limited to function. Rogers wa~ in agreement about the
fact that the coherence of the process of design lay neither in fannal references nor in
scientific rational principles, but he defmed "coherence" more broadly as the recognition
of an essential synthetic intention.67
Rogers's and Paci's rethinking of functionalism in Modem architecture came at
the time when it was being openly questioned in high profile architectural forums, such
as ClAM. On the other side of the Atlantic for example, the conference held at Princeton
University in 1947 entitled The Social Basis For Architecture, had identified technology
with functionalism, and set a research agenda to incorporate notions of environment and
human affective relations to the practice of architecture in order to ameliorate some of
their negative effects .68 But whereas the brunt of the critique there came from the
06 Enzo Paci, "Continuita e coerenza dei BBPR~" in Zodiac. n. 4 (c J968). P 112.
67 To illustrate his point Rogers looks to the work of Asplund:
'lhe sequences of succesive drawings from 1920 to 1937 for the expansion to the TO\\r'n
Hall of Goteborg by Asplund are a typical example ryf this work: born as a stylistic
imitation of Lhe pre-existing neoclassical building. it arrives at a goal unpredictable by
nleans of an unpublished image. The hamlony between the two parts is due only to their
intimate expressive affinity. which is not of philological charact~r by contra..~t or
similari~yor by whatever indebtedness to language. understood in the neo-positivist
sense. but rather of phenomenological essence.'·
My translation. See Ernesto N. Rogers. "Appunti Sui Fenomeno Architettonico. I." in Casahe/la
Conunuita. n. 265 (July 1962). P 1.
68 See Christian Norberg-Schulz. Intentions In Architecture. (Cambridge. Mf\: The T\1.I.T. Press. 1965).
pI7.
emerging behavioral and social sciences, in Milan it came from phenomenology and
focused on the recuperation of lived experience, and on the establishment of an
architectural practice rooted in the immediacy of that experience.
We can now better understand Paci's call to architects. When he demoted
theoretical explanations of architecture in favor of building, he did not mean that
"anything goes." Reason would emerge within action, theory would appe ar within
practice -or so he hoped. The architect would have to just let it happen, as it were. If he
or she suspended abstract and scientific reasoning, the life-world would appear as it was.
The architect would feel the pressure of the new within the life-world, in its full
complexity, and would then enable it to gairl fonn in the objective world through his or
her technical intervention. Utility, reason, and morality would emerge simultaneously,
bringing with them a new era of collective commitment and &uthentic living.
v. Tradition Theorized as History
A. Tradition Defined as the Progressive Tendency of History
Rogers and Paci forced the tremendous post -war search for newness against the
forms of the old. Croce's philosophy of spirit, as he developed it into a pure
historiographical method, made History an obligatory referenc e in Italian intellectual
speculation. It is therefore useful to understand Croce's views on History, in order to
grasp the full implications of Rogers and Paci's critiques.
Croce rethought his idealism in tenns of historiography in his later years, in light
of the many criticisms his philosophy had suffered. 69 He referred to this new version of
69 Most notabJY9 the harshest criticisms came from Giovanni Gentile9his former protege and later enemy.
In the Philosophy ofArt9 Gentile strikes against the incoherent aspects of Croce·s idealism (which he
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Idealism as "absolute historicism." Its objective was the complete resolution of
philosophy into the methodology of historiography. Whereas Croce's early idealism
presented the fonns of spiritual activity independently from the history that they
contained, the Croce of the post-war sought to close the fissure between this fonnal
transcendentism and the central doctrines of historicism. He addressed the crisis of
reason by attempting to purge his concept of method from all rationalistic and fonnalistic
elements and to conceive historiography as indeed a totally immanent process, such that
the shaping of its categories and canons would be controlled wholly by the concrete
content. Croce's philosophy became nothing but the self-awareness of the synthesizing
historiographical process, and involved nothing transcending that process.
As such, Croce's absolute hi~toricismcame close to the phenomenological insight
that reason should emerge out of the Life-world through life-projects that engage
concrete reality. But Croce denied the phenomenological dictum that there was no pure
objective identity, that no object could exist in isolation. In The Aesthetic, Croce deduced
a few corollaries about the nature of art, and history, from thi~ initial description of the
functioning of the mind: Because intuition, as he defined it, dealt only with particulars, he
denied that any aesthetic work, such as history or painting, could be concerned with
general principles. History could not deal with truths about .. say, architects like
Michelangelo, it had to always deal with this particular man Michelangelo. The same
went for art. Each work of art had to be a unique expression of particulars. To gra~p an
object's artistic nature, meant to comprehend it in its uniqueness as an expression.
claims are shared by t~ant and I-Iegel). Gentile considers the notion that nothing must lie outside of the
mind·s conceiving to be a fundamental principle of idealist philosophy --for how then is it to be known?
Croce. concedes too nluch when he opposes the mind to antecedently uexisting matter" on which it imposes
Therefore, for Croce, the notion of genres or styles was not essential to the detennination
of what art was. Stylistic categories were abstract logical concepts that could only be
derived after having identified a series of unique pieces of art.
Croce opposed what he called "sociological historiography" because it tended to
dissolve art in relationships to social institutions, politics, morals and to the economy.
For him, the work of art had to be treated in strict relation to the artist. This meant that
the monograph had to replace sociological history, or the general history of art.
"Sociological historiography" failed, according to Croce, because it focused on mediocre
works to fmd the common denominator of the age, and had difficulty in discussing great
works as something other than anomalies. Croce stressed the autonomous and individual
value of the work of art. He denied that philosophy should be systematic and Iimited it to
the solving of isolated historically specific problems. Thus, any union on the aesthetic
level between art and other disciplines was, for Croce, absurd.
Not so, however, to the few Milanese intellectuals working alongside Rogers as
members of the editorial board of Casabella Continuita. To them, the theme of
Ucontinuity," that Rogers appended to the magazine's title when he revived it after World
War II, stood as a contesting theoretical position that argued the necessary conditioning
of art by its cultural, political~ economic, and physical contexts. Moreover, they finnly
believed that innovation could happen within modernism precisely by linking it to
traditicn. They could not accept Croce's conception of historical reality as a totally
an order. Furthermore. Gentile sees it essential to idealism that differences be overcome in the unity of
mind. Croce fails to recognize this internal unity when he divides the mind into four different capacities.
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immanent reality because it had lead him to deny the idea of progress. 70 In doing so,
Croce had deprived active life of its most relevant practical value. This made it diffi cult
for them to assume the necessary personal responsibility in their everyday practical
activity as builders. In contrast to Croce, Paci and Rogers proposed progress as a
tendency of the life-world (or tradition) making architects commitment to it also an oath
to progress, to the environment, and to the whole of humankind. With this act of faith,
however, they also committed to surrendering their critical agency to the life-world.
In opposition to Croce's historicism, Rogers circle shared a conviction that
because innovation happend in a spatial and temporal context, any work of architecture
'Vvas united, on the plane of tradition, with social, economic, physical, and cultural
realities. A true work of art, or any new creative act for that matter, was par t of a
historical continuity, or tradition, which the new innovated by virtue of its appearance,
and to which it was inextricably bound. A history of architecture had to therefore deal
with these other disciplines as constitutive of architecture. Rogers' circle would argue
that even though they had to critique their society, they could not judge the work of other
architects outside of the terms of the historical reality from which it was born, and in
which it was inserted.
Such was the case of Giulio Carlo Argan, whose readings of Paci and Heidegger
in Walter Gropius e la Bauhaus (1951) helped him expose the falsity of modernism's
mythic foundational claim of autonomy from larger historical currents. Argan
emphasized the problematic link. of modernity to the enlightenment tradition of
70 For critics of Croce like Roberto Vivarelli, this denial stems logically from a flawed reduction of
historical reality to an ideal process, which disregards day-by-day dimension in the range of empiric
experience where improvements may be measured concretely. and where human life ac~ually takes place.
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transcendent reason. He contrasted this \vith the work of Walter Gropius (1883-1969), in
whom he found a "limitless phenomenology of the built" bound to the sphere of the
human, which refused all transcendence and all myth. Gropius had successfully kept the
architectural project limited to an expression of the Life-world's own tendencies, and
thus allowed its own reason to evolve in its contingency and historicity. Argan
contextualized the avant-garde historically, ripping modernism out of the aura of absolute
contemporaneity it once had.
B. Tradition theorized as the progressive tendency of Modernism
Modem architecture's relationship to history was also at the center of the
controversy that "'ould place Rogers and his editorial staff in the European spotlight. In
1959, Reyner Banham (1922-1988), the famed British architectural critic and historian,
wrote a scathing review of Roger's recent work in the pages of the United Kingdom's
most prominent journal The Architectural Revie"'. Banham's motives in writing were
clear: he wanted to eject Rogers (together with what he calls the Italian NeOaLiberty
style) from modern architecture in order to call attention to his own definition of
modernism. Hanham, who had just completed a part time Ph.D. with Nikolaus Pevsner,
was preparing his dissertation for publication as a history of modem architecture entitled
Theory and Design in the First Machine Age (1960) -which would become his most
influential text.
Unlike Rogers, Banham considered architecture to be a synthesis of technology
and culture that happened only at the sYlnboJic level. There was no middle realm
between suhject and object, no life-world that architects must immediately experience, no
See Roberto Vivarelli. HBenedetto Croce and the Uses of Historicism by David D. Roberts" [book review].
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tradition tending towards new fonns. There was no experiential "single-valued criterion"
as the source of authority for the socio-historical value of a building. A building's quality
and value was to be judged according to its ability to function as a sign within larger
socio-historical symbolic patterns.
This ,remise let Banham theorize that "function" in architecture was a symbol,
which could only be read if it resembled truly functional contemporary objects. Thus, the
functionalist architecture of the twenties no longer seemed functional in the 19505
because it no longer resembled ships and aeroplanes. 71 The advancement of civilization
was dependent on technological progress, not on Roger's dialectical "cultural progress."
The result was that Baham foreclosed on architecture's utilitarian claims and reduced its
relevance for the present to an expression of technology:
"It may well be that what we have hitherto understood as architecture, and what
we are beginning to understand as architecture are incompatible disciplines. The
architect who proposes to run with technology knows now that he will be in fast
company, and that, in order to keep up, he may have to emulate the Futurists and
discard his whole cultural load, including the professional gannents by which he
is recognized as an architect. If, on the other hand, he decides not to do this, he
may find that a technological culture has decided to go on without him.,,72
in The Journal of Modern History .. n. 2. v. 62 (June 1990), p 359.
71 In Theory and Design in the First Machine Age .. 2nd. ed.• (New York and Washington: Frederick A.
Praeger. 1967). p 328. Reyner Banham states:
In picking on the Phileban solids and mathematics. the creators of the International Style
took a convenient short cut to creating an ad hoc language of s)1l1bolic forms. but it was a
language that could only communicate under the special conditions of the Twenties.
when automobiles were visibiy comparable to the Parthenon, when aircraft structure
really did resemble EJementarist space cages. when ships It superstructures really did
appear to follow Beaux Arts rules of s)111metry. and the additive methcd of design
pursued in many branche:; of machine technology was surprisingly like Guadefs
elementary composition.
72 Ibid. P 329.
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Fig: Aerial view of the Velasca Tower In Milan, designed by the BBPR, and
completed In 1958. From Ezlo Bonfanti and Marco Porta, , Cltta, Museo e
Achltettura: II Gruppo BBPR nella cultura archltettonlca ltallana 1932-1970,
(Flrenze: Vallechl, 1973), figure 251.
When Banham saw Rogers' recently completed Velasca Tower in Milan (1958),
with its medievalizing volumetry, he immediately identified it with an inability to shed
the symbols of past technologies and embrace the new. Since, for Banham, what defined
the yet unrealized future promised by the modem movement wsa the "[ ...] freedom from
having to wear the discarded clothes of other cultures,,,73 the tum to tradition was a tum
away from modernism. In Banham's modernity, freedom from tradition was the
precondition to a life fully conscious of its present reality, to a truly modem life. The
future coherence of modernism resided in its ability to have no past. With the urgency of
the present, Banham foreclosed on possible revisions of his account of modernism's past
and future. "But even if the men of the nineteen-twenties were wrong, and the men of the
thirties were stubborn in error, that is no reason for going back and re-puzzle its earlier
problems.v'"
73 Reyner Banham, "Nee-Liberty: The Italian Retreat from Modem Architecture," in The Architectural
Review, n. 746 (March 1959), p 235.
74 Ibid. P 235.
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Banham grouped the circle of architects linked to Casabella (Gae Aulenti,
Vittorio Gregotti, Meneghotti, Stoppino, Gabetti, AIda Rossi, and Emesto Rogers) as the
leaders of a regressive turn away from modernism. He questioned whether these
architects could be considered part of the international modem movement at all. Going
even funher, he held all of Italy responsible for the regression, but found the architectural
press particularly at fault, for the excessively laudatory attention it gave to Art Nouveaue
Only Bruno 7~vi, who wa.~ one of the few to openly speak out against Neo-Liberty, and
whose Crocean historicism was also devoid of a concept of life-world, was spared.
Rogers' response was categorical. He meet Reyner Banham's excommunication
with a meditation on how he considered past and history fo be defined. Rogers argued
that Banham wanted to preserve the forms of classical modernism because his concept of
the history of architecture was based on an a-priori notion of formal evolution. Rogers
questioned the authority of the historian~ defending the critical revision of academic
history by artists who refused to mechanistically accept abstract lines of historical and
stylistic demarcation. If modernism was to be the pennanent revolution it promised to be,
then it demanded the constant, physical revision of obsolete fannal elements. Modernism
was the revolution of History in the present, as the continuous transfonnation of tradition.
Modern architecture could only achieve its promise of liberation from the past by
internalizing it, by re-synthesizing its present forms within the life-world. To adjudicate
modernism only to the architecture originating after the nineteen-twenties was to negate
its liberating potential, by reducing it into fonns. 75
7~ Emesto N. Rogers, "L'evoluzione delrarchitettura: Risposta al custode di frigidaires,1f in Casabella
Continuita.. n. 22R (June 1959), pp 2-4.
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Paci had anticipated the arguments of the Banham-Rogers debate, in his 1956
CasabelJa article entitled "Problematica dell'architettura contemporanea.,,76 Paci argued
that architectural function was not merely symbolic, as Banham would later have it,
rather, it was a necessarily link between symbolic expression and utility. Paci's
definition is not self evident, and requires elaboration in relation to the above description
of Paci's life-world.
Paci began his article by establishing that reality was both a process and a
relationship. It was a process insofar as existence was governed by the principle of
irreversibility embedded in spatiality and temporality. As spatial processes, fonns
emerged and endured, were either renovated or remained in equilibrium. To speak first
offonnal "emergence," every such process was also conditioned by temporality. It
arrived from the past as was structured in the present. Turning to fonnal "endurance,"
Paci found it conditioned by the same temporal structure. The structure of the past in the
present was therefore dynamically related to both fonns of emergence and pennanence.
As new fonns emerged, they changed the structure of the present and made 0 Id ones
loose pennanence. New fonns are first expressed in symbolic language as possible new
relationships within the structure of the existing (Le. the Life-world). The hannonious
relation of the new fonns to the existing was their value, and detennined whether they
would ever achieve pennanence or not. Put bluntly, Paci thought that only those creations
that satisfied the needs of past and the present stood any chance of continuing to exist in
the future. In the case of new architectural fonns for instance, he believed that they
76 Enzo PacL <t ltproblematica dell'architettura contemporanea." in Casabella Continuitil<t n. 209 (January-
February 1956)<t pp 41-46.
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would only endure if they were created in harmonious relation to the past and present
structures ot social and economic necessity.
Having defined reality as the life-world, Paci related the recent history of
architecture and philosophy as the process of emergence of a newarchitecture and a new
philosophy from the current crisis of rationalism-<learly, he was here speaking in
reference to Rogers' Neo-Liberty, and to his own phenomenology. Turning to the
masters, he argued that although Gropius' Bauhaus and Theo Van Doesburg's De Stijl
were correctly concerned with relating architecture to the rest of real ity, their
understanding of the relationship of emerging form to the life-world was still based on
mechanistic rationalist concepts. Just as Hussert's epoche incorrectly bracketed
naturalism and psychology, Gropius suspended the relationship of his buildings to natural
and psychological givens. Both were incorrectly concerned with achieving pure
essences, or more precisely, with finding absolute relationships.
Paci also found consonance between Gropius' and Van Doesburg's search for a-
temporal and elementary fonns and Wittgenstein's neo-positivism, which conceived of
reality as composed of unrelated atomized givens. This r jrne conception of reality
resulted, for Paci, in the fonnulation of technical or material standards in architecture.
and to the notion of Ertistenz-Mininlunl in urbanism. Ultimately, argued Paci, this
philosophical and architectural idealism fixed reality and missed the fact that it was a
historical and organic process.
To conclude his article, Paci joined tt~e history of early twentieth century
architecture and philosophy into a common tributary that lead directly to his
phenomenology. He stated that in the United States Gropius discovered the specificity of
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place in the New England region, and Gennan positivism encountered a more expansive
conception of experience in American pragmatism. For Paci, the combination of these
discoveries opened both architecture and philosophy to his own understanding of reality
as a historically contingent lived nature, where no given was absolutely autonomous.
Thus, he depicted philosophy and architecture as discovering what he already knew: that
every element was already a relationship. There was no foundational, essential element,
which was always identical to itself. Pennanence was flexible. 77 Thus, Paci attempted to
provide the historical evidence that his new form of philosophy was a new synthesis
called forth by the historical tendencies of the life-world itself.
··With the existential a-priori of nature and history came Paci's spatio-temporal
conception of archit~ctureas lived fonn. Here, function and fann could not be
understood as Banham's mimetic repetition of symbols in the mechanistic sense. Rather,
it had to be conceived in the integral and relational s1~nse as "emergence." Symbolism in
architecture was not its mimetic function; rather it was the synthetic process through
which the new emerges. Symbolism could not be mimetic because mimesis presupposed
a stable identity of a priori, ideal. un-related elements that did not exist. Moreover,
contrary to Banham's separation of aesthetics and utility, the new always appeared
together with utility, which was an existential characteristic of the life-world. Paci's
phenomenological conception of function viewed architecture both as a construction
responding to specific needs, and as an expression of new fonns and relations.
Architecture·s symbolic aspect emergeJ together wit h utility. According to Paci. the new
architecture, as we)] as the nc\\ philosophy, integrat~d partial point'i of view in to ~,;1 open-
77 Enzo Paci. , "Probiematict1 deB'architettura contemporanea:' in Casahel/a Contlnuita. n. 209 (January-
February 1956), p 44.
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ended synthesis, a new open form. It contained technique, nature and history, reason and
function, and conditioned processes that are open to new relations. 78
Fig: Street level view of the Velasca Tower In Milan, designed
by the BBPR, and completed In 1958. From Ezlo Bonfanti and
Marco Porta, , Clttil, Museo e Achltettura: II Gruppo BBPR
nella cultura archltettonlca ltallana 1932-1970, (Flrenze:
Vallechl, 1973), figure 254.
78 Enzo Paci, , "Problematica dell'architettura contemporanea," in Casabella Continuita, n. 209 (January-
February 1956), pp 46.
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VI. The reception of Rogers and Paci by their students.
Rogers brought the concerns of his students in particular, and of the first
generation of young architects trained in the post-war in general, to bear on the direction
of Casabella. He hoped that his new architecture would find perpetuation in their own
practices. The careers of Giancarlo de Carlo, Vittorio Gregotti, Guido Canella, AIdo
Rossi, Ezio Bonfanti, and Gae Aulenti would all be marked by their early involvement in
Casabella. Rogers and Paci discussed the young generation's contributions infonnally,
and became increasingly aware of the differences that separated them. 79 Paci was most
vocal about his opposition to their interpretations of Marxism and their interest in
Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurt School.80 For him, this intellectual current could lead
too easily towards a regressive fall into irrationality, but for the new generation the
Frankfurt Settool offered an invaluable critique of consumer culture and of the new
leisure society. Ultimately, Rogers' openness to the concerns of the new generation
would cost him his editorship of Casabella. The degenerative brain disease, which
eventually would take his life, made Rogers begin to loose his voice around 1964, at the
same time as Italy fell into economic recession, and there were the first symptoms of
student unrest --which his young editors supported. By the end of t 964, the publisher of
CasabeUa, concerned that Rogers was loosing his intellectual faculties as great mediator
79 In his personal dial)', Paci notes many of his meetings with Rogers, and critiques the new generation of
architects' attempt to redefine the left from within as a projection of their own alienation. For instance, on
the 4th of April 1958 Paci writes:
A colazione con Rogers. Discussione su un'articolo del poveTO Aida Rossi dedicatto a
Seldmayer, :~ rivelazione [?] dell'arte moderne, questi ragazzi proiettano sulla storia e
sulla societa Ie lora monadi [?] interne che applicano al comunismo e ad altre forrnule
con virtu taumaturgiche. L'unica cosa che non vogliono fare e di riconoscere e che loro
stesso estraniamento rientra nell'ordinario 10 costituisce e 10 esplica.
80 Vittorio Gregotti, conversation with the author, Milan, 30 June 2000.
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of debates, and that he is no longer capable of moderating his young and restless editorial
team, begun the process of selling CasabeIla, and replaced Rogers. 81
Together with the differences that separated Rogers and Paci from their students,
there are also many shared concerns that united them. First of all, there was the shared
interest in phenomenology which resulted from Rogers' mentoring role. He opened his
proteges to international connections, and exposed them to his intellectual circle. Rogers
favored his student Vittorio Gregotti in particular. The year after Gregotti finished his
architecture degree, Rogers invited him to join in the founding of Casabella as editor, and
encouraged him to take Paci's philosophy classes. Gregotti soon found himself
accompanying the philosopher to Paris to meet Mer]eau-Ponty -- later Gregotti returned
alone to find Sartre. In Milan, Gregotti made the acquaintance of Paci's own protege, the
philosopher Salvatore Veca, with whom he established a close friendship - the two would
often lecture as guests in each other's class. Later, both wQuldjoin Gruppo '63, which
emerged under the influence of Paci and included members from various humanistic
disciplines (Umberto Ecco would become the group's most famous member). 82
The new generation saw itself as continuing their elder's critique of the modem
movement's emphasis on abstract rationality through the introduction of history and
tradition. Gregotti's first oook II Territorio dell'Architettura (1966) owed more to this
previous generation than it willingly acknowledged. Like Paci, he described the field of
architecture in an expansive and relational fashion. Following Rogers, he established a
Merleau-Pontyan ambiguous zone between subject and object as the realm of the pre-
81 Miriam Tosoni, conversation with the author, Milan 29 June 2000. Tosoni was Rogers secretaI)' at
Casabe/la during his years as an editor.
82 Vittorio Gregotti, conversation with the author, Milan, 30 June 2000.
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existing Life-world, which he then qualified through Paci as an open-ended and fluid
structuring structure. Then, in the manner of Argan, he turned to Martin Heidegger to
describe how architecture was an experiential "mode of Being" towards the life-world.83
Returning to Rogers, he explained the process of design as the emergence of new
(conceptual or material) fonn within the existing.84
Out of the many phenomenological sources of II Territorio dell'Architettura only
Gregotti's unapologetic embrace of Heidegger begot him criticism. 85 Heidegger's
affiliation with the German Fascist regime made Heidegger persona non grata of the
Italian intellectual left. Moreover, Theodor Adorno's critique of modem culture Minima
Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschadigten Leben (Minima Moralia: Reflections on a
Damaged Life, 1951), which had just appeared in Italian, fascinated Gregotti' s generation
and exposes them to Adorno's tireless critiques of Heidegger. 86 Although the similarities
between critical theory and Phenomenology have often been noted, Adorno stood in
fundamental opposition to Paci and Rogers' view of existence as grounded in the
immediate experience of the Life-world.
The demotion of phenomenology by the new generation was perhaps strongest in
the work of Manfredo Tafuri. Although his early work was deeply indebted to Paci,87
83 Vittorio Gregotti, II Territorio dell' Architettura, (Mi lano: Feltrinelli, 1966), pp 101-113.
84 Ibid. pp 45-53, 128-134.
85 Vittorio Gregotti, conversation with the author, Milan, 30 June 2000.
86 Adorno himself would bring critical theoJY to architects with his widely circulated address at the
inauguration of the Deutsche Werkbund in Berlin on October 23rd , 1965, entitled "Functionalism Today."
The paper was first published in German in Neue Rundschau, v. 77, n. 4, (1966). See also the English
translation as Theodor Adorno, "Functionalism Today" in Oppositions, n. 17, (Summer 1979).
87 Enzo Paci influences Tafuri's notion of the historical dialectic, as rendered in his book Ludovico Quaroni
e 10 Sviluppo dell'Architettura Moderna in ltalia (1964). Tafuri's description of the historical dialectic as a
phenomenon in which it is just as impossible to inverse time as to proceed to an automatic repetition of
events, was modelled on Paci's opposition both to "pure traditionalism" and "pure avant-gardism." For
Paci each "pure" movement leads to equally sterile results, ei ther to revivals or to the cult of the new for its
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upon his move to the School of Venice in 1968, Tafuri encountered an intellectual milieu
deeply engaged in the critillue of Italian Marxism, and clearly dominated by Frankfurt
School thinking. Tafuri's exchanges with Francesco dal Co, Marco De Michelis and
Massimo Cacciari are the origin of his philosophical reorientation from the
phenomenology ofPaci towards the teachings of Critical Theory.
Tafuri's reorientation was strengthened by Rogers's and Paci's demotion of
theory in favor of an experientialist practice. In 1968, Tafuri founded the Institute of
architectural history in Venice, the fITst such institutions in Italy. The work inside the
institute took two principal directions in the years immediately following 1968 -69. First,
Tafuri began the pursuit of historical studies on ancient architecture (such as Tafuri's
work on Palladio and Borromini, and his collaborations with Luigi Salerno and Luigi
Spezzaferro on the Via Giulia). Second, the institute undertook research on Modem art
and architecture. Methodologically, the institute emphasized contact of the historian with
primary sources, a concern that was largely absent in t he generation of Zevi and
Benevolo. In 1976, the institute was reconstituted as a separate department of the School
of Venice: The Department Of Critical And Historical Analysis Of Architecture, which
offered degrees on the basis of strictly historical work. This shift supposed a new
specialization that discharged architects of accountability on the level of historical and
theoretical proficiency.
The task for Tafuri was to form specialist historians who, by virtue of their
proximity to architects, should have a deeper understanding of the techniques with which
their objects of study are constructed. Similar departments would follow this trend in the
own sake. see Enzo Paci, "La Crisi della Cultura e la Fenomenologia delr Architettura Conterrporanea," in
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United States, beginning with MIT's 1975 founding of the History Theory and Criticism
of Architecture and Art section, making the separation of architectural theory and
practice an international phenomenon. With the rise of professional historians came the
demotion of architects from the center stage of intellectual life. More importantly,
because Rogers and Paci's claimed that the emergence of a new reason would come
about through practice and action they had to remain silent before their own practice's
relegation to the background of a new intellectualism. Practice, came once more to be
understood as theory's 'appHcation' or 'test.'
When a new engagement with non-modernist architecture emerged in the late
1970s, Rogers and Paci's understanding of tradition as an experience of original
creativity that came prior to reflection resurfaced under various guises. Rogers business
partner, Enrico Peresutti helped disseminate their understanding of tradition in the United
States, where his student Charles Moore trnnsfonned it into "poetic images." In essence,
these appeals to an essential origin to aesthetic expression concealed and perpetuated the
modernist myth that "authentic" creativity occurred in the sphere of radical alterity to
culture, and that it could be achieved through the architect's innocent avant -garde vision.
Although there is no evidence to suggest the existence of such "pure" aesthetic
experiences, self-assertion could elevate practice beyond convention. However, Rogers
fell short of his own project to transfonn objective reality by insisting that subjectivity
remain un-theorized. Without theory, the authorial Self served as and aesthetic veil to
roth the philosopher and the architect, who felt absolutely no need to provide objective
evidence so that others could verify their assertions about emancipating aesthetic
La Casa, n. 6 ( 1959)~ pp 357-58.
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experience. Without an adequate critique that could ground the changing conceptions of
subjectivity in history, their Self-assertions were condemned to become static and
incapable of advancing Self-knowledge. The intersections with phenomenology that
helped open up modern architects to non-modem architecture were obs~ured behind the
veils of subjectivity. In the absence of self-critique, as modernist architects turned to the
fonns of the past, they were incapable of incorporating them into'~e' language of the
present. A case in point was the 1978 Palermo Declaration (which was an attempt by
Leon Krier, Pier Luigi Nicolin, Angelo Villa, Maurice Culot and Antoine Grumbach to
recuperate the link between architecture, urbanity, and politics), which was incapable of
revising of heritage and modernity, choosing instead to attempt a return to the vocabulary
of a pre-industrial era.88 Thus severed from its claims to the construction of a new reason
(or of th~ new in general), Rogers' tradition was rearticulated into a frozen life-world of
unchanging essences. The architect's immediate experience of that newly defined life-
world can yield nothing but a discourse about timeless essences.
VII., Conclusion
In an interview I held with Vittorio Gregotti in August 2000, he described
phenomenology and idealism as the main currents structuring the 1950s Italian
architectural debate.89 The two positions were for him necessarily opposed, because
88 The Palermo Declaration call~ for a return to a pre-industrial city.. rejects originality and modern
techniques for the organization of city form. See Leon Krier.. Pier Luigi Nicolin, Angelo Villa, Maurice
Culot and Antoine Grumbach, uLa oeclaration de Palerme,'" in Archives d'Architecture Moderne, n. 14,
1978, P 7.
89 UArgan euno storieD dell'arte che sta in mezzo a [due] scuole di storia dell'arte: runa crociana, e I"altra,
piu influenzata dalla filosofia tedesea, che era quella da cui Argan dipendeva. Da Venturi a Argan, questo
era, diciamo, un filone diverso. Cia' 10 si vedeva persino nel suo modo di scrivere, nonostante la sua
scritura fosse evidentemente piu sullo stile della tilosofia tedesca. Poi invece, se lei legge gli altri Crociani,
Zevi compreso tTa i grandi architetti, la lora ritlessione edi un'altra natura persino anche del punta di vista
stilistico." Vittorio Gregotti .. conversation with the author, Milan, 30 June 2000.
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they were by two conflicting intellectual traditions, on the one hand, Italian Idealism, and
on the other French Phenomenology. Gregotti's assessment must not be confused with
the by now common view that architects "apply" an "original" philosophy, and that in
doing so they perfonn some degree of violence to it by vulgarizing it. The life and v\'ork
of the circle of architects and philosophers around Casabella from the mid 1950s to the
1960s offers a completely different reality. What we witness is a small but vel)'
influential group centered on the figures of Emesto Rogers and Enzo Paci, who shared
theoretical and ideological tenets, and who would go on to become major players in
architectural culture of the 19608 and 1970s.9o
In tum, Paci and his students were convinced that philosophy had to affect
culture, and they involved themselves directly in aesthetic practices like architecture,
contributing articles to professional journals, and offering their (sometimes unsolicited)
opinion on projects. Paci and Rogers even collaborated in the design for the History of
Italian Science exhibition in Milan's Palazzo Reale.91 Rogers and his circle believed
architecture to be as much of an intellectual practice as it was aesthetic. In this unusual if
not unique chapter in the history of dialogues between architecture and philosophy,
architects not only welcomed the philosophers, but engaged them on equal footing, and
challenge them. The result was a fertile joint project to redefine the intellectual claims of
architecture as well as the practical role of philosophy.
90 Giulio Carlo Argan, would be the future mayor of Rome for the communist part~ Giancarlo De Carlo,
arl;hitect, would join Team X and be one of its principal spokesman; Vittorio Gregotti, architect, after his
membership in the shortlived Gruppo '63 he would go on to become one of the major figures of Italian
architecture; Gae Aulenti, became one of Europe's most renowned architects (and one of the few high
profile women in practice) after she won the competition to remodel the 19th-century GaTe d' Orsay into
the present Musee d'Orsay (1980-86).
91 Ezio Bonfanti and Marco Porta, , Citta, Museo e Achitettura: II Gruppo BBPR nella cultura architettonica
italiana 1932-1970, (Firenze: Vallechi, 1973)'1 p A91.
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Their common work found its sources in French existentialism '8 emphasis on
lived experience as the source of reason, and on action as an expression of commitment.
Their common Marxist background strengthened their relationship to Sartre,92 whose
thinking was particularly popular with the young European post-war generation because
of its insistence on politics and because of its demand that people should reject 'bad faith'
(leading lives according to the false conventions of society) and opt instead for
'authentic' existence. Sartre~s existentialism contrasted sharply with the anns-Iength
politics of Croce. Sartle contributed to youth sub-culture of the 50s by encouraging
individuals to express themselves through their actions, to take responsibility for those
actions, and to have a strong sense of political commitment.93 Italian architectural
discourse would assimilate the Sartrean issue of commitment in two distinct ways:
Architects (mostly of the higher echelons of society) would become committed to
building for the lower classes, and would express their renewed responsibility to the
environment -in more phenomenological circles, this would be more explicitly a
responsibility towards the life-world.94
Undoubtedly, Sartre's international reputation facilitated the acceptance of Paci's
and Rogers' work, in Italy and the world. But the impact and breadth of their work
cannot be reduced to a mere side effect of Sartre. Paci was the only existentialist of the
1950s to bring phenomenology directly to architects, proposing the re-foundation of
architecture through Husserl's phenomenology, in the pre-categorical realms of
92 Notwithstanding his objections to Marx (which were mostly directed towards Marx's "materialist
metaphysics"), Sartre's existentialism is basically Marxist in its social implications. For instance" he
accepts Marx's conception of the class struggle.
93 Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958
- c.1974, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)" p 293.
94 See for example Ernesto N. Rogers, "Le Responsabilita Verso La Tradizione," in Casabella Continuita,
n. 202 (August-September 1954), pp 1-3.
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intentionality and lived experience. Paci made available a much-needed new conception
of engaged architectural politics, whereby the every-day practice of architecture becomes,
not just moral and political action, but the vehicle through which he believed the foons of
a new reason could emerge. Moreover, Paci's call for an authentic architectural praxis,
where reason emerges through concrete life projects, provided a way out of the r~rceived
exhaustion of rationalism. Paci claimed that the 1950s crisis of rationality was in fact a
disaggregating of past forms of the life-world, and that the life-world was calling forth a
new synthesis, a new form or thinking and of architecture. He saw his own philosophy as
that new synthesis and Rogers architecture as its artistic equivalent. Rogers architectural
synthesis rested on the foundation of the originality and authenticity of the life -world, and
on the ability of architects to live authentically by heeding thecall for new fonn of the
life-world. For Paci, the contemporary constellation of the crisis invested the modes of
the architectural project, inevitably, with the modes of reason of philosophy, and vice
versa.
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The phenomenological re-articulation of modernism was furthered by the
successful union of philosophy and architecture, in defiance of Croce's objections..
When, Paci and Rogers introduced immediacy in experience as the only true foundation
for new architectural fonn, they shifted the emphasis of design from a scholastic
adherence to shapes of the past to a more open ended subjective re -interpretation of the
past as understood from the perspective of the present. Between 1953 and 1964,
Milanese architects lay claim to history in the pages of Casabella in a rather articulate
9S This is, according to Salvatore Veca, one of Paci's more significant contributions to architecture. See
Salvatore Veca, "Un Filosofo e I'Architettura: Enzo Paci," 10 Casabella, "Casabella Cinquant'anni 1928-
1978," n. 440-441 (October-November 1978), pp 73-74.
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and coherent fashion, as the material with which they also worked. But, a',vay from the
highly intellectual architectural circles of Milan, the international community quickly
dropped the nuances of phenomenological analysis.
In dealing with the major themes of post-war modernism, Paci and Rogers
effectively re-defined the very notion of architectural practice as the potential source of
collective self-consciousness and rationality. But their understanding of practice did not
last, and the idea of authentic experience was soon be demoted to an excuse for architects
to abandon intellectual aspirations and ignore historical reality~ In all fairness, it must be
noted that neither Paci nor Rogers ever really demonstrated the phenomenological
method of achieving authentic experience systematically in their architectural essays.
More often than not, instead of building up from an apodictic experience to the level of
complexity and interdependency of architectural science, they asked architects to simply
drop scientific speculation and opt instead to rely on poetic visions for their practice. This
generated the by now common argument by architects that their subjective experience
(usually presented through a few analytic sketches) grants them the necessary command
of history, the vernacular, the territory, and the city to design appropriately. The
repercussions of this position are still felt today, in the desperate attempts between
architectural intellectuals (theorists, historians) and practitioners (architects proper), to
operate independently of each other, while operating inside each other, and in the general
disappearance of a discourse on social commitment from avant-garde practice.
The importance of Casabella Continuita in disseminating Paci's and Roger's
thinking cannot be understated. It allowed them, as we have seen, to help infuse the
international post-war discourse of architecture with a very particular understanding of
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how the immediate lived experience of an authentic Life-world could help bring about a
new architecture, out of the crisis of the old. The reception of their postulates, which
often overlooked their epistemological model, opened modem architecture to new
problems, which remain alive today: the nature of history and tradition, the oon-
transcendence of reason, the relationship of theory and practice, the spatial and temporal
rigidity and fluidity of form, the fusion of culture and environment, the ethical
responsibility of architects to both society and environment, and, perhaps most
importantly, the diffusion of individual subjectivity into the world and into collective
consciousness.
The persistence of the crisis of modernity in the present attests to the fact that
Paci's and Rogers' contribution did not succeed in resolving it, but it did alter its
structure fundamentally. The strategy of working phenomenology inside architecture, as
its philosophical foundation, is its greatest strength and most vulnerable weakness. It
allowed the concepts of life-world and experiential immediacy to "feed" on, or be
introduced in the shadow of existing theories of architectural expression and perception.
By shaping itself to the fonn of architectural problems its own accents became almost
unrecognizable. But here again, the moment when phenomenology appeared to have
surrendered to architecture was the instant when it had the greatest strength because it
made everything under the sun appear in its image.
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We are living in a country which is the richest of all in availabilities, if we were to
speak up. And I am glad we don't, because as soon as we tecome conscious of it,
it'll be as ruinous as McCarthy, who spoiled our true consciousness, our sense of
democracy. He tried to define it and called for sides to be held, to be counted, and
therefore destroyed the beauty of what democracy could be. And we're suffering
to this day because of the attempt to isolate, you know, the qualities of
democracy.
Louis I. Kahn I
I.. Introduct;~n: Antl-Avant-Garde, Neo-Avant-Garde and McCarthylsm
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed at Sing Sing prison in 1953, the first
American civilians to be put to death during peacetime on charges of espionage. The
evidence for their conviction, which alleged that they had passed atomic secrets to the
USSR, was so scant that even Pope Pius XII had joined the international community in
pleas for executive clemency, but President Harry S. Truman turned them down in 1952
(as did President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953). Truman could not afford to appear lax.
In 1949, while American supported factions were fighting Korean communists, China
"fell" to Mao Zedong's anny. That same year, news arrived that the USSR had carried
out an atomic explosion. The idea that the Soviets had "the bomb" terrified Americans,
many of \vhom took to building nuclear fall-out shelters in their back yards. On March
22, 1947, Truman, under pressure from the republican controlled 80th Congress, issued
Executive Order 9835, which put in effect a new loyalty-security program for federal
employees meant to weed out communists and other dissidents. As a result, anti -
Communism became the official policy of the United States. Federal employees had to
undergo political background checks from the FBI, which were often based on specious
1 Louis I. Kahn, "1973: Brooklyn, New York," in Louis I. Kahn: Writings. Lectures, lntervie»'s, 00.
Alessandra latour, (New York: Rizolli International Publications, Inc., 1991), P 329. This lecture, delivered
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reports from undisclosed informants, and which could result in thea dismissal. The
Rosenbergs were mortal victims of what came to be known as the American "Red Scare."
Inflamed by the execution, Jean Paul Sartre wrote an article in the French newspaper
Liberation accusing the American people of succumbing to fascism:
You've allowed the United States to become the cradle of a new fascign
[... ] fascism is defined not by the number of its victims but its way of
killing them [... ] you have quite simply tried to stop the progress of
science by a human sacrifice [... ] your country is sick with fear. 2
The discriminatory practices of Truman's Federal Employee Loyalty Program
soon spread to state governments and to the private sector. Political tests became
common to screen individuals for anything from a passport to a fishing license.
University jobs were no exception. After all, the Rosenbergs, like many other young
Americans, had become members of the Communist Party while in college. The image of
the college professor as a Left-wing demagogue acquired increased currency. Once
perceived as a safe haven for liberal ideals and academic freedom, the university became
suspect as the breeding ground of dissidents. But precisely because its legitimacy as an
institution had been built around its intellectual autonomy, universities found themselves
in a paradoxical position: They had to maintain the appearance of objectivity and
fairness, while at the same time evincing a sense of political spotlessness before the
community. That is, they had to "clean the house" of communists and "fellow travelers,"
without appearing discriminatory.
at Pratt Institute in the Fall of 1973 was vriginally published in Perspecta 19: The Yale Architectural
Journal, (1982), pp 89-100.
2 Sartre's article appeared in Liberation on June 22, 1953, as uLes Animaux malades de la rage." In his
biography of Sartre, Ronald Hayman noted Sartre's Soviet bias. In order to chastise the United States,
Sartre was willing to ignore the Stalinist purges in the USSR. Raymon Aron, Sartre's college friend and
colleague, commented that this text belonged to the literature of hyper-Stalinism. See Ronald Hayman,
Sartre: A Biography, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p 310.
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The administrative procedures that ensued to silently cany out these purges have
been widely documented.3 The cultural substrate of affmnation and consensus was as
much a part of university life as of any other aspect of American life from the early 1940s
to the early 1960s. Professors of architecture, who often doubled their academic careers
with professional practices, were never far from the sensibilities of the communities they
served. How did these pressures affect architectural education in general? I will argue
that the conditions of the Cold War helped entrench a particularly American form of anti-
intellectualism within architectural pedagogy, which pitted the mind against feeling, on
account of the belief that it was inconsistent with wann emotion, against practicality,
upholding theory to be the nemesis of practice, against character, on the grounds that the
intellect was prone to wickedness, and against democracy, since to be an intellectual was
deemed to be a type of gentlemanly distinction offensive to AmeriGln egalitarianism.
The broad cultural acceptance of these stereotypes made the understanding of
architecture as an intuitive practice, concerned mainly with the human emotions, to
mushroom unchallenged. Its basic tenets constituted the fiber of what in the late I970s
would be referred to as a "phenomenological attitude" towards architecture. Indeed,
many of the architects who resisted the late 20th century emergence of a theoretical
consciousness in their schools, began invoking phenomenology (without necessarily
3 I have found the following books very helpful in understanding the complexities of the American
postwar's cultural and political situation: Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tov..'er: McCarthyism and the
Universities, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Noam Chomsky et al. • The Cold War and The
University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years<j (New York: The New Press, 1997); Alan
Charles Kors and Harvey A. Silverglate, The Shadow University: The Betrayal ofLiberty on America's
Campuses, (New York, London, Toronto, Singapore: The Free Press, 1998); Peter Novick, That Noble
Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession, (Cambridge
[Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in
American Life, (New York: Knopf, 1963).
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carrying out a sustained study of the philosophy) as a means to quickly give the necessary
credence and intellectual legitimacy against the challenges of young new scholars.
During the 1950s, significant sections of American architectural education
became concerned with the systematic demotion of the intellect as a means to encourage
the realignment of the profession with the reactionary sensibilities of the American post
war heartland. When seen in the light of McCarthyism and the Cold Waf, the emergence
of Postmodernism in the United States reveals a soft underbelly of reactionary politics
beneath the surface of a circwnspect interest in the "vernacular" and the "popular." It is
impossible to divorce the attacks on Modem architecture, as introduced by European
exiles teaching at elite universities, with the attempt to assert the supremacy of America's
white cultural folklore, religious values, and political traditions. The well -known
lashings against the cosmopolitanism, social experimentalisn, and skepticism of
Modernism's architectural intelligentsia drew much of their force from the anti-modem
discourse from America's small town Protestant culture, which since the early twentieth
century had constructed its self-image as the bulwark of American values. Since its
zenith in the anti-evolution crusade of the 1920s, this traditionalizing axis of American
Protestantism had been on the slide on account of its inability to find moderate ways of
putting its programs to action. The Cold War, however, offered this ideology a new lease
on life. During the early years of the Cold War, the anti-modernist strands of
Protestantism were channeled and s~cularized into a political machinery that suffused its
anti-intellectual values within other economic, racist, and nationalist fundamentalisms.
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What McCarthyism presented as the persecution of Communism was in reality the
satisfaction of old-fashioned fundamentalist zeal on the political plane.4
The great 1950s shake down of the American university system is yet to be fully
documented. Although some inroads have been made in the case of philosophy and
history,S its full impact on architectural education has thus far not been documented. Nor
is it likely that a full accounting can be made for some time. Many universities keep
personnel records closed for 75 years.
Architectural education "adjusted" to the McCarthyite repression of liberalism by
in essence affinning architecture's autonomy from culture and history, or so I will argue.
An axis developed, within the Modernist avant-garde circles themselves that sought to
salvage the practice of Modernism by emptying it of its socialist and refonnist rhetoric,
and replacing it with more circumspect discourses of either "quantification" or
'~spiritualization." Those educators tugging in the direction of "quantification" attempted
to modify the Modernist stress on "refolTI1" into an emphasis on "research," as they
carried out narrowly defmed "scientific" pursuits of truth. For instance, in 1952,
Alexander Chermayeff, a professor at Harvard University's Graduate School of Design,
began a search for "true statements about a house." With the help of his assistant
Christopher Alexander, he reduced the definition of design to pennutations of logical
types. By the early 1960s, both men had secured sufficient federal funds to buy time at
MIT's new IBM 704 computer and produce some of the first automated designs in the
world. A different response to McCarthyism came from the professorate pulling towards
4 Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New York: Knopf, 1963), P 134
5 Most relevant to the present work are John McCumber's, Time in the Ditch.: American Philosophy and the
McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 200 I), and Peter Novick, That Noble
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"spiritualization." They cloaked education in the mantle of a culture that smaked of
monastic piety. Architectural training was to them the study of a quasi-divine mystery as
revealed in earthly appearances, a "calling" which involved shedding the "baggage" of
"lower" fonns of socially or historically constructed knowledge. In 1953, \vhile speaking
about the need to elevate architectural education from its secular professionalism, Louis I.
Kahn famously stated: "I studied at the University of Pennsylvania and, although I can
still feel the spiritual aspects of that training, I have spent all my time since graduation
unlearning what I learned.,,6
Although these two responses to the early years of the Cold War are clearly
identifiable, they rarely appeared in pure fonn, so to speak. More often than not,
proponents of the scientific pursuit of truth in architecture justified it in spiritualizing
tenns, and those advancing the "spiritualization" of architectural education developed
complex methods for testing spiritual experiences that also gave the appearance of
scientific research. Thus, Kenneth Rexroth could claim that Chermayeff's goal was to
scientifically produce houses for private family prayer, and Kahn could "objectively"
assert that bricks wanted to be arches. 7
The critique that emerged in the mid 1960s of Modernism's scientific claims is
well documented in the canon of architectural textbooks. Those histories have correctly
linked the specious claims of 19508 architectural scientism to the "rationalist" legacy of
1920s and 1930s avant-gardes, and criticized Modernism as a whole for being blinded by
Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession, (Cambridge
[Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
6 Louis I. Kahn in Architecture and the University: Proceedings ofa Conference Held at Princeton
University, December Eleventh and Twelfth. Nineteen Hundred Fifty-Three, (Princeton, NJ: School of
Architecture, Princeton University, 1954), p 27.
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a naive utopianism. However, the spiritualizing thrust of Cold War Modernism did not
suffer the same fate. One reason for this was that, unlike architectural scientism, the
spiritualizing impetus of Modernism emerged largely in opposition to agents of change
such as reason, science, and technology. In essence, and to varying degrees of
orthodoxy, it catered to middle-American constituencies which, since the New Deal, had
expressed anxieties about the destruction of their traditional ways of!ife by those
"experts" and "liberals" allegedly in control of decisions to modernize the nation.
Under the new banner of a Postmodern style, Modernism's old spiritualism would
walk hand in hand with 1960s and 1970s structuralist critiques of Modernism. This is in
a sense not surprising since both opposed the "universalizing" tendencies of Modern
rationalism. However, whereas academic critiques would try to de-center the totalizing
claims of rationalism, Modern spiritualism would simply substitute "reason" for "the
sour' as the essential source of the new, thus replacing one type of universalism with
another. The challenge to this spiritual form of Modem essentialism came only in the
1980s with the arrival of deconstruction to architectural discourse.
The coexistence of structuralism and spiritualizing Modernism was also made
possible by their common fascination with the early-twentieth century avant-garde. The
neo-avant-garde pretensions of structuralists resulted in a series of rigorous intellectual
examinations that historicized and relativized the claims of the early European avant-
garde. These 1970s revisions (which were convergent with intellectual assaults on
"modernity'" and "objectivity" that swept acruss university departments, from literary
studies to mathematics) were carried out by a new class of intellectuals who, although
7 See Kenneth Rexroth's introduction to Serge Chermayeff and Christopher Alexander, Community and
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trained professionally as architects, had committed themselves completely to the
academy. Groups such as the Conference of Architects for the Study of Environments
(CASE) or the later Institute for Architecture and Urbanism (lAD) helped crystallize this
growing theoretical, historical, an,j scholarly consciousness inside architectural
pedagogy. In contradistinction to the structuralist attempt to revive a type of avant-garde
intellectual architectural practice, the spiritualizing fonn of Modernism constructed its
image in opposition to the avant-garde. This anti-avant-garde was thus boisterous,
populist, anti-intellectual, spiritual, and hostile to all academic and scientific pretensions.
Few of the architects who embraced it had an explicit theoretical or philosophical model
of its precepts, but what the French call the vulgate anonyme was all the more powerful
for not being systematically articulated.
With the arrival of the first batches of newly minted Ph.D.s in architectural
theory, history, and criticisnl during the late 1970s, the face of architectural education
took a tum towards scholarly rigor, and more competitive tenure requirements. Only then
did the anti-avant-garde tum to phenomenology as a "theoretical" mask in order to
acquire the necessary academic stature to be worthy of publication. The claim that
phenomenology was a late 1960s nomenclature used to denote the ongoing life of a
spiritualizing movement begun in the 1950s within Modernism itself raises a series of
questions. Why did architects tum to phenomenology and not, say, analytic philosophy?
Were there ideas in the philosophy itself that were given to anti-intellectualism? To
answer these questions it is important to expand the limits of conventional intellectual
history to also include the social histories of architecture and philosophy. Yes, these
Privacy, (Garden City" NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963).
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architects were indeed drawn to the critique of rationalism and objectivity they found in
phenomenology. They found echoes of the late Modernist attentiveness to human
emotions in the phenomenological notion that the full 'taking in' of reality occurred as a
function of both feeling and intellect. But similar notions can also be found in other
philosophies, such as pragmatism.
The social history of phenomenology in the United States helps cast light on this
matter. As a function of their inability to enter mainstream philosophy depal1ments,
American phenomenologists turned aggressively towards aesthetic disciplines, looking
first to European literature departments, and then, as early as the 1970s, to architecture.
The difficulties they experienced in securing jobs resulted in a sec tarian and embattled
mentality that resembled the derision architectural anti-intellectuals felt towards the
university. As phenomenologists turned towards architecture, they were fIrst welcomed
by those architects furthest from the intellectual center ofthe discipline.
By the mid 1980s, the persistence of these contacts resulted in the frrst
architectural critiques of phenomenology. These were, I will argue, not critiques of
phenomenology at all, but rather attempts at excising from within postmodemism the by
then quite visible spiritualized facet of Modernism. As such, they represented
postmodemism's push in the ongoing attempt to purge itself of the ghost of Modernism.
The invocation of phenomenology in the publications and pedagogical practices
of the anti-avant-garde often involved the erroneous identification of their misgivings
about the intellect with the critique of reason common to most phenomenological
philosophers. 1970s contacts with phenomenology occurred at a consistently superficial
level, leaving anti-intellectualism in architecture, with its stereotypical assumptions about
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the mind, unchanged at its core. American architects rarely engaged in a careful study of
phenomenology, but they did invite phenorllenologists to participate in architectural
discourse and pedagogy -some of these philosophers reached powerful academic
positions in architecture, like Robert Mugerauer, current dean of the architecture school
at the University of Washington. This systematic superficiality was not ameliorated by
the philosophers who, in writing or speaking to architectural audiences, often presented
phenomenology as the solution to the perceived crisis of Modem architecture. 8 American
phenomenologists, who perceived themselves as the marginalized victims of mainstream
analytic philosophy (which to this day dominates philosophy departments), tried
desperately to retain their new architectural audiences. More often than not,
phenomenologists presented only the bare bones of their philosophy limiting its scope to
a few bullet points about Heidegger's critique oftechno]ogy, or about how Merleau-
Ponty's embodied consciousness challenged the "disembodied Cartesian mind" of
modernist architects. Although these philosophers can in no way be said to share the anti-
intellectualism of the architects they ultimately joined forces with, the two groups shared
a marked sectarianism, an embattled frustration with their respective disciplines, a
devotional belief that their work was in the service of some higher truth (w hich remained
hidden to the uninitiated), and a proselytizing pedagogy which promised salvation from
the evils of modernity through conversion.
8 It is worth noting that some philosophers, especially during the 1980s, did make an attempt to offer a
more nuanced account of phenomenology. A good example is Edward Casey who not only contributed
some early essays to architectural journals on the value of Husserl's eidetic variation to design" but also
attempted to re-orient phenomenology towards the more theory-friendly New York avant-garde at the time
when architects such as Bernard Tschumi and Peter Eisenman became interested in Jacques Derrida's
philosophy of deconstruction. See the concluding chapter of this dissertation in which I discuss the
extensions into the present of phenomenology's career wjthin architectural discourse.
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By the mid 1980s the word "phenomenology" had entered the common parlance
of architects across the United States. In spite of its tongue-twister pronunciation, the
tenn turned up frequently in student journals, conference proceedings, newsletters and
professional magazines as the accepted nomenclature for atype of anti-intellectual low-
brow design approach, which stressed piety towards the material world and the
attunement of "interior" self with "outward" reality. The sudden popularity of a tenn
with such philosophical (read intellectual) pedigree in architectural circJes across the
United States could be initially misread as a sudden nation-wide conversion to high
thought. Much to the contrary, this chapter will argue that phenomenology served as a
fa~ade to give academic credibility to the architectural expression of America's cultural
misgivings towards intellectuals.
II. "Conventlcules" and Little societies: a social history of
phenomenology's Initial inroads Into the antl-avant-garde.
A. Disciplinary Marginalization: architects and phenomenologists
on the fringes of academe.
The early introduction of phenomenol~icalthought in American architecture
schools was caught in the framework of the internationalist "one-world" spirit of the
post-war years, a time when American universities began regularly sponsoring European
intellectuals on lecture tours and visiting teaching appointments. These efforts were
encouraged and supported by government initiatives like the Fulbright Program, which
was established in 1946 with the aim of "increasing mutual understanding between the
people of the United States and other countries, through the exchange of persons,
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knowledge, and skilIs.,,9 Christian Norberg-Schulz, for instance, attended Harvard
University between 1952 and 1953 on one such Fulbright grant. As scholars across
disciplines expressed their fervent enthusiasm in cross-continental dialogues, so called
"international" journals increased in circulation, and books emerged aimed at bridging
intellectual divides. The Division of Humanities of the Rockefeller Foundation funded
scholarship that promised to bridge intellectual divides, and financed its simultaneous
publication in various European languages. Some of these books, such as Philosophic
Thought in France and the United States (1950, published in French and English), helped
raise awareness of Phenomenology in this country.
Emesto N. Rogers and Enrico Peresutti, whose design philosophy as partners in
the Milanese BBPR group had developed in dialogue with phenomenology, were among
those European "stars" to become involved in American architectural education at this
early stage. In 1952, Enrico Peresutti began his decade long teaching career in the United
States with an appointment at MIT. tO Rogers's 1955-1956 lecture tour included venues
such as Harvard, Berkeley, University of Oregon at Eugene, Ann Arbour, Clemson,
Blacksburg, Yale, and Minneapolis. At the end of the tour, he was named honorary
member of the American Institute of Architects. Rogers's reputation preceded him, for in
1951, Walter Gropius had proposed him as one of three candidates to inherit the head of
the architecture school at Harvard. I I A few years earlier, Jean-Paul Sartre had made his
9 The Fulbright Program, United States Department OfState Bureau OfEducational And Cultural Affair~
(August 19, 2001), http://www.iie.org/fulbright/overview.htm.
10 Ezio Bonfanti and Marco Porta, Citta, Museo e Achitettura: II Gruppo BBPR nella cultura architetton;ca
italiana 1932-1970, (Firenze: Vallechi, 1973), p A 139.
11 Rogers returned to the United States in 1959 to spend the academic year teaching an Italian culture class
at UCLA.. Berkeley. In 1961 he returned to present a lecture at Columbia University on Le Corbusier, and
in 1962 he lectured on Olivetti, again at Berkeley. During this period, on account of his worsening health,
he declined offers to teach at MIT, Harvard, and Yale. Ernesto Rogers, Louis Kahn, Alvar Aalto,
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flfst lecture tour of the United States. Between December 1945 and March 1946, Sartre
spoke at Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, and Carnegie Hall. But there is no
evidence that American architects took notice of Sartre. The fact that Sartre delivered his
addresses in French and without translators did not help. More importantly, he had been
invited on account of his popularity as an author of novels and plays, and his trip
sponsored mostly by French literature professors (with the exception of the lecture at
Carnegie Hall which was sponsored by Charles Henri Ford, editor of the avant-garde
literary magazine View).12
The circumscription of SaTtre's audience to littyary circles was not simply a
function of the language barrier, nor of a perception among philosophers that his thinking
was "soft,,,13 nor of a simple lack of worldliness of architects. There were important
cultural and political issues that compromised hi s philosophy in the eyes of Americans,
and worked against the more academic efforts to introduce it. Sartre was a staunch
Marxist, a belief that made him more dangerous than a simple "egghead," as conselVative
Americans often called intellectuais. 14 Sartre made no secret of his politics, openly
Markelius, and Kenzo Tange served together in the World Academy of Art and Science, Architecture and
Urbanism section, since 1962. See: Ibid. pp A 141- A 142.
12 Ann Fulton, Apostles ofSartre: Existentialism in America, 194.5 -1963.. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1999), p 25.
13 These reasons are summoned by Ann Fulton in Apostles ofSartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963,
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999). Otherwise a well researched and comprehensive
piece of scholarship on Sartre in the United States, the book fails to take stock of how the charged political
climate of the 19505 impacted Sartre's appeal to American audiences.
14 Louis Bromfield, a popular right-wing novelist, issued a mockingly derisory definition of the term
"egghead," which exemplified the more general cultural perception of intellectuals as pretentious,
conceited, effeminate, snobbish, immoral, dangerous, and subversive:
Egghead: A person of spurious intellectual pretensions, often a professor of the protege of
a professor. Fundamentally superficial. Over-enlotional and feminine in reactions to any
problem. Supercilious and surfeited with conceit and contempt for the experience of more
sound and able men. Essentially confused in though and immersed in mixture of
sentimentality and violent evangelism. A doctrinaire supporter of Middle-European
socialism as opposed to Greco-French-American ideas of democracy and liberalism.
Subject to the old-fashioned philosophical morality of Nietzsche which frequently leads
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criticizing France's colonialism and protesting against the United States' foreign policy,
and "dividing himself," as one of his biographers put it, "between political controversy
and journeyman writing.,,15 He often chose his literary work for its pc1itical content. -a
case in point was his 1955 decision to work on a screen version of Arthur Miller's play
The Crucible, which associated the McCarthyite persecutions with witch-hunting in
seventeenth-century Salem.
By the same token, the political past of Emesto Rogers and Enrico Peresutti, both
fonner members of the Partito d'Azione, was a difficult hurdle for their work in
American architecture schools. Before their arrival in the United States, Rogers and
Peresutti had already curtailed their political views to discussions within a small group of
friends gathered around the Marxist industrialist ol«\driano Olivetti. Their finn's work
during the 1950s was characterized by an "exalted abandonment to the immediacy of
gesture without adequate conveyance on the plane of consciousness.,,16 The critical
evasion implicit in the surrender of design to the immediacy of experience was a response
to the "crumbling of ideals" on the political and professional spheres. 17 Italian
intellectuals felt as thought they had failed to articulate their wartime experiences into a
coherent program for political action. Rogers and Peresutti (along with many other
Italian architects) attempted to sublimate this sentiment by constructing "culture" as an
ethical and political battlefield where architecture "still mattered." But this concern with
culture, Rogers would later accept, was partly a frustrated attempt to make up for the
him into jail or disgrace. A self-conscious prig, so given to examining all sides of a
question that he becomes thoroughly addled while remaining always in the same spot. An
anemic bleeding heart.
Louis Bromfield, nThe Triumph of the Egghead," in The Fteeman, v. In (December 1, 1952), P 158.
IS Ronald Hayman, Sarlre: A Biography, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p 322.
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collective failure of Italian partisans and of the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (
Committee of National Liberation, or CLN) members to carry out the "renewal of
society" they had both envisioned and promised. 18 The retreat of the Rogers, Banfi,
Belgiojoso, and Peresutti towards the stability of private conversations, and private
commissions, was characteristic of the Milanese postwar cultural milieu, which was
acutely aware not only of its own failures but of that of liberals and intellectuals in the
United States and Russia. rfhe world appeared to them condemned to become a
consensual hell governed by "organizational men." As architect Elio Vittorini recalled,
by 1952 Italian architects were confronted with serious questions:
Was the Zdanov operation in Russia really finished? Was the McCarthy
operation in America really succeeding? This was the darkness of the years
around '52. In conclusion, man seemed indeed destined to become the monstrous
integral 'functionary' prefigured ill Hegel's romanticism. 19
The real failure of Italian politics, argued Vittorini, was that it stood perplexed
before fascism's appropriation of culture as the inalienable "thing," as the rallying cry
that gave strength to the murderous excesses of fundamentalism. 20 The burden, then, was
16 My translation. Ezio Bonfanti and Marco Porta~ Citra, Museo e Achitettura: II Gruppo BBPR nella
cultura architettonica italiana 1932-1970, (Firenze: Vallechi, 1973), p 129.
17 Ibid. pp 90-91, 129-130.
18 Emesto N. Rogers, "Continuita:' in Esperienza dell'architettura, (Milan: Giulio Einaudi editore, 1958),
pp t30-133. Rogers originally published this article in Casabella -Continuita, n. t99, (January 1954)~ his
first editorial to inaugurate the new series. The comments on the CLN were added as a postscript for the
book publication.
19 My translation of Elio Vittorini, as quoted in Ezio Bonfanti and Marco Porta, Citta, Museo e Achitettura:
II Gruppo DBPR nella cultura architettonica italiana 1932-1970, (Firenze: Vallechi, 1973), p 1300.
20 "Di chi ela sconfitta pili grave in tuno questo che eaccaduto? ... E se ora milioni di bambini sono stati
uccisi, se tanto che era sacro estato 10 stesso colpito e distrutto, la sconfitta eanzitutto di questa 'cosa' che
ci insegnava J'inviolabilita loro... Questa 'cosa' voglio dire subito, non ealtm che la cullura... non vi e
delitto commesso dal fascismo che questa cultura aveva insegato ad esecrare gia da tempo, non dobbiamo
chiedere propio a questa cultura come e perche il fascismo a potuto commeterii?" See Elio Vittorini, "Una
nuova cultura," in II Politecnico, n.l (September 29, 1945), P 1. These remarks about culture, which
Vittorini made in the first number of II Politecnico (the journal he directed for the famous publisher
Einaudi between September 1945 and December 1945) were to crystallize. according to Bonfanti and
Porta, the aspirations of the Italian intelligentsia coming out of the struggle for liberation. See Ezio
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on intellectuals of the postwar to understand culture, to appropriate it and define it so as
to execrate its misconstrued (idealist) distortions. The attention given in Italy to "reality"
across disciplines was commanded by this dictate to recapture culture. For the members
of the BBPR, Husserl's (and Paci's) "return to things themselves" rung harmoniously
with the new political necessity to return to culture.
Fig: Enrico Peresuttl with Princeton University students (Including Charles
Moore) In the Yucatan, Mexico. From Kevin P. Kelm, An Architectural Life:
Memoirs and Memories of Charles W. Moo~ (Boston, New York, Toronto,
and London: Bulflnch Press Book! Little, Brown and Company, 1996), p 58.
By 1952, when Peresutti took up his first teaching appointment at MIT, the rising
fundamentalism of conservative Protestantism was claiming sovereignty over American
culture, and calling upon defenders of good old American values to join in the struggle
against communists and liberals." Peresutti, whose alertness to the surreptitious nature of
fascism had been sharpened by his years as a partisan, warned his students about the
political importance of this (now American) struggle over culture. He called upon them
Bonfanti and Marco Porta, Citta, Museo e Achitettura: Il Gruppo BBPR nella cultura architettonica
italiana 1932-1970, (Firenze: Vallechi, 1973), p 91.
21 For more on this phenomenon, which Richard Hofstadter referred to as the rise of Protestant orthodoxy in
America, see his Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New York: Knopf, 1963), p 124.
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to hold on to "reality" and to keep a vigilant watch over culture. 22 In the Italian context,
Peresutti had attempted to solder postwar culture by appealing to both the "stable" past of
"spontaneous architecture" and to the open-mindedness of Milanese late 19th century
cosmopolitanism. But what past were American architects to hang on to? Folk
architecture in the United States was associated precisely with the type of Protestant
culture whose more orthodox factions were now clamoring against intellectuals.
Peresutti's pleas were answered (or so his students thought) by Lewis Mumford's
Bay Region Style.23 Mumford had attempted to salvage the American vernacular by
differentiating it from the "rural folk" and from Protestantism, and by linking it to a more
cosmopolitan notion of the 19th century suburb. Striking back on defense of intellectuals,
Mumforri went as far as to blame the uneducated as well as Protestant ethics for reducing
"reality" to a singular ideal. Their reductivism, he maintained, had seriously hampered
the critical mechanisms of scientific theory, therefore eliminating resistances to Modem
technology's degradation of the environment.24 The Bay Region Style, as Mumford
22 On Peresutti's pedagogical insistence that his students remain attentive to "reality" see Richard C. Peters,
"Lighting for Moore," in GA Houses, n. 7 ( 1980), pp 143-148.
23 Mumford first coined the tenn in his article "The Skyline [Bay Region Style]," which appeared in The
NewYorker, (October 11, 1947), pp 106, 109.
24 Mumford differentiated between science, with its emphasis on reason and understanding, and technics
which aimed at manipulating and transfonning the world. Science, he argued was positive and could in
fact help discern between good and bad technical applications. Technics was in a sense blind to itself. For
Mumford, the destructive advances in modem technics resulted from ignoring science, that is, from
demoting the intellect. Some attacks against the intellect, such as the challenge to the theological
understanding of the universe were gocxl, argued Mumford, insofar as they gave way to an interest in
nature. Mumford credits the common folk for this advance. ''Their minds were less capable of forging their
own shackles." The rational, common sense interest in nature was a shift from the erudite view of the
world as an expression of a metaphysical beyond. Thanks to those who could not understand the
allegorical significance of the mystic numbers three and four, seven and nine, and twelve~ the world moved
towards scientific mensuration. The second great obstacle to the advance of Modern technics was animism,
which understood all entities in the world as containing a spirit, or an expression of a higher unattainable
truth. This exorcism was the great achievement of the intellect. Animism was overcome by the
imaginative capacity of dissociation. "The specific triumph of the technical imagination rested on the
ability to 1issociate work from the action of men and animals and create the water-mill: to dissociate light
from the combustion of wood and oil and create t he electric lamp." Scientific dissociation was perverted,
continued Mumford, by Protestantism, which made particular facets of the real stand in for reality as a
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defined it, was an attempt to widen the understanding of reality, to promote openness and
heterogeneity, in sum, to resist all "purisms" -aesthetic, ethical, political, or otherwise.2S
Much like Peresutti, Mumford argued, against the political pressures of McCarthyism, for
an inclusive definition of culture. This similarity allowed Charles W. Moore to claim
Peresutti as one of his greatest influences (along with Louis I. Kahn and Jean Labatut) in
shaping his self-image as a "Bay Region" architect.26
whole. In Protestantism he saw the double drive towards abstraction and quantification that came to
characterize both capitalism and technological thinking. Protestantism rested on the abstraction of print and
money, rejected pictorialism and allegorical symbolisms of communal life in order to emphasize
individuality, and endorsed the quantification and accumulation of what it considered reality.
"Life in all sensuous variety and warm delight, was drained out of the Protestant's world of thought: the
organic disappeared. Time was real: keep it! Labor was real: exert it! Money was real: save it! These were
the realities and the imperatives of the middle class philosophy." (p 43) This failure to take reality in as a
whole, gave rise, according to Mumford, to the worst aspects of modem technology. See Lewis Mumford,
Technics and Civilization, (New York and Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963), pp 28-36,
43.
25 Mumford's Bay Region Style has been mostly discussed as a reaction to the International Style, which it
of course was. What I am arguing here is that the note of dissidence it sounded was not simply aimed at
replacing an orthodox style with a more inclusive palette of formal references. It was "neotechnical," as
Mumford elaborated it in other works. It was also a program for a more inclusive civilization, one that
could keep fundamentalisms at bay through intellectual rigor. This was the essence of his definition of
(and call for) "neotechnics," which was not a historical period (like the "eotechnic" and "paleotechnic"),
but rather a form of social and physical organization. See: Ibid.
26 "I started out thinking of myself as a 'Bay Region architect [... ] and then had been swept in tum by
Europe and Japan. I had taught history at Utah, and I carne to Princeton to do a degree in history. So
Peresutti's concern with the past was wonderful. The Idea behind his sketching trips was for us to take
something old and full of context, and then try to put new things in them -but new things that would not be
like imposters, but like those congenial fellow travelers on the train." Charles W. Mooe as quoted in David
Littlejohn, Architect: The L~fe and Work ofCharles W. Moore, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winstct'l,
1984), pp 125-126. It is doubtful, though possible, that Moore invoked the term "fellow traveler" here in
allusion to the term used by McCarthy to refer to communist collaborators.
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Fig: Enrico Peresuttl (left) and Louis I. Kahn (center) with students.
From Kevin P. Kelm, An Architectural Life: Memoirs and Memories of
Charles ~ Moore, (Boston, New York, Toronto, and London: Bulflnch
Press Book! Little, Brown and Company, 1996), p 69.
Philosophers in the early 1950s, and phenomenologists in particular, also came
under the sway of an ideology of purity. A sizable wave of phenomenologists had arrived
in the United States as refugees during the 1940s, and slowly begun to draw interest to
the philosophy.r" Among them were Aron Gurwitsch, Felix Kaufmann (1895-1949),
Fritz Kaufmann (1891-1958), Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), Herbert Spiegelberg (1904-
1990), Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965) and Moritz Geiger. Together with Americans
Harmon Chapman and John Wild (1902-1972), and under the leadership of Dorion
Cairns (1901-1973) and Marvin Farber (b. 1901), they founded the International
27 An earlier origin to American phenomenology can be ascribed to Dorion Cairns and Marvin Farver, who
were sent from Harvard by William Ernest Hocking (1873-1966) to study in Freiburg under Edmund
Husserl during the 1920's. Farber's published dissertation, Phenomenology as a Method and a
Philosophical Discipline (1928), was effectively the first American work on phenomenology. There had
been phenomenologists teaching in the United States prior to that. Winthorp Bell, Husserl's student, had
taught phenomenological value theory at Harvard in the 1920s, where Moritz Geiger had spend had also
taught, in 1907, before becoming a visiting professor at Stanford University in 1926 and 1935. Anattempt
to introduce phenomenology prior to these exchanges had been made, but effectively frustrated by William
James, the famed American Pragmatist so praised by Husserl in the second edition of Logische
Untersuchungen. James advised the would-be publishers of Husserl's book against its publication,
claiming that Americans would not be interested in another German work on Logic. See "Edmund
Husserl," in Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, ed. Lester Embree, et. al., (Dordrecht, Boston, and London:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p 363.
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Phenomenological Society, along with its journal Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, which included prestigious phenomenologists from Europe in its editorial
board, such as Antonio 8anti (1886-1957), Gaston Berger, Eugen Fink, Jean Hering,
Gerhart Husserl (1893-1), and Ludwig Ladgrebe. The society had 231members in 1942,
but its ranks dwindled so much during McCarthyism that it had to cease convening.
Pragmatism, the quintessentially American philosophy with which some of the early
phenomenologists had established a rapport, suffered the same fate. In their place, and to
the practical exclusion of all other philosophical schools, Anglo-centered currents such as
analytic philosophy, logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy established
their hegemony over the academy. During the 1950s, only the New S~hool for Social
Research in New York offered Ph.D.s in phenomenology, under the tutelage of Schutz,
Cairns, and Gurwitsch.28
Why did phenomenology become so undesirable, so fast? Sartre's acid criticism
of America certainly did not help. But more importantly, phenomenologists were unable
to "adjust" to the demands of the changing political climate. McCarthyite forces were
turning the persecution of Communism's alleged falsehood and mendacity into a
generalized intolerance for professors who did not "speak the truth." The mood of
caution and self-censorship that presided over American life in the late 1940s and 1950s
made this notion of "truth" congenial to a narrowly reduced, highly idealized,
depoliticized and dehistoricized "objective" knowledge.29 As American philosopher John
McCumber put it, the discourse of truth in McCarthyism relied on "a simple dichotomy:
28 Lester Embree, James M. Edie, Don Ihde, Joseph Kockelmans, and Calvin O. Schrag, ''United States of
America," in Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology, 00. Lester Embree, et. aI., (Dordrecht, Boston, and London:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p 721.
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intellectual life is either a scientific quest for truth or a mere propagandistic mission.,,30
The success of Analytic philosophy in the United States was in part assisted by its claims
to "objectivity," which circumscribed truth to the production of statements any
relinquished any connection to culture or politics. 31 By the same token philosophies like
phenomenology or pragmatism, which called into question objectivity, seemed
intrinsically suspicious.32
Phenomenologists did attempt to appear useful in the "battle of ideologies." John
Wild, a professor of philosophy at Harvard, was one of phenomenology's most ardent
promoters during the postwar. The Challenge ofExistentialism (1955) was one of his
early attempts to provide a comprehensive textbook for the study of phenomenology.
Wild unapologetically argued that philosophy involved politics, and that if American
29 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession.,
(Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
30 John McCumber., Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 2(01), p40. McCumber, is currently a professor of philosophy at
Nortwestern University. In 1988 James Edie invited McCumber to be a part of the editorial staff Seriesfor
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. When Edie retired, McCumber inherited the editorship of the
series from him. Nevertheless, McCumber claims not to be a phenomenologist. John McCumber,
conversation with the author, 25 May 2001.
31 McCumber singled out two philosophers, Raymond B. Allen and Rudolph Carnap, to illustrate the two
primary modalities of circumscribing truth to the production of statements in American analytic
philosophy. During the academic freedom cases of two University of Washington professors, Allen implied
that his colleagues were communist propagandists by famously suggesting that philosophy was restricted to
the objective, "timeless, selfless quest for truth" concerned with analytical truths and logical syntax in the
manner of science. Although Camap did separate scientific method from truth, McCumber critiqued him
for not going far enough. In his 1936 article "Truth and Confinnation," Camap agreed that truth was
timeless, but he argued that one could never achieve it because scientific inquiry unfolded in time. Science
could therefore only "confirm" things in time. Yet, regardless of its shortcomings with regards to truth,
science was our knowledge of the truth. This argument, for McCumber, naturalized philosophy into an
empirical science. Both positions, summarized McCumber, relegated the philosophical search for truth to
science, following the canon of logical positivism. John McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American
Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2(01), p41-42.
32 The disciplinary homogenization witnessed by philosophy as a function of cultural pressures in the
McCarthy period was also common to other disciplines. The disappearance of dissident currents in history
departments, for instance has been documented in Chapter 11, "A Convergent Culture," in Peter Novik's
more extensive study of "objectivity" in That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American
Historical Profession, (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press4 1988).
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philosophers did not attend to this they were leaving their flanks open for a communist
attack. His condemnation of the 1950s American academy was uncompromising:
Academic philosophy has become a barren wasteland with little relevance
to actual life and with little appeal, excep t to careerists and technicians. It
is not surprising that many of our own enquiring youth in times of chaos
and depression have turned to the Marxist synthesis. No alternative has
been offered. Our philosophy has fallen into evil days. It is no longer
doing the work which men have expected of it in the past. 33
Positivism, according to Wild, was chiefly responsible for this decay. He felt that
its hold on the Anglo-Saxon world had contorted modem thought into a worrisome mix
characterized by: "inattention to the immediate data of concrete experience; neglect of
existence and first philosophy; a physicalist approach to the problem of human
awareness, leading to subjectivism; and a radical separation of theory from practice,
leading to the de-rationalization of ethics.,,34 Further worsening this disparaging
assessment, Wild presented dialectical materialism as a coherently articulated philosophy
that was spreading unchallenged to all areas of human thought and activity. The
Challenge ofExistentialism was twofold: it attacked analytical philosophers and
communists alike on the cultural battlefield. 35 Wild was convinced that phenomenology
could put an end to communist ideology through rational critique?6 But convincing his
33 John Daniel Wild, The Challenge ofExistentialism, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955), p 25.
34 Ibid. p 26.
35 Analytic philosophy, also referred to as linguistic philosophy, is characterized by its method of
philosophical inquiry, which concerns itself with sentential t ruth. The early picture theory of language
characteristic of the work of early analytic philosophers, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein or Bertrand Russell,
established a direct relationship between language and reality and posited the possibility of learning a oout
the world through the philosophical study of language. In the course of the 20th century, analytic
philosophers expressed misgivings about the Udefectiveness" of everyday language in uhooking onto" the
world. Some analytic philosophers thus resorted to a type of "ideal" language, known as symbolic logic,
which could pass as scientific, truthful, and free of ambiguity. It was against this reduction of philosophy
to the study of "perfect" statements that Wild objected.
36 This belief that was shared, or at least followed, by many of the young phenomenologists that Wild
would publish in his Northwestern Series on Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. For instance, in
line with Wild's program to find value in phenomenology as an alternative to both positivism and
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American readership proved more diffic ult. He was writing in the wake of a hotly
contested European debate in which Merleau-Ponty famously defended the right of Sartre
to integrate Marxism and Existentialism. Wild conceded that "Sartre has flirted with
many political theories and movements, last of all Marxism. But," he added, uthe
connection between existentialist thought and any definitive political philosophy, as it is
now presented to us, is wholly arbitrary and unstable.,,3? This ideological instability,
unfortunately for Wild, was precisely what McCarthyism aimed to put J.n end to. Wild
called for a philosophy that, involved in practical life, could serve as the wisdom guiding
and ordering life. There was a need, he argued, to combat the cold -war of ideas with the
bullet-proof criticism of a systematic philosophy that, like Phenomenology, could
dismantle Marxism:
We fmd ourselves en~aged in what is primarily an ideological war against
a fonnidable enemy, well equipped not only with physical weapons but
with ideological annament as well. These ideas are not a mere jumble. [...l
We may believe that these conceptions are distorted and un-sound. But it
is naive to think that we can effectively oppose them by non-rational
means. These are not material objects that can be shot down or blown up
by physical weapons. These are ideas; and the only adequate weapon
against a false system of ideas is the truth, or at least a closer
approximation of the truth. 38
This was simply too risky a proposition for academics living through a period
when universities had become inherently inhospitable to dissent. Like Wild, Sartre had
unsuccessfully attempted to introduce the United States to a philosophy that mingled in
communism, Klaus Hartmann limited his study to Sartre early allegedly a-political book Being and
Nothingness arguing that: "The phase of Sartre's thought with which we are to deal appears, taken by itself,
as a philosophy not yet subservient to socia-revolutionary praxis. Precisely to the extent that it is not so
subservient, its links with traditional philosophy come to the fore, and it can be considered the latest
metamorphosis of our philosophical heritage:' See Klaus Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology: A Study ofBeing
and Nothingness in the Light ofHegel's Logic, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press.. t966), P xiv.
37 John Daniel Wild, The Challenge ofExistentialism, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955) p
166.
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the worlds of literature, psychiatry, psychology, and politics. Sartre's American
reception had suffered precisely from being too involved in culture, and (it is worth
noting) too staunchly hostile to religion in a country where most philosophers, although
not overtly religious, "were not far removed from the spiritual traditions of their families
and communities, and they were averse to a philosophy that trnmpled too indelicately on
remaining religious sensibilities.,,39 Phenomenologists tried desperately to make
themselves appear useful to the Cold War. Some like William Barrett (b. 1913), a
professor at ~ew York University, turned their anti-communism into an outspoken
support for Senator McCarthy~O
According to historian Ellen Schrecker, McCarthyism produced "one of the most
severe episodes of political repression the United States ever experienc ed. It was a
peculiarly American style of repression -nonviolent and consensual.,,41 The efficacy of
the repression rested on the system's decentralized structure which eliminated
accountability. McCarthyism's machinery was divided between the House Un-American
Activities Committee (HUAC), which identified and accused citizens of promoting
communism or dissidence, and the private sector, which punished the individuals by
fIring them, often before the government agencies had made any fonnal accusations.
Once an individual had been singled out as undesirable by government agencies, the
private sector became the willing executioner of sanctions. Contrary to common wisdom,
the American university system was not a bulwark for academic freedom. Its long history
38 Ibid. p 5-6.
39 Ann Fulton, Apostles ofSartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1999), p 138.
40 John McCumber, conversation with the author, 25 May 2001. William Barrett became best know for his
book Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), which was
helpful in introducing a non-philosophical readership to phenomenology and existentialism.
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of accepting political orthodoxy over the scholarly ideals of freedom of speech did much
to contribute to McCarthyism.42
Universities, as institutions whose business relied heavily on their reputation,
could not afford to loose stature before the court of public opinion. Consequently, a
silent and consensual system of repression ensued whereby administrators purged their
departments of outspoken faculty members, as a preventive measure to protect the
university of what they ''might'' do. Professors with a history of activism were quietly
dismissed on fears that might become "unfriendly" witnesses before the HUAC by
refusing to "name names." Administrators and pI )fessors alike worried about the bad
press that inevitably followed when a professor made recourse to the Fifth Amendment
before an investigation committee~3
The academic authorities that carried out these purges did so as secretly as they
could. When they could not perfectly conceal what they were doing, they tried to disguise
41 ElJen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), p 9.
42 According to Schrecker, the tendency of American universities to pay lip service to academic freedom
helped define the mission of the university as an institution for research instead of reform. Schrecker
determined that as early as the late 19th century, university administrations began quietly denying tenure to
professors who were in outspoken opposition to the beliefs of the larger community. (p 15) By 1915, a
series of highly publicized cases, such as the firing of economist E. A. Ross from Stanford for denouncing
the industrial abuses of railroad companies, helped forge an academic culture that discouraged the political
involvement of professors, and encouraged their circumscription to disciplinary matters. After the First
World War. as after the second, "institutional loyalty was the overriding concern. In almost every situation,
faculty members and administrators responded to outside pressures for the dismissal of dissenting faculty
members in accord with what they believed would best protect or enhance their school's reputation." (p
23). See: Ibid.
43 In anticipation of several congressional committes aimed at searching for subversives in american
campuses due to begin in 1953, university professors and administrators at all levels met to attempt to
define academic freedom. On February 15, 1953 twenty five presidents of America's most prestigious
universities met as members of the Association of American Universities (AAU) to discuss the issue.
Unable to reach a satisfactory global definition, and scrambling to keep outsiders from inteJVeening in their
hiring and firing proceedures, they established that personell decisions were Utechnicar' matters determined
by each discipline·s intellectual demands, and beyond the competence of anyone who lacked a Ph.D. This
definition created a zone for political autonomy so limited that, as Schreker demonstrated, it excluded as
unscholar!y "whatever political behavior the leading members of an academic community feared might
trigger outside intervention." See: Ibid. p 12.
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its political nature.44 This was the case in the action brought against Enrico Peresutti at
Princeton University. Since 1953, Peresutti had been offering a yearly "architectural
composition" class at Princeton University, in which he had consistently encouraged
students to break out of the "technical" limits imposed on their discipline and become
actively engaged in social problems. His insistence that students take in "reality" in its
entirety, was a cany over from the cultural battles he had been engaged in Italy
immediately after the war. Teaching by example, Peresutti re-enacted his partisan
resistance to the fascist leveling of culture by refusing to restrict his opinions to
architectural audiences. It must be noted that he spoke only about architectural matters,
but failed to separate technical expertise from socio-political pronounceraents, as was the
nonn in the United States. Furthennore, he incited students to break out of their
"bureaucratic learning" and sharpen their sense of criticism, 45 stirring their interest in
phenomenology -a school of thought deemed "irrational" and "absurd" by analytic
philosophers.46 For Peresutti, the moral training of architects was the most important
aspect of an architectural education:
44 Ibid. p 264.
45 Enrico Peresutti, as quoted in Architecture and the University: Proceedings ofa Conference Held at
Princeton University, December Eleventh and Twelfth, Nineteen Hundred Fifty -Three, (Princeton, NJ:
School of Architecture, Princeton University, 1954), P 61.
46 The first, and most heated debate between analytic philosophy and existentialism in the United States
took place between analytic philosopher Van Meter Ames, existentialist Maurice Natanson, with John
Yolton, a Locke scholar teaching at Princeton in the 19505, mediating the debate. Ames objected to
Sartre's rejection of empiricism and linguistic analysis. For Ames, the suppo5tition that noun-substantives
had actual existence violated the principal tenets of these methods. Existentialism for him resulted in
irrationalism: insofar as it used "absurd words,~' it made Uabsurrl worlds." Natanson, on the other hand,
suggested that Ames's contention reflected his ignorance of phenomenology, which maintained that human
existence could not be fully explained in any language that would establish an empirical meaning criterion.
Natanson asked that Sartre be considered on the merits of his arguments, and that he not be rejected simply
because he ignored the largely unquestioned canons of the analytic and empiricist methods. The debate did
not serve to change the opinions of the participants. For Ann Fulton, a Sartre scholar, the significance of
the debate lied in the attempts at re-conciliation during a time when empirically and analytically oriented
thinkers were given to outright dismiss philosophies such as existentialism, which contradicted "scientific"
canons: "The debate was significant not only because of the attempted mediation it called forth. Yolto n '5
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[... ] I don't believe in emphasizing a technical training for an architect. I
believe much more in a moral training. What is a moral training? It seems
to me that if an architect is not perfectly trained in a technical way, this is
not a very important fault, as it is for a doctor, for instance. If a doctor is
not technically trained, he can kill a man, perhaps two or three; but if an
architect is not morally trained, I think he can kill not one man but a whole
society.47
In the mid 1950s, Peresutti began publicly denouncing Princeton University's
new $30 million building campaign. In his mind, the stripped-down Modernist designs
selected by the Board of Trustees not only seriously compromised the moral structure of
the University as a whole, but also reflected negatively on the pedagogical position of the
entire architecture school, and on its social commitments. 48 Peresutti's request that the
commissions be given to architects "of stature," like Frank Lloyd Wright (who Casabella
had strongly promoted), inflamed the administration, which did not want to alienate its
private and governmental donors. Robert W. McLaughlin, Director of Princeton's
School of Architecture, attempted in vain to discipline Peresutti. The issue was such a
source of tension that it became the object of debate during a symposium on architectural
education held at Princeton in 1953 attended by some of the nation's better known
educators and practitioners.49 John Ely Burchard, Dean of Humanities and Social
failed mission was of a piece with similar efforts made in this period. Growing familiarity with Sartrean
thought made it easier for critics to sort out its strengths and weaknesses and to suggest ways of increasing
communication between different idioms and approaches." Ann Fulton, Apostles ofSartre: Existentialism
in America, 1945-1963, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999), p 73
47 Architecture and the University: Proceedings ofa Conference Held at Princeton University, December
Eleventh and Twelfth, Nineteen Hundred Fifty -Three, (Princeton, NJ: School of Architecture, Princeton
University, 1954), p 17.
48 "Le Dimisioni di Peresutti dall'Universita di Princeton," in Casabella Continuita, n. 238 (April 1960), p
50.
49 Conference participants included: Turpin C. Bannister, Head of the Department of Architecture at the
University of Illinois; John Ely Burchard, Dean of the School of Humanites and Social Studies at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Chairman of the Conference); Henry L. Kamphoefner, Dean of the
School of Design, North Carolina State College; Robert W. McLaughlin, Director of the School of
Architecture at Princeton University; Jose Luis Sert, Dean of the Graduate School of Design at Harvard
University; William Wilson Wurster, Dean of the School of Architecture at the University of California
(and former dean of MIT's School of Architecture); Max Abramovitz, from Harrison and Abramovitz, New
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Sciences at MIT, asked: "What effect should the architecturnl faculty be permitted or
encouraged to have on the architecture of the university itself],6o A conversation ensued
in which McLaughlin felt pressed to again remind Peresutti of the kind of self-censorship
expected from the Princeton faculty:
Kamphoefner: Who selects the architects for Princeton buildings now?
McLaughlin: Princeton is governed by a board of trustees.
Wurster: That's the same as a state university.
Burchard: They are not self-perpetuating?
Wurster: No.
McLaughlin: There is a very definite line between the fune tion of the
trustees and the function of the faculty. At Princeton, building is the
function of the trustees and it would be no more considered good practice
for the faculty to interfere with the trustees, than for the trustees to tell us
in the School of Architecture how we should teach.
Wurster: I \vonder if the board of trustees knows any more about building
than your faculty, who are going to live in these buildings. As Churchill
says, "First we shape our buildings and then they shape us."
McLaughlin: As a practical matter, the School of Architecture is
frequently consulted about architecture but not necessarily followed.
There is no question that if you have a serious divergeilce as to what is
being taught in the School of Architecture and what is being executed on
the campus, you can have a very unhealthy situation.5I
York; Robert E. Alexander. from Richard Neutra and Robert E. Alexander, Los Argeles; Gordon Bunshaft,
from Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, New York; Louis l Kahn, Philadelphia; Alfred Shaw, from Shaw,
Metz, and Dolio, Chicago; Perry Coke Smith, from Voorhees9 Walker, Foley and Smith, New York; Hugh
Stubbins, jr.• from Hugh Stubbins Associates, Boston; and Enrico Peresutti. Douglas Haskell, from
Architectural Forum, was present at the proceed'Dgs and published a brief summary in his magazine
entitled uHow to Design a Good Architect: Educators and Architects at Princeton Conference Ponder the
Problem of Training the Young Men Who Will Shape the Second Half of this Century," in Architectural
Forum,n.l,v. 102 (January 1955),pp 140-142, 150, 155, 159,166. A heavily edited version of the
cOllference proceedings was later published as Architecture and the University: Proceedings ofa
Conference Held at Princeton University, December Eleventh andTwelfth, Nineteen Hundred Fifty -Three,
(Princeton, NJ: School of Architecture, Princeton University, 1954). Peresutti'8 participation was cut down
to four paragraphs in 11 72 page book.
so My italics. Architecture and the University: Proceedings ofa Conference Held at Princeton University,
December Eleventh and Twelfth, Nineteen Hundred Fifty -Three, (Princeton, NJ: School of Architecture,
Princeton University, 1954), p 53.
51 Ibid. P 54.
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Peresutti's deeply political intellectualism had become noxious to the well-being
of the university's reputation. These confrontations were precisely the type of events that
attracted the unwanted attention of the HUAC. Architects were expected to conduct
"scientific" research about architecture, not make grand proclamations about the moral
bankruptcy of the university. There was too much at stake. Driven by Cold War
insecurities of Soviet preeminence, the Eisenhower administration, whose main concern
with universities had been to purge them of Communist and disloyal professors, had
begun to pour money into universities for construction and for improving curricula, a
trend which continued for the greater part of the t9608. 52 Curriculum studies,
commissioned by state governments and private institutions, 53 had a direct effect on
architectural practice and pedagogy. For instance, the Educational Facilities Laboratories
52 The architectural press did not fail to note that Eisenhower's most important addresses to Congress in
January of 1955 ~the State-of-the Union, the Budget, and the Economic Report) emphasized his intention to
boost construction activity as a means to buttress national prosperity. The editors of Architectural Forum
expressed great excitement to see that lobbying groups on Capitol Hill were gaining the support of
Congress for bills that would make $500 million dollars a year for educational buildings (almost the same
as for roads, if we take into account that the Bureau of public roads received $559.3 million in federal aid
in 1954). See "President's Economic Program Banks Heavily on Construction," in Architectural Forum.. n.
2, v. 102 (February 1955), pp 9.. 13, 17. The article "Building's Soaring Statistics,n inArchitectural Forum,
n. 2, v. 112 (February 1960), pp 107-112, predicted that school b~i1ding would playa major role in the
continued explosive growth of the construction industry during the decade to follow. The graphs appearing
in "A portfolio of charts tracing the industry's dimensions and its steadily growing importance in the U.S.
economy" gave reason for optimism. ''The post-war era.." wrote the editors, "has been marked by the
greatest capital spending boom in U.S. history." The construction industry in t959 amounted to 11.3
percent of the Gross Domestic Product, a rise of400 percent since 1929. Although residential construction
represented the largest percent of new building (43 percent), the Architectural Forum alerted architects to
opening markets in non-residential buildings, especially industrial facilities and new schools. There was..
they claimed, still an immediate need for 132,400 classrooms. Their predictions held true for the greater
part of the 19608 as university campuses mushroomed across the nation. Yet, by the end of the Cold War in
1989, the construction industry had shrunk to only 4.5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, or 245.8
billion dollars. See US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.. "Gross Domestic Product
by Industry in Current Dollars As a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product: 1987-92 and 1993-99,"
(http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/gposhr.htm).. August 13.. 2001.
53 See for instance William C. Bark et aI., Report of the San Francisco Curriculum Survey Committee (San
Francisco), 1960.
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(a branch of the Ford Foundation) paid one thousand dollars to ten "school architects" to
develop "efficient" university buildings according to the Trump Report. 54
University professors and graduate students, and particularly those employed at
prestigious universities, represented about twenty percent of the total number of
witnesses called before state and congressional investigating committees dtlring the
McCarthy era. The majority of them lost theirjobs. 55 By 1959, the activism and
vigilance promoted by Peresutti among his students became intolerable for the
administration. After seven years of service as visiting professor, Peresutti had to resign
on matters of "conviction and principle." In his resignation letter to the administration
Peresutti insisted that the projects sponsored by the trustees were not conducive to the
type of moral and ethical program proper to a university.56 Instead of allowing a debate
to take place where the decisions of the trustees could be put to the test of Peresutti's
better judgment, Princeton President Robert F. Goheen tried to keep the issue quiet.
When Architectural Forum contacted Goheen to inquire about Princeton 9 s reasons for
letting such a world-renowned figure go, he replied that "the committee does not propose
to argue its views with those expressed by Professor Peresutti," and the affair was quickly
54 Dr. Lloyd Trump's 1959 report on improving "efficiency and productivity" in universities was published
by the Ford Foundation, and supported by the Commission on the Experimental Study of the Utilization of
the Staff in the Secondary School. The Trump Report was discussed in '100 productivity push in schools,,"
in Architectural Forum, (November, 1959). The architects invited to design campuses and buildings
according to the report were: Donald Barthelme; Charles W. Brubaker of Perkins and Will; Willian W.
Caudill of Caudill, Rowlett & Scott; Charles R. Colbert of Colbert, Lowrey, Hess, Boudreaux: Phillip J.
Daniel of Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall; John C. Harkness of the Architect's Collaborative:
Samuel E. Homsey of Victorine & Samuel Homsey; John Mcleod of Mcleod & Ferrara; John Lyon Reid of
Reid, Rockwell, Banwell & Tarics; and Eberle M. Smith. Their designs were presented at a symposium
held at the University of Michigan in 1960, and were published in "Three Ace Schools for the Trump
Plan," in Architectural Forum, n. 3, v. 112 (March 1960), pp 118-128.
55 Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), P 341 .
56 Enrico Peresutti, resignation letter dated November 1959. Peresutti personnel file. Seely G. Mudd
Manuscript Library. Princeton University.
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brushed aside.57 Peresutti's international stature allowed him to immediately find a
position at Yale.
As a result of its internal purges, the 19508 academic establishment effectively
silenced an entire generation of radical intellectuals, until the civil rights movement
sparked new waves of activism. Peresutti's was not an isolated case. Only months after
his mentor Peresutti "resigned" from Princeton, the administration turned to Moore,
questioning his moral character and sexuality. In a "Stricly Confidential" letter to then
Princeton President Robert F. Goheen, J. Douglas Brown, Dean of the Faculty, endorsed
the decision of Robert McLaughlin, Dean of Architecture, to dismiss Charles Moore from
the faculty:
The reasons for not holding Moore were sound, I feel, and are related to
personality. Single at 35, Moore did not seem stable or mature in respect
to his relationships with students, and while brilliant, was an uncertain
quantity personally for the long pull. Bob [McLaughlin] has been anxious
to avoid a climate too often associated with art centers.
I am inclined to support Bob's judgment.58
In the Spring of 1955 Robert Bedell, an engineer who had been teaching at
Cooper Union for two years, received a visit by FBI agents inquiring about his "fiiends in
the international communist conspiracy." His refusal to disclose any infonnation to the
FBI resulted in his dismissal from Cooper Union in April 1956, on reasons that were
never made entirely clear. Bedell tried to fight what he considered was a case of political
57 President Goheen's comments are quoted in "Princeton Critic Resigns9 tt in Architectural Forum, n. 2, v.
112 (February 1960), pp 15-16. Goheen private response to Peresutti is in the Peresutti personnel tile.
Seely G. Mudd Manuscript Library. Princeton University. In it Goheen expressed his regrets concerning
Peres!Jtti's departure, and defended his views on "tradition."
58 J. Douglas Brown, "Strictly Confidential Letter to President Robert F. Goheen regarding 'Architecture
Appointment for Committee of Three Consideration',tt in Charles Moore's Princeton Personnel File. Seely
G. Mudd Manuscript Library. Princeton University.
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discrimination, but to no avail.59 John Wild also shared Peresutti's fate. In 1961 he
became the first full professor ever to leave Harvard University~sphilosophy
department.60 Alienated from his colleagues, he took a position at Northwestern
University.
The success of McCarthyism owed much to the collective failure of nerve of
university professors who failed to mobilize in support of their persecuted colleagues.
The Fund for the Republic, an offshoot of the Ford Foundation, was sufficiently alanned
by this fact that they gave sociologists Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens two hundred
and fifty thousand dollars to research the response of university professors to
McCarthyism. In the Spring of 1955 they published their survey of 2,451 social scientists
under the title The Academic Mind. The results were not surprising; most "liberals"
confessed that they were scared. Over 25 percent of inteIViewees reported having
exercised self-censorship. Although 80 percent had unquestionably libernl opinions, only
40 percent of those polled were willing to act upon them. They would join a movement in
defense of a colleague that was fired on political grounds, but they would not initiate it.
59 The list of cases is long and growing as the personnel records of deceased faculty members become
available. Ellen Schrecker has, to my knowledge, conducted the most extensive study to date. It exposes
the various techniques employed by university administrations to satisfy public opinion and protect the
institution from "bad press." Apart from providing examples of the forced resignation technique used in
Peresutti case, Schrecker shows that often junior faculty members were most vulnerable to attacks. To
illustrate the function of seniority Schrecker presented the famous Countryman case at Yale. During the
academic year 1953-54, Vern Countryman.. an associate professor of Law at Yale Univeristy was voted for
tenure unanimously by his department's faculty. The administration, however, denied him tenure in what
Schrecker speculates was a highly politicized decision to appease alumni who were unhappy to see the Law
faculty defending communists in the courts. Countryman, a junior faculty member, had to be sacrificed to
appease public furor although it was the senior faculty (more well reputed, tenured.. and untouchable) who
was moot involved in the defense of communists. See Shrecker's No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the
Universities, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp 252-253. The Bedell case is reported on p
259.
60 Bruce Wilshire, nPhenomenology in the United States," in Nihilistic Consequences ofAnalytic
Philosophy, (Albany: State University of New York Press, Forthcoming in 2002), p 141.
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In addition, the report found that 28 percent of professors felt they would not receive the
support of their colleagues if they were to face political charges.61
B. Inter-disciplinary Symbiosis: Phenomenology and antl-avant-
garde meet each other's needs.
Peresutti's and Wild's response to McCarthyism was similar. They found new
jobs at more welcoming universities, retrenched into the safety of personal friendships,
established societies of like-minded individuals, and begun helping a younger generation
to work and publish against the mainstream of their respective disciplines. With the
exception of Peresutti's circle of students, American architecture of the 1950s had yet to
be exposed phenomenology. There were, however, structural similarities in the social
and ideological makeup of these two groups. Both circles felt marginalized from a
disciplinary mainstream they believed to be inteliectually specious and subservient to a
phony culture. They looked suspiciously upon claims to objectivity and scientism, as put
forth by Analytic philosophers and "International Style" Modernists, identifying them
with a capitulation to the appropriation of culture by reactionary politics. Dissatisfaction
with the narrowing of their respective disciplines to the exclusion of broader cultural
politics provoked different responses, which were both nonetheless based on a common
hypostatization of the primacy of immediate experience.
Phenomenologists attacked the analysts's reduction of philosophy to the
production of true statements as sham scientism. In their effort to return philosophy to
the role of "guiding wisdom" for lives and engagements, they gave equal importance to
fonns of inquiry that appealed to non-scientific criteria of validation for truth, such as
61 Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time ofCrisis ,
(Glencoe, III: Free Press, 1958).
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faith, tradition, or aesthetic insight. Architects in Peresutti's circle objected to the
circumscription of their discipline to a technical expertise governed by scientific
methods. They shared the Modernist interest in the emotional and psychological effects
of architecture, but they rejected the claim that scientific research could fully account for
them. Emotions, they believed, could not be extrapolated from discrete empirical
findings. The truth of feelings was in subjective bodily experiences not objective reason,
in practice not theory.
Unlike phenomenologists, who continued to believe in the intellect as a
complement to emotional disclosures of truth, these architects in general set the mind in
opposition to the body. What ensued was a radical anti-intellectualism in architectural
education that discarded what it saw as the high-brow theoretical avant-garde pretensions
of Modernism. The American tum towards the vernacular was in this sense diametrically
opposed to the European (mostly Italian) intellectualization of vernacular architecture as
exemplary functionalism. The American variant was a negation of Modernism's avant-
garde rationalism, not its critique. In spite of this important difference, this small group
of American architects grew close to phenomenologists who, although not averse to the
mind, shared the same sectarian social network, a similar skepticism towards "pure"
objective reason, and an equal passion for the body.
In the 1950s, the early days of the Cold War's ideological strife, Analytic
philosophers sought to protect themselves from the McCarthyite purges by excluding
ethical and political considerations from their work, and emulating the manner of the
sciences and linguistics. By the early 1960s, mainstream philosophy became inc Teasingly
aware that their discipline had become too narrow, constricting, and wonied about
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philosophical technique. Strict allegiance to the analytic canon had kept them from
answering questions of hwnan relevance and morality. In contrast, although
phenomenology had yet been unable to make itself seem relevant to science, and to make
an impact on American philosophy departments, it had been quite successful in attracting
the attention of cosmopolitan youthS.62 Sartre's existentialist plays and literary works
were a popular reference in literature and other departments. Phenomenology benefited
from the blossoming of Existentialism in European culture. Students who studied Jean-
Paul Sartre and Albert Camus in literature or theater classes were often drawn to the
authors's philosophical sources, and asked for classes on existentialism, motivating
professors to deal more closely with Sartre.63 But this popularity did not result in
attempts to incorporate phenomenology into the dominant currents of empiricism and
analyliis. For the most part, this appeal of phenomenology in non-philosophical audiences
kept analysts at a distance. Phenomenology, in their opinion, was too "soft" and
ambiguous. It did not satisfy the requirements of McCarthyite scholarship, which
demanded that each discipline be a scientific, timeless, and selfless quest for objective
truth. Analytic philosophy rejected the possibility that truth could be attained through un-
62 American phenomenologists had to contend with the failure of their philosophy to find recognition
among the scientific community. In his monumental intellectual history of phenomenology, the first of its
kind in English, Herbert Spiegelberg felt compelled to point this problem out, but could offer no better
answer to it than that of Husserl himself, a sigh of resigned frustration:
One of these [paradoxes] is the fact that a philosophy so detennined to make itself
scientific and to encourage cooperative and progressive enterprise as in the other
sciences failed in this attempt almost from the very start; that, in fact, the founder
[Husserl] of this new movement found himself toward the end of his career in an almost
tragic isolation, which he himself, with a kind of wry humor, compared to that of a
solipsist, and which he finally tried to interpret as a necessity and a vinue.
See Herben Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, (The Hague.
Boston, and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p 82.
63 Such was the case with one of the first courses taught in the United States on subject by Bames at the
University of Toledo in 1950. Although popular in the late 19505, classes on Sartre were rare in the late
19405 and early 1950s. John Wild offered a course at Harvard entitled ''The Philosophy of Man" in 1951,
and Paul Tillich discussed existentialism in the prestigious Terry Lectures at Yale in 1950. See Ann Fulton,
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scientific or subjective means. Therefore, although they looked enviously upon the rising
popular success of phenomenology, they remained convinced that there was no room for
(their) philosophy in the spheres of religion, culture9 art, and politics where the truth
content of a statement could not be empirically verified. T he claim of analytic philosophy
that truth was the property of sentences or statements, allowed them to flourish under
McCarthyism, to secure control of academic departments, the American Philosophical
Association (APA), and the job market.64
Rejected by analytic philosophers, American phenomenology forged a self-image
of "outsider movement." It was further engrained by the fact that phenomenologists had
to find jobs outside of traditional philosophy, in art, literature or language departments.
For the most part, the teaching of phenomenology in philosophy departments during the
1950s remained restricted to Catholic universities. There were a number of reasons for
this that should not be left undiscussed. Significantly, most of the early members of the
American phenomenological community were Catholics. Some had been priests or
seminarians, like Jim Edie, John Wild's protege at Northwestern. This fact motivated
Reiner Schtinnann, of the New School for Social Research (himself a fonner Dominican)
to famously state that: "continental philosophy came to America on the backs of
priests.,,65 Their "self-imposed ghetto mentality," as Monsignor Ellis described the
Apostles ofSartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1999), p 77.
64 In Time in the Ditch John McCumber's principal claim was that, even though the methods of analytic
philosophy were not a direct product of McCarthyism. its hegemony was indeed an artifact of the 1950s
American political establishment. See John McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the
McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001).
65 John McCumber, conversation with the author, 25 May 2001.
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psyche of American Catholics, added to the sectarianism of phenomenologists in this
country.66
Many members of the North American Catholic community gave Senator
McCarthy their sUpport.67 The fact that communist subversion was close to unimaginable
in Catholic institutions allowed them to escape McCarthyism, and to remain more open to
less conventional philosophical practices.68 Even though phenomenology found
somewhat of a safe-haven in Catholic universities, it nonetheless had to revise its earlier
politicized framing, as established under Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, towards a more de-
politicized German point of view. 69 By the early 1960s, the postwar demographic surge
reached college age, and increased government spending on building new universities
increased employment opportunities. Thus, a slew of young professors, such as Edward
G. Ballard, John Compton, Hubert Dreyfus, James M. Edie, Eugene Kaelin, William
66 See Monsignor Ellis, "American Catholics and the Intellectual Life," Thought, Vol. XXX, (Autumn
1955).
67 According to Hofstadter, McCarthy received much support of the Catholic community, although there
were small groups of Catholic intellectuals published in Commonweal and the Jesuits' America that did
denounce McCarthy. Hofstadter argued that many Catholics were motivated by the desire to become first
rate American citizens, and to surmount the popular view that chastised Catholicism for being the religion
of poor immigrants. See Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New York: Knopf,
1963), pp 136-141.
68 Well into the 1960s, the American Catholicism struggled with its educational structure. The clergy itself
produced a number of studies that tried to suggest ways to promote intellectual excellence, including
Thomas F. O'Dea American Catholic Dilema: An Inquiry into Intellectual Life (New York, 1958), and
Father Walter J. Ong, S.l., Frontiers in American Catholicism, (New York, 1957). Part of the problem was
that the predominantly low-income Catholic constituencies had not been able to muster the funds to build
the necessary instutions of learning. Many Catholic universities did begin to spring up in the Post War
period, but they held little if no prestige. In his various surveys of American Universities, Robert H. Krapp
concluded that intellectual achievement in Catholic universities was remarkably low both in the humanities
and the sciences. See Robert H. Knapp and H.B. Goodrich, Origins ofAmerican Scientists, (Chicago,
t952), and Robert H. Knapp and Joseph J. Greenbaum, The Younger American Scholar: His Collegiate
Origins, (Chicago, 1953). p 99.
69 In The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time o[Crisis, (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1958), Paul
Lazarsfeld and Werner Thielens found that the vast majority of professors accused ofuun-americanism"
during the 1950s came from Ivy League institutions and other "better" schools. In the South, where civil
rights posed a different set of social problems, McCarthyism was not as widespread. Lazarsfeld and
Thielens also argued that larger institutions had more sophisticated administrations capable of protecting its
professorate. This belief that professors in smaller parochial colleges were more at risk than those in large
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Richardson, Calvin 0 Schrag, and Robert Sokolowski began offering courses on
Heidegger, Husserl, and others. 70
When John Wild moved from Harvard to Northwestern University in 1961, he
founded the first continental philosophy (as phenomenology was then referred to)
department outside of the Catholic university system.71 He immediately enlisted the help
of James M. Edie in establishing the series entitled Northwestern University Studies on
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, which they aimed at a scholarly yet 000-
philoscphical audience.72 In 1962 they founded the Society for Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy (SPEP).73 During the 196Os, book series and journals devoted to
phenomenology began to proliferate, such as Duquesne University Press's Research in
Phenomenology, and the journal Phenomenological Inquiry. For some, the appearance of
these venues for publication attested to both the vigor of their movement and to the
resistance of other philosophical journals to publish them.
prestigious institutions was challenged by Lionel Lewis, Cold War on Campus, (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Press, 1988), p 226.
70 Lester Embree, James M. Edie, Don Ihde, Joseph Kockelmans, and Calvin O. Schrag, 'United States of
America," in Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology, 00. Lester Embree, et. al. .. (Dordrecht, Boston, and London:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
71 John McCumber, conversation with the author, 25 May 200 I. It must be noted.. however, that Ph.D.s on
phenomenology were granted at the New School for Social Research during the 1~50s. See Lester Embree
et aL, "United States of America:' in Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology, 00. Lester Embree et aI., (Dordrecht,
Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
72 Wild and Edie placed advertisements for their books in non-philosophical journals. Edie succeeded Wild
as editor in Chief of the series in (DATE), and was followed by John McCumber in (DATE). John
McCumber, conversation with the author, 25 May 2001.
73 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, (The Hague, Boston,
and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p 734. The annual meetings of the Society for
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy were held in the following venues: 1962 at Northwestern
University, October 26-27 (first meeting); 1963 at Northwestern University, October 31-November 2;
1964 at Yale University, October 22-24; 1965 at University of Wisconsin, October 28-30; 1966 at
Pennsylvania State University, October 20-22; 1967 at Purdue University. October 26 -28; 1968 Yale
University, October 24-26. References to these meetings, and some of the proceedings can be found in An
Invitation to Phenomenology: Studies in the Philosophy ofExperience, 00. James M. Edie, (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1965), Phenomenology in America: Studies in the Philosophy ofExperience, ed. James
M. Edie, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), and New Essays in Phenomenology, 00. James M. Edie,
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).
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The perceived mainstream resistance to phenomenology encouraged the
proliferation of "small societies," which continued to operate as networking platforms
even after phenomenological articles were common in regular philosophy journals. 74 The
fact that Phenomenologists worked mostly alone in non -philosophical schools, or in
philosophy departments dominated by analysts, increased their need to meet face-to-face
with like-minded people in separate groups such as SPEP. 75 Like their journals, these
societies proactively sought out non-philosophical constituencies. Phenomenologists
fought the battle against the analysts outside of philosophy departments, in the larger
university, and in culture. Against the sectarian domination of the American
Philosophical Association by Analytic philosophers, James Edie claimed that openness
was the driving ideology of SPEP:
What has distinguished the Society for Phenomenology and Existential
Philosophy during this period [1965-69] from the various other quasi-
closed (and sometimes secret) Husserl and Heidegger conventicules which
have begun to meet in this country -with restricted membership and cut
off from the criticism and debate \vhich they would face in open
confrontation with the major philosophical currents-is a finn decision to
engage other schools of thought and other methodologies in discussion, to
open the doors of membership to all, and to test the relevance of
phenomenology in the open forum of American philosophy as it exists in
the second half of the twentieth century. In all these collections of articles
from the recent meetings of the Society, we have tried to avoid the stuffy
atmosphere of the philosophical chapel in which an elite group of exegetes
related to the European fathers either by certified discipleship or direct
apostolic succession, expound achieved doctrine. Phenomenology in this
country has already been accused of becoming a new fonn of dogmatism;
74 Lester Embree, James M. Edie, Don Ihde, Joseph Kockelmans, Calvin O. Schrag, , "United States of
America," in Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology , 00. Lester Embree et al., (Dordrecht, Boston, and London:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p 721.
75 McCumber accused SPEP members of meeting exclusively in the absence of outsiders, and of therefore
falling prey to the same type of insularism as that of the analysts. According to McCumber, in the 1990s
the dialogue between the analysts and phenomenologists was happening in Europe, not in the USA. John
McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 200 I), P 84, 87.
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it is to be hoped that the contents of these volumes, and others like them,
will show that such an accusation is unjustified. 76
American phenomenology had two distinct responses to McCathyite orthodoxy.
It tried to appeal to nationalist sentiment by seeking paternity in Pragmatism (the
American philosophy par excellence), and it turned increasingly towards aesthetic
disciplines. The strategy of assimilating continental philosophy into the framework of
pragmatism served as an effective platfonn from which to question the legitimacy of
(British) empiricism and decry analytic Euro-centrism in the United States. Why was this
emerging world power letting Europeans stamp on its intellectual roots? True,
phenomenology was also European, but because of Russerl's admiration for James, it
could easily be portrayed as American in inspiration. In 1967, James Edie went as far as
to claim that American phenomenologists had achieved a veritable "renaissance" of
William James.77 This mid-century patriotism evolved into a generic late century
reverence for the "primordially American," as in Bruce Wilshire's The Primal Roots of
American Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native American Thought. 78
Some philosophers in the analytic and empiricist mainstream contributed to the
association of phenomenology and pragmatism by discrediting both philosophies.79 For
76 James M. Edie, "Introduction," in New Essays in Phenomenology, 00. James M. Edie, (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1969), P 8 ff.
77 As evidence of the phenomenological renaissance of pragmatism, Edie summed his own articles to the
work of Alfred Schutz (The Problem ofSocial Reality, The Hague, 1962), Aaron Gurwitsch (The Field of
Consciousness, Pittsburg, 1964), Johannes Linschotten (On the "'ay Toward a Phenomenological
Psychology, Pittsburg~ 1968), John Wild (The Radical Empiricism ofWilliam James, New York, 1969), and
Bruce Wilshire (William James and Phenomenology, Bloomington, Ind., 1968). See: Ibid. pp 10-11 ff.
78 Wilshire considered William James an existential phenomenologist "before the name" on account of his
ability to describe our immediate involvements. James was for Wilshire the American key to re-
discovering significance in all th2ngs, and his philosophy a precondition for establishing any and all values.
Bruce Wilshire, The Primal Roots ofAmerican Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native
American Thought, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p 21.
79 For instance, in 1951, Van Meter Ames, an aesthetician teaching at the University of Cincinnati,
published "Existentialism and the Arts" in the Journal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism, where he likened
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the most part, however, analysts relegated them to the margin by ignoring them. By the
mid 1950s Analytic philosophy was so institutionalized that it did not feel the need to re-
open questions about its legitimacy. Phenomenology and existentialism were simply
assumed to be extensions of metaphysics or soft subjectivism. 80
Attempts to conciliate phenomenology and pragmatism often pointed to the
primacy accorded to immediate experience in both philosophies. For instance, Richard
McKeon (1900-7), a Spinoza scholar at the University of Chicago, argued that the
criterion of experience, as the organic unity of the individual and "his" circumstances,
gave both philo5Jophies a common touchstone.81 Mal)' Coolidge, philosophy JYofessor
and fonner dean of Wellesley College, went as far as providing an analysis of Sartre fully
contained within the framework of Jamesean thought.82 For Coolidge, analytic and
empiricist thought, could not arrive at a satisfactory model of the individual because they
Sanre's conviction that writing should be a commitment to social change to the pragmatic theal)' th..
ri?ple's desires, fears, and needs propel them into action.
oMcCumber boiled down the objections of analytic philosophy to phenomenology and pragmatism as
follows: ''The pragmatists, pursuing not truth but confinnation, were in competition with empirical
science. The metaphysicians [in which the phenomenologists were later includedl, pursuing truth but
without benefit of logic, were as well. The latter group was illogical and hence unphilosophical; the former
mistakenly took philosophy for a first-order enterprise." See John McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American
Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p 81-82. Ann
Fulton has argued that analysts had a more sustained engagement with phenomenology than McCumber
would admit. For her, Sartre's philosophy challenged analysts to consider issues of ethics and morality. On
the whole, however, Fulton accepts that analysts remained impervious to phenomenology. "[..T] hey did
not overlook its weak philosophical underpinnings, including the inability to derive universal freedom from
individual freedom in a logical manner, and the failure to clarify the meth<Xi by which a person might rna} ..
an ethical choice. These shortcomings would continue to worry American philosophers in later years." See
Ann Fulton, Apostles ofSartre: Existentialism in America, 1945 ~1963, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1999), p 76.
81 The differences, he argued, were that Americans looked for existence in "relations" instead of
consciousness, situated experience in "events'· and not in mental acts, analyzed experience in terms of
"problems and solutions" not "immanence and transcendence/' and searched for the organic whole by
moving from the particular event towards the society or universe, instead of from the ego towards the
absolute or nothingness. Richard McKeon, "An American Reaction to the Present Situation in French
Philosophy,'· in Marvin Farber, Philosophic Thought in France and the United States: Essays Representing
Major Trends in French and American Philosophy (Buffalo: State University of New York Press~ 1950), p
359-360.
82 Mary Coolidge, "Some Vicissitudes of the Once-Born and of the Twice-Born man," in Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, (September 1950), pp 75-87.
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approached it "from the outside," collecting data and establishing nonns from the
standpoint of "objectivity." Phenomenology and Pragmatism on the other hand gave
fuller account of the reality of human existence because they approached it from the
"inside." They described human experience as a totality from the s~ndpointof
subjectivity. Coolidge believed that Phenomenologists and Pragmatists held a more
future looking and optimistic perspective on life, in the sense that they stressed the
freedom of individuals to act within a political and social world. According to Coolidge,
the existentialist stress on individual uniqueness was a valuable insight in questioning the
ability of scientific nonns to fully account for human existence.
What made analysts averse to phenomenology made it welcoming for academics
in aesthetic disl:iplines: the purported lack of philosophical rigor made it less daunting
and avajable; and the rejection of the primacy of rationalistic structures seemed to give
importance to other modes of explaining the universe, such as art, architecture, or
religion. But what really caught the imagination of architects was the proposition that
empiricism, broadly conceived, could be approached from the "inside." And furthennore,
that this "inside" had a direct relation to the "outside" through the fuzzy "in between" of
experience.
The phenomenological interest in how individuals constructed their world through
meaning and values gave rise to an intense architectural curiosity for how individuals
built their world through experiences. When ClAM reconvened i~, f~e United States in
1947, it began professing a tum towards "humanism." Modernism's search for
approaches to design that would incorporate the emotional and psychological effects on
the built environment on uldividuals coincided with the 1948 English translation of
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Sartre's The Emotions. In this book, Sartre had tried to demonstrate the significance of
feelings in the human apprehension of the world. He argued that phenomenological
description offered a picture of the function of feelings as an essential structure of
consciousness that was wholly absent from the analytic or Cartesian traditions.
Methodologically, Sartre \vas attracted to phenomenology because he thought that it
helped provide a holistic examination of feelings that accounted for the work of the
examiner, whereas other perspectives falsely presumed thought to be independent of the
subjectivity of the observer. Phenomenology for Sartre could help break out of the
positivist belief that emotions were images that could be extrapolated from discrete
empirical findings. The assertion that emotions played an integral role in our creative
apprehension of the world suggested that emotions and world were either not en tirely
distinct, or inextricably bound (perhaps dialectically).
SaTtre's philosophy resonated with the attempts to establish emotional wellness as
an ethical basis for the architectural production of environments. As the 1950s unfolded,
two different resJXlnses to this tum towards the intimate and subjective world emerged -
one Modernist and rational, the other anti-Modernist and spiritual-both of which
"adjusted" al ..;hitectural education to the pressures of McCarthyism by sublimating
Modernism's "refonnist" rhetoric into one of "research."
The first response was "scientific," true to Modernism's functionalist principles
and standards of objectivity. Although some of these architects invoked phenomenology
as "proof' of their work's relevance, they remained for the most part oblivious to the
critique of empiricism involved in the philosophy. They sirrlply shifted attention from
"outer" shapes to "inner" images, but the belief that these internal worlds could be
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discreetly documented remained. To them, if emotions and feelings were "real," then
they had to be recordable objectively through scientific methods. The Modernist mastery
of the inner world involved applying traditional methods for describing the environment,
to describing the subject, and profiling users. 83 It looked upon experience as a
"perfonnance specification" established through "representative samples" of the
population in carefully staged "participatory planning" me~tings. This design approach
spoke directly to the interests of market researchers and industrial analysts, and received
large sums of corporate sponsorship. 84
The second attempt to make emotional well -being into the ethical substrate of
architecture was '~spiritual" -by the 19708, it would be commonly referred to as a
"phenomenological" attitude in design, although it had as little to do with
phenomenology as the frrst. The spiritualizing segment of Modernism answered the
83 Some of the better-known examples of this Modernist response came from MIT (where Kevin Lynch
researched "mental images" of built environments, and Lawrence Halprin's "motation" inventories of
highway experiences) and the University of California at Berkeley (where Christoper Alexander catalogued
"patterns" believed to be unions offonnal, psychological, and spiritual forces, and Philip Thiel ). You need
all three to develop design. See La\\ renee Halprin'5 Cities, (New York: Reinhold Publishing Company,
1963), and his Freeways, (New York: Reinhold Publishing Company, 1966). Also see Kevin Lynch, The
image of the City. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press and Harvard University Press, 1960).
84 For instance, Philip Thiel (b. 1920), a student of Kepes at MIT who taught atBerkeley and the University
of Washington, was hired by Arthur D. Little to study the optimum size for a highway billboard. He
described the experience as follows: "MIT had a pavilion at the Expo '60 exposition in Seattle and wanted
to track the success of their building. They hired Serge Buttoleene to do a study oft~e users experiences. In
tum, he hired Gary Winkle, a University of Washington recent Ph.D. graduate, to help. Buttolene looked
me up because he'd heard of me and because I got Gary appointed as a professor in environmental
psychology. Later he got a job with Arthur D. Little to find out what the effect of billboards were on people
on people driving on the highway. We did the work --which is available as a publication by Arthur D.
Little. We took pictures of a strip every 100 feet and then had different subjects view them in sequence. We
projected the original sequence first, then some doctored sequences where we would take out the
billboards, or the telephone poles. The last sequence was just the buildings. The people would sit and bite
into a thing that would keep their head still, and we had eye-tracking devices to see how they scanned the
environment. We attempted to do two things. First we tried to characterize the person's profile: their
education, their background, etc. Second we tried to inventory what they looked at and what iliey felt. It
was the first time that these multiple types of measures were used. We found tha: many times the billboards
improved the experience of the highway! People liked billboards, and the University of Washington
[architecture] faculty was in an uproar. They saw it as a lack of solidarity that I would do this. As a result,
Gary left the university." Philip Thiel, conversation with the author, 6 June 2000.
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McCarthyite need to curtail Modernism's socio-political program by channeling it into a
more acceptable program of refonn: the elevation of individual souls. By turning to the
"inner" world of subjects, it suffused Modem commitments to social progress into the
theological reaction to that very progress. Mouthing the Protestant Christian program of
the distraught American middle class to strike against everything Modem, it fitted
architectural pedagogy into the orthodox framework of the status quO. 85 The long
Protestant "revolt against modernity," as Richard Hofstadter called it, appeared in
architectural circles as an opposition to theory and rational criticism of any kind. The
mantra of architects like Louis I. Kahn was that universities taught only to the mind.,
producing only half learned men without knowledge about the "higher power" of the
80ul.86 Pietro Belluschi, Dean of MIT's School of Architecture, exhorted architects to
shed their "aristocratic" airs, get in touch with their inner "spiritual content," and with
that of traditional fonns cherished by Uthe people.,,8? These architects played into the
popular belief that intellectual sophistication was a sign of distinction inconsistent with
85 For an incisive look at the prehistory of this anti-Modern movement in the United States see Richard
Hofstadter's "The Revolt Against Modernity," chapter V in Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New
York: Knopf, 1963) pp 117-145.
86 This was also the message of Evangelist Billy Graham, who was voted as the fourth "most admired man
in the world" by the American public in a 1958 Gallup Poll (only after Eisenhower, Churchill, and Albert
Schweitzer). He preached against the university and celebrated the McCarthy era as the time when "even
the average university professor is willing to listen to the voice of the preacher." For a good interpretation
of the influence of Graham on American opinion see: Ibid. p 15.
87 The belief that architects had to become servants of the people (a sublimated call for the exercise of
conformism) was common during the McCarthy period. Pietro Belluschi, dean of MIT's School of
Architecture and Planning, lectured the AIA"s New York Chapter on what the new change "from a
profession serving aristocratic ends to one mainly devoted to democratic endeavors'" implied for
practitioners. The need to complete StJohn"s Cathedral in New York was an exemplary challenge to
mooern architecture. Architects" he argued, needed to be more sensitive to the forms of the past and to their
spiritual content. Although they might not seem like "hollow copies'" to the highly educated, they remained
"in the eyes of many people, the highest expression of religious faith when faith was at its highest....
Belluschi called upon modern architects to integrate historical forms of the past into a contemporary idiom,
as a way for them to serve the common man. "Obviously,'" said Belluschi, "what we need is a ~arge supply
of faith --faith that the masses are really capable of growing in awarer.ess and therefore that they are worth
saving, faith also that our more creative people will succeed in producing the spiritual symbols which may
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democratic egalitarianism. The heyday of consensus history and New Criticism had its
architectural expression in "teaching by osmosis" -which John Hejduk would petfect into
an art in the 1970s. For these architectural educators, research was tantamount to an
introspective awareness that confounded "interior" life with "spiritual" life, and design
was an "un-teachable" a-rational or so-called "poetic" act of transubstantiating "inner
spirit" into "outer fonn."
Entwined in the politics of the 1950s academy, vital segments of architectural
education fell into the hands of professors who joyfully and militantly proclaimed their
hostility to theory, and who eagerly identified with students who showed the least
intellectual promise.88 The "dwnbing down" of Modernism in the United States
answered the logic of an unfounded opposition between intellect and emotion. The less a
student "thought out" a design, the more chances it had of being "fresh," of emerging
immediately from the "inner self," as a "pure" expression of the soul. 89 Stupidity was
reassessed as the precondition to the expression of an aesthetic essence, which was
treasured for its alleged innocence. "Intuitive" design was prized for being unfettered by
culture and politics. A slew of 1950s texts likened architecture to a "calling," and design
to the mystical way towards spiritual enlightenment. This devotional literature retained
the emphasis on subjective experience and the voluntaristic impulse of American
serve to reflect and illuminate our civilization. U (p 163) See Pietro Belluschi, "The Challenge of St. John's
Cathedral~" in Architectural Forum, n. 5. v. 102 (May 1955), pp 162-163.
88 This was Hofstadter's appraisal of the American University system in general. It was all the more true in
architectural education. See Richard Hofstadter. Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. (New York: Knopf,
1963). p 51.
89 Mark Jarzombek has traced back the history of this popular belief that education is detrimental to the
"spontaneity" of creative thinking to Ezra Pound's "vitalist instinct,n Max Stimer's "sensuous egoism." and
even. closer to the present Herbert Read's "personalist psychology" of art. See Mark Jarzombek~ The
Psychologizing ofModernity: Art. Architecture, History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2000). p 2350.
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Protestantism, thus contributing to its ongoing secularization.9o We shall see these 19508
segments of Modernist anti-intellectualism extend into the architectural pedagogy of the
1960s under the guise of an anti-avant-garde that revolved around the figure of Charles
Moore. These strands must be differentiated from the postmodernist, structuralist, and
deconstructivist critiques of rationalism thaf~ they came to coexist with in the 19708.
Their confusion with Postmodemism gave a new lease on life to these Modernist
fantasies either of a pure origin or of an absolute alterity to culture-by obscuring their
derivation.91
By the early 1960s, attempts to discover the Rosetta stone to move between
"inner" and "outer" worlds were commonplace in architecture. These efforts to find the
connection between subjectivity and objectivity occurred as American phenomenology
turned its attention to aesthetic disciplines. The translation of Sartre's meditations on
aesthetics The Psychology of Imagination in 1948, and of What is Literature? in 1949,
90 In Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. (New York: Knopf. 1963). pp 266-268, Richard Hofstadter
documented the importance of inspirational literature in the secularization of American Protestantism, and
in the broad diffusion of its voluntaristic and subjective impulses. Protestantism minimized Christian
doctrine by getting rid of the bulk of religious ritual. The inspirational cults eliminated it all together.
retaining only the emphasis on the subjective experience of the individual, and even this only narrowly
conceived as the assertion of individual will. By the 1950s, these popular best-sellers had completely
transfonned the old self-help Protestant system. in which faith led to character and character to a succesful
manipulation of the world, and replaced it with a secularized system. where faith led directly to an
individual will capable of self-manipulation. Inspirational literature promised that this ability to shape
oneself at will was the key to financial success, health. and peace of mind. The success of this literature
evidenced. according to Hofstadter. a problematic naturalization of spirituality. Whereas in protestantism
spirit and world interacted, in inspirational cults they became ambiguously fused.
Within elite American architecture schools of the early 1960s. the inspirational myth of self-manipulation
operated in the interest of prornoting the will to confonnity. Architectural students were taught to despise
"elite professionalism," to be suspicious of individuality as emixxtied in "star" architects, and to wary of
the mind. These were expressions of selfishness, and the architect. they were taught. was a servant of the
community. Withdrawal, self-examination, individuality, analysis, and reflection were bad. An architect
of good character and personality was achieved by practice, not by introspection. Students were asked to
manipulate their self and make it self-less. entirely at the service of others. The critical mind was seen as a
liability for this purpose. It lead students down the path of self-analysis, and criticality, which could turn
students dangerously loose from the traditions and concerns of the communities they were to serve.
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coincided with the burgeoning of the field of aesthetics in the United States, opening
teaching opportunities for phenomenologists in that area.92 An Invitation to
Phenomenology: Studies in the Philosophy ofExperience (1965), James Edie's
compendium of essays, confinned aesthetics as the area in which Americans had made
their first valuable and original contributions to phenomenology. The strength of
phenomenologists, argued Edie, was that unlike ana!ysts they applied their philosophy to
defined areas of human existence. For Edie, the tum towards aesthetics was bound
together by a common interest in applying the descriptive methods of phenomenology to
"intra-mundane structures," in order to understand how the experiencing body mediated
between inner and outer worlds. 93 This of course made their philosophy seem like a
natural fit for Modem architects. But it was not until the early 19708, when translations
of original European works began to appear thanks to Edie's series Northwestern
University Studies on Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, and phenomenological
publications came into wide circulation that American architects to notice of
phenomenology.
91 The pre-history of these fantasies can be found in the Modernist reception of primitivism and of the
mentally ill. See Hal Foster, "Blinded Insights: On the Modernist Reception of the Art of the Mentally Ill,"
in October, n. 97 (Summer 2001), pp 3-30.
92 In 1942, the Journal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism was founded, along with the American Sociey for
Aesthetics, and by the late 194Os, there was a proliferation of university courses and OOoks on the subject.
See Ann Fulton, Apostles ofSartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1999), p 54.
93 Edie spoke confidently of the success of phenomenology in America: '7here is good reason to believe
that in future surveys or histories of twentieth-century American philosophy the 1960's will be recognized
as the period when the phenomenological movement finally took root in our philosophical soil and became
an active and creative force in its own right." What remained unclear for him was the extent to which the
American development of phenomenology was in fact a radical departure. Edie felt the need to put
quotation marks around "phenomenologists" when referring to the authors cOlnpiled in the book. Their
work, he thought, somewhat detached from the founding fathers of the movement. There was, for instance,
a shared degree of suspicion towards Husserl's transcendental constituting consciousness. See James M.
Edie's introduction to Phenomenology in America: Studies in the Philosophy ofExperience, 00. James M.
Edie. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), pp 7-27. For his perspective on the tum of American
phenomenologists towards aesthetics see his introdu~tion toAn Invitation to Phenomenology: Studies in the
Philosophy ofExperience, eel. James M. Edie, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), pp 7-13.
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By the late 196Os, phenomenology had expanded into psychology,
communicology, and economics with sufficient force to warrant the foundation of a
separate Society for Pllenomenology and the Human Sciences. During this period,
however, architects and phenomenologists remained largely oblivious to each other, save
for Peresutti who had introduced his students to the relevance of phenomenology as a tool
in understanding the fullness of "reality." Charles W. Moore, Peresutti's assistant, wrote
the fIrst American dissertation citing the importance of Gaston Bachelard in establishing
the correspondence of "inner" and "outer" worlds in immediate experiences of archetypal
images.94 Peresutti's circle of young architects identified the avant -garde Modernist
circles of the 1950s with acquiescence to the "sham culture" produced under
McCarthyism. They looked upon Gordon Bunschaft (a partner at SOM championed for
his Americanization of the International Style in buildings like the Lever House) and
corporate architecture in general as "evil.,R5
Despite the growing animosity with the Princeton administration, Peresutti had
managed to inspire a small group of students to remain faithful to his teachings, including
Donlyn Lyndon (b 1936), William Turnbull (1935-97), Richard C. Peters, and Charles
Moore (all of whom met at Princeton in 1956). Peresutti lectured them on the importance
of vernacular architecture, on the importance of returning to reaJ "things," and on the
need to differentiate "the drawing of a building and a real building.,.96 To them,
Peresutti's teachings felt closer to Wurster's and Mumford's Bay Region Modemisrrl,
94 Moore utilized Bachelard's work on water and dreams to posit the inmediacy afwater's symbolic content
in experience. The concept of immediacy also served Moore to posit water as a primordial element
common to man and nature, and to relate the two. See Charles W. Moore, Water and Architecture.
(Princeton: Dissertation. Princeton University. 1957).
95 F. Andrus Burr, uLearning Under Moore," in GA Houses, n. 7 ( 1980), P 176.
96 Peresutti as quoted by Richard C. Peters. "Lighting for Moore," in GA Houses, n. 7 ( 1980). P 144.
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more eager to incorporate the thick and contradictory "reality" of American culture.
Prompted by Peresutti, Moore saw the mainstream Modernists as people divorced from
"reality" who dispensed empty rhetoric that was quickly and uncritically accepted by
their academic acolytes:
Dean McLaughlin tried to run a countertrend to people like Labatut and
Peresutti. He brought down people from New York to lecture us, like
Gordon Bunshaft. [... ] He was perhaps the most unpleasant creep I ever
met. Really awful. All these sharp New Yorkers wheeled in to instruct
the young of Princeton.
[... ] When the heroes of the modern movement came, we usually though
they were the prime idiots of all time. I remember Siegfried Giedion
announcing (in a thick German accent, suitable only for Harvard) that the
ideal size for a city was seven hundred thousand. And when questioned
by us about that presumption -which, apparently, people at Harvard had
simply accepted-he announced that Rotterdam was about seven hundred
thousand, and Rotterdam was a nice city, and so seven hundred thousand
was it.
No: the models that were so strong elsewhere in the fifties were just not
very strong at Princeton. 97
Fig: The MLTW partners at the Sea Ranch Courtyard In 1991. From Left to
Right: Richard Whitaker, Conlyn Lyndon, Charles Moore, and WIlliam
Turnbull. The photo was taken on occasion of the AlA's conferral of the
Twenty-Flve-Year Award on MLTW In 1991. From Kevin P. Keirn, An
Architectural Life: Memoirs and Memories of Charles W. Moore, (Boston,
New York, Toronto, and London: Bulflnch Press Book! Little, Brown and
Company, 1996), p 88.
Peresutti's students began referring to themselves as "the family," a small society
of close friends with similar ideas which would later support each other in securing
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academic posts and professional commissions. Richard Peters, who would become a
lighting consultant to most members of "the family," and a successful architect in his
own right, recalled that when in 1962 Moore, Lyndon, Turnbull, and Whitaker came
together to found the MLTW firm (later to be championed as the heir to Wurster's Bay
Region Style), the core members of Peresutti's circle came together.98
Although "the family's" condemnation of the avant-garde gained strength from a
wider cultural prejudi(..e against intellectuals and experts, it must not be confused with
these popular currents. This small anti-avant~gardewas among the most highly educated
architects at the time (very few architects, even to this day, hold a Ph.D. like Moore).
Their anti-intellectualism was constructed as an anti-rationalism that invoked thinkers
such as Diderot, Hume, the Earl of Shaftesbury, Gaston Bachelard, and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty. They pitted the mind against the body, arguing that thought was a reductive
abstraction of the full "reality" of corporeal experience.
To this anti-avant-garde, rational planning and professional nonns were analogous
to the loss of individuality and over conformity spawned by corporate America, and
denounced in books such as David Riesman's The Lonely Crowd (1950) and William
Whyte's The Organization Man (1956).99 Their understanding of the avant-garde as
contaminated by "official" culture justified their search for a new "purity" in Modern
aesthetic expression. They found it in the 1950s architectural discourse which likened
design to an unmediated creation of the "spirit." "The family" came under the spell of
97 Charles W. Moore as quoted in David Littlejohn, Architect: The Life and Work ofCharles W. Moore,
(New York: llolt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984), pp 122-123.
98 Richard C. Peters, "Lighting for Moore," in GA Houses, n. 7 ( 1980).
99 See David Riesman. The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1950), and William Hollingsworth Whyte, The Organization Man, (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1956).
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people like Louis I. Kahn, and extended the Modernist myth of a pure origin to aesthetic
expression well into the 1970s. The anti-avant-garde'8 perception of avant-garde
Modernism as a repressive force attracted it to the existentialist affinnation of the search
for individual freedom. Its anti-intellectualism further opened it to the phenomenological
critique of reason. But it was its interest in the "spiritual life" that finally enabled the
anti-avant-garde to assimilate phenomenology as a "science" to pry open the "inner
worlds" of individuals and things. The anti-avant-garde's conflation of subjectivity and
spirituality also involved confounding intellectual awareness with stream of
consciousness, and the value of thought with psychological activity.
Despite being elitist, the anti-avant-garde played on the cuii:t!ra1 power of populist
sentiment. It camouflaged itself as a popular, anti-elitist movement, in order to displace
the avant-garde elite it sought to replace. In the 1950s, the brooding discontent of small
town Americans with the changes of modernization found an escape valve in professional
experts, who were then rising to cultural prominence. This helped perpetuate culturnl
prejudices against intellectuals well beyond the height of McCarthyism. The 1957 launch
of the Soviet Sputnik satellite shocked American self-confidence into thinking that their
derision for the intellect was hazardous to the nation's survival. As attention turned to the
United States' dependence on expert skills in areas from defense to education and urban
planning, a sense of helplessness intensified in American society, which saw itself as the
powerless object of constant manipulation. Intellect, affinned Richard Hofstadter,
became widely resented as a fonn of power or privilege: "Once the intellectual was
gently ridiculed because he was not needed; now he is fiercely resented because he is
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needed too much. He has become all too practical, all to effective. He is the object of
resentment because of an improvement, not a decline in his fortunes."loo
After having resigned from Princeton in 1959, Peresutti moved to a position at
Yale University. 101 But it was not until the arrival of Charles Moore in 1965 that Yale
became a center for Modern anti-avant-gardism. Moore succeeded Paul RUGolph as
Yale's Chairman of the department of architecture with the intention of propelling his
reputation to a national level, and to challenge the New York based avant -garde. It was,
as his partner William Turnbull remembered, an attempt to "roll the dice for the Big
Time," and "get your name known by the New York crowd."I02 Moore's first grand
gesture at Yale was to disappear for a semester with the first year class to New Zion,
Kentuky, a rural town of two hundred inhabitants in the middle of the Appalachian
Mountains with no electricity or phones. He hoped to pass on to his students the lessons
learned from Peresutti about the vernacular and "reality." Moore proposed a design -build
project for a community center as the semester studio project. More importantly. Moore
sent a strong message to the New York elite. Unlike them, his school was in touch with
the American "heartland." In New Haven, like in New Zion, to be an intellectual was
considered a gentlemanly distinction offensive to American egalitarianism.
100 Richard Hofstadter. Anti-Intellectualism in American Life .. (New York: Knopf. 1963). P 34. According
to Hofstadter. American intellectuals entered the public scene in one of two guises: as experts. who were
perceived as manipulating the institutions that governed public and private life. or as ideologues. who were
feared for tht~ir ability to manipulate the mind .. Even though only a small fraction of intellectuals actually
had a role in public Ii few they affected the prevailing cultural attitudes towards the rest. Americans of the
early Cold War remained on the whole deeply suspicious of intellectuals. Their alleged power made them
the object of McCarthyite accusations that they were manipulating government from the inside. and that
they were stirring the minds of youth towards subversion.
101 Previous to his departure from Princeton. Peresutti had already been a visiting professor at Yale
University in 1957.
102 David Littlejohn. Architect: The Life and Work o/Charles W. Moore. (New York: Holt. Rinehart and
Winston, 1984), pp 95-96.
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Fig: Charles Moore (right) and Yale students (left) on the job site for a
community center In New Zion, Kentucky, In 1965. From F. Andrus Burr,
"Learning Under Moore," In GA Houses, n. 7 ( 1980), P 174.
Fig: Community center In New Zion, Kentuky, designed by Charles Moore
and Yale students In 1965. From F. Andrus Burr, "Learning Under Moore,"
In GA Houses, n. 7 ( 1980), P 175.
At Yale, Moore found a hotbed of phenomenologists interested in art (and soon
also in architecture). Philosopher Karsten Harries (b. 1937), who would later become
deeply involved in architectural pedagogy, had been teaching there since 1961. In
addition, John Wild had accepted a professorship at Yale's department of philosophy in
1963, beginning an era that would be commonly referred to as the "Northwestern- Yale
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Axis.,,103 Contacts between ''the family" and American phenomenologists began during
this period. In their sphere of influence, Moore's anti-intellectualism was crafted into a
carefully staged anti-rationalism that held theory to be inconsistent (and even dangerous)
to practice.
Moore's students were not encouraged to engage in the study of phenomenology.
On the contrary, phenomenology was invoked only to give academic credence to the
demotion of the intellect. As Moore's pedagogy makes patently clear, Phenomenology's
critique of objectivity served only as a front obscuring the systematic negation of reason,
and the hypostatization of feeling. Once summoned to legitimize the anti-avant-garde,
the philosophy's substance could be quickly disc·arded.
F. Andrus Burr began his architecture studies at Yale in 1966. He recalled that
Moore and Kent Bloomer forged a strong "anti -theory" climate at Yale through their
studio pedagogy, which emphasized the primacy of practice and of intuitive design
responses instead of reasoned analysis: "It was an anti -intellectual approach to
architecture, a no-nonsense seat of the pants attitude. The goal of architectural practice
was the built fonn, and the architect participated in the building process. [...] One didn't
talk about architecture, one built it."I04 Moore famously told students that "the opposite
of rational is real,,,105 and that reality was bodily feelings. Burr considered that the
objective of Moore and Bloomer's pedagogical method was to make pupils discover their
"inner feelings," and to exteriorize them in built fonns without the mediation of thought.
Architecture was the transubstantiation of inner spirit into outer matter.
103 Lester Embree et aI., "United States of America," in Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology, ed. Lester Embree
et al.. (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
104 F. Andrus Burr, "Learning Under Moore," in GA Houses, n. 7 ( 1980), P 175-176.
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To acccmplish this impossible task, Moore and Bloomer created a veritable cult
dynamic, attempting to "erase" the outside wOI-Id in order to instill the ne\v credo. "It was
both an act of learning, and a process of deprogratrming-- erasing the preconceptions."l06
Books and drawings were deemed too intellectual. Plans and sections, students were
told~ gave a "false" representation of a building's totality. lbe building's "reality" could
allegedly only be grasped through "feeling" as one "experienced~'it. In an effort to
reduce the inttrvention of the mind in design to a minimum, Moore and Bloomer
encouraged the use of models as a means to bypass drawing altogether. "Students came
to mistrust drawing as a biased representation of architecture, incapable of showing how
one would really experience a building." 107
tNFLUEHCES
PA.RTNERs AND
PRfHCtPt..E
COLLASORATORS
~~
CHARLES MOORE
105 Ibid. p179.
106 Ibid. pI?3.
107 Ibid. P175.
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Fig: Diagram of Charles Moore's "family" of partners, students, employees,
etc. between 1925 and 1974. From Ron Filson, "Charles Moore & Co.
Evolution," In GA Houses, n. 7 (1980), pp 128-131.
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I\foore and Bloomer's pedagogy had deep repercussions in the careers of Yale
architecture students. With serious shortcomings in their drawing abilities, graduates had
difficulty rmding employment in established architecture f1fl11S. Marginalized from the
mainstream of the profession, many Yale students stayed in academia and joined "the
family," which greYl to become a powerful infonnal networking platfonn for university
positions. In continuing Moore's legacy, some welcomed contributions from
phenomenologists in their departments, as in the case of Ron Filson, later Dean of
Tulane's School of Architecture, with philosopher Michael Zimmerman. 108 As a result of
their inability to fit into traditional professional practices, some Yale graduates began to
identify themselves with late 1960s countercultural movements. These Ivy leaguers felt
themselves to be "non-elitist," and spoke of "revolutionizing" architecture by "working
on their own rather than selling their souls to the devils of corporate architecture. [...] It
108 Ron Filson, for instance, studied under Moore at Yale during the late 19605. He then moved to UCLA to
help establish the Urban Design Workshop in 1970 ( which was renamed the Urban Innovations Group in
1972). The workshop was initiated by economist Harvey Perloff. the dean of the school, as an outreach
program modeled on the medical school's teaching hospital, which was to facilitate the involvement of
faculty and students in ureal world" in line with Moore's pedagogy. In 1973 Filson moved to UCLA to
take charge of the UlG's architecture component, where Charles Moore joined him in 1974. For an
account of this period see Ron Filson, "Charles Moore & Co. Evolution:' in GA Houses, n. 7 (1980), pp
J28-13 J.
Filson went on to become Dean of Tulane's architecture school, and offered Christian Norberg-Schulz the
Luce Professorship at Tulane University. Filson had been taken by Norberg-Schulz's 1979 lecture at UCLA
and had long used his volumes as textbooks. In a letter to Norberg-Schulz dated March 19, 1981, currently
at the Norberg-Schulz archive in Oslo, Filson wrote:
"I was assistant professor at the School of Architecture and Urban Planning at UCLA a couple ofyeais ago
when you came and delivered a lecture which I found tremendously exciting and important. I have in
addition relied heavily on your books and writings in my own courses and other work."
Norberg-Schulz continued to negotiate the possibility of accepting the job as is evidence by another letter
by Filson dated September I 1981. Filson invited phenomenologist Michael E. Zimmennan to write
UArchitecture and the Technological Culture," in Tulane Architectural Vie"-', (New Orleans" Louisiana:
Tulane School of Architecture. 1978), pp 9-18. In 1984. Filson participated in the "Place Debate: Piazza
d'Italia,fl which was sponsored by the magazine Piaces, and which reunited some of the members of Uthe
family." In addition to Filson, the s)1l1posium was attended by David Littlejohn (Moore's biographer),
George Baird. Robert S. Harries. Christian Norberg-Schulz. Jay Claiborne with Tom Aidala, Allen Eskew,
Charles W. Moore, and DonJyn Lyndon.
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was an easy step to take; condemnn~gNixon and Agnew one moment, Pevsner and
Giedion the next."I09
So unwavering was their faith in Moore and Bloomer (and so scant their exposuf ~
to other views), that students failed to blame their marginalization with the fundamental
inadequacies of their education. Instead, they held steadfast to their ignorance as a
weapon in the battle against the Modem avant-garde. Moore and Bloomer succeeded in
chiseling out an identity for the architecture students that was distinctly different from
Yale's larger Ivy League student body. To achieve this clique, Moore and Bloomer
sacrificed standard academic administrative practices and obviated clear methods of
evaluating students. In other words, objectivity disappeared, and a student's advance
within the system was subjected to his or her ideological proximity with Moore and
Bloomer.
[...T]he class also found some difficult and disturbing aspects to the new
program. It tended to be vague. Problems were stated in a rather abstract
manner and students were unsure what work should be done in response.
In addition, the criticism was infuriatingly non -specific. There seemed to
be no right or wrong answers. [...] The curriculum was very loose, and
everyone was involved in making very real architecture. In this climate it
was easy to overlook rules and regulations --they seemed so trivial. The
enigmatic and talented George Hathorn joined the class of 1970 over a
mountain of ignored entrance requirements." I 10
The "the family" grew into a veritable nation-wide organization that disseminated
"phenomenologicar' design (as it was beginning to be called by the mid 1970s), and
which came to include a number of phenomenologists -philosopher Robert Mugerauer,
for instance, became a protege of Moore's while at the University of Texas, Austin, and
is currently Dean of the Architecture School at the University of Washington. Initially,
109 F. Andrus Burr, "Leaming Under Moore," in GA Houses, n. 7 ( 1980), P 176.
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the core members of "the family" propagated this current of anti-avant-gardism: Lyndon
as head the School of Architecture at Oregon and then at MIT, Whitaker as AlA Director
of Architectural Education in Washington, and Turnbull as the principal architect of
MLTW in San Francisco. But Moore's impact on pedagogy towered over all of them. In
the course of his career, he held appoinbnents at six universities, and not only helped
promote his fanner students, but sometimes even established new professional practices
with them. In December 1979, Progressive Architecture's survey named Moore one of
the top 10 influences on others in the profession in recent years -Moore and his various
offices also came in first in tenns of number of pages devoted to a single architect by the
magazine. I I I His outstanding influence earned him the 1989 ACSA/AlA (American
Collegiate Schools of Architecture/ American Institute of Architects) Topaz Medallion
for Excellence in Architectural Education. The board conferring the award described him
as "a brilliant and inspiring force who has transformed the character of architectural
education in this country." I 12
IlO Ibid. p 173, 174. .
III David Littlejohn, Architect: The Life and Work afCharles W. Moore, (New York: Holt. Rinehart and
Winston, 1984), P 97.
112 tlCharles Moore Top Educator," in MEMO: The American Institute ofArchitects, (March 1989), p 11.
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Fig: Moore (white shirt) with students (unknown location and year). From
Kevin P. Kelm, An Architectural Life: Memoirs and Memories of Charles W.
Moore, ed. Kevin P. Kelm, (Boston, New York, Toronto, and London:
Bulflnch Press Book! Little, Brown and Company, 1996), p 273.
To summarize, Moore helped confound an existing Modernist discourse on the
"spiritual" essence of design with a broadly diffused low-brow American anti-
intellectualism. Moore's "family" turned the anti -avant-garde into a powerful movement
at the very center of American intellectual and academe life. Its new hegemony was not,
as some believe, a "Postmodemist" interregnum that can now be bridged over as
architects seek to re-connect with Modernism. The anti-avant-garde infused itself in the
way we teach and think about architecture to such an extent that the avant-gardist Modem
canon can no longer be innocently put back together. For the anti-avant-garde was as
"Modem" as its negative, but all the more enduring. Its demotion of the intellect allowed
it to cany on un-theorized and de-historicized, a condition that obscures rather than
reveals its true import.
Against the grain of its own project, the enormous success of the anti-avant-garde
can be historicized as follows: 1) The anti-avant-garde "adjusted" architectural education
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to the pressures of McCathyism by turning the avant-garde spirit of dissent against itself,
and putting it at the selVice of conservative fundamentalists. As avant-garde Modernism
began to gain currency in the United States, and to spread with it the influence of
"expert" cosmopolitan architects over small town America, anti-avant-gardism stepped
up to represent the defense of popular values -even if its "guiding light" ideology
remained fundamentally elitist. 2) The success of the anti-avant-garde entailed the
camouflage of all outward expressions of privilege, such as intellectual sophistication and
theory. Underneath the surface, anti-avant-gardism remained a high intellectual
movement, promulgated by people who were deeply concerned with ideas. The
McCarthyite curtailment of dissent also required the transformation of architecture from
an engine of Modern social refonn, to an instrument at the service of people's emotional
and experiential well-being. 3) The anti-avant-garde was able to maintain the Modernist
ideology of refonn alive by presenting architecture as a tool for achieving individual
uspiritual" ecstasies, which were deemed "revolutionary" insofar as they stood beyond
everyday experience. 4) The anti-avant-garde discourse of pedagogy followed suit with
the view that architectural education taught students to tap into their "inner" spiritual core
and transubstantiate it into a purely new creation. This attention to child-like primal
spontaneity satisfied the Modernist myth of an essential origin by assimilating it into a
widely accepted secularized Protestant ethic of voluntarism and individuality.
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III. The Antl-avant-garde's experlentlallsm: anti-Intellectualism posing
as anti-rationalism
A. The antl-avant-garde's "theoretical" mask
The architectural interest in Phenomenology did not emerge as a direct link to
philosopllY. Phenomenology's role of in crafting the theory of the 1960s anti-avant-garde
was minor. Through Peresutti, "the family" had been exposed to the philosophy, but
their anti-intellectualism calls into question how much of his message they heeded. Their
aversion to the avant-garde was indeed deduced from Peresutti's concern with the
falsification of culture by politics. They vilified American neo-avant-gardism (in its
"master architect" and "corporate" fonus) precisely for loosing the "purity" of European
"originality," and looked upon it as a bastardized copy at the service of the political
establishment. But whereas Peresutti used phenomenology's attention to the real as a
guide in the reasoned critique of cultural mishandlings, "the family" crudely opposed
reality to the intellect, mostly ignoring phenomenology. Like in the Hollywood remakes,
Italian neo-realism lost a great deal of subtlety in translation. The anti-avant-garde would
not engage phenomenology until the late 196Os, when new winds of tolerance began
sweeping across American society and made overt anti-intellectualism into an untenable
proposition. A new theoretical consciousness emerged within architectural discourse as
part and parcel of the university-wide absorption of semiotics and structuralism, which
put scholarly conventions on the foreground of tenure cases. 113 Unable to cany on
business as usual and in need of academic validation, the anti -avant-garde had to evince
113 The structuralist questioning of objectivity and universality also made the avant-garde less comfortable
with its "scientific" taxonomies of emotion as a uperformance specification." Those who continued along
this path, like Christopher Alexander, were relegated to the background. Instead of "catalogues,n the avant-
garde began emphasizing what appeared to be more open ended "systems and processes" --even if some of
these Usystems" remained closed, as in Eisenrr~an's formal permutations.
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its historiography, largely against its own will, in textbooks and class syllabi. To trace
this shift, social history must therefore give way to intellectual history.
The anti-avant-garde, custodian of the Modernist myths of pure origin and of
absolute alterity to culture, spread its cult of innocence and "pure spiritual expression"
through pedagogy. Textbooks began using naIve illustration techniques and authors
effaced their intellectual sources in an effort to appear "common" and "readable." From
the perspective of its discourse, the anti-avant-garde proved to be quintessentially
Modem -not Postmodem, as those that have historicized only its stylistic preferences
have argued. The non -disciplinary impetus present in 1950s and 1960s pedagogical
discourse has a history within Modem architectural thought that dates back to the 19th
century and to such figures as Heinrich Wolfflin. 114 When the anti -avant-garde sought
paternity in the founding authors of architectural history, it found a rich discourse that not
only linked inner and outer worlds through corporeal analogies, but that had already
effectively weeded out intellectual conventions from its discipline! Thus, the core
teachings of aIrlti-avant-gardism remained initially unaffected by the intellectualization of
architecture -Modem architectural history "shored up" the anti-avant-garde against any
clailns of scholarly deficiency. Posing as anti-rationalism, its anti-intellectualism passed
through the academic sift as another attempt to de-center the Modernism's foundational
claims to universal reason and objectivity. Modernism endured in the anti-avant-garde
under the guise of Postmodernism.
114 See UThe New Antidiscipline Discipline" section in Mark Jarzombek. The Psychologizing ofModernity:
Art. Architecture, History. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2000), pp 50-58.
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Jarzombek has argued that the fusion of psychology into Modernist art and
architectural discourse was possible largely because it went by un-theorized, and thus
unrecognized, especially in the postwar years. The "Psychologizing of Modernity" was
only workable through the (unspoken) Modernist theory which held that firstly, "there is
a correlation between internal and external expressions, and that, secondly, this
correlation is the product of free aesthetic contemplation." 115 Doing his part to expose it
by naming it, Jarzombek coined this the theory of "subject -objectification." The
Psychologizing ofModernity (2000) traced its various incarnations from Max Stimer's
nineteenth century sensuous egoism and Theodor Lipps's "science of immediate
experience," to Heinrich Wolftlin's use of corporeal analogy as the basis of an empathic
art history, and beyond into an ethos penneating Modernist thinking. Indeed, as
Jarzombek pointed out, the secret to the self-rejuvenating currency of this theory was that
it constructed itself as the stabilizing limit to Modernism's perpetual crises. Posing as
Modernism's negative, the discourse of experientiatism always appeared ex-nihilo,
somehow floating beyond politics or history, and outside of theory. But upon
Jarzombek's closer scrutiny, this negation occurred only in appearance; Modernism
created the illusion of its own incompleteness by manufacturing immediate experience as
the domain beyond its theoretical grasp. In order to survive, Modernism required this
"deterritorialization of the avant-gardeHl16 -or what I am here referring to as the anti-
avant-garde. Jarzombek was able to lay bare the anti-liberal and reactionary political
substrate animating this anti-intellectual movement by theorizing and historicizing it.
Just as a Wolfflin's thought, properly historicized, shows itself to be intimately woven
115 Ibid. P 66.
116 Ibid. P 158.
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into the Gennan bourgeois refonn, the history of experientialism in America cannot be
separated from the tapestry of McCarthyism and its secularized fonns of Protestant
orthodoxy. I 17
The 1970s introduction of phenomenology into architectural discourse was
concomitant with a larger attempt to give a "theoreticalu face to the anti-avant-garde's
experientialism. It was in great measure a reaction to the dawn of Ph.D. programs in
architecture, which had by and large aimed to support the avant-garde, and which
initiated a mode of intellectual accountability that Jarzombek calls "Critical
Historiography.nllS Given the scholarly attempts to define meaning in architecture as a
function of socio-cultural historical events, the anti-avant-garde retorted with the claim
that authentic knowledge of architecture could only be gained in immediate experiences.
Numerous anti-avant-gardists refashioned themselves as "theorists" in order to protect
Modernism from "false knowledge." Lars Lerup, for instance, argued that "Modem
architecture [... ] conceals and distorts the essence of architecture as type by giving
preeminence to fonn. ,,119 His belief that architecture sprung from a social storehouse of
housing archetypes available in "everyday" immediate experiences motivated the well
intentioned involvement of communities in design build projects beginning in the 19705.
117 In The Psychologizing ofModernity, Jarzombek already gives ample evidence of the symbiotic
relationship between the "deterritorializedtt avant-garde~which I am discussing as the anti-avant-garde, and
the consensual political climate of the J~40s and 19508 in the United States. I am trying to extend his work
by looking closer at that political climate. Although the methods of the anti-avant-garde were not, as
Jarzombek proves, properly American. I suggest that its success in the Alnerican university was indeed an
artifact of McCarthyism. In the context of McCarthyism Modernism's "humanist social program" was not
aimed at social reform (as Sarah Goldhagen has argued) but at social conformism.
Its Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing ofModernity: Art, Architecture, History, (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2(00), p 205-207.
119 As a post-script to his arguments, Lerup invoked the philosophies of Heidegger, Arendt~ and Merleau-
Ponty. He presented the front of specialized intellectual lineage without actuaUy bringing its historicity to
bear on his own thought. Lars Lerup, Building the Unfinished: Architecture and Human Action, (Beverly
Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1977), p 162.
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But it was the success of Moore's and Bloomer's Body, Memory, Architecture
(1977) that gave the greatest thrust to the theory of "subject-objectification," or of the
"body-image," to speak in their own parlance. For Moore and Bloomer, people and
buildings shared outward appearances (bodies) and inward spirit (image). According to
them, the authentic meaning of Modem architecture could be restored if its outward
fonns were reconnected to the inner spirit of subjects. Moore and Bloomer proposed
nothing short of a the(pry of sexual intercourse between people and buildings, which
premised the flow of spirit between entities on intimacy of contact.
Since the mid 196Os, Moore had been arguing the case f or an experientialism that
could cure American society of the walls of interiority that, in his mind, were threatening
to destroy it. In his famous article "You Have to Pay for the Public Life" (1965), Moore
denounced California car culture for thriving on mobile privacy. The real cause for
alann, he argued, was that modern life hid people's body and thus fragmented the flow of
interpersonal contact -i.e. modernity obstructed the spiritual oneness of America. Even
public buildings such as Frank Lloyd Wright's "drive-in Civic CenterH in Marin County,
or John Carl Warnecke's Federal Building in San Francisco. wer~ for Moore "monsters"
of "rootlessness.,,12o Moore thought that the car destroyed place by flattening spatiality.
What was needed, he argued, was Uthe excitement of a sensible framework,,12t made up
of experiences of spatial "depth" that would restore buildings and people to their
"rootedness" in place. place, to follow Moore, originated in this bodily experience. not in
120 Charles W. Moore. nIl prezzo della Spazio Pubblico [You Have to Pay for the Public Life]:' in Lotus
International, n. 95 (1997), pp 102. Originally published in Perspecta" n. 9-10, (1965) p. 57-106.
121 Ibid. P 104.
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the landscape, as Norberg-Schulz would later argue. 122 In order to become coherent
places buildings had to "embody" the "inner" spatial depth of humans. This was simply
achieved, he argued, by buildings that provided different experiences of interior and
exterior, that established a range of dimensional scales, and that "orchestrated" unusual
("rich," ucomplex," or "memorable') relations between spaces.
By the mid 1970s, Moore had developed a full-blown pedagogy of architectural
eroticism, which argued for the liberation of sensualism from the Udogma" of the
"rootless" and always too "theoretical" avant-garde. Moore and Bloomer called upon
students and professionals (perhaps especially professionals) to incorporate the "whole
body" in the design and experience of architecture, and to distance themselves from the
banality of scholarship. For them, the body was the most "universal," "valued" and
"immediately understandable" spatial organization. They capitalized on the popular
perception of the body as the medium through which inner emotion was communicated -
for instance, they discussed the "face" of buildings as expressive of "inner feelings."
They analyzed the anatomy of buildings from various periods and styles in search of
trans-historical emotional contents, somehow preserved and ready at hand on the surface
"expressions" of buildings. Thus, they gave anthropomorphic descriptions of both
buildings and sites, always pointing out the location of the face, the heart, the brain, etc.
Appealing to common sense, Moore and Bloomer quickly tu rned their assertions
about the body's ability to communicate alinguistically into a program for a new
122 Following an argumentative line not unlike that of Moore, philosopher Edward Casey would speak
experiences of "embodiment" as of the origin of place in The Fate ofPlace: A Philosophical History,
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, I.A)ndon: University of California Press~ 1997). In speaking about the various
ways in which architects had made available these experiences through their buildings. Casey omitted the
work of Moore -apart from two references in the notes that refered the reader to Body, Memory and
Architecture ""for the relationship between body and building." (pp 459, 469).
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universally understood architecture. It was not only dearly needed, but also "easy," they
exclaimed. To create it, they argued that it was sufficient to focus on one's emotions. If
one felt good somewhere, that meant the space was indeed good:
If feelings are social, so is the emotional spatiality of the human body,
with all the rneanings which fmd expression along its boundaries, centers,
and psychophysical coordinates. Indeed it is impossible to imagine a
spatial organization more universal, more valued, and more immediately
understandable to everyone than the one provided by the human body. 123
Moore and Bloomer presented their Body, Memory, and Architecture as a
pedagogical alternative to the "rational" theories that, th~y claimed, had led modernism
astray by erroneously presupposing a mind-body split. They contended that the body was
productive of conceptual categories, and that it was therefore necessary for students to
first understand architecture as a Usensous art" with emotional and social effects, and not
just as a technical system. Moore and Bloomer were among the first (and most
successful) architects to conceal their anti-intellectual sensualism behind the face of a
more "theoretical" anti-rationalism, which they peppered with phenomenology: lhey
made recourse to Merleau-Ponty's critique of Cartesian metaphysics in authenticating
their belief in the meaningful pre-rational identity of viewer and world in immediate
experiences; they invoked Bachelard's understanding of "poetic images" as
epistemological breaks in giving new life to the Modernist myth of an essential (a-
historical) origin of artistic expression; and they used Jose Ortega y Gasset's famous
description of enclosure as the origin of communal civic life to put forth architecture as
the spiritual storehouse of humanity, which could "rechargeH individuals with "worii!-
energy" on mere contact.
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The introduction of philosophical references in Moore and Bloomer's book
created a pre-requisite of intellectual competence that was antagonistic to the presumed
spontaneity of their sensualist epistemology. This split was in a sense overcome (or over
looked) on the social level by the effectiveness of literary devices, such as bibliographies,
in constructing the identity of "little societies" within the discipline of architecture that
were attuned to what authors were "in" or "out." On the intellectual plane, the gulf
created by the rising standard of erudition in architecture was bridged over in part by the
attempts of phenomenologists to expand their influence beyond philosophy. The
escalation of the terms of extra-disciplinary engagement required that philosophers
reposition their intellectual labor. In tenns of the architectural prohlematic between ne~
avant-gardism and anti-avant-gardism, this required that philosophy come to arbitrate on
the mechanisms for sunnounting the crisis of bourgeois banality. Phenomenology,
perhaps more so than any other philosophy, attempted to resolve this crisis by premising
the legitimacy and originality of aesthetic creation on the "authenticity" of the architect's
immediate experience. Through this extension of the psychological into the
metaphysical, as Jarzomek has put it, phenomenology salvaged the demise of psychology
in architectural history, giving a new lease on life to the idea that an allegedly
autonomous and psychologically superior el ire could continually rewrite history .124
123 Charles W. ~1oore and Kent C. Bloomer, Body, Memory. and Architecture, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977), p 46.
124 For Jarzombek's argument that philosophy came to replace psychology in postwar architectural hisbry
and theory see his The Psych%gi:in,t: of Moderni')': Art. Architecture. Jlistory. (Cambridge. UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp 185-207.
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B. The mask of Bachelard: The "poetic Image" as the Modern
myth of pure origin and absolute alterlty to culture
1. The "poetic Image" as pure creation of the soul
To pass off their "body-image" theory, not as a mere anti-inteIlectualism, but as
more "academic" anti-rationalism, Moore and Bloomer made recourse to Western
philosophical treatises on perception. They argued that since Descartes philosophers had
demoted aesthetic sensations in order to posit the epistemological superLJTity of the mind
over the body. For Moore and Bloomer, Theod or Lipps ~ 1893 theory of empathy put this
split into question by positing that the self couid exist both in subjective and objective
realms. 125 In addition to empathy theories, they counted contributions idllging from
volumes on Gestalt psychology to books such as that of environmental psychologist J.J.
Gibson's The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966), which emphasized the
productive role of the body in perception, as further refutations of the classical
philosophical paradigm of the senses as receptive mechanisms. 126 Moore and Bloomer
were interested in Gibson's claim that the senses were not passive reception organs but
aggressive infonnation-seeking structures .. which he divided into the visual system, the
auditory system, the tasie-smell system. the basic-orienting system, and the haptic
system. For them, Gibson's rethinking of the human sensorium was important to
architectural thinking for two reasons: First~ it was anti-intellectual. Gibson posited that
the body obtained infonnation about objects without the intervention of mental processes.
Second, Moore and Bloomer argued that it was precisely the a-rational processes
12~ Charles W. Moore and Kent C. Bloomer. Body. Menun)'. anti Architecturc'. (New Haven: Yale
University Press. 1977). p 27.
116 Ibid. P 31-36.
1M2
involving the basic-orienting and haptic systems that were responsible for the human
understanding of place and location.
This had serious implications for the theorization of place in architecture. Moore
and Bloomer tenned this comprehension of personal location the "body-image." It was a
type of personal, inward place, a primordial self-centered, a-ratiollal and emotional
structuring of the inner world. Moore and Bloomer concluded that the basic -orienting
and haptic systems fonned "the core of human identity," and that this provided a new
basis for tlnderstanding human feelings as three-dimensional architectural experiences.
This search for a relation between inner emotional depth and outward spatial dimellS!On
would be a constant in Moore's career as an architect. Gaston Bachelard's work on
"poetic images" was the philosophical tiller of his pursuit. The Bachelardian challenge to
Cartesian and critical philosophy, Moore and Bloomer argued, called for a similar tum
within architecture.
The "poetic image" was a central concept in Bachelard's critique of Oassical
philosophy. In his The Poetics of Space (1958, English translation 1969), BacheJard
discussed it as the key to understanding creation in non-causal, yet rational tenns, and
therefore as the opening towards a new philosophy free from causality and scientism.
This much was quite suggestive to architects who, like Moore, were then engaged in
critiquing their own discipline's reliance on causality, as expressed in fannalist truisms
such as "fonn follows function." But more importantly for Moore, the poetit: image
promised a direct link between the inner and outer worlds. According to Bachelard 's
definition, it was a brief and fleeting union of subjectivity and objectivity. Neither an
emulation of the outer world nor a mirror of pure inner consciousness, it was its own
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specific reality: an irruption of pure immediacy within consciousness. The "poetic image"
appeared in the absence of a past, as though motivated by its own "inner thrust."
Because, according to Bachelard, no causality could explain the onset of "poetic
images,H he regarded them as the open ended and primal sources of creativity, as
moments in which inner consciousness and outer world were materialized into an "inner
vision," as spontaneous "commitments of the soul" which bypassed the "mind" and its
knowledge. Poetic images passed from the soul to the mind as they went "from the
original state of reverie to that of execution.,,127 Therefore, continued Bachelard'} the
poetic image implied a bi-polar model of consciousness: on the one hand was the
consciousness associated with the soul (inspiration and openness) while on the other hand
was the consciousness associated with the mind (talent and reason). This of course
played right into the American anti-avant-garde's popular conception of the intellect as
inconsistent with wann emotion, and into their belief that education deprived students of
their "spontaneity" and "intuitive freshness" in design.
In Bachelard's opinion, philosophy had concentrated on the mind and failed to
recognize what he alleged were the more primord~al origins of thought in the soul. Here
was the crux of the philosophical task before him. If he could only prove that the poetic
image was the source of all new creations in thought, if he could establish that reason was
a function of catching and explaining these poetic bursts. then he could prove that science
and reason were not sources of innovation, that the origin of creativity was detached from
reason. If he could sustain this, it would be a fantastic blow those who claimed that
science, not philosophy was the source of all truth. American phenomenologists,
127 (iaston Bachelard. The Poetics ofSptJ(Oe. trans. Maria Jolas . (Bo~ton: Beacon Press. 1(69). p xvii.
IX4
cornered out of funding and jobs by the '';scientism'' of analytic philosophers took to
Bachelard like flies to honey, following him into Jungian psychoanalysis as a means to
prove the inadequacy of modem scientific explanations. 128 American architects, who
were been caught since the 1950s in the postwar search to move beyond rationalism and
functionalism, were equally attracted to Bachelard insofar as he offered a means to
rethink innovation outside of technologically detennined models of progress.
Although Bachelard's most popular work L'1 America was by far The Poetics of
Space, the book was only the la'it phase in his long search for a rationalism free from the
methods of scientific knowledge, which had begun in 1938 with The Psychoanalysis of
Fire (English translation 1964)9 and had been followed in irlstallments such as L'Eau et
les reves [Water and Dreams, 1942]., L'Air et les songes [Air and Revery, 1943], La Terre
et les reveries de fa volante [The Earth and the Reveries of the Will., 1948], and La Terre
et les reveries du repos [The Earth and the Reveries ofRest, 1948]. In The
Psychoanalysis of Fire, Bachelard tried to prove the defectiveness of modem scientific
explanations alx>ut how humans came to invent the first fire -making procedure. He
claimed that ideas about primitive humans carrying out an empirical observation of
ignition in nature and then trying to copy it were flawed. There was nothing in nature
that resembled the rubbing of two dry pieces of wood. On the other hand, there were
many "archetypal" human experiences relating warmth to rubbing, such as sexual
intercourse. Hence. psychoanalysis could explain this invention very simply by focusing
on poetic images occurring during reveries of fire. Bachelard thought that fanta\ties of sex
128 This is the case for instance of Edward Casey. Ylho became a practicing psychoanalyst, and argued the
importance of Bachelard's interiorization of the world ( his Usubject-objectification'· to use Jarzombek·s
terminology) for the New York architectural Avant-Garde. See his Edward S. Casey. The Fate of Place: A
Philosophical History. (Berkeley, Los Angeles. London: University of California Press, (997).
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involving bodies heating up in the course of vigorous rubbing that originally led humans
to rub twigs together. For Bachelard, this was confinned by the presence of similar
Jungian archetypes of intercourse in various fire-creation myths. The point was that
invention did not involve a causal string of events carefully arranged in time. The truly
new resulted, according to Bachelard, from people reaching "inside," getting to know
themselves, and then projecting their interiority "outside." As he put it:
The method of rubbing then appears as the natural method. Once again it
is natural because man accedes to it through his own nature. In actual fact,
fife was detected within ourselves before it was snatched from the gods. )29
At the time of its English publication, this idea hit American architectural circles
with incendiary force. Bachelard seemed to be suggesting that to get out of the crisis of
functionalism, to invent a new architecture, people had to forget their professionalism,
their academic traini.,g, and all their cultural "baggage" and "get in tune" with
themselves. There were a few important dampers that might have kept the discipline
from catching ablaze with this idea. On the one hand, architects of the McCarthy era
were heavily involved in turning design into a science. Chennayeff and Alexander were
buying time from precious MIT computers to crack the language of automated design.
On the other hand, attempts to break the hold of functionalism through the recuperation
of history were (at least initially) unmistakably linguistic if not semantic in approach -
given the rising popularity of set11iotics and the ground-breaking work of Noam
Chomsky. But it was precisely against these avant-garde notions of architecture as
rational language that Bachelard~swork was most powerful. The anti-avant-garde
recognized this much: the problem of architectural language as a highly intellectualized
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discourse governed by pedantic historians and newly minted Ph.D.s could be quickly
"bypassed" through the Bachelardian model of creativity as ep~stemological break.
Bachelard gave credence to the myth that the newness of Modernist expression was a
function of ~!s absolute marginality to culture, its negation of history. Moore and
Bloomer's ability to tum Bachelard's philosophical concepts into a simple book,
marketed to first year architecture students but geared to the entire professional
community, and accompanied by Bloomer's masterfully naIve drawings, helped them
win over the profession. Their book Body, Memory, and Architecture sold like wildfire.
2. Contested dlsclpllnar-/ knowledge: Modernism as
Postmodernlsm
The anti-avant-garde's de-historization of creativity occurred in opposition to the
heightened relevance given to the historicity or architectural fonns during the 1970s.
Bachelard's claim that the origin of the "poetic image" was in the "depths of the soul"
also bore upon language, giving the anti-avant-garde's UPostmodemist" style a way to
also "bypass" a learned study of classical architecture, ani to argue that a meaningful
"past" was already immediately available in each architect's "sou1.H According to
Bachelard, the "poetic image" was a movement from the soul to the mind, or from logos
to being. In his words, "it is at once a becoming of expression~ and a becoming of our
being.,,130 Like Heidegger, Bachelard considered language and being to hold the same
ontological structure. But') whereas Heidegger supposed an ontological difference
between being and language that reduced knowledge of Being to a henneneutics of
language, Bachelard suggested that the immediacy of the "poetic image" filled that
12Q Gaston Bachelard~ The Psychoanlll:~;Jis of Fire. trans. Alan C. M. Ross ~ (Boston: Beacon Press. 1968)~ p
32.
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"abyss." In this sense, whereas some authors have defended the work of Heidegger as
being dialectical,131 Bachelard's thought can be said to be uncompromisingly
undialectical and affinnative. 132 "Poetic images" were for him "pure sublimations" of the
language of signification that reached back to their primordial origin (the soul).
Bachelard thought that the poetic image provided a way out of the realm of mere
language and towards the experience of the original logos, that is, towards an unmediated
experience of Being. For Bachelard, any and every thing possibly communicated through
common language was only a rationalization of that prior Upoetic image," where neither
subjects nor objects were yet differentiated. As a "pure sublimation" of language,
Bachelard regarded the "poetic image" to be a break with the language of signification
which capable of making the "soul" of language (its logos) emerge. According to
Bachelard, the "poetic image" was "lived-language," or the "original" language, which
uncoupled words and meanings. In it, the ontologically unforeseeable nature of speech
could be experienced first hand. The value of this experience, he argued, was that it
opened people to freedom by returning them to the "original," which was by definition
always "new," and therefore liberated from the shackles of past histories and experiences.
I ~o Gaston Bachelard, The Poe/;cs ofSpace" trans. Maria Jola5 " (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p xix.
131 The literature regarding the d3alectical nature of Heidegger's thought is inlmense. A common point of
reference is Theodor Adorno's famous charges that Heidegger's ontology was undialectical in The Jargon
of..\uthenticity. trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will. (Evanston: Norwestern University Press. 1973).
Fi'ed Dallmayr (b. 1928). an American phenomenologist. attempted a recunciliation of Phenomenology and
Critical Theory by drawing out similarities between the work of Heidegger and Adorno. He attempted ~
defense of Heidegger in light of Adorno's critiques. In his view. it wa~ Adorno's Platonic insistence on the
difference between nature and history (a.c;; a stand in for subject and object) that drove him to argue for the
necessity of a dialectical reconciliation of the two terms. Dallma)T argued that considering Heidegger did
not draw a distinction between the two terms. he was in no way obliged to atternpt their reconciliation. See
Fred Dallmayr. 8et~'eenFreihurg and Frankfurt: fOK'ard a Critical Ontology. (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1991).
112 Bachelard discarded critical philosophy and the tradition of dialectical thought: 'ihere is no deanh of
abstract. uworld-conscious" philosophers who discover a universe by means of the dialectical game of the I
and the non-I. Gaston Bachelard. The Poet;c.\" of Space. trans. Maria Jolas , (Boston: Beacon Press. 1969).
p 4-5.
In brief, the experience of the "poetic image," insofar as it was a bypassing of the
mind and its rational language, constituted an epistemological break out of which
emerged both a new being and a new knowledge. For Bachelard, "this new being is
happy man.,,133 For American architects like Moore, Bachelard's pursuit of happiness
and newness resonated not only with a broader cultural fIXation with comfort and
consumerism, but also with the avant-garde dictum to break with convention, which
made the French author all the more appealing.
Inspired by Bachelard, Moore questioned the relevance of "academic" history to
architects. In his mind, history was contained in "joyous experiences" of "reality." The
learned, he told students, considered Disneyland a populist simulacrum. But it was really
the academics that were fakes who "repressed" their true emotions behind abstractions.
Blinded by reason and academe, they could not "feel" the delight that every other
"nonnal" person experienced (here. He encouraged students to distance themselves from
the "dangers" of scholarship and only look inside themselves for experiences of pleasure.
"Joy," in Moore's parlance, was the only truth, the source of all eternally new creative
expressions:
But the things that are eternal, like the quality of light, are just as real as
they are in the nineteenth-century predecessors --a delight in any time.
And since this delightful stuff at a place like Disneyland is real, I see no
reason why I can't just as legitimately be inspired by a wonderful porch on
one of their Victorian-era buildings as I might be by something done by
Le Corbusier. 134
133 Ibid. P xxv.
134 Charles W. Moore. "Charles Moore [Transcript of Talk with Students and Faculty]:' in The Yale
Seminars on Architt.'cture. v. 2, (New Haven. Connecticut: School of Architecture. Yale University. 1982).
p6.
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Although the theory that architects had to open themselves to their private and
joyful "poetic images" to discover the new seemed simple enough, it was difficult to put
in practice. l-Iow was a "poetic image" different from one's thoughts? Bachelard
claimed that one had to be in a state of reverie to be open to them. Some architects tried
drugs to get beyond their Ucontrolled" thoughts, others practiced meditation, and others
just lied and said "Oh yes, of course I canfeel it, can't you?" This ·.;.'as a problem even
for Bachelard, who resorted to the claim that "poetic imagesH were only those that
~\everyone"had. If it took too much thinking or explaining, that was a good sign that one
was not dealing with a "poetic image." More importantly, Bachelard argued that poet!)'
could induce that state of half trance, of being lost in thought, in which the rational mind
could be bypassed and the margins of consciousness explored. This was not just aimless
wandering or an anything goes~ he warned. Poetry directed and opened the reader
towards specific "poetic images." Thus, poetry was a method of non-rational yet specific
communication. uAnd we should not forget," he wrote, "that these dream values
communicate poetically from soul to soul. To read poetry is essentially to daydream.,,135
Poetry solved the problem of radical subjectivism. The social upshot \\'as that it
broke down the barriers (that the evils of Modernism had rdised) between people.
Bachelard considered "poetic images" to be trans-subjective because. he argued. they
could appear in anyone consciousness. He noted that the trans-subjective character of the
poetic image also made it hvariational," and therefore different from UconstitutionalH
concepts. This meant that one's experience of an "original p()etic image H was never
entirely pure. It always appeared at the surface of consciousness hurdened with some
IJ~ Gaston Bacht"lard, The Poetic's of Sptlc'l', trans. Maria Jolas , (Bosron: Beacon Press, 1(69), p 17.
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personal baggage. Bachelard thought that through a type of phenomenological
description he called "topoanalysis" he could tease the "pure" image out, he could read
the surface of the psyche for clues about the "poetic image" that stirred it into existence
underneath, in the depths of the soul. As U a tool for the analysis of the human soul,"
Bachelard's topoanalysis attempted to isolate characteristics of a poetic image that would
remain constant for any iteration of itself in anyone's mind. In The Poetics of Space he
carried this out by comparing and contrasting his own experiences with those of other
"great men," mostly poets: 6These naIve daydreams, which I thought were my own, were
a source of astonishment to me when I found traces of them in my reading." 136 "Great
men" made "great images." lbeir poetry turned their "inner visions" into outward fonns
which, according to Bachelard, resonated as "poetic images" in the souls of other u men."
This was a type of a-rational, pre-linguistic communication. Thus, "great poetty" opened
regular folk to what Bachelard considered to be the Utruly original."
Moore applied Bachelard's thinking to "loosening up" the increasingly academic
1970s interest in classical Western architecture and in its "burdensome" rationalism.
Instead of discussing architecture in tenns of rules, techniques, orders, and construction
systems, Moore described it as a "sceneH where people and buildings "exchanged
feelings" and "energies" through bodily contact. For Moore, "great architecture,"
classical or otherwise, (like "great poets"') excited people's bodies in such a way as to
make joyful "poetic images" fulgurate on the surface of their consciousness. The problem
of recuperating classical architecture, he argued, was really that of finding the
I '6 Ibid. P 49.
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correspondence between "inner irriages" of well-being arld outer "scenographies" -a
program not unlike that of Christopher Alexander.
Moore's argument gave secular expression to the Protestant emphasis on the
primacy of personal judgment over institutionalized authority,137 asking architects to keep
a safe hcommon sense" distance from the scholars. He decried the post modem
intellectualization of architecture, arguing that semiotics and linguistics missed the a-
rational way in which, he believed, buildings and people "exchanged'" meanings
sensually. 138 Even a book as patently un-scholarly as Charles Jenks's The Language of
Post-Modern Architecture (1977) was too academic for Moore. 139 Professing a faith not
unlike Wolffiin's in the "fundamental corroborations of body, feeling, and
137 According to sociologist Colin Campbell. American Protestantism was particularly given to questioning
authority through a belief in the primacy of personal judgment. By the eighteenth century. however. the
Protestant belief in personal autonomy had become secularized into a cult of self-gratification and self-
fulfillment. He argued that since Western culture has always had a materialist bent (westerners believe
there is a strong connection between the physical world and human values and behavior) the possession of
goods appeared to promise self-fulfillment. To put it another way. consumption is a quest for identity
through sensual means. This helps explain the power of Moore's argument that identity could be acquired
through the sensual consumption of Uimages.·' The connection of Campbell's theories to American
architecture has been previously explored by Dell Upton in Architecture in the United Stall)S, (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press. 1998). p 33.
138 F. Andrus Burr, a former student of Moore and member of Uthe family," recounted the acrimonious
reception of academicism within the anti-avant-garde. Burr argued that Vicent Scully's calls for a ·"true
vernacular" pushed historical research and threatened the anti-avant-garde y-'ith "more conceptual than
perceptual. more frontal than experientiar~ approaches to design. Burr erroneously depicted the rise of
academicism in American architecture as a superficial "take-off~ from Moore·s experiential "image
gathering. n Although Burr attempted to maintain the primacy of sensualism as the uoriginar· historicising
movement in architecture. his explanation ignores a series of important factors, such as the institution of
Ph.D. programs in architecture (which occurred quite apart from considerations of ~toore's theories). See
F. Andrus Burr. ItLearnin2 Under Moore.." in GA Houses. n. 7 ( 1980).. 0 178.
I.N Following broadly acc;pted cultural stereotypes~ Moore equated r~sc..;n with the sense 0 sight. and
emotion with touch. Thus, he could argue that Jencks was too UintellectlJar' because his formal analysis
remained at the level of the visual (or symbolic). See Charles W. Moore. "Charles Moore On Post-
Modernism," in Architectural Dl's;gn. n. 4~ v. 47 (1977), P 225. ("lharlcs Jenks position appeared in the
same issue under the title tlA Genealob'Y of Post-Modern Architecture:' pp 269-271.
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architecture,,,140 Moore urged Postmodernists to learn the past through "images," which
he defined as the "full corporeal experience" of an immediately meaningful world:
And if we are to do it (whatever it ends up being called) right, then we'll
have to do more than clothe our buildings in the semantically appropriate
Orders. We will have to bring comprehensible Order to them, to extend
the order that we feel in our bodies to the built world. 141
Moore used the '·poetic imageH as a front to extend the Modernist myth of
originality within architectural Postmodemism. Moore's famous "image gathering" was
a reaction to this 1970s "intellectualization" of architectural education. By the early
1980s, the idea that design was the arrangement of "images" in experiential "sequences"
had taken over the design studio of nlost major U.S. universities. 142 "Certainly at Yale,"
exclaimed a student, "we talk about it [images] a lot." But the student was not entirely
clear about the trans-subjective and communal claims Moore was making about
"images." Moore answered that the Uimage" emerged in communities "spiritually,"
140 See Mark Jarzombek's discussion of Heinrich Wolfflin's empathic art history. and its indebtedness to
nineteenth century German anti-abstractionist movements. It would not be difficult to find paternity in
Wolfflin for Moore"s belief that the past could be discovered in "corporeal experiences." "The essential
thrust of Wolfflin's argument," writes Jarzombek" U was that since architects invest their structures with
animation, observers today can relive the past when looking at a building by studying their own breathing
patterns and other empathetically induced bodily movements." See Mark Jarzombek" The Psychologizing of
Modernity: Art, Architecture, History, (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p 42.
141 My emphasis. Charles W. Moore. "Charles Moore On Post-Modernism." in Architectural Design. n. 4 ..
v. 47 () 977). P 255.
142 A good gauge of the popularity of Moore's "imagen design method is the slew of articles making
reference to it in the series of published proceedings from the Association of Collegiate Schools of
Architecture conferences from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s. One of the more infonnative articles in this
regard is that of Frances E. Downing, a professor at the State University of New York. Buffalo. and
Thomas C. Hubka. from the University of Oregon. which was entitled "Imagery and the Generation of
Form in the Design Process," in Prodeedings of the 67th ACSA Annual Meeting .. ed. Michael J. Bednar.
(Washington, D.C.: Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture. 1979). pp 187-191. This approach to
design survived its more "PostrnodernisC· expressions in architects such as Steven Holi. who aJleged that he
began designing frOITI a series of perspectives which he then arranged into sequences. He then tried to draw
his plans so that one would experience the building as U a continuous deployment of changing
perspectives.·" What Moore called inlages.l-Joli called uanchorings" -an experiential and m)1hical bond
between subject and object. From the perspective of discourse it becomes clear that architectural styles
alone are not sufficient basis for differentiation between "schools." I would therefore argue against the
alleged novelty of Ho!rs design method" as ~t has been discussed in articles such a..~ David u'Clerc·s
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echoing the claims made by Enzo Paci and Ernesto Rogers before him about the identity
of individual and collective in experiences of Tradition:
An attempt is made to add to that fund of images, to enter into some set of
transactions that enrich the image bank, call it "educating" I guess. Then
some imagery that comes out of the people present develops which is
going to mean more to the people than some image laid on them. [... ]
So I press for a catholicity [sic.] of image collection. In the absence of any
clear knowledge of where images ought not to come from, it's legitimate
to have them come from anywhere that means anything to anybody. [... l
Images get talked about too much nowadays as though there weren't
anything else that was important, but you can't say we are not going to
collect images because it isn't possible.1 43
Among Moore's many skills was the ability to recall a veritable storehouse of
Uimages'" on command. a mental collection he developed by combining professional
practice with the teaching of architectural history. Yet, as Donlyn Lyndon (Moore's
student and later partner in ML~rW between 1962 and 1964) pointed out, his true talent
was blending those historical images with more whimsical personal ones in hope of
achieving "a lodging for innumerable fantasies of inhabitation ... opportunities to imagine
and enjoy being there.,.,144 The objective of this fusion was everything except capricious.
Moore's design method was an open chalJenge to the fonnalism of the modem masters.
Against Mies' "I do not want to be interesting~ I want to be good,'" Moore famously
proclaimed being "interesting" as an ethical responsibility of architects. UIt's hard today,
I suppose." pondered Lyndon, "to recognize that this freely exploratory mode was once a
"Steven 1-1011: Un Americain aNe\\' York.'t in L'Arch,tecturl' (fAujourd'hui. n. 291 \:ebruary 1994). pp R6-
115.
14' Charles W. Moore. "Charles Moore [Transcript of Talk with Studc:lls ~~nd Faculty,.'t in The Yale
Senlinllrs on Arc!7lfecture. v. 2. (New Haven. ('onnecticut: School of Archl:ecture~Yale University. 19R2).
P-l:iio~~;..n Lynden. "Spint Play:' in Charles Moon': BUildings ami Proj('cts /949-/98f>, t.-d. Eug.ene 1.
Johnson. (New York: RlllOIi InrcrnallonaJ Puhlication~ Inc .. 19X6). p 3).
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radical position, hard to call forth the temper of the late fifties when dogma was the
central concern of many architects.,,145
3. The function of encloBure in the transubstantiation of
"inner vision" into "outward form"
Could architecture be like poetry? Could it induce a state of reverie in people that
would allow them to think up the new? Bachelard seemed to suggest just that, and
architects like Moore were quick to capitalize on it in their writings. In The Poetics of
Space Bachelard dealt specifically with how a rationally constructed geometrical object
such as a house could induce daydreaming. In his estimation, this happened in houses
that "condensed" and "defended" intimacy. When people felt at the center of a protective
and ordered environment, they could relax, stop worrying about reality, and let their
imagination run free. Intimacy, he argued, occurred when people felt enclosed, shielded
within "nests" or "chrysalis" like spaces. Bachelard called this image of the sheltering
environment the "oneiric house," whic h closed the universe off vertically (from cellar to
garret) and horizontally (as an isolated hut). 146 When such bodily confinement was
achieved, and reverie began, Bachelard argued that something amazing happened: people
experienced "concentrated wandering," they felt to be "elsewhere," inside the intimacy of
the room immensity itself unfolded. The importance of these types of experiences for
Bachelard was that, if taken at face value, they suggested that there was no such thing as
subject and object, inside and outside. Rather, the two seemed intenningled in "'intimate
immensity." "This is a conclusive fonnula," he proclaimed, "for the demonstration I
145 Ibid. P 29.
146 See Chapter 1 "The House. From Cellar to Garret. The Significance of the Hut" in Gaston Bachelard,
The Poetics ofSpace, trans. Maria Jolas , (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
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want to make on the correspondence between immensity of world space and the depth of
'inner space' .,,147
It is surprising to see commentators of Bachelard claim that he took no interest in
religious matters when there i~ no shortage of passages linking the divine with the notion
of immensity. 148 In addition, some in Bachelard's circle of close friends were deeply
concerned with theological questions, such as Gaston Roupnel, a physicist whose interest
in the relationship between reason and faith is reflected in his 1927 book Siloe. Woven
into Bachelard's writing is a thread that ties reveries of immensity to the irtemal
contemplation of divine mystery. It is worth noting that some of the architectural
phenomena that interested Bachelard most have a long institutionalized history in
Catholic thought. Take for instance the notion of confmement as the precondition for
experiencing the "reversal of dimensions or inversion of the perspective of inside and
outside."i49 This notion undergirds the entire monastic Catholic tradition, which, as
Jeffrey Hamburger has pointed out, considered internment and enclosure as a prerequisite
for the spiritual life. 15o In medieval Eurcpean convents, the rooms reserved for mystical
experiences were occupied according to highly ritualized practices of meditation and
prayer meant to induce the transcendence of the corporeal self, and the experience of the
"elsewhere" or "otherworldly."
Was Bachelard's work read as a manual for how to inhabit intimate spaces so that
they would yield mystical experiences? Certainly the work of mid century American
147 Gaston Bachelard, .the Poetics ofSpace, trans. Maria Jolas , (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p 205.
148 One such attempt to "secularize" Bachelard is Roch C. Smith's Gaston Bache/ard., (Boston: Twaine
Publishers, 1982). He makes explicit reference to his project in p 6.
149 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics ofSpace, trans. Maria Jolas , (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p 225.
150 Jeffrey F. Hamburger, The Visual and the Visionary: Art and Female Spirituality in Late Medieval
Germany, (New York: Zone Books, 1998).
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architects interested in Bachelard seems to suggest precisely that. Fueled in part by
McCarthyite anti-intellectualism, the view that architecture, as the art of controlling the
body, could afford spiritual experiences in excess of any textually induced meditation
(such as literary reverie) buoyed up to the mainstream of North American architectural
discourse by the 1960s -where it lives on in the present. 151 Yet, exposing the
phenomenological roots of this belief is not without historiographical difficulties. First,
phenomenology was only one strand in a more general attempt to give a "theoretical"
face to the anti-intellectualism of the anti-avant-garde. Second, the power of the
psychologized discourse of empathy that architects made recourse relied precisely on its
de-theorized and de-historicized method, which by staying at arms length from academic
fonnalities such as footnoting could claim to be closer to "real" life experience.
Architects often extended this technique, "saturating the discourse" as a means to prevent
readers from straying from anti-avant-gardism. 152 Third, and perhaps more importantly,
the discourse of experientialism discouraged textuality and thus worked to efface its own
discursive traces. It drew its legitimacy from its pervasiveness and from the cult of
151 The view that architecture can produce spiritual experiences by exciting the body finds contemporary
expression in a variety ofmcxialities. Most pervasive among these are the slew of projects likening
architecture to a "prosthesis" for feeling the "other worldlyn (be that cyber-space or ecstatic mysteries). In
these projects objects restrict people's bodies to force them to "see" things one way or another. Some claim
that the union of body and machine in experience allows for extra-sensorial perceptioil, as in, for instance,
Doris Kim Sung's recently published "Incorporations: Exploring the Space between Bexly, Mechanism, and
Imagination," in Journal ofArchitectural Education, v. 54, n. 4. (May 2(01), P 260-263.
Phenomenologists have played an important part in the subsistence of this belief. Take, for instance~ the
work of philosopher Bruce Wilshire, who insists that people can "heal" their inner selves from Uthe
addiction of thought" by assuming unusual bodily postures. See Bruce Wilshire, The Primal Roots of
American Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native American Thought, (University Park, PA:
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p 109.
152 By the late 1970s many began practicing what Jarzombek has called the Uquotation habit," which sought
out footnotes only as a means to validate existing beliefs. "The quotation habit," argued Jarzombek,
"responded not only to the lack of intellectual substance in the earlier psychologically oriented discourses,
but also to the untheoretically informed disciplinary discourses of art history." Mark Jarzombek, The
Psychologizing ofModernity: Art, Architecture, History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2000), p 202.
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personality, or more precisely put, of the "psychologized ego.,,153 This cult, built largely
through interpersonal exchanges such as "desk crits" in design studios, are verbal
histories that remain largely hidden to historiography. Nonetheless, the bureaucracy of
pedagogy required a minimum of textual documentation in the form of textbooks, class
syllabi and handouts. These offer a window into how Bachelard's work entered the
design studio. In addition, there is the architectural work of these educators, through
which they taught by example. As these buildings were published and discussed in print,
a record remains of how professionals attempted to weave architectural fonn, bodily
experience, and spiritual exaltation.
Fig: The aedlcula as the excitement of both virility and spirituality. The
captions read: "Four columns and a roof create an aedlculs, a shelter and
a place suitable for renewing virility;" and "Medieval saints found similar
aedlcular homes." Charles W. Moore and Kent C. Bloomer, Body,
Memory, and Architecture, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p 6.
153 Jarzombek traces the origin of the psychologized ego to Max Stirner whose De,. Einsige und sein
Eigentum (The Individual and His Property, 1844) argued that the ego was a natural and innately free
aspect of existence that was forced to conform to socia! nonus. Stirner vouched for the rights of the
"egoist" to assert his innate historical consciousness. This theory was not without problems. and as
Jarzombek pointed out, they became visible by the end of the twentieth century, as many artists and
architects disguised their "anti-intellectualism behind an impenetrable wall of self-confidence and self
promotion." (p 204). See: Ibid. pp 44-46. Charles Moore has often been described as one such "wall of
self-confidence." The emphasis on self-promotion is perhaps most evident in David Littlejohn's biography
of Moore Architect: The Life and Work ofCharles W. Moore, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1984).
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Fig: Charles Moore photographed under an sedlcula In Stafford,
England, with Erld Hurner, Dimitri Vedensky, and Dona Gulmares.
From Kevin P. Kelm, An Architectural Life: Memoirs and Memories of
Charles W. Moore, (Boston, New York, Toronto, and London: Bulflnch
Press Book! Little, Brown and Company, 1996), p 100.
This pseudo-theological reception of Bachelard is apparent the built work of
Charles Moore, one of the principal disseminators of such a view. Moore attempted to
resolve Bachelard's call for chrysalis-like corporeal intimacy in the aedicula, or
miniature temple used for ceremonial purposes. Following Bachelard, Moore believed
that the aedicula reduced the infinite cosmos to the dimensions of the human body, and
allowed for a "body-centered sense of space and place," with walls to "stiffen a boundary
just beyond the body itself.,,154 As Moore described and designed it, the aedicula
154 Charles W. Moore and Kent C. Bloomer, Body, Memory, and Architecture, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977), p 5.
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blended mystical experience with a highly charged eroticism. It was supposed to literally
rub against the skin, to wann it up through friction to awaken the dream of "inner fire,"
which as Bachelard described it in The Psychoanalysis ofFire was the seed of man's
fertility. Moore laced sexuality with religiosity effortlessly by printing two sketches side
by side, one of a man in an aedicula described as "renewing virility," and the other of
"medieval saints" who had "found similar aedicular homes."I5S A closer look at the
connection Moore made to the medieval aedicula clarifies its mystical dimensions. In
medieval iconography, the aedicula often appeared as the visual allegory of a nun's
physical confmement, which guaranteed the purity of her marriage to Christ, and granted
the intimacy required for her. spiritual union with Him. 156 In his built work, Moore
explored this conception of architecture as a stimulant of spiritual experience, often with
openly homoerotic connotations. 157 As one critic described the showers in the men's
locker room of the second Athletic Gub at Sea Ranch, California (1969): "There, yellow
155 Ibid. P 6.
156 See Chapter one, "Art, Enclosure, and the Pastoral Care of Nuns," in Jeffrey F. Hamburger, The Visual
and the Visionary: Art and Female Spirituality in Late Medieval Germany, (New York: Zone Books,
1998), pp 35-109.
157 To this day, Moore's sexuality remains ambiguous. Moore's mannerisms, his discussions of "joy" in
design, and the homoerotic overtones of his rhetoric often inspired suspicions that he was a homosexual
(Lee Cott, urban designer and collaborator of Robert Yudell, in conversation with the author, July, 2001).
However, he is said to have lived a celibate (public) life, and was allegedly never seen in the I.:ompany of
neither man nor woman. Most of his followers played into this diversion of desire towards nlore
professionally accepted forms. Take Eugene Johnson '5 discussion of Moore's working habits\ which is not
without homoerotic innuendo: uMoore is apparently unable to work on his own. [... ] He needs a straight
man to play against, but he also enjoys having someone else to look after the boring details." (see i3!l~ene J.
Johnson, "Performing Architecture: The Work of Charles Moore," in Charles Moore: Buildings and
Projects 1949-1986,00. Eugene J. Johnson, (New York: Rizzoli International Publications Inc., 1986), P
90.) Even David Littlejohn, Moore's first biographer skirted the issue. By the mid 1980s however, as
feminist and queer studies began to take over the academy, this disciplinal)' silence began being called into
question. Although the issue was never openly discussed" academics such as Richard Guy Wilson,
professor at the University of Virginia, suggested that Moore's work could not be properly understood
without addressing his sexuality. Wilson criticized Littlejohn for glossing over the issue: "Littlejohn
probes gingerly into Moore's private life, but delicacy makes the excursion futile. Moore emerges as a
charming and gregarious host who cultivates a somewhat disanning amiability and shambling gentility, and
yet is fully in charge of his stage-managered fa~ade.n (See Richard Guy Wilson, "Charles Moore: The Bay
Area Style and Beyond [Book Review of Architect: The Life and Work of Charles Moore, by David
Littlejohn]," in Architecture: The A.J.A. Journal, n. 3, v. 74 (March 19~5), p 163.
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aediculas are painted around openings in a wall that holds the shower heads on its
opposite face. As one descends the stairs from the changing room to the showers, one
sees the bathers as if they were classical nudes in niches.,,158
Fig: Aedlculas designed by Moore for the showers In the
men's locker room of the second Athletic Club at Sea Ranch,
California (1969). From Charles Moore: Buildings and Projects
1949-1986, ed. Eugene J. Johnson, (New York: RlzzolI, 1986), P
59.
158 Eugene J. Johnson, "Performing Architecture: The Work of Charles Moore," in Charles Moore:
Buildings and Projects 1949-1986, ed. Eugene J. Johnson, (New York: Rizzoli International Publications
Inc., 1986), p 59. This fascination with the bath as a site of male sexual intimacy and religiosity was
continued well into the end of the 2(11'century. For instance, see the compilation of student projects from
Princeton, Charles Moore's Alma Matter, published by Sanders, Joel, ed., Stud: Architectures of
Masculinity, ed. Joel Sanders, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996).
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Fig: Charles Moore's aed/cular bath for his 1962 house In Orinda,
California. From From Charles Moore: Buildings and Projects 1949-1986,
ed. EugeneJ. Johnson, (NewYork: Rlnoll, 1986),p 101.
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Fig: Charles Moore's aedlcular bed for his 1966 house In New Haven,
Connecticut. From From Charles Moore: Buildings and Projects 1949-1986,
eel. Eugene J. Johnson, (New York: RlzzolI, 1986), P 105.
Moore pushed Bachelard' s idea that reveries of cosmic immensity could be
achieved through small spaces for bodily pleasure. In the designs for his own homes (a
total of eight!) the aedicula often enclosed the bath, as in his 1962 house in Orinda,
California, or clasped around his bed, as in his 1966 house outside of Yale University. In
the latter, the walls of the aedicula were painted with stars and its ceiling displayed a
trompe-l'oeuil dome, in a tongue-in-cheek reference to Bachelard's idea that bodily
intimacy was directly correlative with celestial immensity. Moore pushed the idea to the
extreme. In an unprecedented move within the history of architectural monographs, he
included fifteen Christmas cookies decorated with "fantastic drawings" of
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dreamscapes.l'" For those that ever doubted that the body could contain immensity,
Moore presented the possibility of literally ingesting it.
Fig: Charles Moore, decorated Christmas cookies, assorted sizes, 1983
(collection of mrs. Saul Weingarten From Charles Moore: Buildings and
Projects 1949-1986,ed. Eugene J. Johnson, (New York: RlzzolI, 1986), P
278.
159 The cookies were not meant to be literally eaten. They were designed as art objects and are not in the
collection of Mrs. Saul Weingarten. See Charles Moore: Buildings and Projects 1949-1986, 00. Eugene J.
Johnson, (New York: Rizzoli, 1986), pp 278-279.
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What was masterful about the use of the cookies was that they served to illustrate
a very complex intellectual problem about the relationship of intimate body to
environmental or cosmic immensity in an immediate way. This technique was perfected
in Body, Memory, Architecture, where images illustrated but also exceeded the assertions
made in the text. The images functioned at the intersection of philosophy and
architecture, of "high" intellectualism and "low" professionalism. The image, as a site of
exchange, did not serve to introduce "common folk" to philosophical treatises. Rather,
these images assumed a quasi-independent status. Body, Memory, Architecture could be
"read" in the absence of the text, by just looking through the figures. In this sense, they
blurred the academic and professional boundaries typically associated with philosophy
and architecture. In these images, the barrier disappeared that had kept apart American
popular culture (always mistrustful of intellectuals) from Western philosophy.
Although the images were meant to "educate the masses," they also functioned as
a two-way street allowing phenomenology to be soaked in the "reality" of everyday life,
at a time when it needed it most. This reality included popular fonns of eastern
spirituality adapted for Christian audiences by corporate motivational speakers, grass
roots and Gaia reverence for "mother earth," and a rising belief in the power of traditional
spiritual healing methods. In the course of the 1970s phenomenologists and architects
alike attempted to incorporate these popular concerns into their work, as the two
disciplines continued to tum towards each other. 160
160 Hofstadter documented the importance of inspirational literature in the secularization of American
Protestantism, and in the broad diffusion of its voluntaristic and subjective impulses. Protestantism
minimized Christian doctrine by getting rid of the bulk of religious ritual. The inspirational cults
eliminated it ali together, retaining only the emphasis on the subjective experience of the individual. and
even this only narrowly conceived as the assertion of individual will. By the 1950s, these popular best-
sellers had completely transformed the old self-help Protestant system, in which faith led to character and
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Fig: Suso embracing Eternal Wisdom, Blbllotheque Natlonale et
Unlversltalre de Strassbourg, MS 2929, tol. av. (Photo: BNU). From
Hamburger, p 203.
character to a succesful manipulation of the world, and replaced it with a secularized system, where faith
led directly to an individual will capable of selfrnanipulation. Inspirational literature promised that this
ability to shape oneself at will was the key to financial success, health, and peace of mind. The success of
this literature evidenced, according to Hofstadter, a problematic naturalization of spirituality. Whereas in
protestantism spirit and world interacted, in inspirational cults they became ambiguously fused. See
Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp 266-268.
The inspirational myth of self-manipulation operated in the interest of promoting the will to conformity
within elite American architecture schools since the early 1960s. Architectural students were taught to
despise "elite professionalism," to be suspicious of individuality as embodied in "star" architects, and to
wary of the mind. These were expressions of selfishness, and the architect, they were taught, was a servant
of the community. Withdrawal, self-examination, individuality, analysis, and reflection were bad. An
architect of good character and personality was achieved by practice, not by introspection. Students were
asked to manipulate their self and make it self-less, entirely at the service of others. The critical mind was
seen as a liability for this purpose. It lead students down the path of self-analysis, and criticality, which
could tum students dangerously loose from the traditions and concerns of the communities they were to
serve.
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Fig: Drawing of Infant taking In the cosmic Immensity of the sun. The
caption reads --The Infant experiences a fusion of body and environment"
From Charles W. Moore and Kent C.. Bloomer, , Body, Memory, and
Architecture, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19n), p 38.
Body, Memory, Architecture affords many a concrete example of how these
complex popular concerns were given resolution in the immediacy of illustrations. To
read against the grain of their alleged immediacy it is useful to consider these images as
appropriations of historical icons that were used to serve similar functions. The medieval
age, which Moore was so fond of, offers a wealth of such antecedents. Dominican friars
of the 13th and 14th centuries used illustrations in manuscripts in pastoral applications,
such as in teaching the preliminary stages of the mystical itinerary. These images were to
be abandoned at the highest level of contemplation, when the pupil was to embrace both
vision and mystical union. This hoped-for moment is illustrated in a 14th century
manuscript about the life of the Rhenish Dominican mystic Henry Suso (ca. 1295-1366),
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where he is depicted pulling his cloak apart to show Infinite Wisdom embracing his soul
inside his chest. The image used in Body, Memory, Architecture to illustrate this union of
the body and the "elsewhere" bears an uncanny resemblance to medieval iconography.
Moore and Bloomer depicted an a -sexual baby (possibly the reader?) whose self
(abstracted into a circle, the symbol of the soul) appears linked through a Chippendale
opening to the cosmic immensity of the sun. Eternal Wisdom was thus replaced by the
cosmos, and the God Head by Mother Earth. This re-naturalization of spirituality played
into the cultural trends of the 1970s.
These interpretations of Bachelard's thinking on the relation of intimacy and
immensity gave new strength to the Modernist search for pure origins, this time disguised
as the spiritualization of architectural pedagogy. If, as Moore's illustration indicated, the
spiritual fusion with the cosmos occurred during infancy, then the arduous mystical
journey became that of "returning" to that "originar' child-like experience. The belief
that enlightenment awaited those who could shed their cultural and social "baggage," and
return to a child-like engagement with the world became institutionalized in American
Architectural education through fITst year design studios which typically involved forcing
students to break with the "preconceptions" of the society outside of the architectural
discipline, and reaching "inside" themselves for true authenticity. Famous architectural
educators such as Christopher Alexander, spoke of design pedagogy in skewed
theological terms as a kind of anti-education. For him, professors were supposed to
simply help students get on "the way" to the mystical release of "the fundamental order
which is native to us. They do not teach us, they only remind us of what we know
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already, and of what we shall discover time and time again, when we give up our ideas
and opinions, and do exactly what emerges from ourselves.,,161
John Hejduk (1929-2000), Dean of Cooper Union's School of Architecture since
1976, was enonnously influential in disseminating the belief that to grasp a work of
architecture was a type of religious experience equated with authenticity -although he
reserved the term "authentic" only for those works of architecture which induced such
experiences in him. Hejduk argued that religious epifanies involveeJ immobilizing the
body in order to help focus people's attention on the mind. "Authentic" architecture, he
argued, hindered people's movement and was experienced as a series of "fixed
conditions." The bondage of the body yielded, to follow Hejduk, a mystical moment in
which "inner vision" and "outer reality" synthesized into an experience of "totality."
When the body was properly enclosed, the mind became free to grasp the building in its
entirety. Like Moore and the rest of the anti-avant-garde, he believed that architectural
meaning was available pre-linguistically in immediate experience. Spirituality,
understood as "absorbing that thing into ourselves and making something living and
breathing from it --something personally meaningful,,,162 became the most important
lesson in an architectural education. To explain this idea to students, Hejduk used the
simile of the body as food within the building's digestive tract. 163
161 Christopher Alexander, The Timeless Way ofBuilding, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p
xv.
162 John Hejduk, "John Hejduk[Transcript of Talk with Students and Faculty]," in The Yale Seminars on
Architecture, v. 2, (New Haven, Connecticut· School of Architecture, Yale University, 1982), pp 182-183.
163 In the following lesson, Hejduk illustrated how architectural ingestion (Le. the enclosure of people's
bodies), forced the mind to transcended its corporeal contingency:
It's a singular reality maybe of no great significance, but the point is that the body is
fixed~ not in motion, and that means the mind can begin to operate and it does operate.
Now, architecture is the only art form where I can be on a mountain, I can look at a house
and I can see it in a distance like the model and I can also see it as a fixed condition. I'm
not walking; it's a fixed condition. I'm a fixed condition and then I can approach it. And
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These examples emphasize the need to ask about the function of instruction in the
dissemination of intimate space as a site for spiritual experiences if we are to better
understand the architectural reception of Bachelard (and phenomenology in general) in
the United States. Under the direction of Donlyn Lyndon in the 1970s, the University of
Oregon became established as an important hub of architects interested in
phenomenology. Oregon's school of architecture was then perceived to be at the forefront
of a national tum in architectural education that challenged the hegemony of the east-
coast establishments with alternative grass-roots oriented practices. Christopher
Alexander's success in convincing the administration to rework their campus planning
according to community driven principles of design put what would be called "The
Oregon Experiment" on the architectural center-stage. l64 Oregon's reputation was also
bolstered when, after the death of Louis I. Kahn in 1974, the school hired six of his
employees: Richard Garfield, Thorn Hacker, Galen Minah, Piccioni, Kleinsasser, and
Gary Moye. The school's rising importance was recognized across the Atlantic.
European architects such as Ricardo Bofill encouraged prospective students to make
I'm approaching a fixed condition [gestures] but what's happening as I'm approaching
the fixed condition is that the thing is beginning to change from total picture to not so
total, because we can never see architecture in any way totally. We can pysically not see
it in the sense that we can see a painting or a drawing in a total condition at once. [...]
And then what happens as you move in on it? [...l it hovers over you and there's a
crossing. The most incredible part about the crossing is that from the moment you go
over into it you become:: eaten by it, digested. You now have become a physicality like a
piece of food or another organ that's in it! And you have to be in motion. And when
you're in motion the mind doesn't work! It's a fragmented condition; you go through it,
but when you want to think about i~ what happens is that you stop and fIX yourcondition
and then your mind begins to work.
See John Hejduk, "John Hejduk[Transcrjpt of Talk with Students and Faculty]," in The Yale Semioors on
Architecture, v. 2, (New Haven, Connecticut: School of Architecture, Yale University, 1982)~ pp 186-187.
164 Christopher Alexander discussed the process of convincing Oregon University's administration to adopt
his principles of urban design in The Oregon Experiment, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
Each chapter in the book expands on one of Alexander's planning principles: organic order, participation,
piecemeal growth, pattern language, diagnosis, and coordination.
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Oregon their top choice instead of Ivy League institutions, the University of Virginia or
Rice, which were seen as too caught up the fonnalist throngs of modernism. 165
Asked why Bachelard was such an important reference to his colleagues, Jeny
Finrow, then a newly minted Assistant Professor at Oregon later to become dean of the
school of architecture, replied that he helped elucidate problems about human-
environment relations: "We viewed him as working to clarify fundamental experiences of
space. [... ] We thought he was doing what we were doing." 166 Bachelard's writing~
argued Finrow, was easier to understand than that of other phenomenologists such as
Heidegger or Husserl, which also made him ITtore teachable~
One of the most popular classes during this period of Oregon University's
ascendancy was Earl Moursund's "Spatial Composition and Dynamics." His class
objectives and assignments offer a window into the design ideology within which
Bachelard's writing was put to work. The Poetics ofSpace was introduced by Moursund
as furthering an ongoing, and by then fully articulated, architectural discourse about
people's emotional, psychological, and spiritual responses to environments. The
principal references in this discursive constellation, as reflected in the class reading list,
included Moore and Bloomer's Body, Memory, and Architecture, Christian Norberg-
Schulz's Existence, Space, and Architecture, Rudolph Arnheim's The Dynamics of
Architectural Form, and others. These texts constituted the primary vehicles for the
contemplative ascent of students. Through them young pupils learned to regard
architectural compositions as "thoughts,n that could be immediately experienced through
165 Sergio Palleroni, was one such students advised by Ricardo Bofill. Sergio Palleroni, conversation with
the author, 5 June 2000.
166 Jerry Finrow, E-mail letter to the author, 20 September 2<XXl.
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the body, "bypassing" the mind as in Bachelard's "poetic images." To emphasize this
phenomenological connection, Moursund referred to architectural composition as the
induction of "image-responses" in people. He turned the objectives of the class towards
teaching undergraduates how to feel "poetic images" that were "evoked from qualities
and essences" of architectural experiences. Following Bachelard's teachings, he
encouraged students to consider these images as catalysts of reverie, and therefore as
"primeval sources" of new design ideas. For Moursund, learning to experience poetic
images was the prerequisite for a student "to discover, daydream, speculate, imagine,
explore," and "find orientation which connects him/her to the world (universe).,,167
167 Earl Moursund, "Discussion 1: Introduction and Assumptions," handout given fvlarch 28, 1979 in
"Spatial Composition and Dynamics" class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School or Architecture and Allied
Arts, University of Oregon.
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Fig: Earl Morsund's reading list for his "Spatial Composition and
Dynamics" class at the University of Oregon, 1979. Readings Include
Gaston Bachelard,Christian Norberg-Schulz,and CharlesMoore.
As both proof of competency and learning tool, Moursund asked students to
design "A One Room House" that would cause occupants to experience a "poetic image."
Much like in Moore's aedicula, the single cell nature of the project encouraged shrinking
architectural enclosure to the closest proximity with the inhabitant's body. The design
process was divided into four stages and spaced out during the course of the semester.
First, site analysis followed by an initial schematic synthesis of the student's experiences
into a "poetic image," which Moursund referred to as a "critical image." Second, students
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were asked to modulate the enclosure of their room according to the principles of "center,
surround, proxitnity, which enhance the sense of being and enrich one's mental
perception.,,168 To reinforce the Bachelardian notion of correspondence between inner
intimacy and outer immensity, as allegedly experienced in poetic images, Moursund used
visual and textual examples. Frank Lloyd Wright's Burligham House, for instance,
served to illustrate the coincidence of "three frames for viewing the world: finite, infinite,
immediate.,,169 In the fashion of the corporate motivational speakers of his day,
Moursund used decontextualized excerpts from literary sources, such asThe Book ofTea,
to stress the connection between bodily awareness and the immensity of spiritual
wisdom. 170 Going beyond Moore's pseudo-monastic emphasis on enclosure as an
architectural prerequisite for the elevation of the soul, Moursund established a direct
correlation between types of enclosure and the experience ofdifferent poetic images:
Space cells are units of closure and consequently units of experience, --
images, lesser wholes. These units of experience are demarked by
common characteristics of the element type -repetitions and variations in
shape, size, direction, location. 171
168 Earl Moursund, "On-going study of a space: Project number two [... ] A One Room House," handout
given April 10th , 1979 in "Spatial Composition and Dynamics" class (Arch 4160" Spring 1979)" Schooi or
Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.
169 Earl Moursund, "Week 2, Part 1, PAlTERN -MESSAGE," handout given in "Spatial Composition and
D~amics" class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School or Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.
17 Consider the following passage quoted by Moursund from The Book ofTea as an example of how to
make the experience of a small room reverberate with Eternal Wisdom:
"Rikyu" in his garden at Sakai" obstructed the open view of the sea by planting a grove of trees in
such a way that only when the guest stopped at the stone basin to wash his hands and rinse his
mouth preparatory to entering the tea house, he caught an unexpected glimpse of the shimmering
sea through the trees -a glimpse of Infinity-thus suddenly revealing the relationship of the water
in his cupped hands lifted from the basin to the vast expanse of sea and of himself to the
universe."
See Earl Moursund, "Week 2, Part 1, Pattern-Message," handout given in "Spatial Composition and
D~amics"class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School or Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.
17 Earl Moursund, "Discussion 3: Closure, Spatial Elements, Human Response:' handout given April 5th ,
1979 in "Spatial Composition and Dynamics" class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School or Architecture and
Allied Arts, University of Oregon.
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Following the introduction of students to the belief that enclosure produced
"poetic images," the third and fourth steps of the project required that each designer tum
their project into a mechanism for elevating the user's spiritual wisdom. Moursund
insisted that each one room house "develop and elaborate the potentials for humans to
relate themselves to the environment and stretch (if not expand) their levels of
comprehension.,,172 Luckily, to pass the class one was not (in fact could not be) required
to confess whether or not one had experienced a "poetic image." It sufficed to exhibit
proficiency in fonnal manipulation itself. The prevailing assumption was that design
dexterity demonstrated spiritual "connection." Ultimately, the professor graded
according to loose categories that were established a priori. Again following Moore,
Moursund required the use of such design strategies as "aediculation," "balance of
energy," "expansion! contraction," and others which were tenned "thought frames."
These constituted a complete lexicon to describe design processes as the manipulation of
"single units of experience" into full "images of the whole." 173
To summarize, the anti-avant-garde used Bachelard as a mask to pass off its
experientialism as a "study" of the "living" past. The fact that Bachelard situated the
"origin" of creativity and invention in the subjective and transubjective "poetic image,"
allowed the anti-avant-garde to posit the architect's "soul" as the primordial repository of
humanity'S creative history. The genius of this identification is that it relegated the
172 Earl Moursund, "On-going study of a space: Project number three," handout given April 24th, 1979 in
"Spatial Composition and Dynamics" class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School or Architecture and Allied
Arts, University of Oregon.
173 Moursund recognized the similarity between making universal wholes out units of experience, and
making sentences out of words. Therefore, he taught Peter Eisenman's early applications of structural
linguistics to architectural form as a useful "thought frames" in the process of transforming simple
enclosure to yield complex types, and therefore more illunlinated image-wholes.. Earl MouTsund, "Space:
The Structure of Experience," handout given April 24th, 1979 in "Spatial Composition and Dynamics" class
(Arch 416G. ~pring 1979), School or Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.
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Modernism's myth of origin to "spirituality," to a realm of faith that was culturally
exempt from the "shackles" of reason. The alleged historicism of the anti-avant-garde's
Postmodernism reveals itself precisely as its de-historization. Whereas Bachelard wanted
to understand creativity in non-causal, yet rational tenns, the anti-avant-garde dispensed
with reason altogether. But if Bachelard's work did not literally invite the aesthetic
project of anti-intellectualism, it certainly tilted the philosophical balance in favor of
sensualism by opposing creativity to conscious thought. 174 The Bachelardian model
located creativity in the "margin" of consciousness, outside of reflexivity in the "half-
trance" of reverie (where he also located the origin of consciousness itself). Under
Bachelard's banner, the 1970s anti-avant-garde reacted to the rising standards of
academic rigor by recasting itself as a "marginalized," and therefore supposedly more
"authentic," fonn of "historical research." By claiming its "marginality" to history and
theory, the anti-avant-garde guaranteed its hegemony over the pedagogy of "practice" to
remain largely unchallenged.
c. The mask of American phenomenologists: Architecture as
philosophical training
As far as 1980s design pedagogy went, the general acceptance of the claim that
the "poetic image" was both subjective and transubjective made Moore into a hero who
had "cracked" the universal language of architecture. So widespread was the belief that
an architecture based on "poetic images" could embody and perpetuate the ancestral
174 Mark Jarzombek has argued that in turning towards aesthetics, some twentieth century American
phenomenologists, like William Barrett, have encouraged anti-intellectualism as a way to compensate for
their belated attention to modern art. According to Jarzombek, the philosophical defense of Modernism
came in the heels of an earlier defense by psychology from which it inherited many of its biases. See Mark
Jarzombek, The Psychologizing ofModernity: Art, Architecture, History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), p 100. The case of Bacherlard suggests this vel)' principle. Bachelard's quasi-
opposition of intellect to emotion must be therefore read not just as philosophy, but as part of a larger
infusion of psychological principles within philosophy itself.
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"feelings" of society that it became accepted as vulgate anonyme. References to
Bachelard or Moore disappeared in conferences and syllabi, and professors spoke as if ex
nihilio. 175 The more the theory remained un-articulated, the more powerful its hold on
design pedagogy.
But even if the anti-avant-garde's "theoretical" masks allowed it to smuggle its
anti-intellectualism initially, its new face also made it identifiable. By the mid 19808,
more theoretically inclined architects were drawn to the philosophical sources of the anti-
avant-garde. As they engaged phenomenolog}' first hand they pointed out how the
philosophy had been mishandled in the past, some with the intention of furthering the
aims of the anti-avant-garde, others with the purpose of defeating it. The mid 19808
witnessed a confusing (and sometimes confused) double reception of phenomenology:
On the one hand young architects proposed phenomenology as a way to critique
metaphysical and spiritualizing referents in architectural education, while, on the other
hand, phenomenology was invoked precisely by those who endeavored to spiritualize
architecture as either the recovery of the ''fullness of being," or as the synthesizing "cure"
to the fragmentation ofmodemity. As philosophers entered architectural discourse and
took sides, they added to the confusion.
This double reception of phenomenology can be appreciated in the different
appropriations of Merteau-Ponty's notion of embodied consciousness. The anti-avant-
garde invoked Merleau-Ponty to convey the alleged immediacy of transubstantiating the
175 Even discussions of Charles Moore's architecture in terms of poetic images failed to mention his role in
developing the theory. For instance, Carnegie-Mellon University instructor Eleanor F. Weinel, discussed
Moore's Piazza D'Italia project (New Orleans~ 1978) as a collection of "poetic images" where "each image
achieves a distinct and timeless presence." But she failed to discuss Moore's ideas about upoetic images"
completely! See Eleanor F. Weinel, , "ATS Poetica: Conversations in Latitudinarian Architecture," in
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"inner" feelings of architects into tangible "outer" buildings. 176 Architects influenced by
structuralism and deconstruction attacked this view, emphasizing that the "bodily" was
not an experience of spiritual wisdom. They argued rather that it was a Foucaultian "site"
where one could appreciate physical evidence of intersecting power relations. Merleau-
Ponty did suggest that creation (artistic or philosophical) was an "exteriorization of
interiority." In his booklet L'CEil et L'Esprit (1964) he even called upon art as a means to
clarify his philosophical claims about the existence of a life-world prior to subject and
object distinctions. 17? L'mil et L'Esprit was a philosophical performance of the aesthetic
objects it described. Merleau-Ponty tried to make his philosophy do what came so
naturally to painters: to give material expression to an "inner" vision.
In L'Oeil et L'Esprit Merleau-Ponty wanted to describe painting and philosophy
as projects in which making and knowing were one and the same. To do this, he first had
Language in Architecture: Prodeedings ofthe 68th ACSA Annual Meeting, 00. John Meunier, (Washington,
D.C.: Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, 1980), pp 138-145.
176 1950s architects and planners, such as Kevin Lynch, interested in issues of environment-behavior
relations were drawn to Gestalt psychology. The same issues also motivated the interested in Mereau-
Ponty, given that he was credited with having made great contributions to Gestalt psychology. In
"Merleau-Ponty's Examination of Gestalt Psychology," in Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure,
Language, 00. John Sallis, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), pp 89-121, Lester Embree, a
philosopher at Florida Atlantic University~ analyzed Merleau-Ponty's career-long interpretation,
acceptance, and critique of Gestalt psychology. The article began with Merleau-Ponty's critique of the
naturalistic attitude of Gestaltists, and then moved to Merleau-Ponty attempt to extend Gestalt psychology
by providing a more accurate description of "depth." For Embree, Merleau-Ponty's central contribution to
Gestaltist thought was his articulation of three species of behavioral structures: The syncretic, the
amovible, and the symbolic forms. Embree argued that Merleau-Ponty's more general importance
stemmed from his notion that "there is one subject matter -'active consciousness' or 'perceptual behavior'
(Le. Iiving)--approachable 1x>th from within and from without in oneself and in others, that in approaching
such a matter one may have recourse to an analytic attitude, but that the ordinary perceptual comprehension
isf,rior."
17 Bernard Waldenfels argued that Merleau-Ponty achieves the "third dimension" (the field this side of
subject and object) by weakening the principle of consciousness "the known is outweighed by the
experienced, the intellectual by structure; this is certainly not a radical revision." According to Waldenfels
Merteau-Panty failed to describe this third region in its own terms, and had to make recourse to a type of
perpetual "double-view" that described consciousness always in terms of lxxly and world. Waldenfels
maintained that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology did not undercut the opposition of subject and object. It
was a philosophy of concrete subjectivity, but it was still a philosophy of su~iectivity. See Bernhard
Waldenfels, "Perception and Structure in Merleau-Ponty," in Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure,
Language, eel. John Sallis, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), pp 21-38.
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to prove that painting and philosophizing were not reproductions of the real, but
processes of emergence of the real itself. In tum, this required evidence that thinking was
not disconnected from the real, but that it could in fact "manipulate" matter. Therefore,
Merleau-Ponty began by critiquing the Cartesian notion that consciousness could exist
beyond the body. He argued that thinking was not the type of ever-present vision
described by reflexive thought. Rather, thought was a type of "embodied vision," an
immediate, situational and corporeal experience that preceded any "transparellt" idea or
model about vision or aoout the visible ever put forward. In that sense Merleau -Ponty
consid~redexperience to be an "original" or "primordial" vision. As understood by
Merleau-Ponty, vision was the experience of the life-world, which he alternatively
described as lived-space. 178
Merleau-Ponty argued thai from the perspective of the experience of thought the
material world erupted within pure ideality, contrary to what Descartes upheld. 179
Particularly, in the experience of painting and philosophizing one felt that appearance
was indivisible from reality, and that vision was inseparable from the visible. 180 The
178 Merleau-Ponty differentiated his philosophy from the tradition of reflexive thought that originated with
Descartes' metaphysics. In contrast to Descartes' notion of space as res extensa, in Merleau-Ponty's "lived
space" there was no difference between container and contained:
L'espace n'est plus celui dont parle la Dioptrique, reseau de relations entre objets, tel que
Ie verrait un tiers temoin de rna vision, ou un geometre qui la construit et la survo}e, c'est
un espace compte apartir de moi comme point ou degre zero de la spatialite. Ie ne Ie vois
pas selon son enveloppe exterieure, je Ie vis dedans, j'y suis englobe. (p 58)
Merleau-Ponty maintained that Descartes's notion of space (and the space of disembodied thought) was
only possible as an abstraction of lived-space. However, he believed that Descartes negated the very world
which enabled his meditations and thus gave rise to the sort of abstract thought which was to take over
science. Maurice Merleau-Ponty. L'OEil et I'Esprit, (Paris: Editions GaJlimard, 1964).
179 Ibid. P54.
180 For Merleau-Ponty, embodied vision allowed one to "witness the fission of Being from within"(p 81)
where and when "things" became differentiated from one another, while they remained encroaching upon
each other. Embodied vision therefore let things acquire "presence" as the "visible" within a lived
spatiality. According to Merleau-Ponty, this ulived-space," which was opened up by embodied vision, was
an englobing experiential reality which supported every cohesion and disbandment of things into and out of
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problem of course was that people had a tendency to view thinking as an abstraction.
Modernity was to blame for this, thought Merleau-Ponty, because it had placed too much
trust in the "abstract methods" of science. This, he argued, made the duty of philosophy,
painting (and presumably of other aesthetic fields such as architecture) that of preserving
the "mystery" of the "fullness" of immediate experience. Philosophers and artists were
for him the guardians of "truthful" experience, until such time as science was ready to
stop imposing its models upon thought. Painting and philosophizing, he thought, could
tum "the skin of vision [i.e. thought] inside out," change people's perceptions about
reality (and modernity). Cezane, he claimed for instance, "thought with paint.,,181 For
Merleau-Ponty, the task of philosophy and of art was to maintain open the experience of
lived-space, of "the body and the soul, of the existing world," so that science would some
day awaken to it and realize that not everything was a "construction.,,182 This meant that
philosophers and painters had to simply continue "making their vision," to continue
rendering it visible in the world so that others could heed the message -in other words, to
flood the discourse with their "perspective."
Architects were taken by the idea that they too, like painters and philosophers
could "preserve the faith." They began speaking of a new "ethical responsibility" of
infusing matter with thought, of making their personal hinner vision" scintillate under the
surface of architectural shapes. In 1984, Mark Schneider, a professor at the University of
Houston's School of Architecture, offered a graduate seminar on phenomenology that
the "visible." As such, "lived-space" \~as Being itself, where the visible and the invisible, presence and
absence, coexisted. See: Ibid: p 84.
181 "Or, cette philosophie qui est afaire, c'est elle qui anime Ie peintre, non quand pas il exprime des
opinions sur Ie monde, mais aI'instant oil sa vision se fait geste, quand, dira Cezanne, it 'pense en
peinture'." Ibid. p 60.
182 Ibid. P 58.
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explored the architectural ramifications of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of making and
knowing as one and the same. 183 Since Merleau-Ponty established a relation of
equivalence along the axis of an immediate corporeal-mental "experience" of reality, the
seminar turned into a discussion of "everyday" experiences of reality, as too "nlental,"
"false," or "abstract." If, as phenomenologists argued, people were "blind" to the "real"
boundaries of reality, then they only had a fragmentary view of where they were.
Schneider drew the cliched conclusion that Modem subjects could not ''find themselves,"
and that it was the task of the architect to employ his or her "superior" vision in making
wholesome environments.
The anti-avant-garde's claim on the "fullness" of experience r~ayed itself off
against a schizophrenic conception of self-hood it helped fabricate. The supposedly
fragmented, schizophrenic, modem subject required the phenomenological search for
stable limits, or so argued the anti-avant-garde architects as they engaged in paranoid
searches for the "purifying fullness of reality." John Lobell, a professor of Architecture at
Pratt Institute, lambasted "monumentai architecture" for blocking "the flow of
consciousness," and breaking an experiential "umbilical union'" between world and
people. He urged architects to regain their place in the centering womb of reality, to
"penetrate into phenomena, into the dialogue [of experience] itself.,,184 Student projects
183 The class was structured around a seminar by Dalibor Vesley. See Dalibor Vesely, "On the Relevance of
Phenomenology," in Pratt Journal ofArchitecture: Form; Being; Absence: Architecture and Philosophy,
v. 2, (New York: Rizzoli International Press, 1988), p 59-62.
184 John Lobell, "Architecture and the Structures of Consciousness," in Form f" Being; Absence:
Architecture and Philosophy: Pratt Journal ofArchitecture, v. 2, (New York: Rizzoli International Press,
1988), p 205.
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throughout the late 19808 engaged in paranoiac a~mpts to put the self back together with
prosthetic machines meant to enhance bodily perceptions. 185
Schneider asked Dalibor Vesley, professor of history, theory, and design at the
University of Cambridge, England, "why should an architect study phenomenology?"
Vesley replied that phenomenology was important because it was the way for architects
to achieve authentic experiences of reality, to leave behind the "highly sublimated,
intellectual, and abstract world" of science, and win back "the tendency to see things the
way that people used to see them, as designers or painters." He claimed that
phenomenology's response to modem culture was to provide a restorative "cleansing" of
experience. The upshot for busy architects was that phenomenology was easy to learn;
for Vesely, it was not even a philosophy!
Phenomenology is not a philosophy, as such, but a tendency to restore to
the modem situation a global and consistent conceptual direction. One
can think of it as an inevitable dimension or hygiene of the modem mind.
It is a catharsis one must go through in order to restore one's own
experience. The word "phenomenology" is not important. One also does
not have to worry aoout phenomenology as a discipline. 186
During the 19808, the "know thyself' idea gained a wide following among North
American architects who could easily reconcile it with their Judeo-Christian beliefs. Far
from resisting this appropriation of phenomenology, many philosophers actually
encouraged the view that it could serve as a spiritual path towards inner awareness. As
early as 1965, Glenn Gray, a philosophy professor at Colorado College, who also
explored the appeal of existentialism to countercultural university movements of the
18S These types of student projects continue to appear at present. See fOT instance Omar Khan's MIT project
entitled UBody A(r)mour" in Thresholds, n. 21 (Fall 2(00), pp 70-73.
186 Dalib.JT Veseiy, tlOn the Relevance ofPhenomeno)ogy:t in Pratt Journal ofArchitecture: Form; Being;
Absence: Architecture and Philosophy, v. 2, (New York: Rizzoli International Press, 1988), p 59.
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1960s, thought that the concept of authenticity could provide the "spiritual nourishment"
for those left drifting by the mid-century erosion of politics and religion. As these
traditional systems of values lost currency, Gray f~lt that individuals could find the
necessary guiding principles for life in existentialism's emphasis on inner being, self -
examination, and self-evaluation. In Gray's estimation, Americans were not only
philosophically ripe for existentialism, but also culturally inclined towards it. Americans
favored the type of individualism, resoluteness, and self-reliance on offer in
existentialism. If existentialism did not completely take over philosophy departments,
Gray thought, it was because many American philosophers, while paying lip service to
these ideals, in reality favored a much more socialized version of them. 187
By the mid 1980s, phenomenologIsts like Karsten Harries extended the idea of
"spiritual nourishment" from philosophy to architecture. ''The philosopher's words," he
wrote, "are less likely to touch this inner nature than the built environment. Architecture
is at least as likely to edify as philosophy.,,188 The "ethical function" of architecture,
Harries argued, was to get society be)tond Modernity's "arbitrariness" (read schizoid
fragmentation) by making people feel the "wholeness" of the "original" language of the
senses and the imagination. 189 The ethical task for architecture, he insisted, was not so
187 Glenn J. Gray, "Salvation on the Campus: 'Nhy Existentialism Is Capturing the Students," in Harper's
Magazine, (May 1965), pp 53-60.
188 Karsten Harries, "Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture," in Perspecta: The Yale Architectural
Journal, v. 20, P 20.
189 "I cannot do more here," stated Harries, "than provide a few hints as to how one might go about
developing an understanding of the natural language of architecture. Perhaps the tenn 'language' is
misleading, for if we can speak of a language at all, this is a language addressed, first, to sense and
imagination. Before attempts are made to articulate words, it needs to be felt. The arts, and more
especially architecture, are in a much better position to teach us to listen to this language than philosophy. I
can imagine courses that would explore it, but such courses would have to rely on images." Harries thus
played right into the anti-avant-garde's anti-intellectualist discourse, which was by then claiming that
designing with "poetic images" led to the spiritual elevation of students. See Karsten Harries, "Thoughts
on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture," in Perspecta: The Yale Architectural Journal, v.. 20, p 18.
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much the control of the ph}Sical environment, but the pastoral care and elevation of
people's "spiritual control." For the philosopher, architecture was the best way to teach
the process of spiritual self-discovery on which he premised the "discovery of
meaning.,,190 Michael Zimmennan, a phenomenologist who became interested in
architecture while teaching at Tulane University in the 19708, identified "egoism" with a
dismembered experience of reality. In his article "The Role of Spiritual Discipline in
Learning to Dwell on Earth" (1985), Zimmennan argued for an "ego-less attunement to
LogOS.,,191 Contradicting his own theory, Zimmennan argued elsewhere that only those
architects capable of imposing their egoistic visions on the world had been capable of
creating places where people could still experience the "spiritual" and "emotional"
dimensions of existence. 192
190 "Meaning cannot finally be made or invented; it can only be discovered, where such discovery will also
be a self-discovery." Karsten Harries, "Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture," in Perspecta: The Yale
Architectural Journal, v. 20, P 14.
191 Michael E. Zimmerman, "The Role of Spiritual Discipline in Learning to Dwell on Earth," in D'K-'elling,
Place and Environment: Towards a Phenomenology ofPerson and World, 00. David Seamon and Robert
Mugerauer, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), pp 247-256.
192 Zimmerman thus unwittingly folded Max Stirner's "psychologized ego" into Heidegger's "being-
towards-death." See Michael E. Zimmerman, "Architecture and the Technological Culture," in Tulane
Architectural View, (New Orleans, Louisiana: Tulane School of Architecture, 1978), pp 9-18.
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4THE BUILDING
DASGEBAUDE
Fig: Image of Christopher Alexander's Llnz Cafe In front of the Forum
Design Exhibition structure In Llnz, Germany, 1981. Alexander thought this
building was an example of an "ego-less" architecture. From Christopher
Alexander, The Llnz Cafe /Das Llnz Cafe, (New York: Oxford University
Press, and Vienna: Locker Verlag, 1981), p 35.
The idea of an "ego-less" architecture became extremely popular in theorizing the
possibility of a new vernacular architecture arising immediately from the people.
Christopher Alexander, and other architects involved in self-help community projects,
regarded the sacrifice of their ego as a "gift" to humanity's spiritual awakening. 193 In
193 For Alexander, "authentic" creation could only take place in the face of death. In recognizing their own
mortality, humans also found their existential similarity with all things nature, and could thus "let-go" of
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1981 Alexander built a cafe outside of the Forum Design Exhibition in Linz, Gennany,
that he hoped would shame modem (and post-modem) design for its supemciality, for
creating what he saw as a "world of pretense and show which almost no one believes in,
truly, deep in themselves [...].,,194 Alexander constructed his building through his "feel"
method, which allegedly brought him in touch with organizations of space emerging from
"the kernel of the universc.,,195 These patterns were for him so fundamental that he
asserted their universal objective validity: "[...A]mazingly enough, they are the same for
everyone. They are the same for different people, with different values: and they are even
the same for people from entirely different cultures.,,196 In his mind, he was taking his
own ego out of 'lrchitecture, "letting" images of the human soul emerge through him, as a
sacrificial "gift" to God. 197 The Linz Cafe, then, was to be a three dimensional
photograph of the "inner universe" of human beings, a veritable ecorchee of the soul in
which visitors could see themselves reflected as a part of God, and find contemplative
peace. He saw the "sacrifice" of his own ego as a way to bring about a "new era" in
society:
Even here, however, I believe that there is enough to challenge the present
forms of architecture, and to show that, in our time, this could be
possible... that it is not a hopeless dream, ... but a right and proper thing to
do, which, as we learn to do it, will bring immense rewards ... and will
their ego and allow the emergence of the "characterof nature," which he alternatively called "life-patterns."
See Christopher Alexander, The Timeless Way ofBuilding, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp
153-154. Although Alexander did not mention it, his argument was close to Heidegger's description of
Dasein's authentic existence as a project of "letting" being emerge in being-towards-death.
194 Christopher Alexander, The Linz Cafe / Das Linz Cafe, (New York: Oxford University Press, and
Vienna: Locker Verlag, 1981) p 85.
195 Ibid. P 90.
196 Ibid. P 87.
197 "It is so easy to say this ... and so hard to make it clear. But definitely, in a specific sense, the works of
art, which touch us, which evoke great feeling... are works which have consciously. and deliberately been
created as offerings to God, as pictures of the universe, of or something that lies behind the universe... as
pictures of the human soul." Ibid. p 69. Also, see his discussion of the "gift" in p 72.
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bring us into a new state of our society, where the inner person will once
again, be deeply present, in the outer things we build. 198
Fig: Christopher Alexander experiences the "Intimacy" of one his design-
build projects In Mexican, Mexico. From Christopher Alexander, Howard
Davis, Julio Martinez, Donald Corner, The Production of Houses, (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p 312.
Perhaps no American phenomenologist has made a stronger case for
architecture's role in the "spiritual" education of the United States than Bruce Wilshire, a
student of William Barrett at the New School for Social Research in the 1960s, and
198 Ibid. P 76.
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currently professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. Wilshire proposed architecture
as a pedagogical tool to awaken "primal habits" in which the harmonious relation of
things could be immediately experienced. This was not entirely new to architectural
theory, since postmodem authors had long endorsed the recuperation of craft understood
as "involuntary habits" (as Kenneth Frampton described them in his theory of
Tectonics). Wilshire believed that these "primal habits" could re-ground what he called
the "experiencing body-self' in the "primal life-world." 199 They were the axis between
two symmetrical worlds of "inner mystery" and "natural mystery." Wilshire believed
that in the course of evolution, the "body-self' had "given" "primal habits," or actions
which were perfectly in tune with Nature and thus helped humans live "authentically as
one" with the world. The problem was (again) that modern science blocked the
involuntary by placing all of its emphasis on Reason. Wilshire believed pretty much
everyone but himself to be "drugged with thought. ,,200 To get out of this "addiction of
thought," Wilshire affmned that humans had to return to ancient rituals preceding the
199 Wilshire derived a notion similar to Merleau-Ponty's body-consciousness from William James'
Pragmatism. Although James set out his The Principles ofPsychology as a scientific study, Wilshire
maintained that James' realization that the psychologist could not exist outside of the world he studied, that
he could not isolate his thinking and methods from the object thought about, led him to posit the identity of
subject and object. Wilshire portrayed James as struggling with his "radical empiricism" to finally
conclude that there were no independent existences, and that "relations of things are equiprimordial with
the things related."(p 54) In other words, thinker and thoIght were for James identical to the world thought
about in a key way. This discovery, as Wilshire understood it, put an end to Cartesian dualism and helped
James establish a "wholistic" and corporeal ontological framework for experience. Wilshire used th is
framework to depict James as the forerunner, not only of phenomenology, but of the Gaia hypothesis.
which, as articulated by James Lovelock in the mid twentieth century, conceived of the earth as a self-
regulating living organism. To this, Wilshire added the more theological thesis that the earth was also
spiritual, insofar as, in accordance to James's ontology, the soul was not some immaterial entitYJ but "just
all that the lxxly does."(p 60) In essence, Wilshire argued that if, as James suggested, there were no
independent existences, then the earth was the horizon of humanity's common body and soul. Bruce
Wilshire, The Primal Roots ofAmerican Philosophy: P:-agmatism, Phenomenology, and Native American
Thought, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2(00).
200 Ibid. P 11 1.
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modem "blockage" of the involuntary. 201By straightening out the body, Wilshire hoped
to re-orient the mind. "To reconnect and readjust the head and neck properly," he wrote,
"may be sufficient to release this archaic fixation and to free the self for mature
behavior.,,202
Fig: John Dewey's diagram of an Ideal school In his 1899 School and
Society. Reprinted In John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum and The
School and Society, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, c1958), p 81.
Wilshire advocated using architecture to re-train the body according to ancient
rituals like shamanism or Tai-Chi. This proposition was not new to philosophy, he
claimed. John Dewey had already recognized that the purpose of architecture was to
realign the "body-self' with the "mystery" of Nature. 203 In his 1899 School and Society,
201 "All we can do is locate ourselves practice-wise and ritualistically in the world that is experienced as
whole, and trust that our anchorings and resonatings in proven namings will evoke responses from the
'neutral' body, responses that contribute to our integration and integrity and are beneficial to all over the
long run." Ibid. p 109.
202 Ibid. p 112.
203 Wilshire claimed that Dewey came to understand the importance of the body in re-aligning the spirit
after he underwent sessions in 1916 with F.M. Alexander, a psycho -bio-therapist who claimed to alter
"minding by altering bodily movements and postures."( p Ill) In writing the introduction to Alexander's
The Use of the Self, "Dewey writes that since there are central organic habits that condition every act we
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Dewey presented diagrams of an ideal school adjacent to a garden with avenues leading
back into the community. The concept generating the school was the integration of
theory, which he housed in a central library, and practice, which he arranged in the
perimeter of the structure. Bruce Wilshire believed the drawings to be "spatiospiritual"
planning aimed at awakening in children the "prefigurations of space-time-and-culture
coiled in the body, which guide our intercourse in every situation, our deepest habits that
should be fostered, not paved over or managed in ham-handed way.,,204
Wilshire admired Dewey's anti-academicism and his desire to unite poetry,
morality, and science into an "art of life," but he felt that his predecessor had not gone far
enough in his architectural experiment. 205 Dewey had not incorporated "ancient
regenerative rituals" into his design, and this, for Wilshire, meant that architecture would
not be able to bear the weight of making places in which humans could regain their
orientation within the "mystery of Nature." In the twentieth century, "a fragmented time"
according to Wilshire, nature was so transfonned as to be unrecognizable. Thus, he
argued that Dewey's education system needed to be extended to the manipulation of the
body within the realm of the archaic, where, he believed, a connection with "primal
Nature" could be re-awakened through "habits." For Wilshire, architecture would have
to re-train the body in ancient involuntary movements so as to re-center the mind.
perform, we can hope to locate these, bring them under conscious direction, and convert 'the fact of
conditioned reflexes from a principle of external enslavement into a means of vital freedom.' " Ibid. P 117.
204 Ibid. P 107.
205 "But are even Dewey's achievements in integration as deep and comprehensive as we need? Is the
central room, the museum, active and poweIful enough? Or will they erupt randomly and demonically? Is
Dewey adequately attuned to the archaic-ecstatic? Is performance allowed sometimes in the library? Is
ritual? I think of the need for ritual in particular. Most significant it is that though he pictures the school
adjacent to a garden, there is no suggestion of wilderness anywhere within his dia gram! This absence
means occlusion of ancient forebears' ritualized acknowledgements of the gifts of Nature." Ibid. p 108.
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"Education is the master art, another name for the art of life" 206 and architecture would
serve as the tool for integrating, and regulating, the sacred positions of the body. 207
Although Wilshire did not write for an architectural audience, the degree to which
his thinking resembled that of the architectural anti-avant-garde is an index of the
assimilation of phenomenological themes in architectural discourse. Like Charles Moore,
Wilshire considered that human weUness was dependent on a pre-reflexive "intimate
communion" with the world. The capacity for total involvement in immediate
experience, according to Wilshire, had helped William James sunnount his debilitating
depression, and Black Elk return from a near death experience. For Wilshire the
complete engulfment in the world allowed both Black Elk and James to let "the world's
energies" augment their immunological and regenerative powers. Moore also believed
that his buildings could help people sunnount the crises of modernity on an individual
level, by "recharging them" with immediate experiences. Architecture, for him radiated
meaning and was amplified in its sphere of influence by its users. Moore believed he was
helping people "take possession" of their world by transfonning it into something as
close to a "poetic image" of their inner psyche as possible. With characteristic humor and
disanning frankness, Moore recognized that his ideas about how buildings received and
dispensed human "energy" was bound up in a Christian ethics:
206 Ibid. P 103.
207 Consider the following passage in which Wilshire tries to recuperate a mystical origin for the Cartesian
axis which generates descriptive geometry: "Dewey is suggesting, I think, that losing this basic orientation
is like losing the primal person's sense of the magic number seven--a talisman that orients and locates us in
the world around us. Why seven? Notice how the four cardinal directions establish the horizontal axis; then
point down and then up to establish the vertical axis --that's six-- then connect all the points at the center
which is yourself, and you have the sacred number, seven. You have found yourself by finding your place
in the world. Knowing, feeling, moving, and being are one. Black Elk, for example, finds himself and his
people by locating then all relative to the Six Grandfathers and to the central Tree of the World that can
boom in our lives." Ibid. p 103.
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It's my belief that buildings become energized by human care, like casting
bread on the water and having it come back club sandwiches or whatever
the Christian precepts are. For a building to be satisfactory, it has to have
a great deal of energy put into it. If a building gets enough attention to
energize it, then it can repay the people who invested the energy: the
designers, the users, the fund-raisers, all the people who were involved. 208
Meadowcreek's Philosophical Foundations
Six Meta-Patterns
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208 Charles W. Moore, "Charles Moore [Transcript of Talk with Students and Faculty]," in The Yale
Seminars on Architecture, v. 2, (New Haven, Connecticut: School of Architecture, Yale University, 1982),
p 1. Moore expressed this same idea at numerous times in his career, sometimes with almost identical
words. Compare the passage quoted to his description of buildings as "receptacles of human energy; if they
receive enough of it, they can repay in satisfaction for the occupants, as in the biblical image of bread cast
upon the waters." See Charles Moore, "The Yin, The Yang. and the Three Bears," in Charles Moore:
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FIG: NU88dowcreek'. Phlloaophlcal Foundetlone: Six MeblaPstt.na,"
David Be8mon'. phiIoaophlcaI ldeel. • prllCtlcld deelgn requlrementa.
From Dwelling, StMIng, 8nd DMlgnlng: To"".rd • PhenofIJfHJo/oglctll
Ecology, edt D8vld S88mon, (AI"ny : State Unlverllty of New York Pr_,
c1803). P 335.
The "outsider movement" mentality of American phenomenologists made them
seek inter-disciplinary assistance in asserting the value of their philosophical
contributions. Thus, they willingly provided a philosophical mask to the anti-avant-
garde's anti-intellectualism, defending the spiritualization of architecture as a
upurification" of modem experience that reconstituted and "preserved" its abject
fragments "holistically." What begun in the I950s and 1960s as a tum towards lite rature,
art, psychology, communicology, and economics advanced by the 1980s into human
geography, behavioralism, environmentalism, planning, and architectureQ In the early
1990s phenomenological publications devoted specifically to architecture and it~
philosophical exegesis begun to appear. Philosopher and geographer David Seamon, for
instance, founded the Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology Newsletter
(1990), and established the SUftlY Series in Environmental and Architectural
Phenomenology. Seamon became Associate Professor of Architecture at the University
of Kansas, where he co-taught graduate courses that used Christopher Alexander's work
to "transcribe" his philosophical ideals into practical design requirements. 209
Simultaneously with these publishing efforts, associations such as EDRA (Environmental
Buildings and Projects 1949-1986, eel. Eugene J. Johnson, (New York: Rizzoli International Publications
Inc., 1986), p 15.
209 David Seamon and Gary J. Coates, "Promoting a Foundational Ecology Practically Through Christopher
Alexander's Pattern Language: The Example of Meadowcreek," in Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing:
Toward a Phenomenological Ecology, edt David Seamon, (Albany: State University of New York Press,
c1993), pp 331-351.
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Design Research Association) appeared as umbrella societies for architects interested in
,henomenology to network.210
IV. Conclusion
Post-structuralism began to differentiate subtle nuances in the history of
Postmodem architecture. The new class of architect/theorists correctly associated the
primacy accorded to a "freely exploratory" practice in the 1970s with the capitulation of
architects to cultural conventions about the limits of that practice. In essence,
poststructuralists argued that 19708 architects had tried to retain their cultural status by
restricting a "freely exploratory" theory, which might have undennined the definition of
established roles assigned to architects in the broader social contract. Thus, these authors
emphasized function of discourse in cultural reform. The promise of course was that
210 The Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology group held a network meeting at the 21st annual
Environmental Design Research Association conference, held in April 6-9, 1990 at the University of
Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. The EDRA symposium was entitled "Phenomenological Approaches to
Landscape and Place." Ten people were present at the Networking lunch. Co-chairs Margaret Boschctti and
David Seamon, with Robert Mugerauer led the meeting. They addressed what types of projects the EAP
might sponsor and in regard to what organization or event. Some members proposed a conference session
where participants would "go out into a place or environment and work to experience it directly and offer
phenomenological observations." See "EDRA Meetings 1990," in Environmental and Architectural
Phenomenology Newsletter, n. 3, v. 1 (Fall 1990), p 2. Patrick Condon (Faculty of the School of
Architecture, University of Minneapolis) chaired a session in which Robert Mugerauer and David Seamon
participated. Many of the papers were concerned with describing or prescribing a "fullness of experience."
See for instance: M. Gee, Graduate School, City University of New York, "Art and the Non-Functional
Object"; M. Boschetti, Kansas State University, "Continuity and Change in Century-Old Farm Homes";
J.Hammond, Universjty of Illinois, Urbana-Guunpaign, "Anatomy of the Taishan Village"; R. Bechtel,
University of Arizona, Tucson, and I. Altman, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Variety of Religiolls and
Important Places"; D.Seamon, Kansas State University, "Using pattern language to Identify Sense of Place:
American Landscape Painter Frederic Church~sOlana as a Test Case"; R.Mugerauer, University of Texas
at Austin, "Midwestern Suburban Landscapes and Resident's Values"; P.Gobster, North Central Forest
Experiment Station, Chicago, and R. Chenoweth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, "Peak Aesthetic
Experiences and Natural Landscape."; H. Schroeder, North Central Forest Experiment Station, Chicago,
''The Felt Sense of Natural Environments"; W. Engler, Iowa State University, "Experience at View Places:
An Inquiry into Emotional Ties between People and Places."; Carolyn Norris-Baker and Rick J. Scheidt,
Kansas State University, " Place Attachment Among Older Residents of a 'Ghost Town t: A Transactional
Approach." The conference proceedings are published in Robert Selby ed. Coming ofAge: Proceedings,
Annual Meeting, 1990, Environmental Design Research Association (Chanpaign-Urbana: University of
Illinois, 1990).
234
architects could regain a type of avant-garde critical function by manipulating and
directing the ways that architecture was spoken about. Unfortunately, this re-theorization
of practice was partly de-historicized, it looked at the (000-) intellectual history of the
discipline in a social vacuum. As a result, architects appeared as perpetual lackeys of
power, congenitally predisposed to accept the status quo. But history is filled with
instances of architectural subversion, resistance, and even organized refonnism. This is
all the more true in the twentieth century, when it is actually difficult to find instances
when the "refonnist" rhetoric is not present. The question to ask then is how can
architectural discourse appear to be advocating cultural and social revolution and in fact
be cementing the status quo? A de-historicized theory is as dangerous as a de -theorized
practice.
But an intellectual history of theory is in a sense not sufficient. Without the
context of a social history it becomes impossible to understand the dimensions of an
idea's radicalism. By the same token it becomes difficult to assess if the distancing of
theory from practice at a particular historical moment benefits the interests of reactionary
or liberal politics. In this sense, the social history of McCarthyism in America upturns
received accounts of twentieth century American architectural intellectual life. The
hegemony of a "sloppy" and "inconsistent" theol)' of architecture in the 1960s and 1970s
cannot be thought of as part and parcel of being an architect. It is rather an artifact of a
consensual system of repression, which weeded dissenting architects out of the academy
and dissenting opinions out of discourse. The idea that Postwar American architects
"chose" to "dumb down" theory en masse presupposes that they had the choice, that there
was freedom of speech, when in fact there was not. In light of this reality, the
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displacement of theory to the background appears as an "adjustment" to social and
political conditions, which in many ways did "cave in" but in others also helped preserve
a commitment to libernl ideals of freedom either in discursive fonn or in practice.21I
In the late 1940s and 19508, European avant -gardism became suspect in America
for its revolutionary rhetoric. Congressman George Dondero of Michigan, who made his
career as a watchdog against Communism in American education, repeatedly lectured
Congress on the dangers of imported avant-garde Modem art.212 American society also
became increasingly impatient with "domestic" intellectuals~ such as the New Deal
experts that had helped modernize the country. Small town Americans looked upon their
academic credentials as a sign of privilege inconsistent with American democracy. And
it was precisely the defensibility to some of these values, such as democratic
egalitarianism, that made the case for intellectuals so difficult. The pursuit of intellectual
excellence became circlDllscribed to science (i.e. the improvement of the "art of war"),
and spirituality (or the enhancement of the "art of life"). Architectural education split
211 Charles Moore and "the family" learned the lesson to "dumb downn theory after Peresutti's forced
"resignation" from Princeton. The question now remains whether Moore's "loosening'" of theol)' from
practice was a careerist move, or if it was a way to carve out a space of discursive exemption in which to
carry Qui: social reforms from within, such as improving the living conditions for the disenfranchised.
Judging from the kinds of prujects he was involved in, I would tend to think of him more as a careerist.
However, under a similar discursive mediocrity, aimed at securing the backing of reactionary political
institutions, others carried out truly unconventional work, which in many ways challenged the social
agenda of those very institutions of power backing them. I am thinking, for instance. of grass roots
activists such as Sergio Palleroni, a professor from the University of Washington working to improve the
slams of Cuernavaca with IMF funds, or even Christopher Alexander's idealistic self-help projects in
Mexicali.
212 ''The art of the isms, the weapon of the Russian Revo!ution, is the art which has been transplanted to
America, a'1d today, having infiltrated and saturated many of our art centers, threatens to overawe, override
and overpower the fine art of our tradition and inheritance. So-called modem or contemporary art in our
own belov~ country contains all the isms of depravity, decadence, destruction [...]
All these isms are foreign origin. and truly should have no place in American art. [...J.-\H are instruments
and weapons of destruction." Congressional R~ord, 81 st Congress, Ist session, (August 16, 1949), P
11584, as quoted in Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New York: Knopf, 1963),
p 15. See also Dondero's speaches on "Communism in OUf Schools," Congressional Record, 79th
Congress, 2nd session, (June 14, 1946), pp A. 3516-18, and "Communist Conspiracy in An Threatens
American Museums," Congressional Record, 82nd Congress. 2nd. session, (March 17. 1952), pp 2423-7.
236
roughly along these lines, as did the rest of the academy. But both" adjustments"
preserved the founding myths of Modernism untouched. Both maintained, for instance,
the belief of a stable foundational origin to aesthetic expression, even if they thematized
it differently: a belief in Objective truth became the basis for scientism and the ClAM
avant-garde, whereas a faith in the radical individuality of the subjective soul became the
basis of the anti-avant-garde's spiritualism. The first expression came under scrutiny
with the 1960s critiques of instrumental reason. The second endured until 19808, when
deconstruction put into question the notion of authorship. In this sense, what from the
perspective of fonnal styles appeared to be Postmodernism, from the perspective of
discourse can be better appreciated as the extension of Modernism.
In a sense, the separation of the study of objectivity from that of subjectivity
prepared the ground for the post-structuralist critique of authorship. The anti-avant-garde
gave the refonnist discourse of Modernism an inward tum towards the "sou]" and
subjectivity, which satisfied Protestant orthodoxy on a more acceptab~e secular plane
through promises of self-manipulation. But the idea that the soul could be refonned also
implied that it could be subject to forces outside of itself. Contacts with the
phenomenological tradition although admittedly superficial did have some profound
effects. Bachelard's critique of the idea of creativity as a willful act of reason encouraged
the architectural search for "ego-less" design practices. The reform of the sou~ e,·entually
became its negation in favor of a more trans-subjective source. Some, like Christopher
Alexander believed this trans-subjective origin to be God. Others believed (and continue
to believe) that an ego-less architecture could emerge immediately out of bodily
experience if only it could be liberated from the workings of the willful and unruly mind.
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This satisfied a middle -American cultural anxiety before an increasingly heterogeneous
moral and religious landscape with a new type of stabilizing universalism: bodily
experience. Still others, less pious indeed, became open to the post-structuralist "death of
the author."
Although the talk about autonomy (of practice from theory, body from mind,
architecture from philosophy) appears hollow from the perspective of discourse, it did
enable the distance between poles necessary to rearticulate ideas, and to change
conventions of practice. This distancing is sometimes the result not so much of isolated
intellectual pursuits, but also of extreme social conditions. It was precisely at one of
these moments of greatest distancing, during the aftennath of the McCarthyite era, that
phenomenology fIrst entered into Anglo-American architectural discourse. Although
post-structuralist critics were quick to accuse phenomenology for sanctioning the
superficiality of architectural discourse, it in fact enabled them to identify and critique the
ever-elusive remnants of modernism.
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I. Introduction: postwar "humanism" as experlentlallsm
By the late 1970s, Christian Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000) was a household name
in architecture schools around the world as a principal proponent of architectural
practices attuned to and expressive of local character. His early works entitled Intentions
in Architecture (1963), and Existence, Space and Architecture (1971) had earned him
wide recognition both in Europe and the Americas, and his later Genius Loci: Towards a
Phenomenology ofArchitecture (1979) would extend that audience to Asia and Australia.
The frrst and third book mark turning points in Norberg-Schulz's career and thinking.
After Intentions, Norberg-Schulz abandoned his professional practice for a career as an
architectural historian, convinced that the contradictions of contemporary life prevented
avant-garde architects from effecting any progressive change in society. Given the
waning image of the modernist architect as refonner, Norberg-Schulz thought that it now
fell upon historians to take up the colors of avant-gardism and find ways for architecture
to regain cultural and social relevance. Sixteen years later, Genius Loci presented the
philosophy of Martin Heidegger as the key to a new way of experiencing architecture
which promised to unify humanity and world, curing modem experience's contradictions
and multiple deceptions of artificiality. The rook consecrated the image of
phenomenology as a path towards experiential self-awareness, and eventually turned
Norberg-Schulz's theory into a catch basin for all disillusionment with mode mity.
Norberg-Schulz is often credited as the "founding father" of phenomenological
studies in architecture and landscape architecture by his North American followers. I And
I Norberg-Schulz's followers in the United States included faculty members in most of the nation's
architecture schools. His influence was particularly strong at MIT, Yale University, University of
Michigan, University of Oregon, University of Washington at Seattle, University of California at Berkley,
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yet, Norberg-Schulz's turn towards Heidegger owed much to the postwar architectural
culture of the United States, which he had been regularly exposed to from his early days
as a Fulbright fellow at Harvard to his teaching appollitment at MIT in 1974. This North
American architectural discourse served as a filter through which Norberg-Schulz read
Martin Heidegger and eventually developed his popular theory of Genius Loci. The
success of his work rested on his ability to appropriate existing modernist conventions,
such as Kevin Lynch's understanding of cities in tenns of subjective images and Georgy
Kepes 's belief in the importance of visual competency in design, and to essentialize these
design methods into universal truths. The process of de-historicizing these design
approaches cannot be completely attributed to Norberg-Schulz. Historiographical erasure
was in fact at the very core of modernist discourse, selVing to conceal the multiple
interdisciplinary oorrowings that infonned the construction of subjective experience into
a touchstone of modem architectural design's emancipating promises. The secret of
Norberg-Schultz's success was his ability to perpetuate modernist conventions by
concealing them under the mask of Heidegger, such as the ClAM dream that architects
could help advance society by fmding new experiential ways to break free of
conventions.
Kansas State University, and the University of Texas at Austin. In a letter to Norberg-Schulz dated July 15
1982, which is held at the Norberg-Schulz archive in Oslo, David Seamon, who together with Robert
Mugerauer would become a leading member of the American phenomenological school, commented on the
foundational importance of Genius Loci to the America academy: "I write now to describe a project that a
philosopher, Robert Mugerauer, and I are working on: a collection of essays tentatively titled Dwelling,
Place, and Environement, whose main thrust will be a phenomenological approach to environmental
behavior and design, particularly the Heideggerian perspective. [...] We believe that the volume could stand
as a seminal collection, and since you are a 'founding father' of the perspective, so to speak, it would be
splendid if an essay by you could be included, perhaps something extending a theme or themes in Genius
Loci (personally, I am very much taken with your notion of 'creative participation ')."
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Fig: Detail of Norberg-Schulz's magazine TEAM, which was a forum for
disseminating the Ideas of Scandinavian ClAM youth groups. See TEAM:
Collaboration of Young Architects and Artists, n. 2 (February 1952), ed.
Christian Norberg-Schulz and E. Neuenschwander, (Oslo: Printed at
Statens himdverks, and distributed by Christian Norberg-Schulz, 1952).
As a young architect, Norberg-Schulz was deeply involved in ClAM. Through
Siegfried Giedion (1888-1968), his mentor and teacher at the Eidgenossische Technische
Hochschule (ETH) in Zurich, he became familiar with ClAM's postwar stress on
subjective experience as the basis for disentangling modem architecture from the
discursive snarl of functionalism, which had, according to some of the group's members,
reduced the practice of modem architecture to the bureaucratic implementation of rigid
codes. The idea of rebuilding Europe according to the ClAM principles of functionalist
planning provoked a considerable amount of anxiety. There was some disagreement as to
whether Le Corbusier's La Charte d'Athenes [The Athens Charter, 1943], which
enshrined the well-known ideal of the ClAM city, neatly divided into four functional
zones (dwelling, work, transportation and recreationj.i was sufficiently sensitive to
2 Le Corbusier's Athens Charter was written on the basis of the findings presented at ClAM IV (1933),
perhaps the organizations most successful meeting, and the first to address the "chaotic" development of
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principles of human proportion, scale, and beauty, which in the eyes of critics like Reyner
Banham had been disregarded by Modernism's functionalism.
Fig: From left to Right: Jaquellne Tyrwhltt, Slgfrled Gledlon, and Jose Luis
sert at ClAM 10, In Dubrovnlk, 1956. From Eric Mumford, The ClAM
Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000).
Even Siegfried Giedion, who together with Helene de Mandrot and Le Corbusier,
had been one of the principal instigators in the formation of the legendary ClAM in 1928,
and had even served as the group's first secretary general, had misgivings about Le
Corbusier's doctrinaire approach to planning. At the ETH during the late 1940s, Giedion
lectured students like Norberg-Schulz about the erosion of "humanist principles" in
design.' Giedion had developed these lessons about "humanism" in the United States,
where he carried on the activities of ClAM with Walter Gropius, Laszlo Moholy -Nagy,
Jose Luis Sert and others during the war years. The group operated under the name
"Chapter for Relief and Post-War Planning," which laid claim to the European
reconstruction years before it had even begun. Like other members of the group, Giedion
the modem metropolis. Although the meeting was originally scheduled for Moscow, political tensions
made this impossible. ClAM finally met aboard the SS Patris Il, a cruise ship sailing fro m Marseille to
Athens and back, thus the name ofLe Corbusier's book. Jose Luis Sert's book Can Our Cities Survive?
(1942) was also recapitulated the themes of ClAM IV, albeit in less dogmatic terms than Le Corbusier,
3 Norberg-Schulz studied at the EIH between 1945 and 1949, where he obtained his diploma of
architecture. Giedion accepted a post as professor at the ETH in 1946. Norberg-Schulz kept his notes from
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concentrated primarily on accumulating infonnation about American industrialized
building techniques that could be put to use after the war. The research led to Giedion's
famous book Mechanization Takes Command (1948). In it, he concluded that the
separation of human thinking from feeling, which he had identified earlier in Space,
Time, and Architecture (1941), was the result of the radical transfonnation of the
everyday environment by industrialized means of production. The "outside" world had
fallen out of synch with the "inside" world of individuals.
Giedion's perception of a lack of correspondence between outer reality and inner
emotion made him view the postwar era as a time of profound crisis. He described
humanity's lack of existential direction as resulting from the same "anonymous history"
which had yielded the chaotic metropolitan centers of Europe and the Americas. This
was the history of mechanization. Giedion thought that, from the perspective of the
present, the objective of mechanization was clearly to control both man and world.
However, this goal had not become explicitly apparent to humanity until the end of the
19th century. Giedion's "anonymous" history was then a contribution to understanding
the te/os of technology since gothic times, when, he explained, a shift had occurred from
craft making to mechanized production. Giedion remained optimistic about the present
however, arguing that it was precisely within that moment of great uncertainty that a new
epoch would come about.
Norberg-Schulz would later recall that Giedion and the American intellectual
scene of the late 1940s was foundational to his own attempt to refonnulate Modem
design principles away from functionalism and towards a new and more holistic approach
Giedion '8 classes for life. They are held at the Norberg-Schulz archive in his widow's home in Oslo,
244
that would balance human emotions with the environment.4 In 1947, on the occasion of
Princeton University's bi-centennial anniversary, a conference entitled "The social basis
for architecture" was held to assess the achievements of the profession to date and
propose new research agendas.5 The interdisciplinary event was attended by some of
America's (and arguably the world's) most influential professionals, including Frank
Lloyd Wright, Gyorgy Kepes, William Wilson Wurster, Walter Gropius, Richard Neutra,
and Siegfried Giedion among over seventy others.
Judging from the participant's remarks, and from the structure of the conference
itself, it becomes quickly apparent that Giedion's call for a return to "humanist'~
principles of design that would check the advances of technology was less than an
original contribution to American architectural discourse during that period.6 At the
Norway.
4 See Norberg-Schulz's comments aoout the 1947 "The social basis for architecture" conference in his
Intentions in Architecture 9 (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1965) p 17.
S The conference proceedings were later edited and published in Thomas H. Creighton, Building for
Modern Man: A Symposium, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).
6 William D. Wilson, an architecture student present at the conference, summarized some of the themes
common to most presentations, the similarities with Giedion's thinking are readily apparent:
The most significant thing to me about the several sessions was the spontaneous recurrence at random
of several themes. These themes insistently recurred in spite of a Conference program which attempted
and largely succeeded in channeling the discussion quickly through the various aspects of planning
man's physical envirorment. Obvious though some of these recurring themes may seem, I would
attach a great deal of significance to them simply because they seemed to designate fields of general
agreement upon which men of the architectural and allied professions might meet. Here is an
incomplete list of these recurring themes:
1. Archt~ectural education must reaffirm humanistic values. The proper study of architecture is
man.
2. The machine must be humanized if its application ot architectural techniques and esthetics is
to be of valuable significance.
3. The architectural profession must make a greater effort to tell the public about the better
physical environment within their reach if they want it.
4. The profession must take a more active role in bringing about the legislation which affects
architectural planning.
5. The architect must be the coordinator of teams of specialists including not only designers and
engineers but also city planners, sociologists, and political specialists as well.
In spite of the sporadic attempts of several delegates to introduce the issue of reaction vs. progress, I
would not classify this as one of the dominant notes of the Conference. Nor was the old story of
traditional vs. modern.
See: Ibid. pp 206-207.
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Princeton conference, an entire session was devoted to the need for architecture to attend
to the needs of society and community, with participants such as Richard Bennett
suggesting that architects should come off their "abstract" academic pedestals and
operate as engaged "common men." Following the line of this argument, Henry
Churchill's presentation "Space, Time, and People" made a derisory pun on the alleged
elitism of Giedion's famous book. In another session Talbot Hamlin's "Industrialization:
Servant or Master?" studied the limitations, possibilities, and potential dangers of
technology, as well as ways to curb possibilities for disasters by attending to "human
concerns." Yet another forum stressed the importance of human perception, with Gyorgy
Kepes waxing eloquent about "The Importance of Order in Vision."
In the shadow of the conference's call for "humanism" the principal categories of
ClAM functionalism were being re-cast in tenns that now emphasized the administration
of human feeling and emotion through architectural means. The unstated objective of the
conference was to set a new theory of practice into motion. This required the
rearticulating of the very defmition of architecture. Henry Churchill argued that a new
architecture would require new scholarly investigations into the philosophical and
aesthetic foundations of architecture, which were "not barren exercises in words but a
sorely needed clarification." Norberg-Schulz's answered that call with Intentions in
Architecture (1965), which would earn him almost immediate world recognition.
Although his book came to be regarded as a seminal contribution the dawn of postmodem
architecture, his thinking emerged out of ClAM's internal redefinition and extension of
the task of modem architecture.
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ClAM VI was held in Bridgewater, Connecticut, 1947. It was the first official
meeting to be held after the war -almost a decade after the previous congress. Giedion
pleaded for a new architectural practice that would create environments attuned to what
he perceived as the necessary equilibrium between people's ways of thinking and their
modes of feeling. Giedion's program found echoes in the contributions of a young
generation of architects, including A1do van Eyck, Jacob Bakema and members of tile
English MARS Group, who shared his concern for the return to "humanistic" principles
in avant-garde practices. The resulting Declaration ofBridgewater refonnulated the aims
of ClAM as the creation of a physical environment that "will satisfy man's emotional and
material needs and stimulate his spiritual growth." The new "ethical task" of modem
architects was to insure that "technical developments are controlled by a sense of human
values,," With the publication ofLe Corbusier's famous Le Modulor (1948), ClAM's
ne\v "humanist" dictum was often reduced to an increased attention to small scale
structures, domesticity, and to "spontaneous" or vernacular architecture. Giedion himself
contributed to the hypostasis of human dimensions with his Harvard seminars on 'The
Human Scale" during the late 1950s. In these classes, Giedion catered to the general
emerging interest in non-institutionalized architecture. He often drew his examples from
"anonymous·' strJctures and primitive building traditions, which he uiscussed in tenns of
"regionalisms.,,7
During the early 1940s, architectural historians involved in ClAM like Alfred
Roth made familiarity with vernacular architecture correlative with the progressive
advancement of the modem movement. Siding with Emesto Rogers, Roth's La Nouvelle
7 See Sigfried Giedion and Eduard F. SekJer, The Human Scale: Advanced Seminar for the Master's Class.
(Cambridge. MA: Graduate School of Design, Harvard University, 1958-1960).
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Architecture (1940) contrasted the attention given to the environment by second
generation modernists working in the periphery of Europe with the inhibition of idiomatic
variances characteristic in the work of central European masters (Gropius et. al). Roth
declared the necessity to incorporate the contribution of regional cultures in order to
extend rationalist theol)' beyond the "dogmatism" of the avant-garde. Regional
traditions, he argued, could bring concreteness to the "abstract" principles of Modernism.
According to Roth, the mediation of culture in the application of rational design
principles would help modem architects attain comprehensive, empirical, and real
solutions. This, he thought, would make modern architecture be welcomed by the whole
of society, who would in tum give architects license to transfonn the world. For Roth
regional modernism had a latent educational mission. By moving beyond the closed
rhetoric of abstracted rationalism, architecture would teach the modem taste and sense of
quality "to all foons of the life of the spirit and of existence in general."8
The interest of ClAM members in regionalism had a history that went back to the
late 1930s. Even though one cannot discount the significance of Giuseppe Pagano's 1936
photographic exhibition of Italian rural architecture at the 1936 MilanTrienale in calling
the attention of modem architects to local building types and construction techniques, it is
important to note that it was Siegfried Giedion who disseminated the understanding of
regional architecture as a primitive psychological "experience." This experiential
approach to non-modern architecture, which Giedion learned from his doctor-father
8 Alfred Roth, La nouvelle architecture, presentee en 20 examples [The New Architecture, Presented in 20
Examples], (Zurich: H. Girsberger, 1940) p 2.
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Heinrich Wolfflin,9 would also become Norberg-Schulz's principal tool for analyzing
architecture, and establishing the correspondence of new and old buildings to a fonn of
primary expression he would name Genius Loci. "Contemporary art," wrote Giedion,
"was born out of an urge to go back to elemental expression. The artist plunges in the
depths of human experience, just like the psychologist."IO Giedion's architectural history
entailed the projection of his own subjectivity as evidence of an experiential affinity
between the architecture of "primeval man" and contemporary man." Aesthetic
experience liberated the historian from the canon, allowing him or her to equate modem
architecture to the masterpieces of past by using emotion-response as the basis for
equivalence. The validity of this history was contingent upon the "objectivity" of the
historian's experiences, which, in the case of Giedion, remained unquestioned behind the
veils of his self-assured tenor. I I Giedion's historicizing, insofar as it claimed to be rooted
in "primeval" experiences, was the literal)' countetpart to the design practices of the
modem avant-garde, which also attributed a subjective source to their aesthetic
expressions that was allegedly outside of bourgeois culture and its history. Norberg-
Schulz was fonned professionally within this discursive culture and shared its faith in the
unassailability of the architect's and the historian's "experience." As protocols of
architectural discourse became increasingly academicized in the late 196Os, Norberg-
Schulz remained committed to the primacy of aesthetic experience over theoretical
9 Sigfried Giedion competed his doctoral dissertation, entitledSpiitbarocker und romantischer Klassizismus
[Late Baroque and Romanticist Neoclassicism], at the University of Munich in 1922~ under the direction of
Heinrich Wolftlin.
10 Sigfried Giedion, uForeword to the Thirteenth Printing," Space, Time and Architecture: The Gro'Nth ofa
New Tradition., (Cambridge., MA: Harvard Universliy Press., 1962), p vi.
11 Giedion was so confident of the "objectivity" of his own experiences that in Space, Time, and
Architecture he dispensed with the academic protocol of a general bibliography. He simply stated that it
would "have sv/ollen the volume by some fifty extra pages without at the same time affording scientific
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discourse. This modernist framework would undergird his attempts to legitimate the
"authenticity" of his experiences, and his eventual invocation of phenomenology as proof
of their legitimacy.
It is significant that Giedion developed his experientialist historiography in the
United States, "in stimulating association with young Americans," as Charles Eliot
Norton Professor at Harvard lJniversity between 1938 and 1939, the same year that the
American art critic Clement Greenberg (1904-1994) published his influential essay
"Avant-Garde and Kitsch."12 Gideon's sense that aesthetic valu~ was the cornerstone of
architectural modernism can also be appreciated in Greenbeig's insistence that it was
painting's fOrrtlal properties, not its subject matter, which made it great. Bollt Giedion
and Greenberg believed that if one disregarded "naturalistic features" and foc~sedinstead
on the way lines, foons, and colors rJticulated a painting's canvas or a building's space,
then a series of connections could be drawn between works that did not necessarily
follow the conventions of "antiquarian" history. "History is not a compilation offacts,
but an insight into a moving process of lije,,,13 emphasized Giedion with italics. Thus~
Giedion claimed that cubist painters like Picasso, constructivist sculptors like Kasimir
Malewitsch, and functionalist architects like Walter Gropius were united by a common
attention to "adavancing and retreating planes" that were "interpenetrating, hovering,
completeness." (p viii) His own experience was for him sufficient Uscientific" proof of the objectivity of his
claims. See: Ibid.
~2 Clement Greenberg, ItAvant-Garde and Kitsch," ill The C'olleeted Essays and Criticism, Vol. 1:
Perceptions and Judgements 1939-1944, 00. lA)hn O'Brian, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1986}~ For a general overview of Greenberg's influence in the history of avartt-garde art see Paul
WtJOd, "Introduction: The Avant-Garde and ModernisITJ:' in The Cha!lenge a/the Avant-Garde, 00. Paul
Wood, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press9 1999).
13 Sjgfried Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth ofa New Tradition, (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1962). p vii.
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often transparent, without anything to fix them in realistic position.,,14 This aesthetic
made the works autonomous from political, moral, or socio-pedagogic matters. The task
of architecture was not to persuade people in those senses, but to "elevate" their aesthetic
experiences. Thus, Giedion signaled a turning point in the modernist understanding of
avant-gardism. Modem architects were no longer charged with the responsibility of
changing society, rather, they were to be custodians of aesthetic integrity. To be mired in
politics became a sign of the architect's capitulation to the mediocrity of bourgeois taste.
The principal result of Giedion's and Greenberg's turning inwards was that the aesthetic
experience of art and architecture came to be regarded as the secular equivalent of the
spiritual and emotional purification associated with religious catharsis.
It was in this sense of a purifying aesthetic that Giedion spoke of a "new
regionalism" to characterize how modern architects, operating in every corner of the
globe, should give expression to the "emotionar' and "spiritual attitude" of their
building's site. "This is not achieved by adopting the fOlms of the past," cautioned
Giedion, "but by developing a spiritual [read experielitial] bond.,,15 The continued
interest of CIj~ members in vernacular architecture during the 1950~ responded to this
aesthetic experientialisrn. Evidence of the pervasiveness of this modernist understanding
of the architectural object can be found in Eozo Paci, who in 1956, was using Gideon's
"new regionalism" nomenclatur~ to refer to the phenomenological search for an
experiential aesthetic hannony between the new and the existing, between the modem
and the traditional, the actual and the eternal, the human and the cosmic.16 Like Giedion,
14 Ibid. P 433.
15 Ibid. p xxxi.
16 Enzo Pac!~ • "Problematica dell'architettura contemporanea~" in Casabel/a Continuita, n. 209 (January-
February 1956)~ pp 41-46.
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Paci thought that this aesthetic purity characterized the emerging architecture of an
"Americanized" Gropius, of F.L. Wright, and of other minor architects from Finland, to
California, and Africa. In other words, regionalism was already being treated as the
global project of humanity, commensurate with the international claims of Modernism.
This modernist understanding of regionalism would later reappear under a
different guise in Norberg-Schulz's concept of Genius Loci (as well as in Kenneth
Frampton's Critical Regionalism). The principal difference was that, against the
directives of Giedion, Norberg-Schulz loosened the modernist ban on non-modernist
vocabularies. So long as the building conveyed the "purity" of the "original" aesthetic
experience, Norberg-Schulz accepted it as "authentic." The question was, of course,
what constituted such experiences. Norberg-Schulz would remain committed to the
modernist notion that "aesthetic purity," understood as a series of fonnal relationships,
elevated architecture above political, economic, and social problems. Yet, he believed
that by ignoring "naturalistic features" in favor of "abstract fonns" modem architects had
failed to grasp the most "original" of aesthetics, namely, the way lines, volumes, colors,
and voids were disposed in natural topographies.
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Fig: Cover of Christian Norberg-Schulz's and Gunnar Bugge's, Stav Og Laft
I Norge [Early Wooden Architecture In Norway], (Oslo: Byggekunst and
Norske Arkltekters Landsforbund, 1969).
By the mid 1960s, Norberg-Schulz had made the process of re-naturalizing the
"abstractions" of modernism into his life's calling. In 1963, when he assumed the
editorship of Byggekunst, Norway's premier journal of modem architecture, Norberg-
Schulz began introducing an inset leaf documenting traditional wooden buildings of the
Norwegian countryside in every issue, alongside the most radical works of modernism.
In this way, he introduced the Italian interest in "spontaneous architecture," as it had
been debated in the pages of Casabella Continuita, to a Scandinavian audience. In 1969,
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he collected and published all the insets in his book Byggekunst as Stav Og La!t i Norge
(Early Wooden Architecture in Norway). In the introduction, Norberg-Schulz stressed
the need for modem architects to provide an aesthetic synthesis that would restore the
gulf he saw between nature and humanity, a chasm he believed to be at the root of the
various crises of modernity:
Today it is no longer possible to tackle our problems by traditional means.
Nevertheless we believe that the present book may have a purpose beyond
the presentation of a national heritage. Perhaps it may inspire the
architects of today to solve their problems with the same respect for
nature, man and culture as the anonymous masters of the past. 17
Whereas ClAM discourse in general, and Gideon in particular, inspired Norberg-
Schulz's belief in the notion that aesthetic purity was at the source of all avant-gardism, it
is important to note how his professional training in Norway influenced his naturalizing
interpretation of that principle. As a result of his involvement in the Norwegian circles of
1950s functionalist architects, and of his exposure to their animist conception of nature,
Norberg-Schulz would slowly transfonn ClAM's aesthetic experientialism from a
discour~~ on the "purity" of unadorned volumes to one where nature stood as the standard
"primeval" fonn to which all modem architecture should aspire.
17 Christian Norberg-Schulz and Gunnar Bugge, Stav Og Laft i Norge [Early Wooden Architecture in
Norway], (Oslo: Byggekunst and Norske Arkitekters Landsforbund, 1969) p 5. Norberg -Schulz assembled
the documents included in this volume between 1963 and 1969. with the help of his friend the architect
Gunnar Bugge, and students from the university of Trondheim. It is important to note, that this interest in
vernacular architecture in a sense continued the long series of attempts to resolve the ongoing crisis of
rationalism, now seen as too "abstract" by turning to regional building traditions. While teaching as a
visiting critic at Yale in 1965, Norberg-Schulz visited Paul Rudolfsky·s uArchitecture Without i'Jchitectsn
exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. In addition 9 during the 19605 Giedion insisted that
the coming of a new humanist era in architecture would have to involve "continuity" with history and
tradition. "Both above and below th~ surface of this century," argued Giedion, "there is a new demand for
continuity. It has again become apparent that human life is not limited to the period of a 8ingie life -span. n
See Siegfried Giedion, Constancy, Change, and Architecture, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1961),
p7.
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A. CIAM-PAGON:from emotion to nature and language.
Fig: Arne Korsmo and his wife Grete at Bygd"y In 1951. From Christian
Norberg-Schulz, Arne Korsmo, (Oslo: Unlversltetsforlaget, distributed by
Oxford University Press, 1986),p 31.
At the 1947 Bridgewater meeting, changes were made to the statutes to allow
ClAM to expand as a federation of independent groups. Giedion took an active part in the
promotion of new national groups. He called upon Norberg-Schulz, his ETH student now
living back in his native Oslo, to find a suitable head for a Norwegian chapter of ClAM.
In 1950, they agreed on Arne Korsmo, Norway's leading functionalist architect, who
readily accepted the invitation. Although Korsmo' s international style villas had earned
him national recognition in the 1930s, he found himself as somewhat of an outcast after
World War II. During the 1950s, Norwegian society was bent on rediscovering (or
inventing) its traditional nationalist myths, and the internationalist spirit of Korsmo 's
work kept him from securing many institutional commissions. Korsmo welcomed
Giedion's invitation to direct the Norwegian chapter of ClAM as an opportunity to regain
a foothold in the profession. Under his leadership, Norberg-Schulz joined Sverre Fehn,
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Erik Rolfsen, P .A.M. Mellbye, Geir Grung, Odd 0stbye, Hakon Mjelva and Robert
Esdaile to form PAGON (Progressive Arkitekters Gruppe Oslo Norge ).18 With the
members ofPAGON, Norberg-Schulz began drafting speculative proposals for new
Norwegian towns, civic centers, residential towers, and office buildings. Beginning in
1951, the group presented their projects to CIAM meetings.
Fig: Dammann House, Oslo, 1930, designed by Arne Korsmo. Photo by
Norberg-Schulz. From Christian Norberg-SChulz, Arne Korsmo, (Oslo:
Unlversltetsforlaget, distributed by Oxford University Press, 1986), p 10.
18 Christian Norberg-Schulz, Arne Korsmo, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, distributed by Oxford University
Press, 1986) p 70.
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Fig: Stenersen House, Oslo, 1937-39, designed by Arne Korsmo. Photo by
Norberg-SChulz. From Christian Norberg-SChulz, Arne Korsmo, (Oslo:
Unlversltetsforlaget, distributed by Oxford University Press, 1986), p 10.
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Fig: PAGON project for "A New Center for Several SUburbs" presented at
ClAM VIII. From ClAM 8, The Heart of the City: Towards a Humanization of
Urban Life, ed. J. Tyrwhltt, J.L. Sert, E.N. Rogers, (New York: Pellegrini and
Cudahy, 1952), p 119.
With the foundation of PAGON, Norberg-Schulz launched his short-lived but
productive career as an architect, the development of which reflects his evolution from
ClAM's ideology of formal austerity as an index of aesthetic integrity, to his more
personal belief that only the formal mimesis of nature could yield "authentic" aesthetic
experiences. Arne Korsmo, with whom Norberg-Schulz established a common business
practice in 1951, was instrumental in shepherding the intellectual development of his
young colleague. According to Norberg-Schulz, Korsmo's work was defined by the
search for an "authentic" life, which originated in nature and brought humans together
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into productive dialogues. It was a life understood in opposition to the "isolation"
produced, in the eyes of Korsmo, by modem society.19 Korsmo believed the architect's
task to be that of providing working symbols tllat, through use, would help people fIX
themselves existentially in the world:
Each object, each house becomes not only an article of use, but a symbol,
a compelling symbol with which man identifies through use. In the world
of objects, man seeks, as in a mirror, an ima~e of his ability to choose and
to express himself, a proof of his existence.2
Norberg-Schulz was drawn in particular to Korsmo's treatment of architecture
and nature as symbolic elements through which one could achieve an existential foothold
in the world. Korsmo's animist rhetoric was drawn from the discourse of national
romanticism prevalent in Norway at the time. In accordance to Giedion's theories,
Korsmo translated his love of Norwegian nature and tradition into a search for aesthetic
experiences of "Norwegianness" common to modern and traditional environments.
Norberg-Schulz would later insist that Korsmo "did not conceive of creating as repeating
familiar forms, but rather as discovering ever-new expressions for the thing itself. In this
sense he was not only modem but alive in the true sense.,,21
19 Ibid. P 78.
20 Arne Korsmo as quoted in Ibid. p 30.
21 Ibid. P 26.
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Fig: Arne Korsmo's "Home-Erector-Set." From Christian Norberg-Schulz,
Arne Korsmo, (Oslo: Unlversltetsforlaget, distributed by Oxford University
Press, 1986), p 72.
With so much emphasis on making architecture "deliver" specific subjective
experiences, such as those of "Norwegianess," Korsmo and Norberg-Schulz were
concerned that their architecture would become a formal code, and thus fall into the same
trap as functionalism. The pressing design question was clear: could they achieve a
consistent aesthetic experience without proscribing a fixed vocabulary to architecture?
Each designer had different answers to this question. Korsmo argued that the integrity of
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architectural experience was not so much in the shape of the building but rather in how
people manipulated its parts. Norberg-Schulz maintained that nature was the original
source code for all possible human experiences of the environment. Nature was in that
sense an inexhaustible wellspring of fonnal combinations, different at every location.
The young Norberg-Schulz believed that if his buildings allowed people to visually
apprehend the surrounding topography, they would be "taking in" the most original and
pure aesthetic experience.
Korsmo suggested the "erector-set method" where the architect provided the
client with a number of moveable architectural "pieces," such as walls and furniture, and
the user assembled and erected them according to his or her specific needs. 22 For
Korsmo, the mutability of architecture and furniture enabled the home to be and ever-
changing result of tluffian life and interaction. A home, argued Korsmo, was a living
organism that connected families to nature by allowing them to participate in the
changing processes of the environment. People reshaped their house as the climate
changed, lowering a shade here to kept the sun out, and opening a window there to let the
breeze in. Korsmo's "erector-set" method capitalized on these simple actions, ritualizing
and mythologizing them as "authentic" experiences of nature. As a professor at the
22 Korsmo's "erector-setn methcxi was contemporaneous with a number of other attempts by ClAM
architects to create a "participatory" architecture. The references in Korsmo's explanatory diagram for the
"erector-set" method suggest that he was attempting to frame his work in relation to the nlore established
members of ClAM, such as Le Corbusier, Mies, and Rogers. Korsmo had the opportunity to discuss his
views with these figures in 1949 at ClAM VII. He had more extensive contacts with Rogers, with whom
he participated in the Comnlittee on Architectural and Urbanism Education. See the "Rapport de la rrrme
Comission: 'Reforme de l'enseignement de r Architecture et de I'Urbanismeu in Documents: 7 ClAM,
Bergamo, 1949, (Nendeln: Kraus Reprint, 1979), unpaginated. Korsmo's used the BBPR's Monument to
the Deceased in German Concentration Camps (Milan, 1946) in line 3, far right, of the "Erector-set-
methcx:l" diagrams. See Christian Norberg-Schulz, Arne Korsmo, (Os)o: Universitetsforlaget, distributed by
Oxford University Press, 1986) p 72.
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National College of Arts and Crafts in Oslo, Korsmo schooled his students in his vitalist
aesthetics:
The essential purpose of the summer course was to incorporate into the
teaching the mobility and sense of space that is innate in all people and
which originates from the freedom embodied in nature. Itwas a matter of
consciously developing the possibilities inherent in the free unfolding of
the rhythmic values of form, colour and materials. That freedom is
rhythmic simply means that it is regular and constructive without loosing
the immediate, vital impulse.23
Fig: Arne Korsmo's and Christian Norberg-SChulz's "erector-set" houses In
Oslo, 1952,as they appeared on the cover of Byggekunst In 1955.
23 My italics. Arne Korsmo as quoted in Christian Norberg-Schulz, Arne Korsmo, (Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget, distributed by Oxford University Press, 1986) p 80.
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In 1952, Korsmo and Norberg-Schulz tested the "erector-set" method in the
design of their own residences on the outskirts of Oslo, next to a nature preserve on
"etakollen hill. They built three adjacent prefabricated steel-framed houses arranged
linearly, as "variations on a common theme." A core of services lined the street defming
a wall behind v/hich three double height living spaces opened towards a back garden.
The houses were reminiscent of Charles and Ray Eames's Case study house in Los
Angeles, which Korsmo had visited in 1949 while on a Fulbright scholarship in the
United States. Norberg-Schulz stressed that the principai concept driving the design was
to create a home where the family could work in harmony with an immediate experience
of nature.
The idea is closely bound up with Korsmo's conception of hwnan life. For
him the purpose of work was not simply to make a living; work was the
very expression of living, seeing, recognizing, and choosing. In the house
at Vettakollen this was manifested in an interplay between the natural
surroundings and the life going on within the house, with people and with
thingS.24
During his stay in North America, Korsmo had studied visual perception of fonn
and color with Gyorgy Kepes and Josef Albers at MIT, later mixing their lessons with his
own beliefs in the redemptive power of nature. Korsmo encouraged his young partner to
follow his footsteps and to travel to the United States to develop his understandi.'lg of
architectural fonn. In 1951, Norberg-Schulz joined Korsmo as member of the faculty of
the National College of Arts and Crafts in Oslo, where he worked thro ugh the theoretical
principles of Korsmo's ideas on nature and symbolic fonn in his cla~ses on the
"Principles of Architectural Form."
24 Ibid. P 74.
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Norberg-Schulz began to distance himself from Korsmo as he expanded his
intellectual horizons during a stay at Harvard University in 1952, in the capacity of
Fulbright Scholar. In the United States, Norberg-Schulz widened the theoretical
framework through which he had previousiy examined architectural fonn to include the
philosophical and psychological analysis of percepion. Although he was to have taken
courses at Harvard, Norberg-Schulz9 disillusioned by the fact that Walter Gropius~s
classes were taught by his assistants, spent most of his time in Widener library pursuing
independent research. Korsmo's lessons on architectural fonn as synthesizing symbols,
and the work of Georgy Kepes on visual perception, led him to the work of pragmatist
philosopher Charles W. Morris on the Foundations to the Theory ofSigns (1938), to
Ludwig Wittgenstein's positivist study of logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(1922), and to Jean Piaget's Gestalt perceptual psychology in The Child's Conception of
the World (1929).
This research would comprise the philosophical and intellectual support for his
first book entitled Intentions in Architecture (1965). Although phenomenology is notably
absent from this work, the book (perhaps because of its Positivist and Pragmatist
unde:rpinnings) introduced many themes which would later become central to Norberg-
Schulz's appropriation of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Both in Norberg-Schulz's early
and late writings, one finds a similar emphasis on the emotional relationships established
by individuals with their reality, and on language as the primal "opening" between
humans and world. Because of his background as a teacher of architectural fonn,
Norberg-Schulz would always remain interested in a specifically visual language.
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Norberg-Schulz's work was initially framed, by a dialogue (embodied in the
figure of Arne Korsmo) between modernist architectural thinking and the pressures of
post-war Norwegian national romanticism. There was on the one hand Siegfried
Giedion's call to bring human emotion and thought into balance with the environment.
On the other hand, there was the local Norwegian emphasis on nature as a source of
mystery and life. He found a happy medium between these two directions in Arne
Korsmo's holistic approach to design as a synthesis of human life and natumllife.
Norberg-Schulz's initial theoretical fonnulations would be molded by these sources.
They provided him with the basic framework out of which to later develop his more
phenornenological writings. Norberg-Schulz's development as an architect, was a key
factor in this turn towards phenomenology. In his projects one can discern the evolution
of his thinking, away from the principles of ClAM and towards a type of fannal
contextualism which would characterize his later pronouncements about the visual nature
of architectural language.
II. Place: Grounding Synthesis of Humanity and Environment
A. Norberg-Schulz's architecture: Symbolization of environment
Although the house Norberg-Schulz built for himself in Vetakollen~ Oslo, was
celebrated as an example of Korsmo's "erector-set" method, a closer analysis makes it
clear that the buildi ng represented Norberg-Schulz's attempt to move beyond the
teachings of his more experienced business partner. In Norberg-Schulz's interior, there
was no sign of the integrated moving furniture so central to Korsmo's design theory. The
young Norberg-Schulz designed a more conventional interior, where connections to
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nature were principally visual. Double story windows framed views from the living room
and bedrooms of the ravine in the back yard.
Fig: Interior of Arne Korsmo's house In Vetakollen, Oslo, 1952. Note the
cushions as "moveable furniture." Photo by Norberg-SChulz. From
Christian Norberg-Schulz, Arne Korsmo, (Oslo: Unlversltelsforlaget,
distributed by Oxford University Press, 1986).
Fig: Interior of Norberg-SChulz's house In Vetakollen, Oslo, 1952. From
Norberg-SChulz's professional portfolio Egne Arbelder I, 1947-1956,
(manuscript, c1962).
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Fig: Exterior of Norberg-Schulz's house In Vetakollen, Oslo, 1952. From
Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Egne Arbelder I, 1947-1956,
(manuscript, c1962).
Fig: Interior of Norberg-Schulz's house In Vetakollen, Oslo, 1952. From
Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Egne Arbeider I, 1947-1956,
(manuscript, c1962).
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Fig: Norberg-SChulz's hand-drawn upper and lower plans for his house In
Vetakollen, Oslo, 1952. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Egne
Arbe/der I, 1947-1956,(manuscript, c1962).
In the Eget Hus, as Norberg-Schulz called his residence, he began moving on
from Korsmo to emulate the work of the modem masters, whose disciplinary status was
by then being contested and redefined. His house reflected his academic interest in the
teaching of form, and it played up the formal possibilities of prefabricated steel
construction in the manner of Walter Gropius,25 and Charles and Ray Eames's case study
house in California.i" Upon returning from Massachusetts in 1953, with construction on
his house nearly complete, he used the structure to test his studies on color theory and
25 One of Walter Gropius's principal achievements at the Bauhaus was the introduction of unit construction
as a simple method for combining standardized units into functionally complex wholes.
26 Arne Korsmo visited the Eames's case study house in 1949, while traveling as a Fulbright scholar in the
United States. Norberg Schulz credited the Eames as an influence in the design of the Planetveien houses
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gestalt perception. He painted the central beam and column of his living room a primary
red, and installed blue curtains in the mezzanine. Against the white walls, the use of
primary colors was evocative of the Hungarian architect Marcel Breuer's (1902-1981)
famous designs. 27
Fig: Exterior of 0hrn family House, Stabekk (1959). Designed by Norberg-
Schulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne
Arbeiderll, 1956-(manuscrlpt, c 1962).
in Vetakollen, Oslo, in Christian Norberg-Schulz, Arne Korsmo, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, distributed by
Oxford University Press, 1986), p 68.
27 Marcel Breuer studied with Gropius at the Bauhaus and began teaching there in 1925 as head of the
carpentry workshop. At the Bauhaus, he was influenced by the DutchDeStijl architect Theo Van Doesburg
whose work was characterized by the use of discrete volumes painted in primary colors. Breuer joined
Gropius as professor at Harvard in 1937, where he helped train the third generation of modem architects.
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Fig: Interior of 0hrn family House, Stabekk (1959). Designed by Norberg-
Schulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne
Arbe/der II, 1956- (manuscript, c 1962).
Fig: Plans for 0hrn family House, Stabekk (1959). Designed by Norberg-
SChulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne
Arbe/der II, 1956- (manuscript, c 1962).
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Fig: Mles van der Rohe, Project for a three-court house. From Kenneth
Frampton, Studies In Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction In
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press,
1995) PAGE NUMBER.
Norberg-Schulz took each new private residential commission as an opportunity
to study the work of yet another modem master, in a sense situating himself as the heir to
the whole of the modem legacy. In the 0hrn family House in Stabekk (1959), for
instance, Norberg-Schulz explored Mies van der Rohe's trademark spatiality. The walls
and roof are treated as independent planes that frame a central service core and open the
main living space towards a garden. Although the allusions to the materiality of Mies's
project for a brick country house (1923) are clear, Norberg-Schulz shied away from its
centrifugal spatial arrangement, producing a rather compact and confined series of spaces
by comparison.
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Fig: Exterior view of Villa Weidemann,Oslo (1959).Designed by Norberg-
Schulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne
Arbeider II. 1956-, (manuscript, c 1962).
Fig: Elevation and Section of Villa Weidemann,Oslo (1959). Designed by
Norberg-Schulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2,
Egne Arbeider II. 1956-, (manuscript, c 1962).
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Fig: Interior view of Villa Weidemann, Oslo (1959). Designed by Norberg-
SChulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne
Arbelder II, 1956-, (manuscript, c 1962).
The angular walls and cantilevered overhangs of Norberg-Schulz's Villa
Weidemann (Olso, 1959), which is set on a steep slope, are reminiscent of Frank Uoyd
Wright's work of the late 1940s. Interest in Wright's work had witnessed a resurgence in
the late 1950s, especially through the pages of Casabella Continuita, where Enzo Paci
and Emesto N. Rogers praised Wright's work as "spazio vissuto" (lived space).28 At the
1947 Princeton conference, Wright was emphatically calling for an architecture in
opposition to technology as the promise of a new agrarian society, more in line with
Thomas Jefferson's 18th century views of the United States.29 As Manfredo Tafuri later
commented, Wright's "excessive complication of geometrical forms" expressed his
desire to bring about a new age of humanism, by sublimating both geometry and
28 See for instance Enzo Paci's "Wright e 10 spazio vissuto," in Casabella Continuita, n. 227 (May 1959),
ff 8-10.
"No! -no assembly-line is the answer either for him, for you, or for me (and that means for our country)
in education, building or living. Decentralization of our American cities and intelligent utilization of our
own ground, making natural resources available to him for subsistence, is his road, yours and mine, to any
proper future as a democracy for which we may reasonably hope. Essentially, we are a mob-ocracy now.
Our present extreme centralization is a bid to slavery -all down the line, a bid by a shortsighted, all too
plutocratic industrialism in control of government." See Frank Lloyd Wright, "Education, Individualism,
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technology in playful symbolism. ''To play with geometry and techniques means
indicating the possibility of transcending the civilization of labor: This presents itself as
prophesy of a post-technological civilization.,,3o As Norberg-Schulz matured he became
more convinced of the need for architecture to serve as an anticipatory realm where
people could get an experiential foretaste of that promise of a world beyond the
contradictions of modernity. For Norberg-Schulz modem alienation was basically the
result of humanity's progressive distancing from pure aesthetic experiences of nature. If
the "purism" of the modem avant-garde' s aesthetics had dissociated it from nature,
Norberg-Schulz thought that true avant-gardism would be to elevate modem aesthetics to
the standard or nature, which was, he believed, the ultimate benchmark of all
civilizations.
Fig: Project for a hotel In Holmenkollen, Oslo (1960). Designed by
Norberg-Schulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2,
Egne Arbelder II, 1956-,(manuscript, c. 1962)
Following the ideological underpinnings of Wright's naturalism, Norberg-
Schulz's architecture emulated the salient features of the landscape surrounding it. His
1960 project for a hotel in Holmenkollen, again a hill site in the outskirts of Oslo, took
the concept previously developed for the Villa Weidemann and developed it as a series of
and Architecture," in Building/or Modern Man: A Symposium, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1949), p 189.
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repetitive, prefabricated units. The longitudinal sections reveal that the flanking walls are
fmished at an angle not for structural reasons, but to imitate the slope of the site, and to
make symbolic reference to the landscape which surrounds the building. By the early
1960s it was clear just how far Norberg-Schulz had moved from Korsmo's theory of
design as a vitalist fusion of life processes and architectural elements. For Norberg-
Schulz, design was the process of thematizing the essential fonnal characteristics of the
local topography aJld translating them into an equivalent set of fonnal relationships
within the architectural composition. Norberg-Schulz theorized this belief in his book
Intentions in Architecture, where he applied Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889-1951)
meditations on language to a discussion of how architecture could symbolize nature
through "structural similarity":
Language is a symbol-system. A symbol system has to be constructed in
such a way that it easily adapts itself to regions of the object world. This
adaptation is possible by means of a common logical fonn.
'Symbolization' therefore means a representation of a state of affairs in
another medium by means of structural simi!arity.31
Norberg-Schulz's use of Wittgenstein, whom he read while at Harvard in the
early 19505, bespoke his nzodernist understanding of modem aesthetics. As historian
Peter Galison has noted, Wittgenstein's Viennese school of logical positivism was
intimately related to the development of the Bauhaus's theories of modem design. 32
Hannes Meyer invited Rudolph Carnap, and other positivists to lecture on logic at the
Bauhaus. Galison makes the clainl that both architects and philosophers were privy to a
common aesthetics of purity based on the myth of an "original" and Utransparent" logic
30 Manfre-rlo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Modern Architecture, trans. Robert Erich Wolf, (New York:
Harry N. Abrams Inc, 1979), p 352.
31 Christian Norberg-Schulz, Intentions in Architecture. (Cambridge. MA: The MJ.T. Press. 1965), p 57.
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of construction. Logicians tried to restrict truth to sentential structure, ridding philosophy
of "superfluous" metaphysical verbiage. In like fashion, Bauhaus architects tried to
approximate the "truth" of aesthetic expression by ridding their buildings of
ornamentation.
Wittgenstein's meditations on language in his book Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1922) were pivotal for Norberg-Schulz's theorization of nature as the
ultimate ground of any architectural expression. Wittgenstein argued that only sentences
that could be empirically verified could convey meaning. In order to say something, a
proposition had to be a "picture of reality w" The simple signs making up a sentence had
to correspond to the basic elements of reality, or otherwise, the proposition was
nonsensical. Because of its strict correlation with reality, argued Wittgenstein, every
proposition had a single and defmitive meaning, which could be ascertained through
proper analysis (thus the tenn analytic phIlosophy). The basic correlative of
W3ttgenstein's thought was that there had to be common essence to language, to
propositions, and to thought, which had to be the a priori order of the world.
Wittgenstein described this essence as a common '4logical form." This idea fascinated
Norberg-Schulz, who began speculating that the fundamental problem of modem
architecture was that it had lost touch with "reality." To make modern architecture
meaningful, thou~ht Norberg-Schulz, architects would have to ground their expressions
in the "common essence" relating all languages and reality .. The problem, as Wittgenstein
made clear, was that the essential logical fonn common to language and reality could not
itself be represented. Norberg-Schulz acknowledged this fact, speaking of this primary
32 Peter Galison, "AutbaulBauhaus: Logical Positivism and Architectural Moderism," in Critical Inquiry, n.
4. (1990), pp 709-752.
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logical form as a "quasi-object," or a "non-descriptive symbol-system" that preceded all
knowledge of the world:
The perceptions of daily life are generally intennediate to the objects and
quasi-objects mediated by the specialized symbol-systems. The non-
descriptive symbol-systems, therefore, do not give us knowledge, but
experiences and directions for our conduct .. To this purpose they employ
synthetical signs which mediate reality in its phenomenal totality. 33
In sum, Norberg-Schulz identified Wittgenstein's essential10gical fonn with
aesthetic experience. Although at the time of Intentions in Architecture Norberg-Schulz,
in line with analytic philosophy, believed that immediate experience could not convey
meaning in itself, by the time his famous Genius Loci appeared in 1978, he was claiming
that knowledge manifested itself immediately meaningful aesthetic experiences to the
subject. Genius Loci introduced a broad audience to Norberg-Schulz's "Spirit of Place 4 '
which posited that natural places self-manifested through the architectural work of
humanity. Norberg-Schulz's "Spirit" owed much to Heidegger's understanding of the
artist as a kind of instrument of being's self-disclosure. As early as 1936 Heidegger had
argued that should O()t be understood as a mimetic, representational, or symbolizing
process. 'Creativity,' he argued, should not be defined in the tenn s of productivist
metaphysics as "producing" and object. Instead, it should be regarded in ontological
terms as the proces~ of "lettingY' an entity become manifest. 34 Norberg-Schulz would
eventually share Heidegger's ontological understanding of art"s creative dimension as the
process of Gestalt-grounding, or as the clearing and limiting which meets the surge of the
Hevent of presencing'" and "lets" entities become entities as such. But, in the 1960s,
33 Christian Norberg-Schulz, Intentions in Architecture, (Cambridge, MA: The ?vt.I.T. Press, 1965). p 64
14 See Martin Heidegger, Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, (Winter Semester, 1936/37)~ 00. Bernd
IIelmbUcheL in Gesamtausgabe. (Frankfurt am ~1ain: Vittorio Klostermann. 1985) p43. See pp 16Q..161 of
the same book for the English translation.
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Norberg-Schulz still conceived of the "language of architecture" as involving the
architect's willful imposition of form unto matter in familiar and therefore
understandable shapes. More importantly, he still considered immediacy in experience to
be a "naturalistic" epistemological model.
Fig: Norberg-Schulz summer house, Porto Ercole (1962). Designed by
Norberg-Schulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne
Arbelder II, 1956-(manuscript, cl962).
Fig: Sun terrace of Norberg-Schulz summer house, Porto Ercole (1962).
Designed by Norberg-Schulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional
portfolio Vol. 2, Egne Arbeider II, 1956-(manuscript, cl962).
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Fig: Entrance of Norberg-Schulz summer house, Porto Ercole (1962).
Designed by Norberg-Schulz. From Norberg-SChulz's professional
portfolio Vol. 2, Egne Arbelder II, 1956-(manuscript, c1962).
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Fig: Living room of Norberg-Schulz summer house, Porto Ercole (1962).
Designed by Norberg-SChulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional
portfolio Vol. 2, Egne Arbelder II, 1956-(manuscript, c1962).
Fig: Formal mimesis: View of Norberg-SChulz summer house
(foreground), and 16th century Spanish fortress In the background. From
Norberg-SChulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne Arbelder II, 1956-
(manuscript, c1962).
Norberg-Schulz's pre-phenomenological understanding of architecture's
"symbolizing task" is most clearly apparent in the summer house he built in 1962 for his
family in Porto Ercole, a small fortified seaport town in southern Tuscany. The house is
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sited atop a hill that extends into the Mediterranean and flanks a small bay with a beach.
Across the bay, the hill is mirrored by another mount on top of which one can discern the
battlements of a sixteenth century Spanish fortress. Norberg-Schulz took the inclined
planes of that structure to symbolize the mountainous geography upon which it stood.
Following his theory of symbolization as "structural similarity" he designed a two-story
house with a heavy masonry base tIle surfaces of which were appropriately inclined to
resemble the fortress sittin g across the bay. He hid the rooms inside de base, leaving the
second story as a diaphanous space capped by a canopy -like concrete slab under which
was the main living room and kitchen. Short of producing a literal copy, Norberg-Schulz
responded "mimetically" to the site. He allegedly regarded the confusion of vacationing
bathers who walked up the hill in search of the Spanish fortress only to find Norberg-
Schulz's house, as evidence of the design's suc<:ess. 35
Although Norberg-Schulz is thought to have hdi scovered" the more
phenomenological notion of the "Spirit of Place" in 1976, he arrived at the idea through a
long a tortuous struggle with the broade( notion "environment" and its relationship to
building form. Prior to understanding "place" as a Heideggerian "world" confronting
humans, he regarded it in his writings as an environment to be technically mastered
through the "building task," and symbolized through building fonn. His own buildings
were a product of the attempt to symbolize the environment through the mimesis of
abstracted fOnTIs. This early dual interpretation of environment, as something to be both
dqrninated and expressed, would facilitate the turn towards his later descriptions of
.'5 Anna Maria Norberg-Schulz. conversation with the author. Oclarer 2000.
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"place" as a world which "needs" humanity's work in order to realize the "call" of its
Spirit.
Whereas in his early theoretical work Norberg-Schulz had subsumed place under
the notion of "building task," as something to be "dominated" or "mastered" through
technological means, his practice as an architect enabled him to consider place as a more
autonomous aspect of the Uarchitectural totality."
Norberg-Schulz's struggle with the relationship of place to building is illustrated
in an exceptional, one page meditation in which he attempted to clarify his ideas. On
upper left hand side of the page Norberg-Schulz described the "architectural totality" by
drawing a square diagram with diagonals, and labeling each corner "Place", "l-ask",
"Fonn", ''Technique.'' This was a departure from his description of architecture in
Intentions in Architecture, where he had described the architectural totality as "Task,"
"Form," and "Technique." In short, the word "place" had not yet made its appearance as
an independent tenn. At the time of Intentions, task, fonn and technique were expressions
of "Semantics," a general symbolic system "which manifests the most basic functional,
social, and cultural structures of an epoch. ,,36 However, by 1966, after his experience of
building in Italy, Norberg-Schulz substituted "semantics" with "place" to denote the
study of how a particular location could signify meaning.
Norberg-Schulz made another important concept explicit in this manuscript. He
viewed the "terrain" as a sentence made up of simple signs, which he identified with
discrete topographic features, and was interested in "special research in syntax in relation
to the types of terrain." Thinking in the manner of a logical posit ivist, Norberg -Schulz
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believed that the topography of the landscape literally "spoke," and that through proper
analysis one could understand the meaning of its proposition. For Norberg -Schulz,
architecture was the best suited method for the exegesis of the meaning of the terrain,
because it was a human creation like language. But in order to convey meaning,
architecture had to express a "picture of reality," to use Wittgenstein's tenninology, with
each of its elements corresponding precisely to each discrete feature of the terrain. The
underlying claim of Norberg-Schulz's theory "'as that there was an a-priori essential
Ulogical fonn" common to reality, natural terrains, architecture, language, and thought.
J6 Christian Nor~rg-Schulz.Intentions in J4rchitecture. (Calnbridge. MA: The M.I.T. Press. 1965). P 175.
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FIg: Below II the Translation of Norberg-SChulz'~manuscript LIIndslcllp 0l1l1enne...vetIc;
mitt FortIIIk [Land8cape and the Work of MaIn; My Suggeatlon]37
MI1 is not wrong to use such a diagram:
Place
Form
Task
Technique
The question is if one should not divide the influence of the pla:8 over the other three dimensions.
The pla::e decide!. the building task. The building task comes in like (unity. The pla:e can have
influence on the form and on the technical instruments one uses (relationship to the ground. etc.). But
what we are fighting with is to present a diagram that describes the architectonic unity. It is clear that
the task..form and technique are three sides of that, but what about the place? It is probably better to
let the place "drown" in the same way~ the client I&drowns" (he goes under the dimension of "task'').
and to talk about the relationship of the building..tasl': to the giYefl conditions (which do not let
themselves be separated), the level of the form depends on the envirooment (operK:lose form), and
together with technicai mastering of tM given en'JirC1meot. If the place should come in ~ a separate
main dimension e-..~n It should be diffeertiated. This IS not easy because a pla:a hE various
combinations of chara=teristics which are both practical formal and technical. But as we have divided
the whole in three main dimensions that correspond with this it is illuminating that the terrain ha s to be
then divided cax>rding to this. The theme landscape and human..work could also bee~ed in
three main and different ways. It is illuminating that in TroncIleim they have wanted to start with the
formal. There is also a spsciaJ research in syntax in relation to the~ of terrain. For nr .:va can
hold on to the
even though the
can be used in special cases.
[written vertically on the right margin']
The decisive is that when we describe the place we do not describe a portion of the architectural unity
but something thai comes out of it.
We can describe building formaly technically in terms of task, but not in terms of place ..
37 Christian Norberg-Schulz's original pencil manuscript is written in Norwegian and bears the title.
Landskap og Menneskesverk; mitt Fors(Jk [Landscape and the Work of Man; My Suggestion]. it was
translated verbally by Anna Maria Norberg-Schulz on October 4. 2000, and transcribed by me. I have
dated the manuscript as prior to 1966 under the assumption that it was written in preparation for Norberg-
Schulz's Christian Norberg-Schulz. "II Paesaggio e L'Opera delrUomo (The Landscape is the Work of
Man):' in Edilizia Moderna. n. 87-88 ( 1966), pp 63-70.
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The published version of this meditation, entitled "II paesaggio e I'opera
deU'uomo" (1966) did not mention the word place. Instead, Norberg-Schulz referred to it
as "landscape" and discussed its relationship to architecture in fonnal tenns. The task of
architecture was to "interpret" the natural environment into understandable and therefore
meaningful fonns. The landscape itself, although suggestive of order, did not possess a
clear, continuous structure, partly because its immensity could not be grasped in
perception. Norberg-Schulz applied the categories of fonnal analysis developed in
Intentions in Architecture to the landscape, referring to the its udiffuse" order as
"topological," that is, as constituted by relationships of proximity, similarity, and
continuity. The task of "the work of man" was to analyze this "loose" order and convey
its "meaningful" structure, a process which, to follow Norberg-Schulz, required
establishing "difference." Therefore, because the landscape was diffuse, architecture
should be concrete. Architecture became meaningful as it entered into an oppositional
relationship with the fonns of the landscape. The paradox was, argued Norberg -Schulz,
!ha! by establishing its difference, architecture was actually inserting itself into a
meaningful order greater than itself. The positivist idea of a common "logical fonn" to
both architecture and terrain would be foundational to Norberg-Schulz's later
phenomenological phase, when he would call for a meaningful opposition of Humans and
World, and would define architecture a~ a "setting into work" of the Place's Spirit in
order to l11idwife the self-realization of that Spirit.
Thus Norberg-Schulz bega.-, to explore the idea of "meaning" as nol entirely
constructed by the subject, but rather arising from the confrontation of subject and object.
Thus he found himself pressed against the problem of culture. as the ever-changing
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system of meaningful relationships between people and their object worlds. It was not
tenable to consider this new category of place as a static category like the others,
especially in light of the ongoing debate at the heart of ClAM about how to reconstruct
European urban centers, and how to deal with their transfonnation. What was a place,
then, if it was always changing? This was a real conceptual difficulty for Norberg-Schulz
who, we must recall, was a professor of building fonn, accustomed to theories of
perception premised on the stability of the object to be perceived.
B. Technology, Mobility, and Norberg-Schulz's early formulations
of Genius Loci
The small number of Norberg-Schulz's commissions between 1950 and 1956
contrasted sharply with his ambitions. With the members of PAGON he produced master
plans for new urban centers across Norway, plans for the renewal ofOs)o's central
districts, high-rise office towers. concert halls, and town halls. To Norberg-Schulz's
frustration, none of these projects came to fruition. Finally, in }958, he won the first
prize for the new Norwegian Exhibition Hall Competition to be built in Oslo. even
though he shared the prize with another local architect by the name of Hovig. For a brief
time Norberg-Schulz thought his career was about to take off, as his name appeared in the
local professional and popular press as the young promise of Norwegian architecture.
The competition committee asked that both winners work out a final sol ution together,
and Norberg-Schulz soon saw his design compromised, and his voice drowned in
committee meetings. The jump in architectural scale involved a loosening of direct
personal control over the design that Norberg-Schulz found difficult to tolerate. The
building, as fina~:y constructe(t, bore no resemblance to the competition ent!)'. Norberg-
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Schulz's expressionistic roof hanging from two long -span arches was replaced with a flat
slab and a grid of columns. The experience left him disillusioned with the profession.
Fig: Elevations of Norberg-SChulz's winning competition entry for the
Norwegian Exhibition Hall Competition, Oslo, 1958. From Norberg-Schulz's
professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne Arbeider II, 1956- (manuscript, c1962).
Fig: Norberg-SChulz's structural stUdy model for the Norwegian Exhibition
Hall Competition, Oslo, 1958. From Norberg-SChulz's professional portfolio
Vol. 2, Egne Arbeider II, 1956- (manuscript, c1962).
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Fig: Ground level plan of Norberg-Schulz's winning competition entry for
the Norwegian Exhibition Hall Competition, Oslo, 1958. From Norberg-
Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne Arbelder II, 1956- (manuscript,
c1962).
Norberg-Schulz moved to Rome in 1960 to try to rebuild his practice. He
befriended Prof. L'Orange, director of the recently founded Norwegian Academy in
Rome, who had raised sufficient funds to give his institution a building. Norberg-Schulz
secured the commission, and quickly drafted plans that L'Orange accepted. But
L'Orange's students mounted a front of opposition against Norberg-Schulz, who they
regarded as too un-scholarly and Modem (i.e. against history, which was their lifeblood).
Norberg-Schulz, who was then finishing the manuscript to Intentions in Architecture
resisted the accusations, and began studying the history of Baroque Architecture. In spite
of his efforts, L' Orange yielded to the pressures of his students and opted for purchasing
an existing structure. The decision SPelled the end of Norberg-Schulz's career as an
architect, and he would always recall it as "a stab in the back." Disillusioned, Norberg-
Schulz turned his efforts to publishing Intentions.
But his years in Rome were by no measure unproductive. His tum towards history
would be crucial in changing his understanding 0 f Wittgenstein' s formal logic as a fixed
essence, to his later understanding of it as an entity in flux. In looking to prove his
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competency as a historian, Norberg-Schulz took classes at the University of Rome with
architectural historian Giulio Carlo Argan, whose own work covered a spectacular range
of periods and figures. Argan moved with ease f~om the study of contemporary
architecture to critical reflections on Borromini (1952), and Baro(ue Architecture in Italy
(1957). His Walter Gropius e fa Bauhaus (1951) had introduced Heidegger to an Italian
audience more accustomed to French phenomenology via the writings of Enzo Paci's and
Emesto Rogers.38 During this period in the mid 1960s, Norberg -Schulz began the serious
study of Heidegger's Being and Time and of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of
Perception. The discovery of Existentialism would eventually lead him to writing
Existence, Space, and Architecture (1971), where he would extend his 1965 definition of
architecture to include, predictably, existence and space --these were, of course, popular
tenns in the Italian architectural debate of the 196Os, Bruno Zevi and Emesto N. Rogers
having had their strongest disagreements over the relation of space to human lite. 39 The
38 Argan agreed in principle with Heidegger~s assessment of the rise of technology as the source
modernity's crisis~ and as a self-enhancing process leading to the total domination of society and nature.
However, Argan did not read technology as a proouct of Western metaphysics. In contrast to Heidegger~s
reluctance to speak on political and social issues, and more in line with the work of the Frankfurt School,
Argan regarded technological as a socia-political process determined by bourgeois ideology. The
architectural crisis of Modernism resulted from the confrontation of the architectural understanding of
technology as a progressive humanist impulse, and the reality of a cultural situation where technology only
helped further enhance the power of the bourgeois technocracy. See" for instance his
]9 In his 1945 Manifesto per I'Archirettura Organica, Bruno levi contributed to the international ClAM
centered call for a return to humanism. In his opinion, this nleant returning to a human~ non-monumental
scale which could avoid state mythology. Zevi drew philosophically from Benedetto Croce. who Emesto
Rogers and Enzo Paci regarded as problematically indebted to Kantian idealism. and caught up in subject
object paradigms that failed to recognize the existential life-world. Through organic architecture Zevi
introduced the idea of architecture as the Hart of space,n often describing space as space-time. Zevi would
later attribute his understanding of space-time to HJewish thought" which, in his mind conceived of being as
movement in opposition to Greek thought. which understood being as frozen presence. (see Bruno Zevi,
uEbraismo e concezione spazio-temporale nell'arte~" in Zevi su Ze\';~ (Milan: Editrice Magma" 1977) pp
120- i 31, originally published in La Rassegna Mensile di Israel (June 1974). The notion of space time
encouraged Enzo Paci to draft Zevi to the ranks of his phenomenology. He claimed ttl' t when levi spoke
of space as "space-time"" he shooed his Crocean idealism. Space-Time was a type of lived space that was
part of a coherent historicism which could not accept ideal processes. It recognized. according to Paci, the
concrete spatial and temporal processes of work and invention through which the new might emerge. Paci
argued that levi's various interpretations of architecture (political, philosophical. religious. scientific,
materialistic, etc.) all rested on the authenticity of this common lived space-time: the Life-world. See Enzo
289
years in Rome, however, would see Norberg-Schulz timidly apply exi~tentialist thinking
to his new interest in the Baroque, and in particular to the work of Bernardo Vittone. 40
Through Argan, Norberg-Schulz began frequenting a circle of architects and historians
who shared an interest in the Baroque, such as, among others, Rudolf Wittkower, Aldo
Rossi, Manfredo Tafuri, Henry Millon, as well as Paolo Portoghesi and his partner
Vittorio Gigliotti. It was Gigliotti who, on a walk through the Roman Forum, pointed out
the altar to the Genius Loci, ancient deity of the place, to the amazement of Norberg-
Schulz.41
Paci, "Problematica dell'architettura contemporanea~" in Casahella COfllinuirll. n. 209 (January-February
1956), pp 41-46. See also Bruno Zevi, To"'ards llll Organic Architecture, (London: Faber & Faber, 1950),
originally published as Verso un'architecttura organica: Saggio sullo svilupfJo del pensiero architel1onico
neg/i u/rinli cinquflat'anni (Turin: EinaudL (945).
~o In Norberg-Schulz's work on ViUone we see, for instance, the projection of phenomenological concerns
with achieving uprimal" experiences unto the late Baroque. Having analyzed Vittone's churches in terms
familiar to Kevin Lynch as vertical nodes which punctuate wider horizontal fields, Norberg-Schulz states:
Eevidente che il movente e un processo di spiritualizzazione e I'estensione stessa
espressa dalle strutture diafane non eintesa quale conquista del mondo esteriore. Le
chiese di Vittone sono dei veri e propri santuari, per quanta infinitamente este!\-. Nel
Vittone si coglie percio il desiderio di un ritorno ad una condizione esistenziale piu
originale.. che etipicamente settecentesco.
[It is evident that the motive is a process of spiritualization and the very extension
expressed in the diaphanous structures is not understood as a conquest of the exterior
world. Vittone's churches are true sanctuaries, insofar as they are infinitely thenlselves.
In Vittone, therefore. we can perceive the desire to return to more original existential
conditions, which is sonlething typical of the settecento. )
See Christian Norberg-Schulz, UCentralita cd Estensione nelle Opere dl Bernardo Vittone (Centrality and
extension in the Works of Bernardo Vittone)," in Atti del Covegno su: "Bernardo Vittone e la Disputa fra
Classicismo e Barocco nel Settecento" [Proceedings fronl the Conference: uBernardo Vittone and the
Dispute Between Cla~sicisnl and Baroque in the Settecento"]. (Torino: Acadcrnia delle Sciense di Torino,
1970).p 17.
.11 Anna Maria Norberg-Schulz, convcr'\ation with the author. (>Ctoher 2()(X).
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Fig: Cover from the of the Bernardo Vlttone conference program attended
by Rudolf Wlttkower, Aldo Rossi, Manfredo Tafurl, Paolo Portoghesl, Henry
Millon, and Christian Norberg-SChulz. see Bernardo Vittone e la Dlsputa
Fra Classlclsmo e Barocco nel 700: Convegno Internaz/onale promosso
dall'Accademla delle SClenze dl Torino nella rlcorrenza del 20 centenarlo
della morte dl B. Vlttone, 21-24 5ettembre, (Torino: Conference Program,
1970).
As history would have it, L'Orange's "stab in the back" coincided with the
international success of Intentions in Architecture. Published originally in 1963 the book
propelled Norberg-Schulz (almost instantly) into international architectural spotlight,
drawing him away from architectural practice and pushing him more towards the
academy. Norberg-Schulz returned to Oslo that same year, and was immediately offered
the chief editorship of Byggekunst, Norway's premier architectural journal. One year
later, Intentions earned him the title of Doctor Technicae by the Norwegian State
Polytechnic inTrondheim. Before he could think about re-starting his practice, he was
spending most of his time lecturing across the United States and Europe.
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Norberg-Schulz's lectures were targeted directly against the experiments on
tnobility and flexibility of contemporary projects such as Constant Nieuwenhuys's New
Babylon (1957-1974) and Archigram's Walking Cities (1964). Norberg-Schulz made his
attack explicit in coining ''The Concept of Place" (1969). "What must we demand of the
environment so that man may continue to call himself such?" Asked Norberg-Schulz. "A
mobile situation without architecture, or a graspable place that is articulated
architecturally?" He proclaimed that "mobile" projects destroyed the necessary balance
between humans and place. In his view there could be no mobility unless there was
fixity. Therefore, utopian projects claiming to set all of society in movement ran the risk
of defeating their own goals. The design for mobility was premised on the assumption
that total movement would give society "deeper human contact and a richer interaction,"
but without ordered places that humans could identify with, their world would tum into a
disorienting chaos. Thus, continued Norberg-Schulz, "the current utopias of mobility are
symptoms of escapism, since they evade the real and concrete problems of the present."
What these projects manifested was a "lack of roots" characteristic of spiritual emptiness,
which substituted true identification with the random consumption of meaningless
stimuli. Norberg-Schulz argued for "rich articulation," which "due to its complex
structure, may lead the subject to various interpretations. The 'various interpretations'
pennitted by chaotic fonn are on the contrary mere accidental projections of the ego, and
burst like soap-bubbles.,,42 By turning to technology, the projects of Archigram and
Constant would only perpetuate (not ftx) human al~enation, because, according to
Norberg-Schulz, it was precisely technology that was responsible for the isolation of
42 See Christian Norberg-Schulz t "II Concetto di Luogo" [The Concept of Place], in Controspazio, n. 1, v. 1
(June 1969), pp 20-23.
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human beings. "Man" had not yet gained control of the forces unleashed by the machine,
and as a result, mechanized life was transfonning cities into chaotic environments.
Norberg-Schulz was convinced that this process was at the heart of the crisis of
Modernism, and the loss of humanist principles. Without ordered environments humans
would not be able to grasp meaningful relationships between primary architectural
systems and secondary environmental topologies. The loss of visual order to
technological mobility was therefore a process threatening to strike down the core of
human identity: It was an existential problem.43 Through an architectural leap of logic,
Norberg-Schulz posited that by bringing back visual order architecture could help return
social stability.
43 Although in "II Concetto di Luogo" Norberg-Schulz already mentions "existential space" he describes it
in terms of Gestalt psychology. It would not be until Existence Space and Architecture that he would bring
Heidegger's Being and Time to bear on his analysis of human existence. See Ibid. pp 20-23, and Christian
Norberg-Schulz~Existence, Space and Architecture, (New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers,
1971).
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Fig: Photograph of Oslo's center used by Norberg-Schulz to represent how
technologies of mobility "uprooted" city dwellers from nature. From
Christian Norberg-SChulz, The Concept of Dwelling: On the Way to
Figurative Architecture, (New York: Electa and Rizzoll International
PUblications,1985).p 67.
Norberg-Schulz's first formulation of "place" was an attempt to critique the
contemporary discourse on "space," which he considered to be a continuation of
"abstract" functionalist principles in design. The "mobility" espoused by Archigram and
the Constant was made possible, to follow Norberg-Schulz, by an underlying abstract
discourse about "space" which ignored the concrete ways in which humans actually lived
and constructed meaning through interactions with fixed environments. Therefore,
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Norberg-Schulz saw the struggle against space and mobility as a necessary first step
towards the new era promised by Giedion and postwar ClAM. Norberg-Scllulz was
committed to helping bring about a new humanism to Modernism ever since he attended
ClAM IIX (1951) as a young delegate, and had discussed the importance of returning to
"man" with Rogers and Giedion.44 The late 1960s attention to fiU table technological
environments was, for Norberg-Schulz, a very real threat to the project of humanism. On
both sides of the "space and mobility" divide, architects agreed on the need for deeper,
more meaningful human interaction. Norberg-Schulz argued, together with Kevin
Lynch, Charles Alexander, Colin St. John Wilson and others that that interaction could
only take place against the background of a perceptibly structured world. Place, then, was
the "origin" of human action and meaningful inter-action. It was, to follow Norberg-
Schulz, the "immediate condition" of balance between our "inside" and the "outside" that
was established when one felt "at home." In other words, "place" was the satisfaction of
Giedion's call for a balance between human emotion and environmental reality.
The production and reception of Norberg-SchuIz's theory of place as meaningful
environment was framed by a historical moment in which a new environmental
consciousness was emerging in opposition to technology. Rachel Carson's The Silent
Spring (1962), the fITst book from within science to sound an alann on the negative
effects of high-tech agriculture on long-teon health standards, was an overnight best
seller, which led CBS to broadcast a documentary on Carson's work in 1963. The book
44 Upon his return from ClAM nx Norberg-Schulz founded TEAM, a magazine for young ClAM groups,
in which he immediately published the documents he received from Rogers and Giedion. See Walter
Gropius, Emesto N. Rogers, C. van Eesteren, S. Gideon, Serge Chermayeff, Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, , "ClAM 8,
Commission 3: Report on Architectural Education," in TEAM: Collaboration ofYoung Architects and
Artists, n. 2 (February 1952), 00. Christian Norberg-Schulz and E. Neuenschwander, (Oslo: Printed at
Statens hAndverks, and distributed by Christian Norberg-Schulz, 1952).
295
would eventually lead to Gaia theories, where the whole earth was taken as a
biologicaVgeological system. Melvin M. Webber's Explorations Into Urban Structure
(1964) brought forth the claim that the advancing techno culture of liberal capitalism was
turning the once clear boundary between city and nature into a chaotic "non-place urban
realm" where human interaction was no longer possible. Norberg-Schulz's attack on
technological mobility, as a means to return to humanist concerns, must also be read in
relation to a growing body of literature which identified a growing distance between the
humanities and the sciences. Charles Percy Snow's The Two Cultures initiated the debate
about the autonomy of these two branches of knowledge in 1959, and the co ntroversy
continued with Aldous Huxley's 1963 Literature and Science, where he argued that the
two fields had become completely independent. IJastly, Giedion's and Norberg -Schulz's
belief that the coming of a new more authentic era rested on the ability toovercome the
present state of technology was not an isolated architectural affair. On the contrary, it
was an issue that, at the time, was receiving the attention of science, politics, philosophy,
and the emerging social sciences. For instance, Herbert Marcuse's One Dimensional
Man: Studies in the Ideology ofAdvanced Industrial Society (1964) posited that social
emancipation could only be conceived as a revolutionary transfonnation of science and
technology itself, that is, through a New Science, or a New Technology, that would be
liberating, not oppressive.
Norberg-Schulz's first 1969 fonnulation of the theory of place in tenns of Gestalt
psychology was an attempt to draw from, and influence, these contemporary
conversations. By that time, the understanding of perception in tenns of Gestalten had
also emerged as an important concept within phenomenology. In his quest to ground the
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new architecture in the balance between human needs and environmental pressures,
Norberg-Schulz dermed place as the union of humanity and world, as the "existential
space." That defmition re-directed his research towards the study of what he considered
to be existentialist authors, namely Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. As a
result of that encounter, his theory of place would be radically transformed, and, along
with it, his conception of experience. Norberg-Schulz continued to consider place as the
necessary ground of meaningful human life. Howeyer, in the span of a few years, place
would cease to rest on the Gestalt perception of environmental order. Instead, place
would become contingent on a more immediate and Heideggerian poetic self-disclosure
of the environment.
III. The Turn Towards Heldegger
A. Place as the Poetic Self-Disclosure of truth through Alethe;c
images
Norberg-Schulz considered the concept of place to be such an important
discovery that he felt compelled to amend Intentions in Architecture with Existence,
Space and Architecture (1971). He set out to extend the laws of Gestalt perceptual
psychology, which he felt had only yielded abstract organizational principles, with an
understanding of "existential space," a tenn he used interchangeably with "place" and
with genius loci. Although Norberg-Schulz had given some attention to Being and Time,
Norberg-Schulz did not understand Heidegger's early work to be a challenge to his own
work. He continued to explain experience according to a Kantian model where chaotic
exterior stimuli are synthesized and rendered meaningful in the mind. He still conceived
Place as a structured and hierarchical environment suited for human perception of order.
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It was only after his careful study of Heidegger's post 1935 texts (in which Heidegger
himself had turned from Husserl's model of phenomenology as "rigorous science" to a
henneneutic ontology premised on ihe poetic disclosure of Being) that he would begin to
describe place as a poetic call for authentic human work at the service of the Spirit's self-
realization.
In Existence, Space and Architecture Norberg-Schulz continued to discuss the
relation between place and architecture in tenns of cause and effect. Beginning with the
concrete and messy world, he established a linear model of increasing order and
abstraction achieved through experience: First, there is the world of objects, in which
humans act. Second, humans experience that world immediately. Third, they make a
"stable" mental image symbolizing their experience (this is the "existential space" or
"place"). Fourth, they gain knowledge of the world by making logical relations between
mental images. Fifth, (if they are good architects) they transform the world, in accordance
to their mental image, into meaningful environments, thus returning to the fITst step.45
TIle system owed as much to Kant as to current behavioral science. Although
Norberg-Schulz had studied the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he apparently did not
accept Wittgenstein's later recognition that language was not a simple naming and
reference structure, but rather a complex game of interrelated human praxis, a "fonn of
life," or a non-linear but nonetheless recognizable Gestalt. In contrast to Wittgenstein,
Norberg-Schulz presented Gestalten as fIXed mental images or archetypes of existential
spaces. Existence, Space and Architecture can be read as a catalogue of existential spaces
(or archetypal places), drawn as diagrams which follow the work of Kevin Lynch on The
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Image of the City (1960) almost directly. The value of the catalogue being, according to
Norberg-Schulz, that it wOLi!d help architects quickly understand how to order
environments meaningfully. The more ordered an environment, the greater the quality of
its genius loci, and the easier it would be for people to make mental images, to
understand the world, and to live meaningful lives. Norberg-Schulz was convinced from
the start that the task of architects was to help bring meaning to the world by ordering it.
This work also implied attentiveness to differences in landscape from region to region,
and a strong respect for the archetypes of order existing in environments (urban or
otherwise). Norberg-Schulz's emphasis on difference and regional specificity
foreshadowed the reception (and reification) of his theory of place in the 19808 as
foundational to identity politics. "Indeed, the truly 'great' city is characterized by a
particularly pronounced genius loci.,,46
Existence, Space and Architecture concluded that the objective reality was
symbolized in mental images, which Norberg-Schulz called existential spaces (or
archetypal genius loci). The book remained very much within the Kantian
epistemological framework of Intentions in Architecture, and treated Heidegger's work
as though it was part and parcel of the vel)' metaphysical tradition Heidegger sought to
debunk. For instance, Norberg-Schulz equated Dasein with place (or existential space),
and considered Dasein to be a symbolization ofBeing-in-the-world just like place was a
symbolization of objective reality.47
45 Christian Norberg-Schulz, Existence. Space and Architecture, (New York and Washington: Praeger
Publishers, 1971), P 11.
46 Ibid. P 27.
47 Ibid. P 27.
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In 1971, then, Norberg-Schulz had yet to recognize in Heidegger a completely
new framework for thinking about the relation of architecture to the "event of
pre8encing" of Being's truth. But after 1974, Norberg-Schulz began using the tenns
Genius Loci and aletheic image interchangeably to refer to an immediate self-disclosure
of architecture'8 Truth in visual experience. At the height of his career in the 19808, he
would assert the absolute foundational "grounding" power of this aletheic Image.
Although his notion of aletheic experience can be traced directly to his reading of
Heidegger, his understanding of it as a strictly visual phenomenon cannot. Rather, we
must look to the work of Kevin Lynch (1918-1984) on urban Images, and of Georgy
Kepes on vision, both of whom were centrai for Norberg-Schulz's conceptualization of
fonnal order as an immediately graspable image. Norberg-Schl'lz's reading of Heidegger
must be understood as are-articulation of Lynch's and Kepes's ideas in light of a new
theory of experience. This, of course, runs against the grain of Norberg-Schulz's own
theory, which maintains the universal validity of the aletheic image'8 Truth content. The
aletheic Image tends to foil all attempts at contesting its claims to Truth with its own
totalizing immediacy. To destabilize its self-referentiality one must trace its indeb tedness
to historical discourses outside of itself. These various historical projects and dialogues
intersect in Norberg-Schulz's intellectual career providing a broader map of how a brutal
immediacy could erupt within the more recalcitrant reflexive forms Modernism, namely
functionalism and rationalism.
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology invited Norberg-Schulz to teach
classes on the theory of Genius Loci and on Baroque architecture during 1973 and 1974.
He accepted this appointment (one among dozens of similar invitations from prestigious
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institutions around the globe) with the hope of working with Kevin Lynch and Georgy
Kepes who were then teaching at MIT, and with Rudolph Arnheirn at Harvard. Upon his
arrival in Cambridge, Norberg-Schulz still considered place to be a mental symbolic
image of the fonnal order of the environmeIlt explainable in tenns of traditional
metaphysics. In a letter to his wife Anna Maria de Domenicis dated February 17, 1974 he
wrote:
The course on Renaissance and Baroque runs easily, but the Genius Loci
needs much preparation and brings about long and difficult discussions. It
is certainly inspiring and useful forme. [... ] Significantly, my courses are
especially popular among the girls; women need meanings and
metaphysics, and my little book is the only one today, in this field, which
offers something. The teachers at MIT also have lots of duties with
administration and tutorials, and are always running around. But I hope to
get in touch with everybody, such as Kevin Lynch and others.
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Through his contact with Lynch and Kepes, Norberg-Schulz re-worked his
.fIG.!1. 1'1Nt Jislp,a;.. R~II ;,1 ~
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Fig: Kevin Lynch's diagram's of "the Boston Image." From Kevin Lynch,
The Image of the City, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press and Harvard
University Press, 1960), p 147.
understanding of architectural form in terms of gestalt psychology, as well as his
conception of style in terms of semantical relations. He borrowed their usage of the word
"image" to describe the effortless apprehension (or readability) of complex formal
relations. Norberg-Schulz believed that Lynch had identified a new perceptual
phenomenon where form and style coincided. For Lynch, the image was the intersection
in time of objective order, subjective identification of that order, and the projection of
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meaning unto the world. It was a process that was always in the making. "Since image
I,
development is a two-way process between observer and observed," stated Lynch, "it is
possible to strengthen the image either by symbolic devices, by the retraining of the
perceiver, or the reshaping one's environment." 48 At the city scale, this last task was the
domain of architects and planners. Lynch encouraged these professionals to craft orderly
environments, to help others identify them and give them meaning. Architects and
planners were an important part in making the image of the city, but they by no means
controlled it. Lynch therefore ascribed a great deal of importance to the participation of
people in the active transfonnation of the environment.49 People had to put their five
senses to "work" to perceive order, and could of course be trained to improve their
skills.50 Lynch's The Image of the City (1960) was extremely popular in the 1960s and
1970s because it addressed the deep felt postwar concern for the "]oss" of order in the
face of the rapidly changing morphology of urban environments, which Norberg-Schulz
shared. Lynch laid the ground\vork for retraining the visual skills of designers, and his
methods were put to work across the nation to help students identify new order-patterns
and positively transfonn their environment. 51
The visual properties that Norberg-Schulz believed would produce a coherent
genius loci corresponded to those making up Lynch's "image." Norberg-Schulz in fact
48 Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press and Harvard University Press,
1960) pI I.
49 "Environmental images are the result of a two-way process between the observer and his environment.
The environment suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer -with great adaptability and in the
light of his own purposes-selects, organizes, and endows with meaning what he sees. The image so
developed now limits and emphasizes what is seen, while the image itself is being tested against the filtered
~rceptual input in a constant interacting process." See: Ibid. p 6.
o "Environmental images are the result of a two-way process between the observer and his environment.
The environment suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer -with great adaptability and in the
light of his own purposes-selects, organizes, and endows with meaning what he sees. The image so
developed now limits and ernphasizes what is seen, while the image itself is being tested against the filtered
perceptual input in a constant interacting process." See Ibid., p 6.
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used the two terms interchangeably, and described them in tenns of Lynch's lexicon of
"paths, edges, landmarks, nodes, and regions." Unlike Lynch however, NC'rberg-Schulz
did not understand the Genius Loci as a changing entity that people could transform, but
rather as a type of Wittgensteinian "essential fonnallogic" which conditioned all possible
transformations of the city's image in time. Norberg-Schulz derived the notion that this
logic was a "primordial" visual language from Kepes.
Kepes shared Lynch's conviction that the "ret raining the eye" was an imperative,
and insisted that only through visuality could humanity hope to control the industrialized
systems of production that, in his (widely shared) view, were turning urban cores into
"nodes" within immense sprawling metropolises. Kepes made nothing but the grandest of
statements about visuality. He proclaimed that there was a need to rein in technology
from its out-of-control state and into a coherent "new vital-structure" connecting all fields
of knowledge. The lingua franca of this communication would be vision, since it could
allegedly transmit more knowledge, more immediately than any other vehicle. More
importantly, argued Kepes, intellectuals and idiots alike, all over the world, could speak
it. "Visual communication is universal and international: it knows no limits of tongue
vocabulary, or grammar, and it can be perceived by the illiterate as well as the literate.,,52
51 Ibid. p 12, and especially the section on Jersey City on pp 25-32.
52 See Gyorgy Kepes, The Visual Arts Today, (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1960) p 13.
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Fig: The visual laws of organization of meaningful signs according to
Kepes' The Language of Vision, (Chicago: P.Theobald, 1944).
Arguing that verbal language structured human consciousness, Kepes concluded
that it was mandatory to teach people how to see the structural order behind
contemporary art, if humanity was ever to enter a new era of existential awareness. To
teach people to see was to help them regain control of their technologically altered
environments. It was to help them achieve "the mastery of nature." Norberg -Schulz, who
was also deeply concerned with how to control nature without using technological means,
drew heavily from Kepes. In particular, he borrowed his notion of vision as a life-
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structure through which humans engaged the world without ''using ittn that is, without
turning it into a product for consumption.
Contrary to Norberg-Schulzts objectives for teaching at MITt the two years he
spent there would actually distance him from Lynch and Kepes as he re -oriented his
thinking towards Heidegger's henneneutic ontology. Far from his family and regular
academic responsibilities, Norberg-Schulz found himself spending long hours alone in
his dormitory room, and took to reading a recent edition of Heidegger's late essays
entitled Poetry, Language, Thought (English translation 1971).53 The book spoke to him
on many of the issues he had considered crucial since his days at ClAM with Oiedion,
and around which his conversations with Lynch and Kepes had revolved. It spoke of the -.
alienating effects of modem technology, of the need to find a new relationship between
humans and world that would not be premised on productioni~tmetaphysics, of the need
to return to a primordial experience of the world, and of the promise that this new
encounter of humans with the world would bring about a new epoch in history. Norberg-
Schulz began to recognize that Lynch's and Kepes's (as well as his own) conception of
image as mental symbolization of place dealt only with "mere appearances" in the
manner of metaphysics, and that in Heidegger9s meditations on the poetic was the key to
the more fundamental structuring structure of the world: Being. But the tum towards
Heidegger came with great difficulty.
53 The copy of Martin Heidegger's Poetry, Language, Though;, trans. Albert Hofstadter , (New York and
London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971) in Norberg-Schulz's library is signed "Boston 1974." The book
is marked cover to cover and includes a number of inset leafs of paper, each with a word that would later
become standard to Norberg-Schulz's writings: "Things" (p 15, the title page of "1be origin of the Walk of
Artn ), "Temple" (p 41), "What is" (p 53), "Techne" and "A1etheia" (p 59), "Science, Truth" (p63), "Poetry,
art" (p 73), "Poetty, founding, truth" (p 75), "Gestell" (p 84), "Science, Technology~ "fhings" (p 112),
"Threat ofTechnology" (p 116), "We are the bees.. ." (p 130), "Money, Measuring etc." (p 135), "Eanh and
Sky" (p 149), "Dwelling" (p 151), "Gathering (bridge)" (p 152), "Space Boundary" (p 154-155), "Building
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Fig: Norberg-SChulz's MIT "genius loci" Class notes with a diagram of
Prague that follows Kevin Lynch's representational technique for
illustratingthe Imageof cities.
Techne" (p 159), "Thing (persons object)" (p 173), "Gathering" (p 174), " Nearness" (p 177), "Thing,
gathering" (p 199), "Poetry" (p 224-225).
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Fig: Norberg-SChulz's diagram of Prague as Illustrated In Christian
Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture,
(New York: RlzzolI, 1980), P96.
Inspired by his reading, Norberg-Schulz drafted an outline for his MIT class on
the "Spirit of Place" which he would later use as a guide for the chapter on Prague in
Genius Loci. Apart from the obvious indebtedness of the diagram of Prague to Kevin
Lynch, the document reveals another discursive filter through which Norberg-Schulz was
reading Heidegger: Giedion's notion of "continuity and change." Since 1938, Giedion
had been calling for a "new tradition" in architecture to be built out of "constituent facts,"
which allegedly remained constant in history. These stable elements were the backbone
for "transitory facts," which appeared and disappeared as history moved on. 54 Giedion
was interested in the urge for "elemental expression" which, in his mind, had served as
the origin of both contemporary and ancient art. The rising interest in embracing the
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"whole of men's psychical existence" was evidence of a return to the origins of art. In
this movement back towards the primal Giedion saw the titillating promise of the future.
"We are standing today," he famously stated, "on the threshold of a new tradition.,,55
Norberg-Schulz's fITst sustained reading of Heidegger occurred as he searched for
a way to reach beyond transitory facts and to resolve the problem of change as set out by
his mentor.56 In his preparatory class notes, he made clear that his research into the Spirit
of Place was really a quest for the eternal and immutable:
The Problem of Change:
To keep the main place-defining elements, and not to give them undue
competition (skyscrapers!)
To respect the general character:
That is: to interpret anew the articulation and rhythm of the historic
buildings (which through centuries have belonged to the same family).
That is: to show the same conscious or unconscious concern as other
historic periods.57
In a telling entry on "Architecture" for the Encyclopedia ofCommunication from
the early 1980s, Norberg-Schulz, borrowing heavily from Heidegger, described his new
understanding of the image. It was no longer a symbol that needed to be produced
through the labor of the mind.. Image and symbol still corresponded to moments in an
experientiaVepistemological process, but now image referred to that which was
S4 See Sigfried Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth ofa New Tradition, (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Universtiy Press, 1962) pp 18-19.. The book compiled the Charles Eliot Norton Lectures delivered
at Harvard between 1938-1939..
55 Sigfried Giedion, Constancy, Change, and Architecture9 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1961) p
7.
56 At the time, the question of change had been at the center stage of architectural debates for over two
decades. The exchanges between Reyner Canham and Emesto N. Rogers in the late 1950s had turned on
how to rethink the formal vocabulary of Modernism through history. By the late 1960s, Robert Venturi had
given a specifically linguistic turn to the same problem with Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture
(1966). The preoccupation with change also extended to the urban dimension, as concern aoout the
dissolution of urban centers rose.
57 This one page document, dated February 18, 1974, was written in Cambridge. but is now included in
Norberg-Schulz's manuscript for Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology ofArchitecture, (c.1978) after
the chapter on Prague.
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immediately given in aesthetic experience, and symbol to the result of conceptual work.
Norberg-Schulz divided the history of commllnication in architecture between two
contending experiences of reality: the pre-Socratic image and the platonic symbol. The
pre-socratic image was, for Norberg-Schulz, the original function of architecture. The
Image, as aletheic experience, revealed an immanently meaningful world immediately to
us. Interpreting Heidegger, Norberg-Schulz considered Platonic philosophy to have to
have reduced the image to a symbol (thereby implicitly criticizing his own earlier
definition), and to have divided subject from object. Norberg-Schulz assigned
foundational primacy to the aletheic Image (as truth), and relegated symbols to pure
abstractions of the mind (which could nonetheless offer valuable historically contingent
insights). 58
As Norberg-Schulz developed his theory of genius loci in tenns of Lynch's
notion of image, he became convinced that every transitory fact in architecture was
ultimately grounded in a primal visual language, which, as defined by Kepes, was a
structure that remained constant in history. Giedion's "constancy" found expression in
Norberg-Schulz's genius loci as a static entity. Unlike Lynch, who argued that people
had to put all five senses to work in order to construct an image, and more like Kepes,
Norberg-Schulz claimed that the environment's aletheic image communicated primordial
meanings to humans visually. Participation in the image of an environment was reduced
to seeing it. In Norberg-Schulz's theory, the image continued to be the intersection of
order, identity, and meaning, but these categories now stood beyond the realms of subject
and object, in ttie pre-subjective and pre-objective realm of aletheic experience. Norberg-
58 Christian Norberg-Schulz, "Architecture," manuscript for the Encyclopedia ofCommunication
commissioned by 51. Martin's Press, p 4. Located in the Christian Norberg-Schulz archive. Oslo.
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Schulz thus excluded human agency from the creation of new meaning and limited their
participation to the visual "use" of those existing. Free from the continuously changing
appearances of subjects and objects, the aletheic Image became reflexive, evidence of a
truth that floated beyond but that was given as the rule and measure of "authentic"
existence.
This explains much of the mystic tendencies associated with the followers of
Norberg-Schulz. The more they sought Truth in their experience of the natural, the more
nature appeared foreign and contaminated by their own presence. True nature receded
before their eyes towards a mystical beyond.
Fig: Members of a commune at Flndhorn, SCotland, celebrate the autumn
equinox with sacred dances and group meditation. Clare Cooper Marcus, a
phenomenological cultural geographer teaching In the Department of
Architecture at the University of California, Berkeley, advocated these
practices as forms of "communion" with nature through which people
could "feel a sense of togetherness." From Clare Cooper Marcus,
"Designing for a Commitment to Place," In Dwelling, Seeing, and
Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology, ed. David Seamon,
(Albany: State University of NewYork Press, c1993), p 317.
The ruse of Norberg-Schulz is that he put his own theory to practice in ways no
one else would have dared to. The structure of his books, whi ch he always insisted on
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laying out, conflated the Aletheic Image with the photographic image. His pictures did
not just stand-in for the experience of landscapes and buildings, they were the Truth
"given" in those objects as immediate meaning. The conventional photo-as-illustration-
of-text model was reversed, and the text stood as a mere "training" accessory to the
photographs. Once the pupil could "see," when he or she could experience the Images
authentically, the text (as well as any verbal explanation) became completely superlluous
(or inauthentic). Even though the Image, as a disembodied a-priori essence, could by
definition never be willed into presence, Norberg-Schulz insisted that with proper
schooling architects could tease it out of the photographs. It was there titillating on the
surface of the page.
Fig: Image pair of tree lined path In Relms, and of the gothic cathedral, also
In Relms, used by Norberg-Schulz to Illustrate that "all places have a
common denominator" (p 61). From Christian Norberg-SChulz, Archltettura:
presenza, IInguagglo e luogo [Architecture: Presence, Language and
Place], (Sklra: Milano, 1996),p 64.
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Mark Jarzombek has noted the function of the illustration in academic books as an
alternative epistemological domain that premised itself on the ability to purify and
transfonn the social through proper education.59 Georgy Kepes' The Language 01 Vision
(1944) helped perpetuate that tradition in architectural theory, and introduced Norberg-
Schulz a long history of claims about the "authenticity" of the Image. Kepes made
nothing but the grandest of statements about visuality. He proclaimed that there was a
need to rein in technology from its out-of-control state and into a coherent "new vital-
structure" connecting all fields of knowledge. The lingua franca of this communication
would be vision, since it could transmit more knowledge, more immediately than any
other vehicle. More importantly, argued Kepes, intellectuals and idiots alike, allover the
world, could speak it. "Visual communication is universal and international: it knows no
limits of tongue vocabulary, or grammar, and it can be perceived by the illiterate as well
as the literate.,,60 Arguing that verbal language structured human consciousness, Kepes
concluded that it was mandatory to teach people how to see the structural order behind
contemporary art, if humanity was ever to enter a new era of existential awareness. To
teach people to see was to help them regain control of their technologically altered
environments. It was to help them achieve "the mastery of nature."
A closer look at how Norberg-Schulz selected the illustrations of his books can
give us a better sense of what he saw in them. Norberg-Schulz drew diagrams in the
margins of his manuscripts that he later used to select photographs. Here, his conception
of the aletheic image in tenns of a-temporal archetypes becomes clear, since any number
59 See the sections entitled "The Image and the Text: De-Scribing 'The Eye':' and "The Mye,iques of
Ocular Poeticism" in Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing ofModernity: Art, Architecture, History,
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2(00), pp 160-176.
60 See Gyorgy Kepes, The Visual Arts Today, (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1960) p 13.
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of photographs could have been "applied" as illustrations of the diagram, and since, in
fact, he sometimes replaced a single diagram in two or more different pictures from
different periods and locations. In the manuscript for Genius Loci, for instance, Norberg-
Schulz drew two simple diagrams on tile margin of the page: a rectangular solid with a
triatlgular extrusion on top, and a solid drum with a cone. These two diagrams were
supposed to demonstrate that the meaning of "earth" and "sky" was "given" in nature as
"ridge," and that the architectural equivalent (or concretization) was the gable roof. In the
published version, over thirty photographs of natural terrains and buildings replace these
two diagrams. Predictably we first see conical and linear mountains, then conical and
linear settlements, and finally conical and linear gabled roofs. In case the reader did not
understand the idea by simply looking at the series of photographs, the captions
condensed the lesson and provided a first level of support: "On the ground under the sky.
Temple of Heaven pagoda, Pekin.,,61 For the really deficient student, the text spells it
out: ''The spatial structures developed during the history of architecture are always in one
way or the other based on centralization and longitudinality and their combinations.,,62
Norberg-Schulz's treatment of visual language as ontological first principle was a
creative interpretation of Heidegger's reflections on language in light of Lynch, Kepes
and others, who (in the context of Norberg-Schulz's thinking) were in tum contaminated
by Heidegger. Norberg-Schulz became convinced that Heidegger's thinking addressed
many of the problems he was confronted with. For instance, Heidegger was also
61 Christian Norberg-SchulZ, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology ofArchitecture, (New York: Rizzoli,
1980) P 65. Siegfried Giedion was also famous for his use of photographs as a narrative structure in which
to develop the main themes of the book. It is possible that Norberg-Schulz learned the importance of the
image in architectural printed discourse from him.
62 Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology ofArchitecture, (New York: Rizzoli,
1980) P 59.
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concerned with how to get beyond the technological domination of man, which he argued
had begun in ancient Greece with the advent of Western metaphysics. Norberg-Schulz,
therefore felt compelled to answer Heidegger's call to move beyond metap)lysics, and
return to a pre-socratic "original" or aletheic experience of the world. Giedion's
"change" could be sunnounted by this Heideggerian "reaching back" to the origins of
artistic experience, to the constant or "primordial ground." Heidegger'saletheia also
resolved Lynch's and Kepes's fonnulation of the image as a "mere appearance" which
had to be "assigned" meaning by subjects. In aletheic experience primordial meaning was
"given" immediately. This, for Norberg-Schulz, eliminated the "problem" of multiple
interpretations from different subjects. Norberg-Schulz believed that the aesthetic
experience of aletheic images gave human beings immediate access to Wittgenstein's
essential "logical fonn." Therefore, he thought, aletheic experiences had to be at the root
of any and all "authentic" or meaningful creative expressions.
B. Excursus: From Gledlon to Heldegger
Given Norberg-Schulz's reading of Heidegger as a solution to surmounting
Giedion's understanding ofmodemity's problems, it is important to compare and contrast
the views of both authors. This analysis can only be done with full awareness that the
intellectual and disciplinary foundations supporting Heidegger's and Giedion's individual
perspectives were different, if not contradictory. However, some of the superficial
similarities were what allowed Norberg-Schulz's turn from architectural Hfunctionalism"
to phenomenology. Norberg-Schulz's own awareness of some of these root differences
would eventually lead him to try to provide new phenomenological foundations to
architectural practice in the late 1970s.
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This analysis can only proceed with the utmost caution. Even though some
parallels may be drawn between Giedion's and Heidegger's writings, they used radically
different logics and methods to arrive at their conclusions. Moreover" Giedion never
discussed Heidegger in detail, and it is doubtful that he was even familiar with the
philospher's thinking. The reverse is equally true. It is unlikely that Heidegger ever read a
book by Giedion. In fact, had he given any consideration to Giedion, Heidegger would
probably have concluded that the architecturnl historian was prey to the very
productionist and foundational metaphysics Heidegger was trying to overcome.
Giedion and Heidegger were contemporaries. Giedion was born in 1888, and
Heidegger in 1889, and being Gennano-Swiss and Gennan respectively, their mature life
was marked by a central European cultural moment that, fro m the mid 1930s to the late
1940s, looked upon its present as the dusk of a great era of Western history --a feeling
best described in Oswald Spengler famous The Decline of the West (1918-22). More
importantly, even though their thUlking evolved independently of each other, it would
eventually be linked in the work of Norberg-Schulz, who considered Giedion and
Heidegger to be his most profound influences.
Giedion and Heidegger began thinking in the mid 1930s that humanity was at a
crucial point in its history, and that a new era was immanent in the present. Heidegger
was convinced that the period coming to an end was a time dominated by technology and
by a reductive human understanding of both people and world as "raw material" to be
used up in the self -enhancing system of production. In 1946~ Heidegger wrote "Letter on
Humanism" amidst a post-war climate that was seriously questioning the very meaning of
enlightenment humanism in light of its mora] and political implications. The root cause of
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the war was metaphysics, which he defined as the progressive subjugation of humanity
into "raw material." He considered this view to be coincident with the Will to Power
which drove technological humanity to surrender itself nihilistically to the advancement
of technology in and for itself. Modern ethics were concerned with "values" which,
continued Heidegger, were nothing but a system of "positions" created by subjects as a
way to intensify the control of the Will to Power over all aspects of human existence.
What humanity needed, he insisted, was not yet another ethical system, but the end of
metaphysics all together. Instead of ethics, he proposed a new ethos, or a new way of
"dwelling on earth" that would help delimit the new basis for human behavior. This
new ethos could not be imposed upon humanity in top down fashion. Rather, according to
Heidegger, it would be bestowed upon humanity as a gift, presumably through his own
philosophy, which claimed to open and delimiting the possibility of the anival of that
gift.
Whereas Giedion believed that the present epoch begun in the late gothic,
Heidegger located its beginnings in ancient Greece.63 For Heidegger, Greece's "original"
confrontation with the world had initiated the long history of Western Metaphysics,
which had since dominated human understanding. Confronted with the "primal" chaotic
flux of being, ancient Greeks had focused on the non-variant aspects in which entities
present themselves. That is, explained Heidegger, they had delimited the terror of the
"original" surge of being by focusing on the foundational aspects that made entities
63 These two different points of origin to the crises of modernity make evident how each thinker was
limited by his disciplinary and cultural historical realty. Because of his art historical background, and
familiarity with the work of Panofsky, Giedion regarded the passing from Gothic scholasticism to the
Renaissance as the foundation of the modern era. Heidegger on the other hand, leaned towards ancient
Greece, which was regarded by his discipline as the birthplace of Western philosophy, and by Gennans in
general as the origin of their culture and historical Spjrit.
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appear as things. Because the ancient Greeks had initiated this foundationalist
metaphysics, Western man, as a result, was compelled to understand the being of entities
in cause-and-effect tenns. The West was "stamped" by metaphysical fixation with one
particular mode in which being disclosed itself, that is, with "beingness."
Heidegger considered that in the present historical era, governed by productionist
metaphysics, being disclosed itself as "beingness." This amounted to saying that being
"gave" itself in such a way that it concealed itself. As proof of this, thought Heidegger,
one needed only to realize that, since its invention in Greek times, metaphysics had failed
to notice the "event of presencing" itself, which was, for Heidegger, the condition of
possibility for things to become manifest. Metaphysics had been oblivious to the
primordial ontological character of presencing as synchronic event with fluid "motion,"
which "hardens" itself diachronically into specific historical modes of "beingness." 64
The history of being in Western history was characterized by being "giving itself' as
"beingness." In Heidegger's own words, "The history of Being begins, and indeed
necessarily, with the forgetting ofBeing. ,'()5 Heidegger argued that metaphysicians had
given various names to this same mode of being as "beingness," including eidos,ousia,
energeia, actualitas, actus purus, etc.66 The present state of "beingness" was also a
hardening of being which had devolved, according to Heidegger, into modem
technology. Now being hid ever more resiliently behind "beingness," forcing humanity to
look upon everything as "raw material."
64 Martin Heidegger, The Question ofBeing, trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback "(New Haven:
College and University Press, 1958) p 63.
65 Martin Heidegger" "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead' ," in The Question Concerning Technology
and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt" (New York: Harper and Row, 1977) P 109.
66 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert
Hofstadter , (New York and London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971) P 81.
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Heidegger felt that in the modem technological era "to be" had been reduced to
"to be produced." Therefore, much of his work was devoted to proving that something
could "be" without being the product of a cause. For Heidegger '~to be" meant "to be
manifest" through the primordial "event ofpresencing." The "event ofpresencing," then,
was the "original movement" which ''joined'' together "beingness" as a coherent mode of
being in the modem world. As such, it was prior to the entities disclosed through it. We
cannot physically perceive the original event, since what we perceive are the entities
disclosed by it. However, the disclosure cannot happen without us, on the one hand, and
the world on the other. We must be present as a "temporal clearing" or horizon for the
presencing of entities, and so too must the "self-manifesting" (presencing) of entities.
Humanity delimited the powerful presencing of entities. It could apprehend entities as
entities by bringing their presencing to a stand. For Heidegger both clearing and
presencing, were necessary for things "to be manifest." In other words, the confrontation
of human existence and the world of entities was needed to articulate the ways in which
things displayed themselves in particular epochs. For Heidegger precisely because the
"event of presencing" itself does not appear, it remains primordial to that which appears.
Giedion shared with Heidegger an intuition about the lack of foundations, or the
primal fluidity, of world-historical human existence. He also attributed the "stamping" of
that existence to the confrontation of humanity and world. However, Giedion refused to
give up the centrality and controlling agency of the individual, speaking of the world as
the "outside" of the subject. Heidegger would have looked upon this insistence on
subject/object divisions as a blindness to the ways in which the world not only constitutes
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humanity but also appropriates it and discloses itself through hmnanily.67 For Giedioo,
then, epochs were "stamped" when humanity's inner and outer worlds reached
equilibrium. However, Giedion asserted, because these two spheres moved in history as
two parallel curves with different periods, as soon as they began moving in hannony,
they came quickly out of phase. "As soon as inner and outer reality agree, corresponding
developments occur in the psyche of man. There is never a standstill. All is in a state of
flUX.,,68 Moreover, Giedion emphasized, no closed circles and no repetitive pattem exist
[sic.] to define the adjuSbnents of inner and outer reality. 1be evolve iD curves, never
repeating themselves.,,69 According to GiedioD, what followed lfter each stamping of a
new epoch was the progressive distancing of humanity and world.
Mechanization Takes Command was Giedion's argument about how technology
had so completely changed the world that humanity could no longer make sense of it.
The coming of the new era was not only immanent in the present but also necessaJY if
humanity was to take control of technology. Where Heidegger argued the need to move
beyond metaphysics to let a new era come about, Gideon waxed about the need to
proceed by shedding old systems of thought and their outdated certaintiesc; "Just as steel
bridges are built, springing from the ground and with one end freely poised in mid -air,
renewed intellectual conceptions will arise piece by piece without the scaffolding of
67 See Martin Heidegger, f'The Word of Nietzsche: 4God is Dead~," in The Question Concerning
Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). For a good
explanation of how Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche led him to discard the conventional notion that
humans are active subjects who look upon and understand entities, see Michael E. Zimmennan,
Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art~ (Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1990) pp 94-106.
68 Sigfried Giedion, Mechanization Takes Command.... A Contribution to Anonymous History. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1948), p 720.
69 Ibid. P 720.
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philosophical systems.,,70 The new "man" would have to achieve total self control, and
learn to reconcile opposing forces, to fmd a balance between individual and collective,
expert knowledge and universal outlook, methods of feeling and systems of thinking, the
human body and its organic or cosmic environment. In other words, humanity would
have to learn to understand the world holistically.
Although both Heidegger and Giedion remained elusive about suggesting specific
fonns of political, social, and economic refonn, each made statements about how
humanity would (or should) relate to the world in the coming era. It is clear to any reader
of Heidegger that he longed for a new society where "authentic" modes of working and
producing would replace what he saw as the alienating bondage of modernity. His
analysis of productionist metaphysics led him to believe that work and workers would
only regain their integrity through a new mode of producing which would emphasize the
relationship between art (especially poetry) and production. If the decline of the West
began with Greek metaphysics, because, according to Heidegger, it made technology
possible, then returning to Greek art and culture could not challenge modernity. What
was needed instead was a confrontation with the same ontological "primal" out of which
sprung Greek metaphysics.71 Heidegger felt that his philosophy was particularly fit for
the task because it was rooted on lived experience (Erlebnis), and thus permitted the
inquiry into the authentic origin (Ursprung) and beginning (Anfang) ofthings~ This
70 Ibid. p 719.
71 Zimmerman contends that Heidegger's treatment of Greek metaphysics as an all-encompassing narrative
betrays his indebtedness to ~ series of ongoing Germanic intellectual and popular traditions. For instance,
Heidegger responded to Hegel's and Marx's deterministic view of history. Heidegger's use of the
etymology of language, and his self-depictions as the spiritual FOrer of the National Socialist Democratic
Worker's Party are, for Zimmerman, directly linked to Fichte's views of the superiority of the German race
and language, and of Gerrnany's "fateful mission to preselVe the highest ideals of humankind." See
Division 1 of Michael E~ Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics,
Art, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990).
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original form of experience, he argued, was opposed to, and continuously threatened by,
the "inauthentic" objectifying experience (Erfahrung), which was foundational to
rational-scientific understanding. 72
Heidegger often conflated inauthenticity with "everydayness," or spoke of
inauthenticity as an aggravated case ofeveryday falleness. Inauthenticity, for Heidegger
was the tendency towards depersonalization that arose, from the ontological condition of
human "faUeness," or of being always already thrown into a particular social and
historical context. Heidegger extended Hegel's and Marx's intuition that human
existence is social to the point of arguing that the existence of the self cannot by
constituted by isolated egos. Instead, it arises through a relational, contextual, holistic,
participatory event. For Heidegger the self did not exist as an autonomous, isolated
subject, but rather as a 'crossing point' in a network of historically unfolding cultural
systems, such as language, into which 'any man' (Das Man) is thrown at birth.
According to Heidegger, people readily accept social nonns because they gain self-
definition only in relation to this pre-existing social whole.73
Heidegger believed that the historical reality into which modem man had been
thrown was a bad lot, because it put "man" in the contradictory position of having to
define himself as an isolated singularity in order to be part of his world. People were
72 See Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert
Hofstadter, (New York and London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971) pp 17-81. See also Heidegger's
Phiinomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristote/es. Einfuhrung in die phiinomenologische Forschung
(Winter Semester, 1921/22),00. Walter Brocker and Kate Brocker-Oltmanns, in Gesamtausgabe,
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985) pp 37-50.
73 "Falling," writes Heidegger, "is not only existentially determinative for Being-in-the-world. [...]
Dasein's facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Daseing remains in the throw, and is sucked into
the turbulence of the "they's" inauthenticity." Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie
and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1962) p 223. See also Heidegger's
description of "Everydayness" in the sections entitled "Everyday Being-one's-Self and the 'They'/' pp
163-168, and "The Everyday Being of the 'There', and the Falling of Dasein," pp 210-224.
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forced to attempt individuation within a cultural system where "everyone is the other, and
no one is himself.,,74 This made for an "inauthentic" contradictory relation in which the
"truth" of man's existence concealed itself. As humans became more and more isolated in
their attempt to be a meaningful part of the social reality, the system became, for
Heidegger, more and more entrenched. Unlike Hegel and Marx, Heidegger saw alienation
as the result of Dasein's ontological condition ofufalleness," not as the result of
economic-material causes. This "falleness" was the condition of possibility for a world
dominated by economic and material concerns.
Prior to the war, Heidegger was already convinced that his work amounted to the
"saving light" that would help humanity rise from its "falleness" and transcend the horror
of its technological subjugation. But Heidegger believed this "liberation" had to occur in
a revolutionary fashion involving all of society. He was convinced that authentic
individuation could occur only within the context of an entire generation willing to
submit to its common destiny. This conviction led him to disastrous decisions, such as
joining the Nazi party. Convinced that the present state of Gennan culture was inevitably
drifting towards the same "productionist" metaphysics, destructive urban-industrialism,
and meaninglessness gripping the Soviet Union and the United States, Heidegger himself
drifted from his original goal to describe the present philosophically "without prophets
and Ftihrer-illusions.,,75 By 1929 Heidegger was clamoring for a new powerful leader to
steer Gennany away from total social chaos or total technological totalitarianism. In
74 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinc;on , (New York: Harper
Collins Publishers, 1962) P 163.
75 As quoted in Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art, p33.
(see Heidegger's Phiinomenologische fnterpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einfiirung die phiinomenologische
Forschung (Winter Selnester, 1921/22) 00. Walter Broker-Oltmanns, in Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985)
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1933, when he was elected Rektor of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger declared his
allegiance to Hitler, understanding the aims of the Third Reich to be in accordance with
his own goals to change the whole course of Gennan and Western history. He finnly
believed the Fuhrer to be a statesman of sufficient vision to carry out politically what
Heidegger himself hoped to carry out spiritually, namely, to protect the Gennan worker
from the evils of both capitalistic materialism, and communistic collectivism.
Giedion also spoke of a coming era in tenns of "universality?" and "humanity."
But in comparison with Heidegger9 Giedion's future seems less ambitiously drafted, if for
no other reason that he did not foresee a turning away from technology, but only its
"adjustment" to the needs of man. For Giedion, technology did not necessarily
camouflage being and reduce entities to "raw material." This was only the case when
technological processes were out of syTIch with the essence of humanity. Giedion
believed that although historical world was always in flux, the physical and emotional
"core of man" remained constant. If humanity could be brought back into hannony with
its environment it could regain control of the world and of technology. Humanity needed
to bring "feeling" back into the things it produced, and to do involved a series of clear
steps that Giedion claimed to have derived from the study of history: "We must establish
a new balance between the individual and the collective spheres. [.0.] We must establish
a new balance between the psychic spheres within the individual. [... ] We must establish
a new balance between spheres of knowledge. [... l We must establish a new balance
between the human body and cosmic forces.,,76 Heidegger and Giedion believed the
coming of the new epoch to be immanently readable in their present. Both men also
76 Sigfried Giedion, Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1948), p 721.
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shared a perhaps disproportionate self-image of their own role in the making of the
coming new era. They both often wrote in a messianic tone laden with the urgency and
self-assurance of the prophet who has seen beyond the veils of the present and into the
future.
It is important to stress that despite the originality of Heidegger's and Giedion's
thinking, their meditations appeared within, and were circumscribed by, different
disciplinary realities. Their attempts to lay claim to the future, to present themselves as
the "guides" of an era to come, must be understood as individual efforts to establish their
avant-gardism within their respective disciplines. Without conflating these different
disciplinary realities, it is nonetheless true that after world war II both men inhabited a
common Western European cultural spherelt The anxiety about the relation of humanism
to the political and social fonns present at the end of World War II extended across
continental Europe. This feeling was compounded by the fact that, by the end of the war,
Western European nations, having been weakened by war, now shared Gennany's 1930s
apprehension of falling prey to capitalism or communism. In France, where
phenomenology had developed into its a school in its own right, philosophers such as
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre took seriously to thinking the problem
through, attempting, unlike Heidegger, to provide concrete political and ethical
solutions.77 In 1951, the same year of his famous "Building Dwelling Thinking" address
77 In an attempt to influence the ambiguous political climate lived in Europe between 1945 and 1949
towards a "non-communist" left, Merleau-Ponty published Humanisme et Terreur, Essai sur Ie Probleme
Communiste (1947). Like those members of the Resistance who had expected revolutionary change to
happen immediately after the war~ Merteau-Ponty hoped for an independent Europe. The plausibility of his
position was being thwarted by the inexorable drift of the West towards becoming a satellite of the United
States. The institution of the Marshall plan in June 1947 was openly criticized by the USSR~ and caused
Molotov~s walkout from the Paris conference in July. French left wing intellectuals, suspicious of
America's intentions, hoped for a neutralist position for Europe but found it difficult to rally behind either
the Communist Party (which was expected to follow Soviet directives)~ or the Socialist Party (which
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to architects at the Darmstadt Conversation, Heidegger proclaimed that the Second
World War had changed nothing.78 The statement inflamed critics who felt that he had
not repented his Nazi past. For Heidegger however, the issue was clear. Because the war
had been won by the USA and the USSR, which he considered to be metaphysically
equivalent, humanity was doomed to continue down the path of alienation and
enslavement to the Will to Power. The coming of the new era of working and prodLCing
authentically would have to wait, though Hei~~gger, perhaps a few hundred years more.
The modem avant-garde's aesthetic of ascension was common to both
Heidegger's and Giedion's writings, who took it upon themselves to elevate society
above the banality of bourgeois culture. This is aesthetic comparison is, admittedly,
superficiat And yet, it was precisely on this level that Norberg-Schulz constructed his
collusion of henneneutic ontology and architectural history. The powerful appeal of his
theory was that it sold the myth of modem avant-gardism to the disillusioned architects of
seemed incapable of formulating an independent platform). Amidst the indecision, the center and right
elements of the French Third Force and of the Gaullists gained support for a unified Western front against
Soviet forces. With the fannation of the Brussels Treaty organization, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and the Soviet Cominform, the political and economic dependence of Western Europe on the
United States became unavoidable. Sartre's failed attempt to bring about non-communist "revolutionary
democratic alliance" (Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionaire) in 1949 marked the end of that brief
moment of hope for a third position. By the early fifties, the Iron Curtain divided Europe into two clearly
opposed ideological camps.
Merleau-Ponty wrote Humanism and Terror as a critique of Arthur Koestler's popular novel Darkness at
Noon. Kastler's depiction of Marxism as a hardened repressive dogma had helped deliver a final blow to
French Communism, whose convictions had been already seriously undennined by Stalin's labor camps, by
the Rajk-Kosov trials, and by the emerging forms of Soviet imperialism. Merleau-Pontyasked, almost
rhetorically, whether Communism's post-war existence was still equal to its humanist intentions. For him,
these were present "without question" in the work of Marx. There was hope, in the mind of MerleatrPonty
and other non-communist intellectuals, that Europe would be able to steer a middle course independent of
both America and the Soviet Union. With this broad objective in mind, Merleau -Ponty resisted the
reduction of Marxism to its present institutionalized fonns, and the post-revolution hardening of Marxist
positions on history and politics. Humanism and Terror was thus a pivotal contribution to the creative
interpretation of theoretical Marxism taking place in the late 1940s, and to its continued currency outside of
communism. The eventual polarization of European politics helps us understand the excommunication of
Merleau-Ponty by hard line French Communists after Humanisme et Terreur.
78 Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, (New York:
Harper and Row, 1972) p 65.
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the 1970s, who had lost faith in the ability of architecture to effect progressive social
change.
c. The Alethelc Image as the source of the "authentic" avant-garde.
If avant-gardism was concerned with advancing human knowledge, then very
fonn of "true" avant-gardism was, for Norberg-Schulz, contingent on experiencing the
aletheic image. Those architects like Arclligram and Constant who did not create in
accordance with its essential "logical fonn" would only produce nonsensical statements.
For Norberg-Schulz, then, his own practice as a historian was avant-gardist in the "true"
sense of the word, given that he claimed to be attuned to the "original" language of the
natural terrain, that he could ''feel'' its essential ''logical fonn" in his experiences of the
aletheic image. If sufficient architects learned to "feel" the "authentic" meaning of
reality, then they would collectively engender a new era free from the contradictions of
modernity. The belief that a historical turning point was just around the comer was not
the isolated fantasy of Norberg-Schulz. In fact, it was the currency of this desire both
within ClAM architectural discourse, as well as within the work of Heidegger and
Giedion, that made it easy for Norberg-Schulz to bring these two thinkers together, and
that accounted for the positive popular reception of his work.
Norberg-Schulz's suggestion that, in order to become leaders in society, architects
had to rediscover a more "authentic" worlJ through Heidegger must be read in light of
previous attempts within ClAM to bring phenomenology to bear on Modernism. Emesto
Rogers, for instance, attempted to rethink the role of history in Modernism through Enzo
Paci's phenomenology. His suggestion that "tradition" was a material like any other to
be used and transfonned by architects, was an extremely popular approach which opened
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the way for Norberg-Schulz's attention to the vernacular, as well as for Critical
Regionalism later in the 1980s. In addition to Rogers, Jose Luis Sert's inaugural address
at ClAM IIX invoked the work of Jose Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish phenomenologist, to
suggest that a debased mass society needed to be stewarded by a "natuml elite" of leaders
such as ClAM towards a more authentic civic life. Ortega y Gasset's ideas, as expressed
in The Revolt of the Masses (1930), were popular among postwar European intellectuals
who were trying to steer a middle course between American capitalism and Soviet
communism.79 It has been suggested that Ortega y Gasset's "natural elitesU were an
ideological undercurrent in ClAM discourse.8o Although this claim might be true, the
impact of Ortega y Gasset was so sublimated as to remain unrecognizable beyond a few
of Sert's postwar essays. The same is not true of Heidegger who, after Norberg-Schulz's
introduction into architecture, remains a staple reference in architectural writings about
place.
Norberg-Schulz's embrace of Heidegger's late thinking marks an important node
of contact between the intellectual tradition of Modernist architecture and
phenomenology. Through Norberg-Schulz, the post-war ClAM discourse about retuning
to a loosely defined "humanism" was extended and re-articulated in tenns of Heidegger
as a concern for "place." However, Norberg-Schulz's intellectual sources were not
limited to Heidegger, although phenomenology eventually concealed the importance of
Wittgenstein, Lynch, and Kepes. In the shadow of Heidegger, these influences were so
79 On the post-war European reception of Ortega y Gasset's call for a "natural elite" to guide the masses see
Raymond Aaron, "The Revolt of the Masses:' in Partisan Review, n. 3, v. 55 ( 1988), pp 359-370.
80 In The ClAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000)" p 207, Eric
Mumford, claims that "Ortega's concept of natural elites clearly had parallels to the Corbusier's view of
ClAM as an elite that could bring about social change by guiding physical interventions "for the common
good," and it could provide a continuing justification fo ClAM as the avant -garde of modem urbanism."
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transfonned by their "exposure" to one another, that Norberg-Schulz's concept of Genius
Loci as alethei(- image can almost be considered "original." Nevertheless, Norberg-
Schulz's avant-gardist self-projection could not free itself entirely from the trappings of
historiography. The various interdisciplinary supports behind his construction of the
emancipating power of aletheic images reveal the ideological nature of his claims to
aesthetic purity.
Norberg-Schulz understood avant-gardism within a modernist framework not
unlike that of Clement Greenberg. By turning inwards to find the common "fonnal
logic" of architecture, landscapes, and thought, he thought that he was guaranteeing the
aesthetic integrity of modernism, keeping it safely autonomous from the "debased" mass
culture he identified modernity with. But, in subscribing to a singular definition of
modernity, Norberg-Schulz deceived even himself. He believed the "purity" of the
Aletheic Image to be outside of modernity's contradictions and deceptions, and safely
began calling himself a "post-modernist." Like all modernists, he subscribed to the myth
that his brand of avant-gardism emerged from an "original" source that was purely
outside of bourgeois culture.
By the time Norberg-Schulz was writing his books about the "essential"
experience of Genius Loci, architectural discourse on avant-gardism had radically
changed. Architects across Europe and America were trying to resuscitate other 19 th and
early 20th century notions of avant-gardism as a practice that engaged critically with the
fonns of caritalist culture in an effort to be a part of a wider movement of progressive
social and political change. In different ways, architects like Renzo Piano, Richard
See also Mumford's comments on Sert's use of Ortega y Gasset as a defense of Gideon'8 "New
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Rogers, Frank Gehry, Rem Koolhaas, and the Archigram group eagerly put their
practices at the service of political agendas in an attempt to influence people's life. For
Norberg-Schulz, their architecture was a "meaningless exercise" in the fullest sense of
the expression. Given that their buildings did not resemble "reality" (read the Genius
Loci) they could not say anything intelligible about it.
Thus, Norberg-Schulz assumed an anti-avant-garde position, holding fast to his
belief that only architecture that emulated the Genius Loci, could give meaning to
contemporary life. For him, the 1970s neo-avant-gardes were only extensions other
"rootless" practices such as architectural functionalism. In his opinion, the fascination
with technology was responsible for the destruction of architects' ability to recognize the
elemental order of particular places. Functionalist architecture, thought Norberg-Schulz,
resulted in the erosion of environmental order, and therefore in the progressive alienation
of people slowly deprived of architectural ways to identify with the world.
By accusing the neo-avant-garde of "alienating" society, Norberg-Schultz made
architects responsible for a great deal of humanity's problems, from urban violence to the
erosion of morals. The upshot was that "rooted" architects could also "save" humanity by
helping to bring order back into the world. The architect's attentiveness to the
environment was an index of his or her ethical responsibility to humanity. For Norberg-
Schulz this attentiveness was to be a sort of talmudic exegesis, a careful fonnal
interpretation of the environment's primordial structure. A "gathering," to use Norberg-
Schulz's tenninology, of the genius loci that could help bring a1x>ut a new more
"authentic" era of humanity.
Wionumentality" and a new American urbanism (pp 13 t, 206)
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Fig: Norberg-SChulz's illustration of how the forms of the natural terrain
surrounding Rome are "gathered" Into the city through architectural
mimesis. This Is how "authentic" meaning was brought Into the
"Inauthentic" city. From Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci: Towards a
Phenomenology of Architecture, (New York: RlzzolI, 1980), P 144
For Norberg-Schulz, the authentic fulfillment of human life required proper
individuation, that is, the achievement of individual identity. Humans achieved identity
when they felt "at home," when they recognized the fundamental order of their
environment, and by extrapolation, of their world.
D. The practice of anti-avant-gardism
Norberg-Schulz offered a new doctrine of "visual work" to architectural
pedagogy. By the 1980s, an architecture student's ability to "see" was regarded in many
European and American schools as more valuable than his or her ability to read. Through
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vision the student "participated" in the meaning of building, by grasping its immediately
meaningful "essence." ''The building is not a sign," he stated categorically, "it does not
portray anything, but rather brings a world into view. The phenomenological approach to
architectural meaning therefore implies a return to the image, in the original sense of the
word. ,,81 This pronouncement was aimed at contemporaneous conversations about the
language and meaning of architecture, which Norberg-Schulz deemed to have
inappropriately identified the symbol (i.e. transitory styles) as the locus of meaning, and
failed to recognize that meaning was "given" as Image. Norberg-Schulz charged against
Postmodern architects who copied the fonns of the past. 82
Norberg-Schulz's theory of meaning was contingent on the literal conflation of a
series of tenns: the genius loci with the experience of the aetheic Image; the aletheic
image with the visual perception of order; and visual order with meaning. Norberg-
Schulz demonstrates this in his books, where the photograph lays claim to the status of
self-evident truth (or aletheic Image). The larldscape was for him more orderly, visually
speaking, than the modern metropolis, and therefore more meaningful. In addition, it was
"there" before humanity and therefore its meaning was more "primal." In the city, one
found only second order "interpretations" of the original meanings "given" in nature. As
the primordial source of meaning, the landscape was for Norberg-Schulz the place where
humanity should continuously return in order to 1) infuse the production of new
architecture with meaning, and 2) to help understand the memories of meanings
preserved in old buildings.
81 Christian Norberg-Schulz, "Architecture," manuscript for the Encyclopedia o/Communication
commissioned by 51. Martin's Press9 p 12. Located in the Christian Norberg-Schulz archive, Oslo.
82 Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology 0/Architecture, (New York: Rizloli,
1980) P 182.
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With the fonnulation of the aletheic Image, also came an intensification of
Noberg-Schu)z's despise for the modem city. It was a feeling shared by popular
sentiment in Europe and the United States where city centers were rapidly decaying, and
crime statistics were rising. Since his early days as a teacher of architectural fonn,
Norberg-Schulz had been horrified by the "visual chaos" of the modem city. By the late
1970s, he associated urban visual chaos with the destruction the Image of the city, and
thus to the loss of meaningful life. If architecture did not reach back to the primordial
spring of meaning, then it would become mere production for its own sake, at the service
of the ever-expanding system of technology and consumer culture.
Alienation is in our opinion first of all due to man's loss of identification
with the natural and man-made things which constitute his environment.
This loss also hinders the process of gathering, and is therefore a t the root
of our actual 'loss of place.' Things have become mere objects of
consumption which are thrown away after use, and nature in general is
treated as a 'resource.' Only ifman regains his ability of identification and
gathering, we may stop this destructive development.83
Until his later years, Norberg-Schulz remained optimistically convinced that
through his teachings he could help architect "see" the meaningful Images of nature.
Every semester, Norberg-Schulz held his first lecture on the architectural history survey
course at the National Folk Museum in Oslo, before a collection of historical fannhouses.
Students were asked to shed their "intellectual baggage" and experience the essential
meaning of those buildings. When the farms were built, argued Norberg-Schulz, they had
"set-to-work" the rural landscape and "gathered" its primordial meaning. In their original
locations they had been part of a larger Image, or genius loci. Having now been
transported into the city each hut preselVed the original meanings as a symbol, whose
83 Ibid. P 168.
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presence referred to the absent landscape and kept its aletheic image alive~ For Norberg-
Schulz, this "setting-to-wort" was the only "authentic" architectural practice, a 1)'pe of
anti-avant-garde resistance to the debased and meaning-starved modem cosmopolitan
culture.
In Genius Loci, Norberg-Schulz developed an awkward system in which meaning
is treated as a natural resource that can be extracted through architectural work and
literally transported to areas in need. According to Norberg-Schulz, the Image is not
equally distributed across the world. Certain areas of the worldpo~more of it
because their particular topographical morphology has a clearer visual structure. In these
areas an Image fonns itself, and "it brings about an 'increase in meaning'; that is, opens
up a world by combining various and scattered elements into a unitary vision.n 84 When
architecture is "correctly" inserted in this "natural" environment, it increases the visual
cohererlCe oftJte existing Image and thus 'adds' to the meaningful 'content' of the world.
Norberg-Schulz considered runl vernacular architecture to be the sort of ucorrect~'
adaptation of architecture within the landscape. Thus, in this system, rural ~hitecture,
like the honest peasant, perfonns the primordial labor ofextracting meaning from
"nature" by adding to the Image. Norberg-Schulz recognized that as soon as a building
was built it became part of a cultural historical reality. Therefore, a dimension of the
building would be transitory, stylistic, or symbolic. This symbolic dimension of
architecture embodied the cultural "form of lifen of a particular epoch butdid not produce
any meaning, it simply 6'used" or "preserved" the meaning given in the primordial Image.
In this sense the symbol was not a sign with a mere indicative function. 1be symbol had
84 Christian Norberg-Schulz, f1Architecture," manuscript for the Encyclopedia ofCOIIUIUUIicmioIJ
commissioned by St. Martin's Press, p 12. Christian Norberg-Schulz archive. Oslo.
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presence, and thus referred to the absent Image. Norberg-Schulz regarded the symbol as
the architectural mechanism through which culture collected or "gathered" and
"contained" the meanings of the Image, and literally moved them to another location.
In the city, for example, multifarious meanings are brought together,
meanings that originally were discovered in other places. Thus the Greeks
brought the temple from its holy place in nature into the polis. With
translocation the Image loses its original function and becomes a symbol
or monumentum, something that reminds. The Greeks regarded the
goddess Mnemosyne (memory) as the mother of the muses. Mnemosyne
was herself the daughter of the earth and the sky, which suggests that the
memories giving rise to art center on our understanding of their
relationship. Architecture keeps and visualizes the most basic properties of
earth and sky and therefore becomes the "mother of the arts. 8
In reading Genius Loci it is impossible to miss Norberg-Schulz's treatmertl of the
rural as the sphere of authentic production of meaning, and of the urban as the sphere of
inauthentic consumption of meaning. For Norberg-Schulz, meaning was "gathered" in
nature as architecture "set-into-work" the landscape. Then, it was trans-located to the
meaning-starved city through symbols. There, meaning was cheapened in urban
exchanges and eventually devalued into a mere memory:
The meanings are inherent in the world, and are in each case to a high
extent derived from the locality as a particular manifestation of 'world. '
The meanings may however be used by the economic, social, political and
cultural forces. This use consists in a selection among possible meanings.
The selection therefore tells us about the actual conditions, but the
meanings have deeper roots. 86
In order to fully account for Norberg-Schulz's appropriation of Heidegger in his
visual pedagogy, it is important to stress their shared abhorrence of the city, and their
common belief that "authentic" work happened in the countl)'side. Both Heidegger and
85 Ibid. p 13.
86 Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology ofArchitecture, (New York: Rizzoli.
1980). p 170.
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Norberg-Schulz were part of broader social and cultural reactionary movements
challenged modem society and its technologies. Heidegger's horizon was Nazism. For
Norberg-Schulz it was a secularized fonn of spiritualism that sought meaning in ancient
obscurantist practices.87 Both men were profoundly convinced that traditional rural life
was a bastion of resistance to the alienation lived in modem urban centers. Against
academic traditions, each sought to "ground" their professions in the country, not in the
city. Heidegger believed that true philosophical thinking participated in rural life through
"honest" work -although in his more fanatical moments as a Nazi, he claimed that mental
work had to be accompanied by physical labor. Norberg-Schulz was certain that
architects belonged in the country. Thus, he elevated visual competency to the level of
87 The mystical element in Norberg-Schulz's theory of genius loci cannot be separated from his deep
religiosity. Norberg-Schulz converted to Catholicism in the 19508, and would attempt to leave Norway for
to join a Catholic academic community in Texas on several occasions. Norberg-Schulz was profoundly
displeased with the policies of the Norway's 1970s socialist government, which he felt was destroying all
forms of traditional life, and promoting the expansion of chaotic urban development. While Norberg-
Schulz was finishing Genius Loci he became convinced that Norway was existentially bankrupt. In 1978
he resolved to leave the country for either England or the United States. In a letter to James Patrick,
Academic Dean of the University of Dallas, dated Oslo, June 9, 1978. (Christian Norberg-Schulz archive,
Oslo) who would eventually offer him a position that same year, Norberg-Schulz described the causes of
his discontent and his hopes for a new life in America:
Our visit to Dallas really meant a turning point in our lives. We came to understand more
clearly our spiritual, human and professional isolation in this "socialist" country where
cultural values hardly count any more, and where we experience how the environment
and the schools tend to break down what we tty to implant in our children.
In another letter dated Oslo, February 6, 1978 (now located in the Christian Norberg-Schulz archive, Oslo),
and addressed to Mrs. Gail Thomas, Director of the Center for Civic Leadership of The University of
Dallas, Norberg-Schulz added:
It was interesting to see that it [The University of Dallas] is a Catholic institution. Being
myself a Roman Catholic, I have always hoped to have the occasion to work with people
that share my values. In Europe that is not easy toda~; as you will know we experience a
general disintegration of all traditional forms of life. 7
Norberg-Schulz's plans to leave Norway never materialized. By the late 1980s he felt totally isolated and
bitter. In a letter to his wife dated February 16, 1988 (now located in the Christian Norberg-Schulz archive,
Oslo) he bemoaned:
I really start to feel that I am entering a "late" phase in life, and ever more that "my world"
belongs to the past. (This feeling is also strengthened by the current tendencies in architecture,
which seem to contradict evetything I have be [sic.] ttying to develop during my career. Now
everything explodes and becomes a completely empty game. We have also experienced this lately
in school during a long and somewhat unpleasant discussion on "information technology," that is,
data, which now seems to be the only thing. It is even supported by [SvelTe] Fehn. who proves to
be a kind of utopian modernist).
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physical labor, considering it as honorable as a peasant's tilling of the land, and necessary
for the productive earth.
Botll Norberg-Schulz and Heidegger shared a deep affinity for the rural folk life
of their countries, and considered it the "home" of their people's Spirit. During their
mature years, both spent long months living in traditional huts in rural areas. Heidegger
spent his free time in his Todtnauberg hut, in Germany's Black Forest, from the mid
1930s onward. From 1988 to 1993 Norberg-Schulz and his family rented a traditional
Norwegian Fann, or "Stabbur" at Minnesjord where they would spend the summers.
They received guests in folkloric dress and engaged in minor peasant work, such as
cutting the grass by hand. It is very possible that Norberg-Schulz's decision to live in the
country was in part driven by the desire to live or be like Heidegger. He was a member of
the Heidegger society and was aware of the importance Heidegger ascribed to life in the
country.
Out of Martin Heidegger's commentators Michael Zimmennan has provided the
clearest analysis of how Heidegger's own scorn for the city is related to roth his
philosophy and to his historical socio-political reality.88 Although Heidegger's criticism
of technology and modernity is not made explicit until the early thirties, Zimmerman
argues that his contempt for contemporary culture is already apparent in the account of
ueverydayness" that he provides in Being and Time (1927). There, Heidegger presented
human existence as the "horizon" or "clearing" in which the being of entities could make
themselves manifest. His ultimate goal was to explain the relationship between
temporality and the human understanding of the being of entit.ies. To achieve this,
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Heidegger begun by attempting to describe the "essential" aspects of hmnan existence.
"Everydayness" referred to what Heidegger considered to be the "essential" condition of
Dasein's "falleness," that is, of being always already thrown into a social and historical
reality with which Dasein must deal in the process of individuation. For Zimmennan,
however, Heidegger's description of Dasein' s everyday falleness was circumscribed by
the horizon of Heidegger's own political and social contemporary culture, and was
therefore more a commentary on industrial-urban society than an "essential" aspect of
human existence. To drive his point home, Zimmennan relates Heidegger's own yearning
to overcome his experience of isolation in industriai -urban society to the major themes of
vo/kisch authors --for instance, Heidegger's desire to help the Gennan Yolk spirit find a
"home" for itself.
It was in the urban metropolis, and in the civic life it harbored, that, for
Heidegger, the process of loss of familiarity and meaning in human existence was most
intense. "Publicness" appears in Being and Time as particularly undesirable aspect of
Dasein's "everydayness," and is often connected to Dasein's mode of being in "civil
society." For Heidegger, such a society constitutes itself through "idle talk" (Gerede) a
fonn of "groundless" language where nothing is understood in an "original" way, and
where understanding is consequently uprooted. 89 Gennans living in big cities were
therefore always "distracted" by an insatiable thirst for the "new," searching aimlessly for
new places, people and goods. 90 According to Heidegger, public transportation,
newspapers, and other big city experiences forced Dasein to have to seek its own identity
88 See Michael E. Zimmerman 9 Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art,
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990).
89 Mart;n Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper
Collins Publishers, 1962) pp 212-214.
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and understanding of reality in foons established by the "dictatorship" of the anyone self
(Das Man). The metropolis was a "groundless" world where everyone became the same,
where every man was indistinguishable, where Dasein lost its originality and became
ellslaved as "raw material" to be used up by the self-advancement of productionist
metaphysics.91
Heidegger did not provide evidence to support his claims about urban life. He
expected other "great minds" to agree with his own readings of reality. Zimmennan
notes, that Heidegger excluded direct references to the bourgeois reality surrounding him,
and to which the connotations of his descriptions seem to point, in order to mah"1tain his
claim that he was speaking about "essential" aspects of existence. ForZimmennan,
Heidegger's commentaries on Spengler, which he fonnulated during his Freiburg lectures
of 1929-30, are the fITst instance where Heidegger openly expresses his spurn for the
modem metropolis, and his understanding urbanity as evidence of a life in decline. It was
in the city, he claimed, that the enslavement of man by scientific reason was most intense
and apparent. For Heidegger, the "essential" contribution of Spengler was that he drew
attention to 'The decline of life in and through spirit [Geist]. What spirit, primarily as
reason (ratio), has fonned and created in technology, economics and world-commerce, in
the whole fonnation of Dasein, symbolized by the great city -- that turns against the soul,
against life and smothers it and compels culture to decline and collapse.,,92
During the years of the Third Reich Heidegger became increasingly explicit about
defming "authentic" work in relation to rural peasant work, and in opposition to the kind
90 Ibid. P 216.
91 Ibid. P 164.
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of work carried out in cities. This definition was suspiciously similar to Nazi propaganda,
which emphatically called for the need to restore peasant values rooted in the land.
Zimmennann notes, however, that in a radio address delivered on March 7, 1934 from his
mountain hut near Todtnauberg, Heidegger differentiated his own view of rootedness
from that of "incompetent, city-dwelling Nazi ideologues" who apparently did nothing
but undennine the scholarly teaching about Yolk-character and folklore. The address,
entitled "Why Do We Stay in the Provinces?" was meant as an explanation of
Heidegger's decision to tum down the chair of philosophy at Berlin for a second time. He
argued that his thought belonged in the Black-Forest along with that of the peasants, not
in some isolated study in a city. Heidegger argued that his thinking drew its force and
foundations from that environment: "It is intimately rooted in and related to the life of the
peasants." This aversion towards the city became a constant in Heidegger's thought. In
1961 he lectured at the seven hundredth anniversary of his hometown, Messkirch,
claiming that only in a small town could the sense of "homeland" be preserved before the
alienating erosion of the modem world.
During his years as Rektor of Freiburg University, Heidegger insisted that
students learn the value of manual labor so as to avoid the "dangers" of elitist
intellectualism. Heidegger thought that the Nazi revolution had helped build a brid ge
between mind and hand by putting an end to the exploitation of workers in the name of
science --a dubious claim in light of the then rampant industrial militarization of the
country. In the late 19305, Heidegger thought, it was high time the university itself
rejected the claim that oilly the mind was the source of real work. Hand labor would
92 Martin Heidegger as quoted in Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation MTith Modernity:
Technology, Politics, Art, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) p26.
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provide students with "the basic experience of the hardness, nearness to the soil and tools,
the lawfulness and strictness of the most simple bodily an thereby essential work in the
groUp.,,93
Norberg-Schulz raised vision to a status equitable to Heidegger's manual labor. If
Norberg-Schulz's aletheic image contained the primal meanings of the rural, vision was
how architects "tilled" the image. Through vision, argued Norberg-Schulz, people could
immediately physically "feel" the land and understand its primordial meaning. As with
Heidegger's rnanuallabor, Norberg~Schulz's visual labor was a skill that required
grueling training, and painful bodily exertion to be put into practice. The reward was a
meaningful life:
Creative participation means to concretize the basic meanings under ever
new historical circumstances. Participation, however, can only be obtained
"by great labor." The "threshold" which is the symbol of participation, is
in fact "turned to stone" by "pain." Participation presupposes sympathy
with things, to repeat the word of Goethe, and sympathy necessarily
implies suffering. In our context sympathy with things means that we
learn to see.94
Norberg-Schulz assigned emancipating power to the immediate experiences
allegedly achieved through skilled visual labor. He believed that through this aesthetic
experientialism architects could not only "set-to-work" places and extract their primordial
meanings, but also distribute them to needy places through architecture. Thus, they could
constitute a powerful elite capable of moving humanity into a better, more structured and
93 Zimmerman points out the similarity between Heidegger's thinking about the mind-hand union, and the
Nazi party line. In Mein Kampf, Hitler stated 47he blacksmith stands again at his anvil, the farmer walks
behind his plough, and the scholar sits in his study.. all with the same effort and the same devotion to their
duty." Heidegger echoed these thoughts in saying that Uthe knowing of pure science is absolutely not
distinguished from the knowing of the peasant, the lumberjack, the earth- and mine-worker, the hand-
worker." See Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with l"odernity: Technology, Politics,
Art, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) pp 69-70.
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meaningful world. To become leaders, architects would require training in the skill of
vision. Since his youth Norberg-Schulz associated seeing with proficiency in the
"language offonns": "The experience of architecture has to be based upon training [... ]
this demand has nothing ulmatural to it. 'To learn to see,' therefore, aims at
understanding a fonnallanguage.,,95
IV. Conclusion
The success of Genius Loci turned Norberg-Schulz into a global household name
in architectural circles. He received letters from admirers and translators from every
continent (except Africa) on a weekly basis. At a moment when the globalization of
economic market forces was threatening to undercut small architectural finns, and to
limit large commissions to equally large corporate international fInnS, Norberg-Schulz
helped architects regain a sense of empowennent. His aletheic Image returned a sense of
purpose to practicing architects everywhere. As the primal source of all existential
meaning, the very authenticity of life rested upon it. Norberg-Schulz called upon
architects to help bestow upon humanity the "gift" of that fundamental meaning upon a
world that had been allegedly voided of it by technology. The claim that the aletheic
Image was disclosed immediately through fonnal order, gave visually competent
architects a key advantage in perceiving it and providing it. Thu s, Norberg-Schulz
helped universalize the ClAM dream of an elite class of Modem architects guiding
society forward. Every architect could now be a leader in bringing about the new age of
existential plenitude, if he or she first learned the visual language of truth as carefully laid
94 Christian Norberg-Schulz9 Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology ofArchitecture, (New York: RizlOli 9
1980), P 185.
9S Christian Norberg-Schulz, Intentions in Architecture, (Cambridge9 MA: The M.I.T. Press9 1965) p 197.
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out by Norberg-Schulz. The ontogenetic character of the aletheic Image required, in
theory, a complete surrender of the architect to its will. The tdsk of the architect was to
help bring imperfect nature to the primordial status of the Image, to "set-to-work" places
towards the telos of the genius loci.
It is no coincidence that Genius Loci became popular at the same time when a
visible return to the religious dimension on a world scale. From Ne\v Age spiritualism, to
religious fundamentalisms, to occultism, to various foons of religious "sensitivity" in
scholarly thought, the early 19808 saw the emergence of "Faith" out of its more
secularized sublimated forms. Slavoj ZiZek has helped analyze how these contemporary
mysticisms, although apparently at the service of a new respect for otherness, in fact
helped perpetuate and intensify racism and violence by weakening the project of critical
philosophy, upon which liberal democracy and its values are built. 96 The career of
Norberg-Schulz epitomizes, at level ofthe architectural discipline, ZiZek's larger cultural
claim that the necessary obverse of a society that asswnes it has achieved universalized
reflexivity is the "impotence of interpretation." The functionalist project to produce a
completely rationalized environment could prosper only to the degree that it rested on a
minimal pre-rational support which evaded its apprehellsion. ClAM's universalization of
functionalism therefore required sustaining (if not producing) its own inefficiency, a
domain which could pennanently elude it and thus perpetuate the need for its
advancement. Norberg-Schulz pushed the functionalist project to the limit where the
attempt to achieve total reflexivity in the underslanding of fonn resulted in the
paradoxical re-naturalization of fonn. There is, in other words, an irruption of the brute
96 Slavoj Zi:iek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For, (London and
New York: Verso, 2000).
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Real within the project of reason before which reason itself must remain silent. Thus, the
violent appearance of immediacy, of the aletheic Image, foils all critical interpretation.
The discourse on perception that Norberg-Schulz deployed to describe the
immediate apprehension of the aletheic Image did not (and could not) provide evidence
as to the Image's claim to Truth. Ultimately, the Image itself stood as its own evidence,
grounding itself in its own immediacy. I have attempted to de-center the totalitarian
tendencies of Norberg-Schulz's aletheic Image by presenting its indebtedness to
historical realities outside of itself. The aletheic Image conjoined aspects of post-war
ClAM discourse, such as the desire to rethink the functionalist fonnallanguage of
Modernism in tenns of nature and history, and to introduce a loosely defined humanism
into practice that would encourage attentiveness to the emotional and psychological
needs of humanity. No less important in granting credibility to the Image's Truth claims
was Norberg-Schulz's late 19705 re-interpretation of the 1960s architectural search for
fonnal order as Heidegger's post 1935 project to tnmscend Western metaphysics and
bring about a new epoch of authentic human existence. The aletheic Image's claim to
immediately given Truth solved the aporias of Posbnodemism's historical quotationism
by displacing the origin of form onto nature as the primal given. Part of the success of
Gellius Loci is that it gave continuity and temporary resolution to a series of historical
architectural anxieties alx>ut its diminishing role in society. More problematically,
because the brutal immediacy of the aletheic Image foiled all critical projects, it
functioned as a place of exception where the Postmodem architect, tolerant to all fonns
and histories, could act out his or her repressed Modernist prejudice against the
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"superficial" game he or she felt forced to "play" by the markets, by theorists, or, more
generally by the project of reason.
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I. Introduction
After graduating from the Architectural Association in London in 1956, KeDDeth
Frampton (b. 1930) joined the British Anny's Royal Engineers, experiencing first b1Ind.
the trauma of the United Kingdom's retreat from empire. Bankrupt, without the militaly
strength or political wilL the British Labour gcv~mmentbegun conceding to pressure
from the colonies at the end of World War II. I Frampton woukl mature politically as an
architect and critic in the context of a wider resbUctwing of the Labour party. His
Marxism, which he would trumpet throughout his career as the basis for his critique of
modem architecture, must be read in the context dtis British political refoon and its
intersections with architectural culture. In the course of his life-long project -to initiate
an architectural practice that could cure the crises of Modemity-, Frampton interpreted
the core values of New Left politics and the British Arts and Crafts according his own
ends only (as expressive ofa building practice irrespective of intention't and as
"grounded" or "authentic" culture), when they were none of these tbiggse His reading
bespeaks a modernist fantasy about a practice innocently detached from the
contradictions of modernity and its multiple fulsifications of self. Frampton thought. to
have found evidence of this fantasy in the "tectonic" aesthetic. However, by placing on
I On August 15 1947. Britain officially left India. arguably its most treasured colony. Bmr.a and Ceylon.
later to become Sri Lanka. followed in 1948. A.t almost the same time" the mandate in Trans-Jordan was
renninated, and Egypt wa.~ evacuated (except the Suez Canal territory). British troops left Palestine in
1948, coinciding with the proclamatioo of the state of Israel. In 1956 their black. African cclonies gained
independence. Other European empires also dismantled during aad after the 19S0s.1n July 1954. France
and the Viet Minh signed the fragile Geneva Accords partitioning VietlWn into a communist Democratic
Republic to the North, and a Franco-American backed p.ssociated State to the Sooth. However. France
would remain engaged in wars for national liberation in Vietnam" as well as in Morocco. Tunisia, and
the tectonic aesthetic the burden of a community free from the complexities of the
mcdem Self, Frampton abandoned the politics he claimed to uphold, and laid bare the
ideological nature of his thought. Frampton's dream of pure alterity to calture preceded
his engagement with phenornenology in 1983, and detennined the teons on which he
would read Paul Ricoeur's existentialism, or so I will argue.
In 1956, the year Frampton received his architecture degree, Soviet Premier
Nikita Khruschev's (1894-1971) secret speech 10 the Twentieth Party Congress of the
Communist Party exposed some of the Stalinist atrocities of Soviet life, and set off a
profound ethical and political crisis for communist intellectuals. The address also
included reflections on foreign policy, in which Khruschev expressed the importance of
decolonization to the outcome of the Cold War. 2 In Britain, Left wing intellectuals read
t~.e rise of post-colonial nations as part and parcel of the pluralisation of identities evident
in their modem cities -3 collusion that would detennine Frampton's advocacy of urban
"enclaves" of identity.. The British New Left3 emerged in the late 1950s as a re-
Algeria well into the 1960s. the decade when Belgium. Portugal and The Netherlands were all divested of
their overseas possessions.
2 Many of the nations emerging in the wake of World War IT became theaters of antagonistic Cold War
politics, with the United States and the Soviet Union trying to shape the nature of new states under duress.
either towards Western style democracies or towards Soviet or Maoist models of communisfJn. ~Jik.ita
Khrushchev believed that the global range of the U.S.S.R.'s nuclear arsenal had made "peaceful
coexistence" with the USA a reality. The future opportunities for Socialism, argued Khrushchev. would
derive from the struggles of coloniai peoples. He therefore committed his administration to the support of
wars of "national liberationn across the world. In his 1958 state of the Union address US President Dwight
D. Eisenhower, responded to the Soviet threats with rhetoric that expanded the missile race to all aspects of
cultural life: "Trade, economic development. military power, arts~ science.. education. the who !e world of
ideas-all are harnessed to this same chariot of expansion. The Soviets are. in short, waging tota~ cold
war." By the time Frampton left the British A:my's Royal Engineers in i 958, the United States Congress
had passed the uNational Defense Education Act:' accelerating weapcns programs~ and deploying
intermediate-range missiles in his nat!ve England (as well as in Italy, and Turkey). See "International
Relations: Total Cold War and the diffusion of power, 1957-72" in Encyclopaedia Britannica,
~ww.brittanica.com,2001), http://www.search.eb.<.:om/bol/topic?eu=108378&sctn=2&pm=1.
3 The first British New Left is generally associated with Edward P. Thomps.Jn, Raymond Willians, Stuart
Hall, Perry Anderson. John Rex. Peter Worsley, John Saville Charles Taylor, Raphael Samue!, Jean
McCrindle, Michaei Barratt Brown, and others. See Michael Kenny, The Firs! New Left6· British
IntellectWlls After Stalin, (London: Lawrence 8£ Wishart, 1995).
349
orientation of Marxist politics, away from the party line of the USSR, and towards a
greater sensitivity for the diverse interests of local constituencies.
In the hands of one of the New Left's most prominent member, the social
historian and political activist Edward P. Thompson (1924-1993), this attentiveness to the
local developed into a celebration of grassroots mobilization within c.,il society. In his
influential book The Making o/the English Working Class (1963), Thompson critiqued
the prevailing Marxist analyses of economic forces as directly productive of historical
change, and of 19th century class consciousness as a correlative of industrial systems of
production. Thompson argued that Marxists had turned the working class into a static
object of study, and missed the particular interests, experiences, and agency of
individuals who struggled to create a collective identity for themselves. The popularity
of Thompson's book initiated a wide scholarly interest in a new type of history narrated
"fonn below."
British architectural audiences had been attuned to the relevance of Thompson's
writing to architecture since the mid 1950s. Thompson's first book, entitled William
Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary (1955) explored how Morris, a 19th-century socialist
and leader of the Arts and Crafts Movement, had been able to juxtapose a creative
practice with engagement in political reality. It was precisely the perceived loss of this
organic relation between aesthetic practices and political engagement that led mid-
century British critics like Reyner Banham to argue that the architectural avant-garde, as
defmed by ClAM, 'Nas in crisis, and to strike against modem historicist revivals s~ch as
those of Ernesto Rogers and the Italian Neo-Liberty. Young British architects like Alison
and Peter Smithson argued for a "participatory" architecture more attuned to people's
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desires and pennissive of the common folk's expressions of "spontaneous" creativity. As
technical editor ofArchitectural Design between 1962 and 1965, Frampton not only
became exposed to this discourse, but also played a crucial role in its dissemination.
Attention to the "participation" of the user in shaping the building was of course not a
British invention. The concept was often invoked by ClAM architects, like Arne Korsmo
and Christian Norberg-Schulz. The key difference was that when the British New Left
architects spoke of "participation" they meant, in most cases, the involvement of the
disenfranchised working class in making the building, not that of the elite bourgeoisie.
This attention to how the working class made itself and participated in the creation of its
environment reflected the broad cultural influence of Thompson in leftist thought.
Frampton would later reiterate the importance that Thompson ascribed to William
Morris and the Arts and Crafts movement. The first chapter of Frampton's influential
Modern Architecture: A Critical History (1980) opened with a quote by William Morris,
and proceeded with a narrative that linked Augustus W. N. Pugin (1812 -1852) and
William Richard Lethaby (1857-193 i) to the origin of the heroic functionalist period of
the modem architectural avant-garde.4 Frampton's narrative reflected an exceptionally
British view of architectural history, which had been previously crafted by the likes of
Nikolaus Pevsner, and which went explicitly against the more canonical modernist
architectural history of authors such a Siegfried Giedion.5 Unlike Frampton, Giedion
4 See Chapter I "News from Nowhere: England 1836-1924u in Kenneth Frampton. Modern Architecture: A
Critical History. (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd. 1980). This chapter opens part II of the book, which is
the history of the modern movement properly speaking. Part I is devoted to a general description of
cultural, territorial, and technical changes in 19th century European life.
5 Sigfried Giedion's Space, Time and Architecture (1941) can be taken as one such example of how the
avant-garde was written into the canoaical history of modern architecture. The book is all the more relevant
here since Frampton's attribution of a British origin to the historical avant-garde went expHcitiy against the
grain of Giedion's better judgment.. Giedion had cautioned against considering William Morris to be the
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situated the origin of the architectural avant-garde in continental European, and identified
it with such figures as the Belgian Victor Horta (1896-1947), the Dutch Hendrik P.
Berlage (1856-1934), and the Viennese Otto Wagner (1841-1918). Even the canon of art
history held the origin of the avant-garde to be French, not British -the Realism of
Gustave Courbet (1819-1877) being accepted as the beginning of an art produced with a
consciousness for social emancipation.
Although Frampton's history would appear to radically revise conventional
wisdom, the identification of Lethaby with the origin of modem functionalism was in fact
the norm in 19508 Britain. The greater part of the architectural profession in the United
Kingdom wanted nothing to do with "European" functionalism, opting instead to defend
their "Englishnessn by continuing the tradition of the picturesque and Victorian or
Georgian architecture.6 By the 1950s, however, the London County Council (Lee), the
city's influential municipal authority, had come to embrace the architectural aesthetics,
although not the planning methods, of functionalism. Moreover, the Lee's long history,
dating back to its auspicious beginnings in 1889, was closely associated not just with
Labour politics (given that Progressives dominated the agency until 1907), but also with
the towering figure of Lethaby, who had served in the agency as Art Inspector and been
precursor to the late 19th and early 20th century avant-gardes simply because his work had preceded that of
the continental masters. Giedion writes:
Does this parallel mean that van de Velde simply followed the example Morris had
already set? We do not think so. The parallel springs from the fact that the disorder
introduced into human life by industry made itself felt in England Inore than thirty years
earlier than on the Continent. Identical conditions led to identical reactions.
See Sigfried Giedion, Space. Time and Architecture: The GroK'Ih ofa NeMJ Tradition, (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1962), p 293.
6 The question of Englishness was inescapable in architectural circles of the 1950s and 1960s. When
American architectural historian Vincent Scully visited the United Kingdom to study some new buildings
by James Stirling, Alison and Peter Smithson, and the London County Council, he felt compelled t\J open
his review with the following remark: "Even worse, I was struck, like all foreign art historians from
Fociilon and Frey to Pevsner and Boney, by the Englishness of the whole business, a topic already well
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responsible for drastic changes to art and architectural education during the 1890s. As
Labour lost its hold on the Lee, there was an increase in attacks from the right on the
municipal authority's leftist ideological underpinnings, as well as on the functionalist
aesthetics associated with them. For instance, H.S. Goodhart-Rendel, an arciiitectural
historian who was at one time president of the Royal Institute of British Architects
(RIBA), attacked both Lethaby and functionalism in the same page of his book English
Architecture Since the Regency (1955):
Functionalism may be regarded as a close architectural analogue of
Puritanism, with its insistance upon moral values, its distate for aesthetic
values, its righteous slow-wittedness, and its abhorrence of gaiety. Like
Puritanism it offered the consolations of assured virtue to those whom a
.. naughty world might otherwise abash [... ] It was first preached in England
by Professor W.R. Lethaby many years ago, but enjoyed no vogue until it
was restated more recently by M. Le Corbusier, and by him put into
practice [... ] Although the theory of Functionalism was Lethaby's and
therefore English, it nevertheless seemed for many years as though the
country of its origin was the only part of Europe in which it never was to
be put into practice. If in Lethaby's own strange buildings all was done
for convenience and nothing for looks, the convenience must have been
that of the builder rather than that of the occupier. 7
To properly understand Frampton's later career as an architectural historian and
critic, it is important to emphasize how during his early training as an architect he
identified closely with the Lee. Between 1960 and 1965, Frampton worked as associate
in the London architectural fmn Douglas Stephen and Partners. During those years,
Frampton designed a housing block in Bayswater, London, which he published in
Architectural Design in 1964.8 In the project notes, Frampton underscored his design's
treated by those gentlemen and one with which the English themselves must by now be thoroughly bored."
See Vincent Scully, "New British Buildings," in Architectural Design, n. 6, v. 34 (June 19(4), pp 266.
7 H.S. Gcxxihart-Rendel, English Architecture Since the Regency, (London: Constable, 1955), p 254-255.
8 Kenneth Frampton. HMaisonettes in Bayswater, London. by Douglas Stephen and Partners, with Kenneth
Frampton. Associate Architect, and R.J. Crocker & Associates, Engineers," in Architectural Design. n. 9. v.
34 (September 1964). pp 442-448.
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abidance to the LCC guidelines for housing, and made special note of how the apartments
followed the preferred LCC "scissors section" in their staircase layout. Frampton's
enthusiasm with the LCC even led him to design the cover for the September 1964 issue
of Architectural Design based on an axonometric of the "scissors section."
Fig: Maisonettes In Bayswater, London, 1964. Designed by Douglas
Stephen and Partners, with Kenneth Frampton as Associate Architect.
From Architectural Design, n. 9, v. 34(September 1964),p 444.
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Fig: Frampton's axonometrlc showing the LCC scissors section of a unit In
his Maisonettes In Bayswater, London, 1964. Designed by Douglas
Stephen and Partners, with Kenneth Frampton as Associate Architect.
From Architectural Design, n. 9, v. 34 (September 1964), p 447.
Many of the positions and themes developed by Lethaby about architecture and
architectural education in and around the LCC would serve as a platform from which
Frampton would later develop of his tectonic aesthetic. For instance, Lethaby opposed
the view that architecture was the vehicle for aesthetic self -expression. Rather, he argued
that it should be concerned with service to all classes of men. He defined service as
common productive labor, the opposite of divided industrialized work tasks. Like Ruskin
and Morris, Lethaby asserted that the best way to think about labor was as if it were "art."
In tum, he thought that the best art was "sound ordinary work" in the service of utility.
As the product of the people, this art-work was not only socialist, but also the most
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elemental form of culture.9 Lethaby's definition of art as common culture would becorrl~
the backbone of Frampton's assertion that "authentic" architecture was "essential" culture
in built fonn. For Frampton, the importance of architects like Mario Botta was that they
restrained their personal creative whims in order to emphasize that ·'essential" culture-
which Frampton variously identified with local building types and with the building craft
of local workers. By keeping their nose close to this '·primary" culture, thought
Frampton, architects could "evade the false naturalness of bourgeois ideology" 10 so
despised by Marxists:
Architecture, where it is not rooted in the community and cultivated
equally by both the profession and the people, has little chance of
emerging as a general culture, and the condition s under which the art of
building may attain this stature are subtle in the extreme. II
9 In "Ruskin: Deafeat and Victory:' originally published in HighK-'QY (March, 1917) Lethaby discussed his
understanding of Ruskin'5 contribution to architecture:
Instead of turning over one of a score of volumes to find points to comment on I will
quickly put down what I find in my mind as the general impression of his [Ruskin's]
teaching:
1. Art is not a luxury, it is an essential element in all right work. 'Industry without art is
brutality; life without industry is guilt.' True work is the highest mode of life.
2. Science is not properly an endless heaping up of 'facts,' regardless of fonn an d
direction; choice is involved; it should be wisdom and service.
3. Economics called political need not be identified with a theory of bank balances
regardless of who holds the cheque books, and what the cheques are drawn for. A
reasonable system of economics would be a doctrine of wise production and beneficent
distribution. 'There is no wealth but lite.' The 'orthodox' economist who had forgotten
life, who never heard of quality in workmanship, and neglected even to foresee war,
nearly burst themselves with rage at such simple utterances.
4. Education need not necessarily be conceived as an introduction to the competitive
scramble, it might be a tempering of the human spirit.
5. An artist, poet, or musician is not properly an acrobat engaged in showing off, his
proper office is to teach and inspire.
6. The !and is not a mine for exploitation and a dumping heap for refuse" but it is our
garden home.
7. Property must observe propriety.
8. Quality of life is the end of all rational activity.
The article was reprinted in William Richard Lethaby, Frum in Civilization: Collected Papers on Art and
Labour, (London: Oxford University Press, 1922), pp 183-187. Godfrey Rubens presented a summary of
Lethaby's teachings which closely resembles the above s~t of points in William Richard Lethaby: His Life
and Work 1857-1931, (London: The Architectural Press, 1986), p 269.
JO Kenneth Frampton, uMario Botta and the School of the Ticino," in Oppositions~ n. 14 (Fall 1978), p 26.
11 Ibid. P 2.
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Fig: Ritual tools for building a Japanese Buddhist temple. From Kenneth
Frampton, Studies In Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction In
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 1995), p 15.
Frampton's Marxism was enmeshed from the start with a particularly British
architectural discourse, which identified modern functionalism with progressive New
Left politics, and which maintained that good design was closely associated with the
working of tools and materials. To say that Frampton was fmnly committed to Marxism
is to say that he was also committed to the functionalist aesthetic associated with Labour
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politics in the United Kingdom. As he developed his appreciation of this aesthetic over
the course of his career, he would never cease to associate it with a type of grass-roots
New Left politics, even though the architects, clients, financiers, and builders of the
buildings Frampton admired often wanted nothing to do with socialism.
During his years as technical editor of Architectural Design, Frampton established
personal contacts with a number of emerging American architects, most notably Peter
Eisenman, a recent graduate of Cornell University. At the time, both men felt they shared
a common understanding that architectural fonn preceded style, and that functionalism
thus implied research into the formal language of architecture. 12 In 1964, Eisenman,
founded CASE (Conference of Architects for the Study of Environments), an association
that attempted to establish a rapport among young academics and established New Yark
policy makers, such as Jack Robert'ion, Rich Weinstein, and Geo Passineli, who were
part of Mayor Lindsey's administration and were said to "run" Lower Manhattan.
Eisenman invited Frampton to participate in the group's first meeting at Princeton
University along with Michael Graves, Robert Venturi, Donlyn Lyndon (Charles Moore's
business partner), Stanford Anderson, and Henry Millon.
The conference would cllange Frampton's life. He moved to the United States in
1965 to take a position as Hodder Fellow and visiting professor at Princeton University.
As a result of the lobbying efforts of the CASE members, an exhibition was held at the
New York Musewn of Modem Art bet\veen January 23 and March 13, 1967, entitled
"The New City: Architecture and Urban Renewal," which marked the high watermark of
12 Peter Eisenman began developing his ideas about architectural form as a-priori to style in tTowards an
understanding of Form in Architecture," which Frampton published in Architectural Design, n. 10, v. 33
(October 1963), pp 457-458.
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the group. The disbandment of CASE after the exhibition did not prevent the mem bers
from maintaining a close social network. Eventually, some of them regrouped as IAU
(Institute for Architecture and Urbanism) again under the leadership of Peter Eisenman.
The debates that ensued there led Kenneth Frampton, Peter Eisenman, and Mario
Gandelsonas to found the journal Oppositions in 1973.
Fig: Kenneth Frampton. (Web Image)
Frampton's commitment to rethinking Modernist practice in terms of a Marxist
responsibility towards culture, politics, and ethics, found its clearest expression in his
important theory of Critical Regionalism, which eventually earned him a wide, and in
many ways well deserved, international following. Critical Regionalism posited the
singular importance of architecture in helping human beings establish a common
essential culture and maintain wholesome communal lives. With the idea that
architecture was particularly well suited to SYnthesizing"universal" industrial processes
and "unique" building cultures, Frampton gave new momentum to the Modernist model
of architects as leaders and stewards of society. The immense popularity of this
proposition with architects of the 1980s propelled Frampton to a position of international
distinction unmatched by any other Anglo-American theorist or historian of the late 20th
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century. In tum, Frampton diligently used his access to scholarly journals and presses
around the world to saturate architectural intellectual life with his singular point of view.
II. Frampton identifies the crisis of modernity with "instrumental
reason"
A. Critical Regionalism opposes "instrumental reason"
Fig: illustration of Ernesto Rogers's and the BBPR's Velasca
tower In Milan on the cover of the proceedings from Critical
Regionalism: The Pomona Meeting, ed. Spyros Amourgls,
(Pomona: College of Environmental Design, California State
Polytechnic University, 1991).
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The First International Seminar on Critical Regionalism, held in 1989 at the
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, attested to Frampton's success in
disseminating his New Left inspired theory around the globe. Architects from various
countries eagerly subscribed to it, like Ricardo Legorreta (Mexico), Glenn Murcutt
(Australia), Erich Schneider-Wessling (Gennany), Tadao A~do (Japan), Harry Wolf
(USA), and many others. In his introduction to the proceedings, Spyros Arnourgis,
Professor of Architecture at the unive:rr,ity hosting the even~ unwittingly discussed
Critical Regionalism in terms that echoed the teachings ofE.P. Thompson. One cfthe
points of departure for the conference, stated Arnou rgis, was to strive towards
architectural practices that could help in "preserving grass-roots participation in the
process.,,13 Arnourgis's definition of Critical Regionalism accepted Frampton's
I~thabian identification of grass-roots work with elemental or "rooted" culture, as well as
his Gennan post-romantic differentiation between Zivilization, signifying materialism
and superficiality, and the less brilliant but more profound Kultur. "By the opposition
between Civilization and Culture," stated Frampton, " I intend, after Paul Ricoeur in his
essay 'universal Civilization and National Culture,' the resistance to locally grounded
cultural fonn as opposed to the phenomenon of universal technology.,,14
I will return in brief to the symposium, and later to Frampton's invocation of the
French philosopher Paul Ricoeur in his articulation of Critical Regionalism. But prior to
discussing this intersection with phenomenology, I would like to point out the historicity
of the oppositional equation "culture vs. civilization" that activates Frampton's theory, as
13 Spyros Amourgis, "Introduction," in Crirical Regionalism: The Pomona Meeting -- Proceedings, 00.
Spyros Amourgis, (Pomona: College of Environmental Design, California State Polytechnic University,
1991), pix.
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well as smile of its problematic Pl\~suppositions, which precede his tum to philosophy.
Although enonnously popular among architects, Frampton's Critical Regionalism was
not without its critics in the academy. Alan Colqu,houn (b. 1921), the British architect~
critic, and Professor of Architectural History and 1beory at Princeton University~
objected (without naming names) to Frampton's hypostatization ofculture as essential
origin. According to Colquhoun, the old Gennan leon z;vilizat;on acquired the
connotation of "technological society" during the late 19th century, in opposition to pre-
industrial social values which became identified with Kultur. "But both in the earlier and
the later senses, Zivilization represented rational and universal as against the instinctual,
autochtonous, and particular."ls Colquhoun found echoes of this opposition in the work
of critics (i.e. Frampton) who read modernity as constituted in a split between the
intellectual (understood as a collusion of the pl0jects of reason and technology) and the
emotional (believed to be the project ofUmtuitive" culture). ForColquhoun~ the
historical uses of the tenn uregionaiismU exhibited an essentialist logic that attributed an
elemental "core" to all cultures. According to this argument~ Frampton's assertion that
culture was "there,u available to be discovered and put to good~ in 6'resisting"
civilization, appears as an ideological assertion.
In an obvious way, Frampton replaced the old dyad by substituting "critical"" for
Zivilization and "regional" for Kultur. 1be aim of Critical Regionalism was to seriously
limit or even break up the perceived autonomy ofZivilization-related phenomena (such as
reason, capitalism or even modernity) and to "reconnect" them with life cmd elemental
14 Kenneth Frampton. "Critical Regionalism Revisited.·' in Critical Regionalism: The Pomona Meeting --
Proceedings. p 36.
l~ Alan Colquhoun. "The ConceP! of RegionaHsm9 rr in Postcolonial space(s), 00. Giilsiim Ba)dar
Nalbantoglu and Wong Chong Thai, (New York:: Princeton Architectural Press. 1997), p 15.
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culture. Frampton argued that these poles "should be seen not so much as categorical
opposites between which we must chose, but rather as the points of dialectic
interaction.,,16 But this scheme only seems simple. For what is civilization and what is
culture? By merely setting up this opposition one seems to concede to civilization the
autonomy that is in question, and to situate living culture at a point beyond reach. The
project of civilization, which Frampton identifies with modernity itself, is doomed to
failure from the start since, by definition, it cannot be a part of living culture -it is seen as
always alien to people's "life." Frampton conceived of "life" paradoxically: it was at
once distant and immediate. On the one hand, it was inaccessible to modem subjects
who, in order to exist in contemporary society, had to invest themselves in multiple,
overlapping and often contradictory identities. On the other hand, Frampton described
life as immediately "there," waiting to rush in as soon as society adopted a common
identity. In his own words:
[...T]he development of culture is by no means the simple
consequence of acquiring power and accumulating capital. [.0.]
Knowledge is critical and refmement essential, but these attributes
are impotent without the passionate adoption of a common cultural
cause, without the use of architecture as agent for both the
realization and the representation of the society and its identity. 17
In this sentence Frampton smuggled in his L ethabian socialism. Living culture
was, for him, the construction of a "common culture" or identity through the erection of
architecture. But why does Frampton assign such a prominent position to architecture in
the realization of "common culture"? The answer is that he valued building because it
inescapably involves collective work. For Frampton, as for Lethaby, life was service,
16 Kenneth Frampton, "Critical Regionalism Revisited," in Critical Regionalism: The Pomona Meeting --
Proceedings, 00. Spyros Amourgis, (Pomona: CDllege of Environmental Design, California State
363
understood as common productive labor. The great "invention" of the British tradition of
socialist architects like Ruskin, Morris, Lethaby, and later Frampton, was to insist that
labor be thought of as "art." Their claim was that this made the drudgery of work
bearable. To be precise about it, work became "slavery" for them when it was divided up
into discrete procedures and regulated by industrial labor. Lethaby, for instance, felt that
modem industry, by forcing everyone to work "the cranks and wheels" of machinel)', had
sucked the life and spirit out of "honest" work. 18 The British Arts and Crafts movement
sought to regain a sense of integrity for individuallaoor, but it succeeded only on the
ideological plane, by projecting the aesthetic unity associated with finished works of
architecture to the work of each person involved in the building's production. The upshot
was that architecture's aesthetic unity could also be easily and ideologically construed as
the wholesomeness of "communal labor."
The sub-theme of so much of Frampton's talk about "unity" was an anxiety about
the alienating effects capitalism's division of lainr. Frampton's critique of architecture
was essentially Western Marxist. He was primarily concerned with how the supposedly
"wholesome" communal work of making buildings was being replaced by standardized
procedures of assembly: "Are we not again confronted," he asked rhetorically, "with
capitalism's subtle appropriation of a cultural and technical capacity that legitimately
belongs to the society as a whole?" 19 Here again, Frampton painted a picture of an
innocent, living Kultur being sapped of its lifeblood by Zivilization's rapacious angel of
Polytechnic University, 1991)" P 38.
17 Kenneth Frampton" "Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino,," in Oppositions, n. 14 (Fall 1978). p 2.
18 William Richard Lethaby" "The Foundation in l.abour:' Lectured delivered at the Arts and Crafts Society.
April 1919, and later published in Form in Civilization: Collected Papers on Art and Labour. (London:
Oxford University Press, 1922), p 222.
19 Kenneth Frampton, "Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino," in Oppositions, n. 14 (Fall 1978), p 25.
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death. Frampton wrote these comments in 1978, five years prior to his first mention of
Paul Ricoeur in his article "Towards a Critical Regionalism." (1983). It is therefore
unlikely that Ricoeur was as foundational to Frampton's theorization of culture in
opposition to civilization as he would later claim. The English Arts and Crafts tradition,
with its condemnation of technological society and its reverence for culture, is the more
obvious underpinning of Frampton's critique of modem architecture. Frampton tum to
phenomenology came as an afterthought, as he searched for a cure to salvage the project
of modernism from the implications of his own historical critique.
Coming back to the uPomona Meeting" for the moment, I want to emphasize the
aesthetic dimension of Frampton's Marxist critique of architecture. The centerpiece of
the symposium was an exhibition of the 'Nork of the Italian architects Antonio Banfi,
Ludovico Belgiojoso, Enrico Peresutti, Emesto Rogers and their BBPR group. Their
famous Velasca Tower graced the cover of the proceedings. This celebration of the
BBPR as a historical precursor to the work of the symposium's participants was
anathema to Frampton, who consistently omitted Neo-Liberty from his survey book
Modern Architecture: A Critical History (1980), and from its subsequent editions (1985,
1992). Frampton's attitude towards the BBPR set him against Alexander Tzonis and
Liane Lefaivre, the other keynote speakers at the conference, who regarded Emesto
Rogers as a pivotal figure in opening postwar Modem architecture to the importance of
uregionalism. ~,20
20 Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre. "Critical Regionalism:' in Critical Regionalism: The Pomona
Meeting -- Proceedings. 00. Spyros Amourgis. (Pomona: College of Environmental Design. California
State Polytechnic University, 1991) pp 18-19.
365
In the shadow of this disagreement about the historical status of the BBPR was a
contentious dispute between Frampton on the one side, and Tzonis and Lefaivre on the
other, over the sense in which "Critical Regionalism" could become a theory of
practice.21 Both C3IT1PS shared the basic view that contemporary social life was
technologically detennined, and both criticized it for repressing other fOlms of communal
identity construction. Both also agreed that buildings could be used as an effective tool
to assert "other" types of identity formations. They differed, however, in their view of
the architect's role with regards to building. Tzonis and Lefaivre asserted the architect's
ability to break free from convention through critical reflection on the nature of fonns.
Put crudely, they believed that it was possible to think one's way out of bourgeois
banality by asking the right questions about the present conditions of life. Furthermore,
and here is the crux of their discrepancy with Frampton, they upheld that ambitious
architecture could change society: architects could help initiate other people in the
intellectual exercise of questioning by producing unconventional buildings where people
could experience "defami1iarized'~spaces, which would (hopefully) encourage
individuals to become more "self-aware" of the "superficiality" of their lives and
surroundings.22 By espousing the notion that archi tecture could be an agent of
revolutionary social change, Tzonis and Lefaivre continued the ideological tradition
21 Although Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre coined "'Critical Regionalism" their conception of the
term had been overshadowed by the success of Frampton 9 S adaptation. The symposium proceedings
attempted in various ways to emphasize Tzonis's and Lefaivre·s definition of Critical Regionalism over
that of Frampton. Their contribution is published first, and Frampton·s founh. The first sentence of
Tzonis's and Lefaivre's essay makes reference to the fact that they introduced the lenn first in ~11le Grid
and the PathwaY9·" in Architecture in Greece. n. 5, (1981)9 and that Frampton later "adopted'" it. The
presentation of the BBPR must also be read as an attempt to Tzonis's and Lefaivre's genealogy of Critical
Regionalist architects (Ernesto Rogers, Alvar Aalto, W'illiam Wurster, Lewis Mumford. James Stirling. and
so on) over (hat of Framp:on (Joar; Antonio Coderech, Luis Barragan 9 Alvaro Siza, Gino Valle, Mario
Botta. Tadao Ando., etc.).
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running from the historical avant-garde to the many 19608 neo-avant-gardes. In their
estimation, Regionalism had been the most successful among postwar neo-avant-garde
technique for "defamiliarizing" modem architecture from its commercial, cliched
variaIlts. Therein lay the singular importance of Emesto Rogers, who, in their opinion,
had spearheaded the regionalist protest against the "neofonnalist and technocratic
architecture of the International Style of the nineteen ftfties,,23 along with Team Ten.
Whereas Tzonis and Lefaivre defined the critical element in regionalism as the
architect's avant-gardiste effort to change culture and society, Frampton conceived the
critical as a resistance to that type of change. For Frampton, architects could not
intellectually will the change of cultural and social nonns into being -this was, for him, a
neo-avant-gardiste delusion. They could only help continue existing "authentic" cultures
precisely by surrendering their intellectualist pretensions to local materials, traditions of
craftsmanship, customary building types, and resulting aesthetic -which Frampton
identified with "socialist" politics. "Where these cultural and political conditions are
absent, the fannulation of a creative cultural strategy becomes more difficult. The
universal Megalopolis is patently antipathetic to a dense differentiation of culture.,,24 To
be clear, Frampton, in line with Tzonis and Lefaivre, also conceived of an organic bond
between aesthetic practices and socio-cultural conditions, but he thought that union was
broken the minute avant-garde architects tried to think themselves outside of their cultural
and historical context. Frampton understood culture to be "intuitive," not "rational,"
22 Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, "Critical Regionalism: t in Critical Regionalism: The Ponl0na
Meeting -Proceedings, 00. Spyros Amourgis, (Pomona: College of Environmental Design, California Stae
Polytechnic University, 1991), P 20.
2.1 Ibid. P 18.
24 Kenneth Frampton, "Prospects for a Critical Regionalism," in Perspecta: The Yale Ar("hitectural Journal,
v. 20 ( 1983), P 162.
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following the tradition of British architectural historians epitomized by Nikolaus
Pevsner.25 The thinking, rational architect promoted by Tzonis and Lefaivre was, for
Frampton, inconsistent with participation in the organic development of culture.
Furthennore, Frampton believed that any attempt to make architecture into an intellectual
project was detrimental to "rooted" culture:
The discovery of the Vitruvian text introduced the notion of architecture
as a conceptual projection; a project which embodied both ideology and
instrumentality as a composite civilizing force. [... ] the Renaissance was
the epoque in which an opposition between these modes [of architecture
and building] rust became evident, as one medieval city after another [... ]
began to radiate a rational world view alien to the city of Christendom.
[... ] From its initiation in the 15th century, classicism never ceased to
project a unitary vision and method which sought to displace and
eventually supersede the continuity of building as rooted culture and to
establish in its stead the nonnative condition of a universal civilization.26
This passage is from "Avant-Garde and Continuity"( 1980), one of Frampton's
most important essays. In it, he noted his objections to Emesto Rogers and rehearsed the
theory that he would later call Critical Regionalism. Again, he returned to the old dyad of
Zivilation and Kultur, this time depicted as an opposition between "autonomous" avant-
gardiste aesthetics that fed on the division of leoor, and "rooted" building practices
arising from "wholesome" communal work~ The title of the essay echoed Clement
Greenberg's "Avant-Garde and Kitsch" (1939). Indeed, Frampton maintained
Greenberg's definition of avant-gardism as the practice of detaching aesthetics from
political and social content, and of focusing inwardly on technique and fonnal
25 Nikolaus Pevsner differentiated between a British understanding of culture as emotional and a French
understanding of it as rational. He claimed to have identified this nationalist distinction between Ruskin ~s
"emotional:' and Viollet-Le-Duc"s "rational" attitudes towards Gothic architecture. See Ruskin and
Viol/et-Le-Duc: Englishness and Frenchness in the Appreciation ofGothic Architecture, (London: Thames
and Hudsom, 1969), p 42. Frampton followed this distinction exactly in his writings. See" for instance,
Kenneth Frampton, "Avant-Garde and Continuity," in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 ( 1982) pp 2()"27.
26 Ibid. pp 21.
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relationships. But whereas Greenberg had advocated aesthetic autonomy as a way to
keep advancing culture within a sphere free from the contradictions of political ideologies
(he denounced Stalin's Soviet Realism and Fascistic "Imperial" styles), Frampton
condemned aesthetic detachment, arguing that culture was not distinct from aesthetic,
political or social categories.
Fig: illustration of Durand's system of architectural combinations.
Originally from Precis des I~ns donnees iI I'ecole polytechnlque. As
printed In Kenneth Frampton, Studies In Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of
Construction In Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture,
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995),p 45.
The history of avant-gardism began, for Frampton, with Jean Nicolas Louis
Durand, who codified Classical Architecture into a "combinatorial construction system"
in Precis des lecons donnees a l' ecole poly technique (1802-1805).27 In his view,
Durand's code turned design into afonnal game of substitution and combination that was
segmented off from what was previously a locally integrated building practice. Frampton
argued that this split from the "living culture" of building marked the origin of the
disciplinary formations later know as the Avant -Gardes of the 20th century: modalities of
369
"cartesian" ideology and instrumentality, premised on the autonomy of forms from local
values, and upholding the utopian promise of universal civilization. Frampton associated
the more general "crisis of modernity" with this "affirmative" movement because, in his
eyes, it had turned architectural form into a "game" of possible substitutions, and thus
reduced its meaning to a pure matter of difference.
Fig: illustration of a modern Jail from A. W. N. Pugln's Contrasts (1841).
From Kenneth Frampton, Studies In Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of
Construction In Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture,
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995) p 37. Frampton used other illustrations
from Puglns text In "Avant-Garde and Continuity," In Architectural Design,
n. 7-8, v. 52 (1982), P 20-27.
Luckily, intimated Frampton, a more authentic "critical practice" of building had
lived on unscathed in England. Frampton drew the lineage of what we can here call an
anti-avant-garde from the British architect Augustus Welby Northmore Pugin (1812-
1852), to Lethaby, the Arts and Crafts, implicitly to himself, and later in his career to
Critical Regionalism. Frampton regarded Pugin as a resistance hero in the pre-history of
27 See: Ibid. pp 21-22, and Kenneth Frampton, "Louis Kahn and the French Connection," in Oppositions, n.
22 (Fall 1980) p 27.
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''the intrinsic opposition of rooted culture to the universal rationality of Classicism.,,28
His significance, according to Frampton, rested on the fact that he continued to think of
architectural forms, moral values, and faith as interdependent. Thus Frampton saw Pugin
as the "continuity" of an architectural practice that claimed to infuse matter with the
inner, pre-conscious meanings of society, and that stood defiant against the ri se of the
Avant-Garde:
As far as he [Pugin] was concerned, the degeneracy of modem
Catholicism was signaled by its equal indulgence in Oassicism, utility,
and industrialization. Durand's detached manipulation of 'empty' classical
elements in order to accommodate and represent the new institutions of
the rationalized and universal state was countered by Pugin's conviction
that the authenticity of rooted culture could only be grounded in faith. 29
The manner in which Frampton pitted Durand against Pugin unveiled not just his
disciplinary commitments to Lethaby and the Arts and Crafts Movement, but also a
repressed map of his New Left politics. Beginning with Durand and Pugin, Frampton
extended this history into the present in tenns of an opposition between the state and
"rooted culture," of a conflict between reason and faith, and of a strict division between
the 'empty' inauthenticity of surface and a 'meaningful' inner Truth of buildings,
between two ~~;iS of 20th century architects: those belonging to a "rootless" Avant-Garde,
and those continuing to work within the limits of "rooted common sense." While
accepting the impossibility of a pure architecture of continuity, Frampton consistently
vindicated work in which he could identify a dissymmetry in favor of a rooted faith in a
hidden Truth (i.e. Louis I. Kahn, Mario Botta, et al).
28 Kenneth Frampton9"Avant-Garde and ContinuitY9H in Architectural Design, n. 7-89v. 52 ( 1982) P 22.
29 Ibid. P 22.
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Frampton's identification of Durand's 1804 treatise as initiating the history of
"rootless" practices, was inspired by the conselVative neo-Hegelian Gennan Art historian
Hans Sedlmayr, who also deemed that date to be the beginning of the West's decline. In
his famous Art in Crisis, The Lost Center [Ver/ust der Mitte-Die bildende Kunst des 19
und 20. Jahrhunderts als Symptom und Symbol der Zeit, 1948), Sedlemayr claimed that
the French Revolution had de-humanized architecture through the '~alien domination" of
geometry, and eliminating all non-rational components such as myth from building. "The
end of the architecture revolution," Sedlmayr stated, "synchronizes with the end of the
political one. Napoleon, who detested ideologues, was crowned in 1804.,,30 In statements
which bear an uncanny resemblance to those of Frampton, Sedlmayr denounced Avant-
Garde architects for feeding the "abstraction-loving mind" with formalism, for "attacks
on the tectonic" such as "cloaking" buildings with ornaments derived from a "fake
vitalism," and for denying "man's earth bound state." 3) Sedlmayr, a staunch Catholic,
identified the Avant-Garde with the sacrilegious attempt of humans stand in for God. He
made their work responsible for the loss of faith and mythic meaning:
As the world becomes more and more objective and reduces all things to
its own pedestrian level, so whatever \vas exalted in mythology is brought
down to a petty scale, and is in the end demoted to the nursery; the myth
lives on as a fairy tale pure and simple, the saga of heroes becomes a
bedtime story-and the God-man becomes !he 'Christkind.' 32
Sedlmayr understood pluralism in architecture as a loss of center resulting from
the eclipse of the image of God from modem building. Without ttle guiding light of the
Lord~ styles succeeded one another in equally empty attempts to master raw materials .. In
30 Hans Sedlmayr~ Art in Crisis, The Lost Center, (H. Regner)' Co.: Chicago. 1958) p tOI.
31 Ibid. P 102-108.
~2 Ibid. P 37.
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the past, thought Sedlmayr, strong cultures had integrated building trades that had given
cohesion and order to architectural fonn. By way of contrast, Modernity had splintered
the unity of the arts within the architecturnl Gesamtkunstwerk (total work of art) and
segmented architecture off as a purely functional problem. Only certain architects, such
as Gottfried Semper had been able to cling on to some "sacramental pretensions" by
insisting on craftsmanship as a synthesis of all the arts. 33
Frampton shared this view of the ultimate futility of all styles, of architecture's
succumbing to instrumental reason, of the need for unity through culture-bound
craftsmanship, and even of Semper as an example of "resistance." Frampton's depiction
of Critical Regionalism as the only practice capable of reestablishing a fonn-inspiring
order mystified Lethaby's notion of culture (as the art of ordinary people) by drawing on
Sedlmayr's Catholic assumptions about the divine roots of fonnal order. Frampton
agreed with Sedlmayr that Urooted culture," as the unassailable dominion of inner
collective values, faith and Spirit, was the only hope for a meaningful life. He used these
two poles to sift the good from the bad. Establishing diffuse analogies between the
"chaos" of contemporary life and buildings that appeared "chaotic," Frampton judged
those architects attempting to assert their individualism through flights of creative fancy,
or those thinkers that insisted on the primacy of reason, to be privy to the Udegeneracy"
of modernity's substitution of Truth for reason. Moreover, he suggested that these
architects posed a greater threat to society than reason il~elf. The claims of reason were at
least total .. but architecture operated in rnore surreptitious and localized ways. thus posing
33 "Semper"s account of an antique temple reads like a description of some gorgeous building of the new
era, for it is a cardinal characteristic of this taCit that it should show this fusion of all the arts. and that in
particular the applied arts and the arts of the decorator t the handicraftsnlen and even of the scene-painter
and stage manager, should play an increasing part in the ultimate effect.u Ibid. p 40.
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an even greater and darker danger. Thus, Frampton presented a long genealogy,
stretching from Durand to Albert Speer and Archigram, which he charged with secretly
driving the progressive alienation and "chaos" of the modem world. Their tum towards
artistic individual expression was the true cause of the final "decline" of the West:
No account of recent developments in architecture can fail to mention the
ambivalent role that the profession has played since the mid-1960s -
ambivalent not only in the sense that while professing to act in the public
interest it has sometimes assisted uncritically in furthering the domain of
an optimized technology, but also in the sense that its more intelligent
members have abandoned traditional practice, either to resort to direct
social action or to indulge in the projection of architecture as a form of
art.34
As historian Beat Wyss has noted, Sedlmayr's own attempts to demote nomadic culture
in favor of traditional earth-bound ideals of construction were undergirded by a
conception of culture as a vertical model of rule and obedience.35 Sedlmayr equated the
34 Kenneth Frampton, Modern Architecture: A Critical History, 3rd edition, (London: Thames and Hudson
Ltd, 1992), P 280.
35 In Hegel's Art History and The Critique ofkJodernity, trans. CaroHne Dobson Saltzwedel, (Cambridge"
UK: Cambridge University Press" 1999) Beat Wyss noted the Hegelian roots of Sedlmayr's emphasis on
the tectonic as a saving synthesis of art an culture, and of his demotjon of the avant-garde for being
whimsical and unethical. Hegel had criticized Romanticism for failing to suffuse form by content. Art had
to find inspiration in its culture and times, so that all could understand it. When artists allowed themselves
to indulge in subjective whims, they severed themselves from the common sense of society. Reason. for
Hegel. was this unifying synthesis of individual artist and collectivity. Wyss claims that in the course of
the 19th century. architects such as Carl Friedrich Schinkel developed the synthesizing nature of Hegelian
Reason into a construction-oriented argument about architecture·s ability to hold together the arts and
culture within the framework of the building: uTectonic functionality and metaphysical meaning came
together to form an original phenomenon--on this basis and on none other could German Idealism erect its
museum."'( p 108) Wyss also identified these Hegelian dictums in the work of 20th century authors:
True an [for Hegel] strove for a synthesis of the particular and the generat such as the
Greeks had uniquely achieved. The hannony of classical art thus remained paradigmatic.
In modern art this wonderful balance had lost its equilibrium -a message that many of
Hegel "s disciples passed on with singular success. They called it 'the loss of center, ·
'degenerate art' or 'oourgeois decadence·: what was always meant was this malady
diagnosed by Hegel. that the artist had allowed his own ideas to grow beyond the
measure of beauty. Only what appeared in the harmonious company of Reason deserved
to be called beautifuL( p 87-88)
Wyss singled out Sedlmayr as an example of how the commitment to Absolute Reason could easily tum
into &n uncritical abidance to totalitarian politics, such as those of Nazism.
374
loss of a clear top and bottom in building to a loss of "obedience" to social laws as
"given" by God in nature:
Sedlmayr's political credo coalesces with Nazi propaganda in that he
simultaneously and in equal measure rejects both bourgeois liberalism and
socialist collectivism. But he would ideally like to see a third way: an
organic patriarchal state. This differs from the Third Reich in that
dictatorship is here seen as being the will of God, something that Hitler
never asserted. 36
Fig: Page from Frampton's "A Synoptic View of the Architecture of the
Third Reich, II In Oppositions, n. 12(Spring 1978), p 66.
In writing about totalitarianism, Frampton depicted the political mechanisms
typically associated with the violence of, say, fascism, as surface effects of a more
profound mishandling of culture by architects. For instance, Frampton criticized the
36 Beat Wyss, Hegel's Art History and The Critique of Modernity, trans. Caroline Dobson Saltzwedel ,
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p 210.
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arbitrary use of symbols in Nazi architecture as a fake attempt to create culture. He
found that Benno von Arendt's use of hammer-shaped. pylons for the entry hall of the
Gennan Labor Front Pavillion (Berlin, 1934) was an "arbitrary" invention of ~'symbolic
codes" aimed at producing an "instant culture.,,37 1be 'degenerate' aspect of Nazi
architecture was, therefore, that it passed eOlpty symbolic play for true, ~'rootecL" non-
discursive culture -the same crime perpetrated by Durand, and more R:CeDdy by
Postmodemist architects such as Venturi.38
Frampton adopted many of the aesthetic biases Sedlmayr's, such as the affmity
towards an architecture express:'\fe of "tectonic production." "[... ] In our evident need to
detennine the future of a sequestered culture," stated Frampto~ "the 'how' must surely
be accorded a status of equal import [to the fonn]. There is, as Hans Sedlmayr has
pointed out, and inescapable moment when place and production are fused together to
yield that quality of character from which we eventually recei"e our sense of identity.•~39
37 To prove that fascist "instant culture" was in fact urootless," Framptool argued that Nazi symbols were
part of a global economy of superficial deformations of a building's structure. Arendt's pylons. he wrote,
derived from other rhetorical creations of totalitarian regimes: Adalbeno Libera's facade for the Italian
Fascist Exhibition (Rome, 1932). and Konstantin Melnikov's Bolshevik~Dam Narkomtjazprom (1934-36).
See Kenneth Frampton, "A Synoptic Vie\v of the Architecture of the n.ird Reich." in Oppositions. n. 12
(Spring 1978) p 66.
38 "Venturi is detennined to present Las Vegas as an authentic outburst of popular fantasy. But. as
Maldonado has argued in his book La Speranza Progettuale (Desi~n, Nature, and Revolution) of 1970. the
reality would indicate the contrary. that Las Vegas is the pseudo-communicative culmination of 'more than
half a century of masked manipulatory violence directed towards the formation of an apparently free and
playful urban environment in which rraen are completely devoid of irmovative wilr:' Kenneth Frampton.
Modern Architecture: A Critical History., 3ed editiorl. (London: lbarnes and Hudson Ltd. 1992), P 291.
39 Kenneth Frampton, "Place, Production and Architecture: To'wards a Critical Theory of Building:' in
Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 ( 1982) P 45. When Frampton revised the article in which these
sentences were written for its inclusion in his best seller Modern Architecture: A Critical History (1980), he
also enlarged the weave of Sedlmayr's thinking in his argurnents. Frampton's attacks on the nomad culture
of Archigram and on the geometric formalism of Eisenm?di (p 312) as "apocalyptic" and "qua1i-Dada"
followed directly from Sedlmayr, who had identified the Dadaists (and the Avant-Garde in general) as an
inhuman degradation of rooted cultural values responsible for the West's accelerating course towards the
end of the world. In Art in Crisis, The Lost Center, (H. Regnery Co,: Chicago. 1958) plOOf SedJmayr
wrote:
·Surrealism,· says Champignuelle, ·corr~,sponds to a condition of inner revolt9 of doubt,
of denial. Artists deny art and painters pa~nting.' One might add that architects also deny
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What would otherwise be described as the affinity created by Bourgeois taste, was, for
Frampton, the shared mythic roots of a common culture. Although Frampton demonized
corporate and Fascist architecture for "distorting culture," his thinking unreflexively
advanced similar falsifications.
Frampton upheld the historical avant-garde's participation in the Russian
Revolution as evidence that avant-gardism could be organically tied to the furthering of
"rooted culture.,,40 And yet, in the fmal analysis, Frampton saw the historical avant -garde
as a failure because it had not peacefully transfonned existing social structures, but rather
attempted to completely replace the old with the new. Between the lines of his derision
for radical breaks one may read Frampton as a British exceptionalist with a preference for
a type of "peaceful revolution" in the manner of Cromwell. Frampton viewed the history
of the 20th century as the progressive degeneration of a well-intentioned avant-gardism
into an obscene "Kitsch" which mindlessly imitated the aesthetic techniques of the
historical avant-garde but was incapable of subscribing to any progressive social
program. Yet, Frampton's critique of the Neo-Avant-Gardes disguised the fact that it
was a cliched imitation of the countless 1970s diatribes against contemporary revivals of
the techniques of the historical avant-garde, which followed Peter BUrger's Theorie der
architecture. but we can spare oUiselves further quotations. One need only read the
proclamations of the Futurist" Dadaist and Surrealist revolutions. The •Viva /0 muerte·
[long live death] of the Spanish revolutionaries might well be the battle-cry of modern art
in this its despairing and suicidal phase.
The recognition of Sedlmayr's dubious politics probably led Frampton to omit Sedlmayr as the source of
his meditations on Eisenman"s "apocalyptic tendencies."" However" Sedlmayr"s name remained in the
book's index (p 312). One wonders why, if Frampton recognized some of the problems in Sedlmayr's
work" he did not also revise his argument. This question is all the pressing considering the popularity of
Frampton~swritings have made his arguments against the Avant-Garde common to the parlance of minor
authors working on phenomenology and architecture. For instance" Kimberly Dovey"s discusses Peter
Eisenman and other Avant-Garde architects as having "retreatedu from cultural values and Ureal buildings"
through the double "abstraction" of drawing and theorizing. See uPutting Geometry in its Place: Toward a
Phenomenology of the Design Process." in D"'elling. Seeing. and Designing: TO»'flrd a Phenomenological
Ecolo~y, ed. David Seamon~ (Albany: State University of New York Press. c1993) p 257-260.
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Avantgarde[Theory of the Avant-Garde, 1974. English translation 1984]. Hal Foster has
pointed out how the critics who condemned the 1970s neo -avant-garde revivals for
failing to be historically relevant were themselves speaking from a position iliat was
outside of history. In light of Foster's critique, Frampton's writing appears blind to its
own modernist pretensions to view history from a position of absolute objectivity. For
Foster, this modernist theoretical nlode):
[... ] pervades attitudes towards contemporary art and culture, where it first
constructs the contemporary as posthistorical, a simulacra) world of failed
repetitions and pathetic pastiches, and then condemns it as such from a
mythical point of critical escape beyond it all. Ultimately this point is
posthistorical, and its perspective is most mythical where it purports to be
most critical.41
For Frampton, architecture's aesthetic detachment from culture originated in the
separation of architects from "rooted building culture," by way of their intt;llectual
pretensions and fascination with the instrumentality of technology. According to his
account,.,neo-avant-gardiste "rootless" autonomy from culture took two fonns in the last
quarter of the 20th century: fonnalism, and pOSbnodemism. He pitted Swiss and Italian
Neo-Rationalism against Postmodemism as two extremes defining the limits within
which "critical architecture" was to work. Neo-Rationalism's claim of autonomy, for
Frampton, ran the risk of being "divorced from the reality of the life world, H and of
degenerating into a fonnalist game emptied of cultural value.42 Postmodemism, on the
other hand, was a false Realism which passed on the private fantasies of architects as a
"reconciliatory historicism" cornparable to Heimatstil. Both poles, for Frampton.
allowed the subjective creative will of the architect to distort culture. There was a need~
~o Kenneth Frampton, "Avant-Ciarde and Continuity," in Architectural Design. n. 7-~. v. 52 ( 1982) P 23 .
.17M
argued Frampton, for an architecture that allowed local cultures to speak truthfully and
for themselves. Critical Regionalism would become, for him, this hoped for architectural
practice devoid of subjective intention. It was the architectural equivalent to E.P.
Thomson's history "told from below."
.\~,VIW"'.~.""1'IaIN'"
~~
Fig: Frampton used these illustrations under the title of "Tessenow and the
Image of Helmat" to Illustrate the pre-history of the Postmodern
falsification of culture, which he deemed to be prevalent In Neo-Llberty.
Page from Frampton's "A Synoptic View of the Architecture of the Third
Reich," In Oppositions, n. 12 (Spring 1978), p 57.
41 Hal Foster, "Who's Affraid of the Neo-Avant-Garde," in The Return a/the Real: The Avant-Garde at the
End a/the Century, (Cambridge, MA, and London: The MIT Press, 1996), p 14.
42 Kenneth Frampton, "Avant-Garde and Continuity," in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 ( 1982) P 25.
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Frampton portrayed Neo-Liberty as an early formulation of Postmodemism,
indicting Emesto Rogers by association for falsifying culture. Frampton's critique
followed the by then canonical portrayal (established by critics from Reyner Banham to
Manfredo Tafuri) of Neo-Liberty as a regressive populism that championed bourgeois
taste.43 Although "Avant-Garde and Continuity" left the disciplinary status of Rogers
intact (i.e. as a pseudo Nazi who had retreated from the freeing potential of Utrue"
modernity)., upon closer analysis Frampton's charge against Neo-Liberty was inconsistent
with his conclusion. After having chastised the neo-avant-garde for only partially
engaging culture, Frampton went on to advance precisely what he had opposed: a
"relative autonomy of architecture" that would balance fannal selt:sufficiency with
cultural integration.44
How was this possible? This contradiction in Frampton's argumentation lays bare
his inability to accept the implications of his own historical critique of the avant-garde:
namely, that architectural practice, in its most advanced fonn, was unable to contribute to
the development of "rooted culture." The view that the neo -avant-garde was incapable of
inhabiting the territory forsaken by the historical avant-garde had led 1970s critical
historians such as Manfredo Tafuri to claim that it had becolne the task of the historian to
replace the avant-garde, and to prepare the ground for the transfonnation of society. But
Frampton could not openly accept this newfound importance of the historian, even as he
took on the role of avant-garde designer through his writings. Frampton insisted on the
primacy of practice as he envisioned it. Unable to live up to his critique of the partial (and
4~ See chapter in this dissertation. and Kenneth Frampton. "Avant -Ciarde and Continuity"· in Architectural
Design. n. 7-~. v. 52 ( I9S2) pp 20-27.
therefore allegedly instrumental) cultural engagements of the neo-avant-garde, Frampton
came to advocate them. To do so, Frampton upturned his Gennan Romantic opposition of
Zivilization and Kultur in an identity thesis, whereby both were now said to be contained
in "type-fonn":
Architectural autonomy indubitably means a rappel aI' ordre -that is to
say, a return to nonnative rules and procedures which are close to the
precepts of Western classicism. Such a return, however, does not
necessarily imply a reduction to the extreme polarities of either pure art or
instrumental reason. [... ] Against this tendency of artistic autonomy to
regress into henneticisffi, the relative autonomy of architecture implies a
re-dedication to the urban fragment [... ] In this ' space ofpublic
appearance' (Arendt) the monument comes to signify not only continuity
of the type fonn and the buill fabric, but also the continuity of a culture; a
culture which stands to be 'rooted' to the degree that it is attached to a
specific and identifiable monument, set in a particular place.
In this passage, Frampton took on the role of the designer, proposing a particular
built arrangement as a synthetic solution to the division between Kultur and Zivilization.
In essence, he claimed that buildings built according to "type-forms" could help cure the
various crises of modernity which he saw stemming from that division. Yet, it is
important to recall that Frampton, first "constructed" that opposition in his critique, only
to then declare to have resolved it. The triumphs Frampton assigned to Critical
Regionalists fed on the cliched critiques of modernity's alleged failures which he
uncritically perpetuated. It is not difficult to see how Frampton's prescliptions for what
can be described as an anti-avant-garde practice soon became a catch basin for ail
disillusionment with modernity.
44 It is worth noting that Frampton~s notion of relative autonomy rehashed the core of Rogers~s thinking,
even as Frampton condemned it'l for Rogers premised Utrue cultural progress·· on the evolving
transformation of Uregionflr~an.:hitecture through the mediation of advances in technology.
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By 1983, Frampton had developed the principal theoretical lines of his '4Avant-
Garde and Continuity" article into the theory of Critical Regionalism. His 1989 address
,.~ the Pomona symposium reflected a number of revisions and clarifications that
Frampton made to his thinking. Most significantly for our purposes, by the late 1980s,
Frampton was consistently invoking Paul Ricoeur in relation to Critical Regionalism as a
way of expanding the opposition between Zivi/ization and Kultur into a meta-discourse
on the conflict between abstract Reason and concrete culture.
lit Frampton'S theory of "authentic" practice prescribes an aesthetic: to
give outward expression to the building's Inward construction.
A. 19708 and 80s models of signlf' ~ ~tlon
The journal Oppositions, which Frampton co-founded with Mario Gandelsonas
and Peter Eisenman in 1973, can be largely credited with the introduction of structuralism
into architectural thinking. In many ways, it familiarized the United States with the
notion, shocking to many, that architecture was not just a discipline but also a discourse.
Oppositions was part of a larger restructuring of the discipline which also took place in
Europe through other journals founded during the mid i 970s with similar critical aims,
such as Arquitecturas Bis (Barcelona), Architese (Zurich), and Lotus (Milan).45
Structuralism rejected the historicist model for understanding how architecture (or any
other cultural product, for that matter) generated meaning, which upheld that architecture
was meaningful only in relation to certain trans-historical entities (such as the field of
architecture itself). In more concrete teons, a historicist would have argued that a new
building, say Le Corbusier's church at Ronchamp, was meaningful because it developed
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an existing traditional fonn, that of the "monument" for instance. Thus, Ronchamp
signified monument. Inversely, the life of that trans-historical fonn known as
"monument," was premised on its constant renewal by new particular buildings (like a
living organism whose life depended on the continuous regeneration of its cells). 'Ine
historicist model of signification was premised on the assumption that these trans-
historical fonns were at once timeless and in constant flux. If one reads the Casabella
Continuitti editorials of Emesto Rogers, where he defended Ronchamp as giving new life
to Tradition in modernism, it becomes quickly apparent that, like most of his generation,
he conceived of signification in historicist tenns. Likewise, Frampton's definition of
Hmaking," as a historically constant yet ever changing "constructive poetic" that
generated meaning, relied on the methodological assumptions of historicism. Frampton's
writings for Oppositions introduced a type of historicism into the folds of the structuralist
project. His contribution blurred the reception of structuralism as a model of
signification, encouraging instead the understanding of htype-fonn" in historicist tenns as
a changing continuity.
Structuralism's model of signification, as it was developed in the semiology of
Roland Barthes and Ferdinand de Sassure, led to a re -evaluation of historicist claims
about Modernism. If in the historicist model meaning depended on the strict correlation
between (trans-historical) word and (contingent) object (in the language of FraJnpton
between logos and techne), structuralism questioned any pennanent or "originar'
connection between signifier and signified, arguing that the constitution of meaning in
language was a function of pure difference. In other words, the meaning of a word like
45 Peter Eisenman, Kenneth Frampton. Mario Gandelsonas~Anthony Vidler assessed the relation of
Oppositions to like minded European journals in their joint editorial HOn Arquitectura~ Bis:' in
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"church" was not dependent on the appearance of churches in the world. Instead,
differentiation occurred within a "structure." Indeed, the word "church" could be
substituted by an almost infmite number of words that could refer to same object, i.e.
basilica, cathedral, building, institution, edifice, etc. However, the selection of the word
was not random. It responded to a series of assumptions associated with different
vocabularies (of scale, of function, of constructive sophistication, etc.), so that the
difference between two words responded in tum to the difference between the systems of
assumptions they each were associated to. Therefore, structuralists argued that 'Nords
were not uniquely tied to certain objects, but that they gained meaning as a result of a
system of reference and difference ..
The implications of Structuralism for the methodology of architectural history~ as
it was practiced in the 1970s, were enonnous. The idea that meaning was the result of a
series of possible substitutions allowed critics to ask questions about previous choices.
Why, in the case of 1920s functionalism for instance, were certain architectural shapes
associated with particular functions of use?46 The notions of stylistic coherence or formal
consistency which had so preoccupied post-war critics such as Reyner Hanham came
loose, as did the entire history (and meaning) of modem architecture. The critical project
Oppositions. n. 4 (October 1974). pp 15R-I59.
46 This issue was debated between Mario Gandelsonas and Peter Eisenman in 1976. Gandelsonas argued
that a neo-functionalism had assumed the dialectical contradictions of 1920s functionalism in a progressive
way, which emphasized the development of the symbolic dimension. According to Gandelsonas, this Neo-
Functionalism mediated between neo -realism and neo-rationalism. the two contradictory "spinoffs" of
functionalism which had foregrounded the importance of language and meaning in architecture. See Mario
Gandelsonas, , "Editonal: Neo-Functionalism," in Oppositions, n. 5 (Sunlmer 1976) pp ]-2. Peter
Eisenman reacted to Gandelsonas arguing that Itthe fonn/function opposition was not nect:ssarily inherent
to any architectural theory.1t Eisenman argued instead for a Post -Functionalism from the stand point of
Foucault's view of modernity as a "new Episteme" which broke with the precepts of classical humanisnl.
He claimed, polemically, that modernism had therefore not yet bt..~n elaborated in architecture. and that his
post-functionalism was a "term of absence'" See Peter Eisenman. tlEditorial: Post-Functionalisnl,r, in
Oppositions. n. 6 (Fall 1976). pp J-3.
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of Oppositions was in this sense cut out from the start: First, they would aim at coming to
tenns with the legacy of Modernism by exposing its myths and regressive tendencies, as
well as its progressive components. Second, they would endeavor to make sense of
contemporary production, exposing the assumptions about meaning and language that
prevailed in the historicism of the Postmodem style. 47
Contemporaneous with simHm- re-evaluations of Modernism being carried out in
an and literature, Oppositions helped establish the value of criticism and discourse in
architectural culture. Although Frampton was not swayed by Structuralism's theory of
meaning, he did partake in the general rewriting of the Modem movement's history. As
Structuralism's emphasis on language became associated with Posbnodemism's re-
introduction of historical fonns into architecture, Frampton's project turned to re-
claiming Modernism for historicism, as an architecture where the aesthetics of "making,"
not symbols, generated meaning.
Structuralism, as it was received in the United States, made the question of
methodology into the keystone of criticality.48 Anned with a new awareness of method
as a set of choices constituting the object of criticism, historians and critics began
thinking about those choices as preceding and detennining any consequent judgment
about that object. This had two implications for the discipline of architecture. First, the
47 These two directions can be already discerned ~n Oppostions·s founding mission statement. In their first
editorial the editors situate the journal as a critical forum for the debate of ideas about the pa-;t and present
of architecture. In addition they emphasized the notion of architecture as a discursive reality that
overlapped and connected with other formal" socio-cultural. and political discourses. See Peter Eisenman"
Kenneth Frampton. Mario Gandelsonas" tfEditorial Statement:' in Oppositions. n. 1 (Septenlber 1973)
unpaginated.
48 In many ways the American assimilation of structuralism simply as "methoclU turned it into a system for
yielding "truth·' that was often as positivistic as the historicism it repiaced. Nonetheless. it opened the
possibility of contestation in once hermetic academic ci;'--:Ies. Oppositions·s enlphasis on method was in a
very real sense productive of a new kind of pedagogy reflected most strongly in new Ph.D. programs
founded in the mid I970s. \\'here the only core curriculunl class was usually UMethods:·
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methodology of past (and present) historians and architects could be examined as a way
of laying bare the set of assumptions and values that guided their work. This work
resulted in valuable studies exposing the foundational myths of the discipline. 49 It also
helped draw attention to "minor" architects and styles that had been previously ignored.
Hence, for instance, the renewed 1970s interest in the theretofore neglected Baroque.
Second, it brought the burden of self-consciousness upon writers, who now had to
consider how and why they were choo~ing a particular subject matter, and what kind of
ideology they were perpetuating by doing so.
The upshot was that once writers made the case that "what" and "'how" they
studied expressed their commitments to the discipline, society, politics, etc. they were
also able to lay claim to "engagement" in ways previously reserved for architects in
practice. Thus, Frampton's Oppositions essays on Modern masters (such as Le
Corbusier, Kahn, and Alvar Aalto) are to be recognized as expressions of his own
commitment to "resisting" Structuralism's uplay" in signification. F or Frampton, the
insistence of Postmodern architects like Robert Venturi on distinguishing surtace from
construction blocked the "almost seamlessH connection of the "user" and the "'collective
unconscious" which Frampton believed to be preserved in the bui Iding's structure.
Frampton read Postmodemism's deviance from an aesthetic of "makingH as an
"arbitrary" invention of "symbolic codes,"· a charge he also brought against Nazi
architecture.5o Only modernism's more "restrained" surface treattnents could come close
to bridging between subject and object, and communicating the constant logos in
49 Most notably. these studies tackled the myths of an enlightened Avant-Garde, of architecture's ability to
bring about utopias. of the relation of rationality to functionalism, and of the affirmation or negation of
historical models in design.
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buildings: their "making." The importance Frampton gave to strict adherence of outer
suiface to inner logos was under-girded by contemporary theories of communication,
such as those of Hannah Arendt and JUrgen Habennas, which posited the need for all
communication to strive towards Absolute communication. It is therefore necessary that
we compare his thinking on non -verbal communication to that of his avowed influences.
B. Reading Arendt: Frampton identifies Inward construction with
the "people's" silenced mythic culture
Frampton deployed the aesthetics of "making" as a precious fonn intersubjective,
a-rational experience, which established a community of feeling subjects, linked by their
shared sense of agreement about the "beauty" of this (and not that) particular building.
Ideologically, this perpetuated the tradition of bourgeois thought whereby the
fragmentation of social order was compensated with a sense of communal unity at the
level of the aesthetic. As the British Marxist philosopher Tell)' Eagleton has noted, this
construction of aesthetic experience, which has its pre-history in Kant, carried with it a
theory of privacy and publicity, interiority and exteriority that was crucial in constructing
the universal subjectivity which the ruling class required for its ideological solidarity:
At the level of theoretical discourse, we know one another only as objects;
at the level of moral ity, we know and respect each other a.~ autonomous
subjects, but can have no concept of what this means, and a sensuous
feeling for others is no essential element of such knowledge. In the sphere
of aesthetic culture, however, we can experience our shared humanity with
all the immediacy of our response to a fine painting or magnificent
symphony. Paradoxically, it is in the apparently most private, frail and
intangible a~pects of our lives that we blend most harmoniously with one
another. [ ... ] If the aesthetic must bear the bur~z- III of human commlllity,
~o See Kenneth Frarnptoil, "A S}'11optic View of the Architecture of the Third Reich .." in Oppositions .. n. 12
(Spring 1978) p 54-R7.
then a political society, one might suspect, must leave a good deal to be
desired.51
Frampton's attempt at constructing community through aesthetic experience
explains his identification of buildings with society as a whole, as well as his careful
construction of "making" (read Critical Regionalism, Critical Practice, or Tectonic) as
that shared yet intimate aesthetic experience. Before we analyze the relation of what
Frampton deemed to be the "correct" formal expression for the aesthetic of "making," let
us look at how he came to hypostatize "interior" a-rational feeling over "exterior"
rational discourse, and at the political implications of this model.
In "The Status of Man and the Status of his Objects: A Reading of The Human
Condition" Frampton focused on the direct relationship that German philosopher Hannah
Arendt established between individual alienation and the atrophy of what she called the
"space of appearance.,,52 Frampton interpreted Arendt's term to have a type of
architectural equivalent in the public square, or more precisely, in the medieval piazza.
The political importance of the square was that its "public" nature was constructed and
delimited by a "gathering" of "private" dwellings. Frampton tenned this "community" of
private buildings a "place." Following Arendt, Frampton portrayed the private house as
the "essential 'darker' ground that not only nourished the public realm but also
establishes its experiential depth.,,53 Inversely, he established the public realm as the
"shallow" surface masking of the "profound" authenticity of private life experience.
51 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic. (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1990) P 76.
52 The article appears reprinted in Kenneth Frampton, liThe Status of Man and the Status of His Objects: A
Reading of the Human Condition," in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 (1982) pp 6-19. Frampton states
that the article was previously published in a critical anthology edited by Melvin Hill titled Hannah Arendt
and the Life of the Mind. I have not been able to locate this original source in the United State~, in either
university Iibraries or the Library of Congress.
53 Ibid. P 8.
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Fig: Frampton used this Image of a medieval town to Illustrate how public
square should be made up of private houses. The Ism of contemporary
architecture, p 70
Fig: Frampton used this project by Oswald M. Unger's to Illustrate how a
modern building should express Its private Interior In the public square.
From Kenneth Frampton, "The Isms of Contemporary Architecture," In
Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 (1982)" 60-83.
Frampton's definition of "public" bundled a series of concepts together that give a
political twist to his derision for both theory and architectural ornament (as in the hiding
of a building's structure with historical motifs). Indeed, the public sphere was where the
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private realm acquired presence for others, but according to Frampton, only at the cost of
inward profundity. Arendt's defmition of labor as processal and private, and work as
(potentially) reifying and public found an echo in Frampton who also thought that the
transition from private to public entailed the threat of alienation, or of a loss of meaning.
Frampton had cultivated this sense that "authentic" experience resided in intimate
feelings since his early 1970s readings of Heidegger. In Being and Time Heidegger
differentiated between language, as an authentic (and private) disclosure of Being, and
"idle talk," as an inauthentic (and public) "closing-off' of Being: "The groundlessness of
idle talk is no obstacle to its becoming public; instead it encourages this. Idle talk is the
possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's
own.,,54 This public kind of communication alienated humans from "genuine
understanding," which of course for Heidegger required a renewed experience of Being.
Frampton's anti-intellectualism, as manifested in his derision of theory (whose very
nature was to be "public" in "publications"), expressed his anxiety at the covering up
private "authentic" life behind the mask of public "idle talk," to use Heidegger's
terminology.
Apart from his more philosophical sources, Franlpton's understanding of the
public was also contingent on the architectural discipline itself, where an elaborate
discourse about "inside" and "outside," "structure" and "om ament" had been at work
since the 19th century. More precisely, Frampton always returned to the writings of
Gottfried Semper and Eugene-Emmanuel Violet-Ie-Due in search of how a building's
internal structure can receive "authentic" outward expression. Frampton derived the
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notion that social structure (and values) may be "d~eposited"in construction techniques
from Semper, and he extracted the idea that a building's structure may itself "contain" a
spirit from Violet-Ie-Due.
Frampton deployed these political, philosophical, and architectural sources in
relation to an ongoing 1970s and 1980s cultural debates about the nature of public and
private. In architectural circles, the discussion was centered on the effect of
suburbanization in the disappearance of public space, the status of the monument 3S
symbol of public values, and the function of ideology in the distortion of the meaning of
public and private. In "On Reading Heidegger" (1974) Frampton lashed against the
"abstract language" (read discourse) of the "apologists of sprawl." In opposition to their
theoretical "idle talk," Frampton called for a return to the "concrete function" of
communication which he felt was at root in the "making" of architecture. He argued that
ttle use of words such as "space" viol ated architecture by abstracting it beyond the point
where it could serve as a meaningful communicative link between nature (including
human nature) and man. Instead, he called for a return to "concrete place." He urged
architects to "make" the public realm, not by appealing of an abstract sphere of
communication, but rather by creating environments where individuals could "feel"
united in common experiences.
c. Frampton Identifies type and craft with Inward construction
The emphasis in Frampton's Critical Re gionalism on craft and typology as
determinants, not only of architecture, but also of all culture can be better understcxxl in
light of Ricoeur's understanding of culture as the embodiment of the involuntary. In his
54 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper
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Philosophie de la volante (1950), Ricoeur argued that the "broken" nature of our
existence could be ascertained in the relations between the "voluntary" and "involuntary"
parts of human nature.55 The former could be described through reasoned thought, but the
latter comprised not just the subjective, but rather the entire lived body. In Ricoeur's
estimation, the body could not be explained away as an instrument of "\-\filled action. The
voluntary aspect of action was enmeshed in involuntary aspects, such as instincts,
emotions, and habits, which he termed the "performed know-how." This led Ricoeur to
contest the notion of freedom as "absolute creation," defining it instead as dependent
independence, or the conciliation of voluntary and involuntary dimensions.
Frampton extracted an architectural correlative to Ricoeur's description of human
nature: like humans, buildings were also "broken" between the voluntary and the
involuntary. Frampton regarded craft and type as involuntary aspects of architecture that
could not be explained a\vay by theory or reason. In his mind, these co-existed in
buildings with more "rational" or voluntary aspects. Thus, Frampton gave a quasi-
existentialist tum to the post-war rethinking of Modernism, which had critiqued
rationalism for reducing the unconscious and psychological aspects of human experience
to mere function. T:~e prefix "quasi" is used here with caution, since Frampton did
indeed treat the individual existence of buildings as though they incarnated the collective
existence of a society. In Frampton's model, craft and type embodied the "collective"
unconscious, which in his mind had also been overlooked by Modernism's emphasis on
absolute a-historical creation. Against this "utopianism" of reason, Frampton stressed
craft and type as the mythic kernel of material culture.
Collins Publishers, 1962) p 213.
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Fig: Frampton used this Image of a ritual bonfire In Japan In
support of his claim that communal structures should embody
collective cultural myths. From Kenneth Frampton, Studies In
Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction In Nineteenth
and Twentieth century Architecture, (Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 1995). p 13.
55 Paul Ricoeur's, Philosophie de fa volonte, (Paris, Aubier [1950-1960]), appeared in English as
Philosophy of the Will, trans. Charles Kelbley , (Chicago: Regnery, 1965).
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Much like Ricoeur had thought in tenns of individual freedom, Frampton
understood Modem culture's "dependent independence" on craft and type as the key to
collective freedom. This had significant implications for his understanding of the
relationship of theory and practice. Frampton refused Ricoeur's emphasis that each
generation re-interpret Myth through critical discourse as a m.eans to keep it from being
"perverted.,,56 Demoting written or spoken public debates, Frampton regarded the
"rational" building act as the only way to re-interpret the collective Myths of craft and
type. This was the basis of what he tenned dialectics. He thought that architecture's
involuntary myths would be brought to reason through "rational" construction
techniques. Inversely, the Modem assemblage of buildings would be turned meaningful
when limited to the craft and type-forms of the past.
Ricoeur would have deemed Frampton's model for resolving the "broken" nature
of human existence to be a "premature" claim to unity. Most significantly, he would have
resisted the characterization of making as a synthesis of matter and thought because it
would presume the displacement of theory and history froin the domain of interpretation,
and their reduction to silent witnesses of practice. In this sense, it can be said that
Frampton eliminated criticality from the equation of architectural practice.
Ricoeur resisted both the identity and the complete separation of theory and
practice. He skillfully argued the mutually constitutive status of the "contemplative" and
the "active." He identified the necessity for a "relative autonomy" of theory from praxis,
S6 "Myths are not unchanging and unchanged antiques which are simply delivered out of the past in some
naked, original state. Their specific identity depends on the way in which each generation receives or
interprets them according to their needs, conventions, and ideological motivations. Hence the necessity of
critical discrimination between liberating and destructive modes of reinterpretation." See Paul Ricoeur,
"Myth as Bearer of Possible Worlds," in A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination, eel. Mario J.
Valdes, (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1991) p 486.
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needed in order to maintain a degree of "openness" in both thought and action, without
which either would spiral into totalitarianism and violence. Without "relative
autonomy," theory and praxis would be either identical, or completely different. In the
fIrst case, Ricoeur argued, we would be powerless before the "fanatical" proclamation of
Truth -this then would have been his charge against Frampton, who by reducing theol)'
to practi~e left no room for contesting views. In the second, we would stand disanned
before the "skepticism" which abolishes all Truth and proclaims the meaninglessness of
life. Ricoeur considered theory and practice to be "dialectically" related. Although he
cautioned his readers from conflating the two, he often came close to doing it himself.
Consider the following passage:
I believe in the efficacity of reflection because I believe that man '8
greatness lies in the dialectic of work and the C\poken word. Saying and
doing, signifying and making are intenningled to such an extent that it is
impossible to set up a lasting and deep opposition between 'theoria' and
'praxis. ,57
"Relative autonomy" meant, according to Ricoeuf, that thinking and acting were
not the same, but that they were comparable existential structures, which could be related
as opposite poles of a dialectical equation. In his view, at the origin of both lied an
existential "affinnative" function, that of human life and its uniqueness. Here again,
Ricoeur's existentialism showed through: In order to think one had to first overcome
contingency and radical nonsense in "hope" of fmding meaning. That is, reflection for
Ricoeur was a movement beyond the very thing one hoped to understand, or an
"affinnation" of a "vehemence to exist." Similarly, in order to act one had to first
overcome the imminence of death. Thus, action was also an "affinnation" of a "will to
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live," which trusted in a "hidden meaning" of life in the absence of any logical
explanation or evidence of such meaning. 58
Whereas Ricoeur invoked "hope' to foil any premature synthesis of theory and
practice, Frampton used the notion precisely to fuse the conceptual and the material in an
ontologized act of making, which was to serve as the foundation stone for his "critical
practice." Frampton's descriptions of "making" invested it with a hidden meaning which
trusted in the identity of "craft" and "type" with a society's "collective unconscious"
despite the absence of all reasoned evidence. This led Frampton into a series of
important contradictions, such as premising his advocacy of practice in the denouncement
of the very discursive reality from which he derived his authority.
Ricoeur considered his description of the "primary affinnation" to be the central
contribution of History and Truth, because it offered the possibility of being critical. 59
Without an awareness of it, one would have no way of relating thinking and doing
without conflating them, and one would fall prey of totalitarianisms and violence. In
arguing for a "relative autonomy" between theol)' and praxis Ricoeur was trying to
address the problem of achieving "free" thoughts and actions. The paradox of freedom
57 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1965) p 5.
58 Ibid. P 13-14.
59 As Herbert Spiegelberg has noted, "affirmation" was also what separated Ricoeur from SaTtre's
philosophy of freedom as essentially negation. Consider the following passage from Ricoeur's Philosophie
de la volonte, as quoted by Spiegelberg:
"The philosophical faith which inspires us is the will to restore on a higher plane of lucidity and
happiness that unity of being which negation has killed more radically than reflection. For us
philosophy is the meditation on the "yes" and by no means the quarrelsome dwelling
(rencherissement hargneux) on the "no." Freedom does not want to be a leper but the very
accomplishment of nature, as fas as that is possible in this world.. Where we pass through as
wayfarers. This is why we meditate on the negation only with the ardent hope of going beyond it
(surpasser)."
See Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, (The Hague,
Boston, and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) p 589.
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was that it had to resist any single "unity" while allowing for multiple (often
contradictory) meanings. How then not to fall into utter relativisim? The key for Ricoeur
was to remain attentive to the presence of the "primary affirmation" in all thought and
action so as to maintain openness without foregoing meaning. The way toviards this
freedom was to continuously move dialectically between reflection and action, a process
he called "rational feeling," without loosing sight of one's existential "hOpe.,,60 Thus,
one could check one's ideas against one's actions, and one's reflexive methodology
against the political ethics of one's actions.
Ricoeur wanted to combine clarity of understanding with the sense of mystery, as
a way of suggesting that no understanding was ever "total," and that no mystery was ever
completely beyond exegesis. Phenomenology was for him ''The crestline which divides
romantic effusion and intellectualism without depth." 61 Here again, we must draw
distinctions with one of the principal tenors in Frampton's writing, where reasoned
descriptions and deductions are cast into the world of occult meanings, but reasoned
explanation is not sought. Thus Frampton tuned the myths allegedly perpetuated through
"making" into realms completely impenetrable to reason and critical thought. Consider
for instance the following passage in which Frampton described Carlo Scarpa's process
of achieving "truth through making":
While Scarpa's obsession with this motif [the double circle] has been
attributed to many different sources, on e of the more likely origins is the
mystical ideogram known as vesica piscis (from vesica, bladder, and
piscis, fish). While the interlocking version of this icon is reminiscent of
the oriental ying-yang symbol, it also represents the oppositions between
solar universality and lunar empiricism. Even if, as le,gend has it, Scarpa
60 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley , (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1965) p 12.
61 Paul Ricoeur, Philosophy of the Will, trans. Charles Kelbley, (Chicago: Regnery, 1965) p 20.
397
first encountered this symbol on a packet of Chinese cigarettes, he would
surely have become aware of its place in the European tradition and of its
latent cosmological attributes.62
Fig: Carlo Scarpa's Brion Cemetery, s. Vito dl Altlvole, Trevlso, 1969-1978.
From Kenneth Frampton, Studies In Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of
Construction In Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture ,
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995).p317.
62 Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth
Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995), p 312.
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Fig: Frampton's illustration of the "sacred" genealogy of Scarpa's double
circle In pages 314 - 315 of Studies In Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of
Construction In Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture ,
,(CambridgeMA: MITPress, 1995).
The illustrations accompanying this passage traced the "sacred" genealogy of
Scarpa's double circle. Frampton intimated that under these fOnTISteetered a world of
Myth that was preserved by them. The occultist vesica piscis embodied the union of the
archetypal and the empirical realms into a "balancing consciousness." Under this
diagram Frampton placed the plans for Gianlorenzo Bernini's Baroque church of
Sant' Andrea al Quirinale, with the same double circle inscribed in them. Further down, a
diagram indicating the "geometric progression" implied by the two circles, annotated
with the mystifying relationships: "axis l/axis 2: axis 2/axis 3: axis 3/ axis 4=1/v3: v3/3:
3/(3v3).,,63 Lastly, in the caption for the bottom double diagram Frampton tells his
readers that: ''The circle and the square, in the art of self -division, give rise to the 3
'sacred' proportional relationships of -n, v3, and v5.',64 Thus, the captions and
illustrations framed the text in such a way as to encourage the reader to "believe" in the
63 Ibid. P 315.
399
persistence of Myth embodied in form. The reader was given a "feeling" of the deep
meanings that lied beyond, but was never quite initiated into the secret rites of
architecture. For Frampton, those rites remained always outside of discourse and reason,
in the realm of an ontologized act of making.
D. Reading Habermas: Frampton Identifies the outward
expression of buildings with the public sphere
Why, we might ask, did Frampton displace the possibility of collectivity to the
level of aesthetic experience? Is it not rather in the sphere of politics that collectivity
should be negotiated and resolved? Frampton regarded fonnal politics as function of
in~trumentalreason and the State. His views of contemporary society were decisively
bleak from the outset of his career. In his early 1970s reflections on Heidegger, Frampton
was already arguing that the "unity" of man could not be regained through "abstract
discourse," and that only a return to a primordial experience of architecture's "thingness"
could help save society. 65
The primacy of practice over theory, and the suspension of reflexivity that it
entailed, was Frampton's prerequisite for experiencing of humanity as a unity. This was
the "hope" that FramTJton offered in the aesthetic of "making": the meaningful experience
of the synthesis of individual and collective, of particular and universal. Thus, Frampton
delivered the synthesis that Ricoeur so vehemently postponed out of the conviction th at
to pronounce it before the Last Judgement could only do service to violence.
To follow Ricoeur's reasoning, a theoretical pronouncement of the synthesis
between "system" and "uniqueness" such as Frampton's ultimately led to violence (read
64 Ibid. P 315.
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revolutions) on the social and political spheres. And yet, in "Avant -Garde and
Continuity," Frampton had mounted his case against the avant-garde precisely in
opposition to the ideological structuring of architectural practice around violent or radical
breaks. Instead, Frampton advocated the "continuity" of peaceful revolutions in the
British tradition, as did many mid-century New Left thinkers. In his article "On Reading
Heidegger" (1974), Frampton tried to clarify how architecture could serve as a foil for the
irruption of violence within society. Even though the article's title refered to Heidegger,
the body of the text dealt mainly with the work of JUrgen Habennas. In Toward a
Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics (1971), Habennas argued that the
strict separation of theory and practice could only lead to a loss of accountability and
therefore to irrational violent conduct. Only a dialectical relation between theory and
practice, he maintained, could result in a model for political decision making that would
allow for accountability and for the setting of infonned and rational goals for
technological production. Although Frampton's "On Reading Heidegger" claimed to
follow Habennas's model, the article in fact remained within the "pragmatic model" that
Habennas wished to transcend. For Habennas, the dialectics of theory and practice
followed immanently from the confrontation of "technical knowledge and capacity" with
"tradition-bound self-understanding," as society strove for ideal conditions ofgeneral
communication, free from domination, for the entire public.66 Frampton, on the other
hand9 insisted that "place-fonn," as the physical and immediate manifestation of the
experience of "common sense", mediated between theory and practice at the level of pre-
understanding. Frampton believed tllat as humans interacted with each other in ''place-
65 Kenneth Frampton, "On Reading Heidegger," in Oppositions, n. 4 (October 1974), unpaginated.
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forms," their decisions would immediately follow historically detennined pre-
understanding, governed by social nonns, of what was practically necessary.67 For
Frampton, Habermas's "public sphere" was constituted in "place" because place was, he
argued, the physical embodiment of socius. Thus, Frampton ignored Habennas's
principal argument, which stated precisely, that the structural transfonnation of bourgeois
public sphere made the presupposition that mediation would happen at the level of pre-
understanding untenable.68
The political ideology making up Frampton's concept of the "public" now
appears clearer. It would be a real physical "place," the surfaces of which would express
the interiority of the structure through an aesthetic of "making." Those select few,
capable of recognizing, in the most private and intimate depths of their experience, the
beauty of these surfaces, would constitute a community. Their common private
experiences would attest to their shared moral values. This "common sense" would serve
as a foil for the advances of "other" values. When Frampton equated "house -building" to
a Heideggerian "rooting," a "clearing the ground" to make a "place of dwelling," he was
suggesting a politics of belonging based on this aesthetic experientialism. 69 Frampton
sought to resolve the problem of the "broken" nature of subjectivity by repressing the
66 See Jiirgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. Jeremy J.
Shapiro, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) p 75.
67 Therefore, concluded Frampton, the test of validity for design goals was their capacity to positively affect
"place." Only in this way would society be capable of guiding technological production towards the
creation of "receptive places". Ultimately, Frampton wanted to achieve a "homeostatic plateau" between
place, production, and nature. In effect, Frampton longed for a synthesis which was not reconcilable with
the dynamism inherent in dialectics. See Kenneth Frampton, "On Reading Heidegger," in Oppositions, n. 4
(October 1974), unpaginated.
68 Haberrnas leveled this critique against John Dewey in chapter 5 "The Scientization of Politics and Public
Opinion" of Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro,
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). For his specific comments on the relation of the transfonnation of the public
srhere to the possibility of mediation at the level of pre-understanding see p 69.
6 Kenneth Frampton, "The Status of Man and the Status of His Objects: A Reading of the Human
Condition," i~ Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 ( 1982) P 19, n. 10.
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issue of individual communication in the public sphere, and replacing it with a
"communal feeling" in the pre-conscious private sphere. More problematic than the
impoverished nature of the resulting subject, is totalitarian nature of this model, where
one's ability to be a part of society depends on one's compliance to an established nonn,
which is itseIfbeyond the limits of reasoned criticism. "In the last analysis," concluded
Frampton, "everything turns as much on exactly how something is realized as on an overt
manifestation of its form.,,70 His conception of signification as immediately given at the
pre-reflexive level of experience contrasted with the reception of Arendt's work by his
contemporary structuralist architectural historians such as George Baird.71
IV. Frampton formulates the Tectonic aesthetic as a "cure" to modernity
A. Frampton believes the Tectonic Aesthetic precedes discourse.
The consistency with which the intellectual history of modernism was mishandled
by Frampton is perhaps less surprising in light of his avowed derision for discourse in
general, a position which became increasingly explicit in the latter part of his career. In
his immensely popular 1995 treatise Studies in Tectonic Culture, Frampton attempted to
70 Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics ofConstruction in Nineteenth and Twentieth
Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995) p 26.
71 George Baird, a contemporary of Frampton, was also deeply influenced by Hanna Arendt, and was
deeply critical of the post-structuralism of the early 1990s. However, he cautioned against the architectural
fetishization of Arendt's emphasis on the "things of the world," which he saw at work both in
"contemporary phenomenologies" and deconstruction. Consider the following passage by Baird on the
status of both object and subject in modernity, which can be read as a criticism of the unmediated
"phenomenological" fetishization of both categories at work in Frampton's "The Status of Man and the
Status of His Objects: A Reading of the Human Condition":
"If her conclusion has been a sound one, our acutely ambiguous current attitude to the
"object" in the modern world might well benefit from a careful reconsideration of it. This
would point to the possibility of our once again assuming a stance vis-a-vis the "things of
the world" that would acknowledge their "brittle" status (to use Adomo~s word), but
would not go so far as to fetishize them. Should we assume such a reconsidered stance,
the it will also follow that contemporary phenomenologies that seek to underscore the
Iiberatory potential of "subjectivity," and the architectural praxes that follow them, will
need to make their case with caution."
See George Baird, The Space ofAppearance, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995) p 21-22.
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fannulate the autonomy of architecture from discourse and especially from "other,"
presumably non-architectural, legitimizing discourses (a goal that was contradicted by his
own arguments's reliance on abstract concepts derived from the history of architecture
and modem philosophy). I1e defmed the tectonic as a "poetics of construction," which
by virtue of its "artistic dimension" was neither figurative nor abstract. Rather, the
tectonic was the "thingness" of construction, the "concrete" and "rea)" that would suffer
the post-facto "abstraction" of mediation.
In this sense, Tectonics revived Critical Regionalism under a different name: it
continued to hypostatize the "making" of "real things" according to traditions of local
craft. Undergirding Tectonics, once more, was the notion of a "critical practice"
promulgating a Heideggerian "return to things" where "primordial" encounters v/ith
"thingness" allegedly disclosed non-discursive, non-intellectualized knowledge.72
According to Frampton, the tectonic was the fusion of knowing and making, social
interaction and construction, concept and material, body and world.73
With this aesthetic of tectonics, Frampton attempted to depict the intellectual
validation of discourse as a second order mental analysis -the pale reflection of a more
"foundational" existential knowledge, which was stable, "rooted," and not affected by
"superficial" afterthoughts. This of course ran counter to the work of Tafuri, whose
descriptions of the dialectical relationship of ideology and practice, had been enonnously
influential in Western academic thought during the 1970s and 1980s, and had inspired a
wealth of new studies in the early 1990s relating the discourse of architects to the
72 Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics ofConstruction in Nineteenth and Twentieth
Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995) p 22.
73 See: Ibid. pp 1-27.
404
structural changes in the capitalist modes of production.74 The anti-discursive position
evident in Studies in Tectonic Culture was a frontal attack on the now mature baby-
boomer group of scholars (including Beatriz Colomina, Mark Wigley, Mark Jarzombek,
and K. Michael Hays) whose theoretical work, influenced by post-structuralism, opened
to historical analysis and placement those very categories (such as the tectonic and other
timeless vessels wherein aesthetic development was said to take place and become
meaningful) that Frampton viewed as indestructible. 75 Frampton argued that
architectural making and thinking not only coexisted in the act of building, but that the
possibility for a truly "critical" architecture, autonomous and resistant to "other" cultural
phenomena (such as capitalism), rested on this union. He made his outrage at theory
public:
74 Jean-Louis Cohen has noted in La Coupure Entre Architectes et Intellectue/s: Ou Les Enseignements de
/'ltalophilie, (Paris: L'Ecole d'architecture Paris-Villemin, 1984) P 205, that Tafuri's critique is a logical
extension of Emesto Rogers's goals with Casabe//a Continuita. He suggests that Tafuri suffered from the
indirect use of AJthusser's definition of ideology as representation of the world, rather than as false
consciousness. Manfredo Tafuri's 1973 Progetta e Utopia, which appeared in English as Architecture and
Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development, trans. Barbara Luigia La Penta, (Cambridge, MA and London:
MIT Press, 1976) was perhaps his most influential work with regard to establishing a relation between
ideology and production in architectural culture. Among the Tafuri inspired works which appeared in the
early 1990s, it is worth mentioning K. Michael Hays, Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject: The
Architecture ofHannes Meyer and Ludwig Hi/berseimer, (Cambridge MA, and London: MIT Press, 1992).
75 The argument in pro of separating architectural thinking from practice, which also drew its strength from
the work of the Italian historian and critic Manfredo Tafuri, took an enormous joint effort on the part of
young scholars working primarily in the North East of the United states during the late 19805. Their
published work raised the standard of competency significantly enough to become in many ways
inaccessible to practicing architects (who often complained that theory was no longer "useful" to them).
The role of social relations must also be considered when accounting for the progressive splintering of
theory and practice. When the baby-boomer generation began mentoring their own students, it became
common practice to discourage Ph.D. students from returning to practice. In addition scholars publicly
inscribed themselves (and each other) within a common project of architectural thought. Consider" by way
of example, the following remarks written by K. Michael Hays (Associate Professor of Architecture at
Harvard University, and editor of the influential journal Assemblage) in praise of Mark Wigley's The
Architecture ofDeconstruction: Derrida's Haunt, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), and printed on the
dust jacket of the book:
"Among the theorists who have recently found architecture a vantage point from which to
open up new questions aoout the logic of space, structure and ornament, surface"
materiality, media, gender, and politics, Wigley may well be the best. [... ] His book will
stand as a mark of a moment in the histol)' of architectural thought when architecture
reasserted itself as a mode of thought in its own right. n
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Among those who are familiar with the professional and academic
architectural scene, it may well be thought that the last thing we need is
another book on architectural theory. [...1This book however has a good
chance of breaking through this barrier of deadening indifference, often
displayed today by many rrtembers of the profession and even by a large
number of students, for this is a refreshingly direct and unpretentious
compendium of the elements of architecture as these can be reasonably
detived from architectural practice.76
The anti-intellectualism of Studies in Tectonic Culture made explicit what had
been a constant in Frampton's career. His position preceded his contacts with
phenomenology, and is therefore perhaps better understood as an extreme radicalization
of the 1960s Anglo-American views on education.7? Frampton's move to the United
States in 1965, occurred in the midst of a widespread American fascination with what
was beginning to be called the British "open education" system. During the early 1960s,
the Labour government made significant changes to the Britisfl education system. They
encouraged notions of team teaching and individual learning, and promoted a shift in
pedagogy from a "didactic" model of "teacher instruction" to an "exploratory" model of
"student discovery."
A.S. Neill, Britain's noted educational progressive, had been a forerunner to these
attitudes earlier in the century. The curriculum of his famous Summerhill experimental
school gave children complete freedom to do and learn what they pleased. The 1960
edition of Neill's book Summerhill sparked the educational controversy in North
America. By 1964, a number of important books appeared that criticized the
Note that although Wigley was trained as an architect in his native New Zealand. he is here identified as a
"theorist" who has "found" architecture.
76 Kenneth Frampton~ "Foreword," in Pierre von Meiss, Elements ofArchitecture: From Form to Place,
trans. Katherine Henault, (London and New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, International, 1990) pp ix-xi.
77 For an in-depth study of Anglo-American education during the postwar see Arthur Marwick who deals
with the subject extensively in the section "British and American 'Progresssives' and 'Do-Gooders', " in
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authoritarian and unimaginative nature of United States education, such as Compulsory
Mis-Education, by Paul Goodman, and How Children Fail, by John Holt. In the early
19608, North American educational researchers were aiready studying the British system,
visiting schools and universities in the United Kingdom, and by 1969, study teams from
twenty North American cities had conducted research in England. Arthur Marwik
suggests that the North American perception of British progressiveness in teaching was
"slightly exaggerated, but perhaps in part because of the good work already put in on
behalf of Britain by the Beatles, it had a great impact.,,78 Frampton was one of the many
British academics who were offered teaching positions in the United States during this
period of fascination with the progressiveness of British pedagogy.
In 1974, The Teacher's Guide to Open Education appeared in the United States
and popularized the notion of "a classroom environment in which there is a minimum
teaching to the class as a whole, in which provision is made for children to pursue
individual interests and to be actively involved with materials, and in which children are
entrusted to direct many aspects of their own experience.,,79 By this time, there were
already numerous critics of open education, especially among university professors who
had seen their authority undennined during the student revolts of 1968. In light of these
debates defenders of "progressive" education radicalized their positions. Most notable
among these "radicals" was Ivan lllich, whose Deschooling Society (1971) and Disabling
Professions (1976) depicted schools and discipl ines as pillars of bourgeois society, and
The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c. 1958 - c.1974, (Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) pp 498-507.
78 Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c. 1958
- c.1974, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) p 503.
79 Ibid. P 503 ~
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intimated that by speaking and writing correctly and grammatically one confonned to
bourgeois values.80
The opposition to academicism was at one with Frampton's Marxist opposition to
the division of labor. He inherited this understanding of scholarship from Lethaby and
the Lee. Essentially, the Arts and Crafts Movement was anti-academic. It argued that
good design was not the result of university schooling, cultivated taste, or even drawing
skill. Rather, Arts and Crafts proponents like Lethaby argued that it was the result of an
intimate knowledge of tools and materials. That knowledge was transmitted through
common productive work. The Arts and Crafts movement was therefore understood as
an opposition to industrial systems of building production.
Frampton's radical devaluation of academic discourse as concomitant with
bourgeois "instrumental" reason began in the mid 1970s. By the mid 19908, his
Tectonics attempted to separate "critical practice" from aU matters of human expression
that might be historically contingent. Givjng up the hope that modem society might ever
reach a sense of community~Frampton sought to compensate for this lack at the level of a
unifying collective unconscious. Tectonics was neither a visual style, nor a verbal
symbol. It was a pre-symbolic and pre-reflexive process of "making." Through
craftsmanship, a tradition-bound way of dealing with matter, one was to gain access to
the involuntary, pre-conscious level of culture and collectivity. Although expressions of
the tectonic could 'look' different (depending on the region or time in which they were
80 Ivan IlHch's influential writings continue to influence thinking of architectural pedagogy. See, for
instance, Duncan Philip~ "De-Schooling Architecture," in Journal ofArchitectural Education. n. 1. v. 42
(Fall 1988), pp 58-59. In this article~ Philip challenges the idea that architectural education should take five
or six years of study.
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produced) for Frampton they all remained affinnations (in the positive sense) of the
deeper existential dimension of "making." In Frampton's own words:
It is undeniable that over the course of this past century the tectonic has
assumed many different forms, and it is equally clear that its significance
has varied greatly from one situation to the next. Yet one thing persists
throughout this entire trajectory, namely, that the presentation and
representation of the built as a constructed thing has invariably proved
essential to the phenomenological presence of an architectural work and
its literal embodiment in fonn. It is this perhaps more than anything else
that grounds architecture in a cultural tradition that is collective rather than
individual; that anchors it, so to speak, in a way of building and place-
making that is inseparable from our material history. 81
Frampton's invocation of phenomenology in this passage to denote the fusion of
"making," "material," and "history" helps explain his differences with postmodem
scholars such as Mark Wigley. In fact, the synthesis he proposed here denounced not just
post-structuralism, but also the basic tenets of Structuralism and Critical Theory with
which he himself had come to be identified during his co -editorship of Oppositions with
Alain Colquhoun, Mario Gandelsonas, Peter Eisenman, and Anthony Vidler in the 1970s.
Frampton's reduction of epistemology to matter ran counter to the 1970s neo-Marxist and
structuralist ideas about the transmission of knowledge, values, and about the constitution
of social collectives. Critical Theory was only one of the many intellectual interests of
Frampton. Arguably, judging from the undialectical nature of his thinking, it was the less
dominant.
In the aftennath of the 1983 "Heidegger Affair,,82 a series of younger critics
schooled in Critical Theory began critiquing Frampton, as v/ell as Norberg-Schulz and
81 Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics ofConstruction in Nineteenth and Twentieth
Century Architecture, (Cambridge Mi\: MIT Press, 1995) p 375.
82 Heidegger's "The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts," although allegedly written in 1945, was
published in 1983, in accordance with his request to his son Herrmann that it be released at a "propitious
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other established historians, for their sustained interest in phenomenology. Hilde Heynen
summed up the new generation's distaste for phenomenology by arguing that Frampton's
and Norberg-Schulz's "uncritical" readings of Heidegger's notions of "gathering" and
"essence" were to blame for the architectural popularity of the philosopher in the 1970s
and 1980s. In contrast to this, Heynen argued that a second more "critical" understanding
of Heidegger had been carried out by her generation of scholars, including Mark Wigley
and Francesco dal Co, who had stressed Heideggerts description of the impossibility of
dwelling in the Modem era, and compared them to similar diagnosis by Theodor Adorno.
Heynen therefore questioned the value of Heidegger to architects concerned with
"rooted" dV/elling, and associated phenomenology with Nazi ideology.83 In response to
these critiques Frampton became all the more emphatic about the ability of
phenomenology to help ground thinking in building, to unite theory and practice.
Moreover, he dismissed the new post-structuralist challenges to this union as testaments
to their "rootless" Avant-Garde alienation from culture.84
time." The essay \vas received as an attempt by Heidegger to defend his involvement in the Nazi party.
Inadvertently, it sparked a series of historical investigations which effectively exposed the mendacious
character of his remarks. The "Heidegger affair," as it came to be known in academic circles, was
unleashed first in France in 1987 with the publication of Victor Farias 9 s Heidegger et Ie nazisme (Paris:
Verdier, 1987), and then in Germany with Hugo Ott's Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu Seiner Biograhie
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1988). By 1998 the "affair" also received attention in the Anglo-American
academy through the work of philosophers such as Richard RoTty, Richard Wolin, Thomas J. Sh eehan and
Michael E. Zimmerman.
83 See Hilde Heynen, "Worthy of Question: Heidegger's Role in Architectural Theory," in Archis, n. 12
(December 1993), pp42-49.
84 The opposition Frampton to set up between "critical practice" and "rootless theory" is made evident in
the two titles under which he published one of his most notable condemnations of theory. First published
as "Place, Production and Architecture: Towards a Critical Theol)' of Building," in Architectural Design,
n. 7-8, v. 52 ( 1982) pp 28-45, Frampton changed the title to "Place, Production and Scenography:
International Theory and Practice since 1962" when it appeared in Modern Architecture: A Critical
History, 3rd edition, (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 1992).
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B. The Tectonic aesthetic Is a Christian ethics of practice
Ricoeur depicted Christianity as in a sense pre-figuring the battle of existential
phenomenology against idealism. Phenomenology's "return to things" was in his mind
foretokened by the satisfaction of "the wrath of God" on the cross. 85 With Christ's
crucifixion, two fonns of ethics appeared: on the one hand the "ethics of coercion" as
Reason "in the flesh" leading to its institutionalization first in Roman Law and now in the
nation-state, and on the other hand the "ethics of love" materialized as "embodied" Myth
and giving culture its "unique life." Human existe nee was for him limited and tom
between these two poles, essentially "broken" between the need to build "systems" and
the mY5tery of life, whose singularity defied all systematic thought. At the level of
collective existence, this meant that unlike the s tate, understood as "a set of tools which
accumulates, sediments, and becomes deposited, a cultural tradition stays alive only if it
constantly creates itself anew.,,86 Ricoeur regarded the re-unification of Reason and Myth
as the limit of human existence, an absolute horizon from which human life received its
meaning.87
85 Paul Ricoeur, "State and Violence," in History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley 9 (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1965) pp 238.
86 Paul Ricoeur, "Universal Civilization and National Cultures," in History and Truth, trans. Charles A.
Kelbley, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965) p 280.
87 In his attempt to describe both the finite and infinite aspects of human existence, Ricoeur was setting
himself apart from contemporary existentialists, who emphasized finitude as the universal characteristic of
existence. Ricoeur's philosophy might seem to be a counterpart to that of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology
ofPerception (1945). Ricoeur cast doubt on Merleau-Ponty's identification of"man" with his insertion into
the perceptual field, arguing instead that there could be no philosophy without any absolute. Against
Merleau-Panty's description of human existence as pure embodiement that is then transcended in
reflection, Ricoeur argued that the act of existence simultaneously became embodied and transcended its
embcxliment. In other words, the experience of finitude was non-identical to finitude, since it presented
itself only as a constrasted experience between limitation and "transgression." Ricoeur used a similar line
of reasoning to critique Sartre's "philosophy of negation." He blamed Sartre for taking nihilating acts to be
a "nothingness" which would stand for the ontological essence of human reality. The infinitude of
"nothingness" missed, according to Ricoeur, the "primary affirmation 99 of limitation inherent in any
reflexive act. See Paul Ricoeur, "Phenomenologie existentielle," in Encyclopedie Fran~aise , v. 19. (1957)
pp 6-12.
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According to Ricoeur, only myth, as the opposite of reason, could resist the
pressure of reason to subsume everything in its path. But where was one to find myth in
the increasingly secular European 20th century? Ricoeur asserted that myth could be
found in culture. For him all cultures originated in myths, which could subsequently die
or change in time. The value of a "living culture" was its ability to preserve the "ethical
and mythical nucleus of mankind. ,,88 A "living culture" kept the "negatlve" of Reason
alive in the fonn of a unique "singularity" that prevented Reason from closing upon itself
as a fmished "system." It was for him important that philosophy not try to de-
mythologize it through reason.89 Inversely, Ricoeur argued that the task of Reason was to
keep Myth from closing upon itself. Only the dialectical relation of Reason and myth
could keep both systems "alive," and move history forward by pennitting the emergence
of new (and contesting) myths (or truths) within the unattainable horizon of Truth:
It seems to me that we can distinguish certain conditions which are sine
qua non. Only a culture capable of assimilating scientific rationality will
be able to survive and revive; only a faith which calls upon the
understanding of intelligence can 'espouse' its time.90
Ricoeur read the meaning of nation-state and culture as arising from more
essential human experiences of absolute and finitude. Taken individually, these opposite
poles were meaningless. However, taken together and in "hope" for their reconciliation,
they acquired profound meaning. Thus, Ricoeur tenned his thinking "eschatological" to
denote its circumscription to the horizon of hope for the re-unification of absolute
"system" and unique "finitude" into a single Truth, as promised in Christ's apocalyptic
88 Paul Ricoeur, "Universal Civilization and National Cultures," in Histol)' and Truth, trans. Charles A.
Kelbley, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965) p 283.
89 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley , (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1965) p 13-14.
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second coming. Until that final day, Ricoeur thought human existence would fmd
meaning in a life led in hopeful anticipation:
This limiting situation, by which ethics splits into two ethics of distress, is
undoubtedly not a constant situation, nor even a lasting or frequent one.
But like all extreme things, it throws light on the average Donnal
situations. It attests that until the last day, love and coercion will walk
along side by side as the two pedagogies, sometimes converging,
sometimes diverging, of mankind.
The end of this duality would the total "reconciliation" of man with man.
But this would also be the end of the State, because this would be the end
of history. ,,91
Politically, Ricoeur's eschatological thought meant that both the rational nation-
state and the mythic cultures had to advance together. The decolonization movements of
the 1950s "awakened", according to Ricoeur, the "margins" to their existential
rationality. "We are witnessing the advance onto the world scene of great human masses
who were heretofore silent and downtrodden. It can be said that a growing number of
men have the awareness of making their history, of making history; in this sense, one ca n
say that these men are really joining the majority."92
The danger of decolonization, as Ricoeur saw it, was that it failed to also
et:courage the advancement of mythic culture. The nation-states (new and old) were
replacing Truth with their specious and incomplete rationality. In a notably existentialist
90 Paul Ricoeur, "Universal Civilization and National Cultures," in History and Truth, trans. Charles A.
Kejbley, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965) p 282.
91 Paul Ricoeur, "State and Violence," in History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley ., (Evanston., IL:
Northwestern University Press., 1965) pp 246.
92 Paul Ricoeur., "Civilization and National Cultures," in History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley ,
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965) p 276.
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gesture, Ricoeur called upon every individual to limit this perversion by reaching into
their cultural myths and asserting them. 93
Frampton translated Ricoeur's call for an architectural audience, encouraging
architects to assert to their mythic culture as a sign of their ethical commitment. But
\vhereas Ricoeur had argued for nation and culture to "walk hand in hand," Frampton
took traditional culture to be the source of all authenticity, and identified any deviance
from it as evidence of a demoniacal instrumental reason. Thus, avant-garde counter-
cultural practices, or theoretical questioning of the validity of culture were to be strictly
resisted. In the epilogue to "The Isms of Contemporary Architectlre," Frampton
introduced "Regionalism" as a type of marginal architectural practice that by
hypostatizing "the culture of the region" above any other interest served as the foundation
helping to ground all architectural styles.94 Thus he turned Regionalism into a universal
"ethics of love," comparable to that of Christianity, whereby a Regionalist architect could
welcome and check all extraneous forces. By reaching back towards architecture's
mythic origin in craft and "regional" types, architects could help their community
preserve its unique identity before the Usystem." For Frampton, an architect's
93 For Christians like himself, the task was to assert the "revolutionary" demand of Love, which required
one's sacrifice for a greater universal good. Individual disobedience in the name of fraternal love would be
punished by the state, yet this personal sacrifice would serve humanity by limiting the state:
I must act with the idea that the maxim of my action might become a universal law. The meaning
of my act of disobedience, when extended to all, is therefore a threat to my State whose chances of
survival I lessen. This is the "meaning" which I must accept and even assume if I disobey: in the
limiting situation of war, the testimony that I bear to the absolute quality of the commandment
which forbids murder puts my State in danger and, along with it, my fellow citizens. I do not have
the right to bear this testimony if I do not assume, besides the risk involved, the meaning afmy
action, that is to say the threat to and, in the extreme, the sacrifice ofmy State.
See Paul RicoeuT, "State and Violence," in History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley , (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1965) p 245.
94 Kenneth Frampton, "The Isms of Contemporary Architecture," in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52
(1982)p77.
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"Regionalism" was the measure ofhis or her critical stance (or "resistance") towards
outside influences.
Frampton's discusgions of culture as a ''balance'' to technology would seem to
indicate that he shared Ricoeur's concern for keeping Truth and History "open."
Ricoeur's notion of human freedom as dependent independence, a dialectical movement
between the willful creation of systems and the involuntary uniqueness ofexistence, can
be read as a blue print for Frampton's discussions of the "relative autonomy of
architecture," as the dialectical relation between "rational" building systems and
"mythical" or unexplainable types. However, there are also marked differences
separating the two models. Whereas Ricoeur saw the mutually limiting relation between
Reason and Myth as occurring through the dialectics of theory and practice, Frampton
considered that the two poles could be "reconciled" in practice alone. Frampton
established a strict separation of theory from practice, arguing that particular traditions of
"making" yielded buildings that could hold together "mythic cultureU and "universal
reason" within their framework. Theory, in his mind was only an abstraction of this more
fundamental union.
Frampton considered that one need not to wait for Judgment Day to experience
the synthesis of the individual and the collective. It was "there" in those special buildings
which he selected. Frampton made various attempts to construct the semblance of an
anti-avant-garde movemente In a special issue of Architectural Design devoted to
Kenneth Frampton, he put forth Gwathmey Siegel & Associates, Henri E. Ciriani, Josef
P. K1eihues, J~m Utzon, and Cesar Pelli to
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demonstrate, in different ways, the vestigial potential for architecture to
resist. To evoke the notion of resistance is to challenge the progressive
myth of the avant-garde and to tum, if not to the antithesis, the arriere
garde, then certainly to the strategy of revealing 'differences,' as practiced
by Adolf Loos throughout his career [ ... ].95
Frampton carefully assembled buildings from around the world as exemplary of
an aesthetic that, according to his own taste, expressed the union of the individual
architect and the collective for which he or she worked. Critical Regionalism must thus
be viewed less as a practice and more as an anti -avant-gardiste aesthetic supposedly
shared among architects such as Mario Botta, Tadao Ando, Alvaro Siza, J0m Utz0n, and
others. To the uninitiated, this aesthetic by no means conveys the union of architect and
collective. Hence Frampton's life-long efforts at educating architects.
c. Frampton anoints architects who produce the Tectonic
aesthetic
For Frampton, this feeling of human unity, of "community" and "region," arose
out of the recognition of by a group of individuals that they shared a common aesthetic
taste. It was in this experiential sense that Frampton characterized the "region" of his
Critical Regionalism. Hence, the importance he ascribed to cultivating, and teaching, a
shared way of valuing aesthetic experiences. Consider the following clarification, which
he offered in 1986, after he called on university journals to focus their content
Hexclusively around the work and concerns of a particular architecture school," and to
stop publishing "star" architects:
This example enables me to define more clearly that which I have
attempted to elaborate elsewhere under the rubric of "critical regionalism."
By appropriate extension, an architectural school can certainly be
95 Kenneth Frampton9 uThe Resistance of Architecture: An Anthological Postcript" in Architectural
Design, n. 7-89 v. 52 ( 1982), P 85.
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conceived of today as a cultural "region"; and it is precisely the self-
cultivation of this region which will enable it to resist without falling
either into reactionary henneticism on the one hand or into the media
juggernaut of universal civilization.96
Frampton's own community project involved the teaching and dissemination of
the Tectonic aesthetic. Frampton made the claim that this aesthetic of "making" was the
only one that could yield an "authentic" experience of public collectivity, because only it
wove the fabric of that experience with the thread of interiority and privacy. A building's
ability to tum its most inward constructional logic into an outward public experience was
the measure of its social content. Frampton's ability to introduce these somewhat
abstract and highly theoretical concepts as the telos of mainstream architectural history
partly attests to the desire of certain architects to be a part of a wider disciplinary
community. As it turned out, Frampton claimed the aesthetics of "making" to descend
directly from some of the canonical French and Gennan forefathers of the Modem
movement. Thus, the appeal of his community is that it offered membership in the
Western canon to those outside of it at the price of speaking the aesthetic language of the
center.
To speak briefly of how Frampton re-articulated the history of the canon in terms
of the aesthetic of ''making,'' we must look to the lineage he sought for his "tectonic
tradition." He located the origin of the movement in Semper's founding of the Zurich
Polytechnikum (now the ETH) in 1855, and ascribed its popularization to the structural
rationalism of Viollet-le-duc.97 The next touchstone in the lineage was Hendrik Petrus
96 Kenneth Frampton, "Architecture in Print: A Dialogue with Kenneth Frampton," in Design Book
Review, n. 8 ( 1986) pit.
97 See Kenneth Frampton's "Introduction: Reflections on the Scope of the Tectonic" in Studies in Tectonic
Culture: The Poetics o/Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA:
MIT Press, 1995) pp 1-27.
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Berlage, the Dutch master and precursor of Modem architecture, who achieved,
according to Frampton, a synthesis of Semper and Violet-Ie Due by understanding the
identity between building structure and social structure and fusing them in architectuml
fonns:
Like Louis Kahn after him, Berlage was to envision the walls of the
environment as literally emoodying the space of society; as being the
matrix within which and by which the society is fonned. In this regard his
Stock Exchange building assumed the existence of a social community or
Gemeinschaft, both within and without its volume.98
Fig: section through Berlage'. Exchange building In Amsterdam (1897-
1903). From Kenneth Frampton, Studies In Tectonic Culture: The Poetics
of Construction In Nineteenth and Twentieth century Architecture ,
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995), p 53.
Frampton went on to state that the articulation of the building's masonry provided
the immediate aesthetic experience of the burgher values of the middle ages, suggesting
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that the vestiges of "rooted communal ideals" belonging to a pre-industrial society were
somehow embodied in the "high-quality craftsmanship" of the Dutch. Berlage, being
Dutch, had somehow connected to this traditional mindset and given it unital)' expression
by exposing the high craftsmanship of the building to view. Thus, through a leap of
logic, Frampton argued that Berlage had been able to realize socialism in ways that no
Marxist discourse ever could!99 This type of argument can be traced back to similar
assertions made the members of the British Arts and Crafts movement, such as William
Morris and Augustus W. Lethaby, to whom Frampton owes a great intellectual debt.
In like fashion, Frampton argued that Louis Kahn had been able to give us access
to the communal "spirit" "alive" in the aesthetic experience of "making" by exposing the
inner structure of traditional type fonns. This was the same argument that Frampton
would also make in relation to Mario Botta. These architects, insisted Frampton, had a
"deep" or pre-reflexive understanding of their culture, which set them apart from
"superficial" discourses, from the "vulgar historicizing and monumental rhetoric," of
Postmodemists like Philip Johnson and others:
For Kahn, 'historicist' monumentality meant an orientation toward the
underlying structure of traditional forms. Thus he remained committed to
transforming these forms rather than reducing them to the status of being
mere references which made rather obvious allusions to historical
precedents, and it may well be that it is this subtle distinction which
accounts for his eclipse from current discourse. 100
The "underlying structure" to which Frampton was referring here was of course
meaning, which for him was Hgiven" immediately in fonns. Frampton's theory of
98 Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics ofConstruction in Nineteenth and Twentieth
Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995) p 336.
99 Ibid. P 338.
100 Kenneth Frampton, "Louis Kahn and the French Connection," in Oppositions, n. 22 (Fall 1980) p 41.
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meaning circumvented the rising hold of allusive historicism upon architectural practice
between the 19708 and 1980s, and the surrounding problematization of meaning and
language by postmodem scholars. The notion that buildings contained a "deep" meaning
in their structure clearly undennined the treatment of architectural surfaces with historical
shapes. Through his endorsement of a loosely defined typology Frampton was able to
"salvage" not only the language of modernism, but also its ideology. He made the
classical Modernist depiction of the avant-garde architect as the guiding light of society
available to all architects. So long as architects held fast to traditional building methods
and forms, the "common sense" and values of society would be preserved, and a good
ethically sound future. The architect's safeguarding of tradition guaranteed the continued
presence of a pre-reflexive physical "foundation" upon which all new theoretical, moral,
or ethical discursive constructions would have to be grounded.
Frampton's fetishization of the experience of the ~·interior" of a building's
structure as the "authentic" locus of meaning, relegated the building's "exterior" sutfaces
to the realm of "superficial" discourse, to the "public" realm of "idle talk." Within
architecture, this separation was easily assimilated as part of the centuries-old debate over
the primacy of structure or ornament, a question that had been problematized by Robert
Venturi's Learning From Las Vegas (1972), and which dominated architectural thinking
during the 1970s and 1980s. 10 1 Frampton touched the nerve of this debate by asking the
question in moral and political tenns: was it ethical to completely separate structure and
ornament, as did Venturi? In Frampton's model of meaning, although the surface was by
default an inauthentic public expression of the true structure, it was important that it
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remained close to the "inner structure" of the building because, for better of for worse,
once the construction process was over, the interior "essence" was only approachable
from the outside. Therefore, Frampton equated the subduing of non-structural
expressions with an ethical commitment to society.102 This motto came awfully close to
Modernism's founding myth of dispensing with superfluous non-functional ornament, a
connection that Frampton encouraged by depicting Critical Regionalism as the
recuperation of Modernism.
By insisting on the reduction of the "public" surface of architectural objects,
Frampton could more easily make the claim that non-ornamental architecture was more
"authentic" and "honest" because it came closer to the inner essence of the building. The
popularity of Frampton's condemnation of Postmodernism's separation of "public"
surface from "private" structure was aided by a long standing post-war discourse in the
social sciences which also equated the "public" as a source of alienation. Habennas's
work on the difficulties of communicating in the public sphere without ideological
distortions found echoes in 1970s reflections about the relation of ideology to cultural
production; for instance, in Alvin Gouldner's famous book, The Dialectic of Ideology and
101 For a historical account of this separation of "essential" and "superficial" interior within the Modem
movement see Mark Wigley.. White Walls, Designer Dresses: The fashioning ofModern Architecture,
(Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1995).
102 Consider, for example, Frampton's discussion of Swiss architect Mario Botta:
[... ] Botta is able to pass from the vernacular referent of the exterior to the stoic and
astringent order of his rationalist interiors: to the black slate, white-washed bloc, radiant
wall panels, and to Escher-like staircases by which his modernist space is structured. It is
by means such as these that Botta is able to evade the false naturalness of bourgeois
ideology [... ]
See Kenneth Frampton, "Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino," in Oppositions, n. 14 (Fall 1978' p 17.
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Technology (1976), which located the origin of ideology itself with the emergence of a
mass "public."I03
D. The Tectonic aesthetic subsumes the architect's Intentionality
The existential status of "hope" also assumed theological status in Ricoeur's
thought, in his case as a Kantian limiting concept. Hope, for Ricoeur, helped one refuse
to say "the last word" (to refuse any "unity" or "totality"), and simultaneously gave one
faith in the meaningfulness of the pursuit of truth. Ricoeur insisted that this hope for an
ultimate resolution of things in a fmal nloment in history, for the "eschatological
moment," was existentially foundational to philosophy (or to any discipline). In his view,
it provided the necessary open.,ess and freedom for philosophy to detennine its own
problems, methods, and statements. In other words, "hope" allowed one to accept the
103 One of the most comprehensive 1970s studies of the historical relation of ideology to the public is Alvin
W. Gouldner's, The Dialectic ofIdeology and Technology: The Origins, Grartlmar. and Future ofIdeology,
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1976). In Chapter 4, "The Communications Revolution: News, Public, and
Ideology," Gouldner argues that the onset of the "age of ideology" rests on a series of technology related
factors which enabled the creation of a new mass public. The increase in population that ensued the post-
industrial revolution increase in available food, coupled with the secularization of the masses, their
increased levels of literacy, and the availability of printed materials, compounded into an erosive force
which disintegrated the core of traditional social systems. In response to the augmented market for secular
meaning, symbol systems proliferated that attempted to synthesize the recent revolutionary events. This
was fertile soil for ideology. The growtll of journals and newspapers from 1780 to 1830 brought into being
a new social phenomenon: the (news reading) public. This new social formation stood in sharp contrast to
traditional forms. It no longer drew its sense of constituency from persistent interaction with one another~
but rather from exposure to the same social stimuli, which foster among them shared interests and
understandings. But the vel)' fonnal content of newspapers prepares the way for a rationalization of
society, through a rationalized categorization of the information about the social to which individuals are
exposed. News grounded conversation in public cafes became the vehicle of public rationality, dependent
of course on the "free" time make available to bourgeois society through professionalism and industry.
Appealing to the very rationality of the media, ideologies served to mobilize "social movemel1lS, It creating
common interests and goals among the population. Ideologies can thus be further defined as symbol
systems produced and consumed by a (news-reading) public accustomed to a mediated experience of the
real, where events are experienced de-contextualized from life.(p 105) This removal of context occurs in
two principal levels: on the one hand, the systems are free from the Itaffect" structure of face-la-face
interaction; on the other, these (news) systems are always "interpretations" of life events~ texts on texts.
The separation of news-communication from everyday life potentiates ideologies by enabling the claim to
self-groundedness imposed by rationality, and by widening the disparity between facts and values, theory
and practice (p 106).
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independent (and often unreconcilable) truths of different disciplines (like theology and
science). The disquieting premise was that disciplines like philosophy could only
achieve autonomy to the extent that they remained open to their own foundation upon an
originary eschatological myth. Philosophy could only exist, so long as it resisted its own
totalitarian tendency to "violently rationalize" or de-mythologize everything, including
itself. "Here philosophy seems to be well guarded against itself by non-philosophy. [... l
It seems that in order to be independent in the elaborations of its problems, methods, and
statements, philosophy must be dependent with respect to its sources and its profound
motivation.,,104
Inspired by Ricoeur's attentiveness to the non-rational, Frampton sketched out a
definition of Hcritical practice" as docta ignorantia in "Avant-Garde and Continuity"
(1980), which he would later rename Critical Regionalism. 105 Criticality, as Frampton
described it here, was not a mode of reflexive judgment in the tradition of critical
philosophy, but precisely the resistance to thought. It was imperativ~,he insisted, that
architects return to traditional building methods, and to traditional culture understood as a
craft. This was "critical practice," a "rooted" making that could in his mind alta ck the
degeneracy and corruption of "affinnative practices" such as "rootless" "avant-garde"
architecture, and theoretical speculation. 106 For him, aU "affinnative practices" embodied
enlightenment reason, industrial production, and consumer culture.
Frampton recognized the impossibility of eliminating industrial production,
reflexive thought, and reason from the equation of progress. Herfce, he argued for a
104 Paul Ricoeur~ History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley , (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1965) p 14.
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middle course between "affinnative" and "critical" practices. He accepted that
architecture had to embody both voluntary and involuntary aspects of life. However,
unlike Ricoeur, he maintained the ethical primacy of Myth over Reason. His middle
course was therefore a strategy for "grounding" a -moral universal reason in local ethics.
But how was architecture to support the enormous burden of containing reason? Here,
Frampton spun his theory of umaking" into an entire socio-political program for
achieving collective authenticity. This required a series of conceptual steps aimed at
turning "making" into Myth, which are nowhere stated but always implicit in Frampton's
thinking. First, Frampton regarded "making" buildings according to historical typologies
as the "habitual" practice of putting buildings together according to "know -how." This he
considered tantamount to the immediate embodiment of the involuntaty into the
architectural fonn. Second, since by definition buildings were made by many people,
they embodied the involuntary "know-how" of many. This made Frampton understand
buildings as the material incarnation of collective mythical values, or in other words,
culturally bound ethics. Third, since people used these buildings, they would immediately
experience the values "hidden" in the building at a pre -reflexive level.
Frampton's identification of making with the process of infusing matter with
"spirit," meant that, unless local craftsmanship "checked" industrial production, soon
only the ethics of coercion (to use Ricoeur's tenn) would govern our experiences of the
world. Without craft, he argued, the "value-less" instrumental reason allegedly governing
industrial production would be injected into every physical artifact, it would conquer the
world, ..:ontrol of humanity, and eventually destroy it. Frampton held "avant-garde"
105 HAvant-Garde and Continuity'" was prepared for a conference with the same title held in Valencia,
Spain, in 1980. The essay was later printed in Architectural Design.. n. 7-8, v. 52 ( 1982) pp 20-27.
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architects and theorists responsible for fueling the "utopian promise" of life devoid of
physical (and therefore moral) constraints. They had produced "rootless" or
"autonomous" architectural fonns, which responded only to vacuous mental exercises,
and were therefore undercutting the "common sense" embodied in traditional
environments. Frampton's apocalyptic rhetoric, and his lashings against discourse and
"star-architects," have only intensified in his later years:
The United States loses some 50 acres of virgin-cum-agricultural land per
day to suburbanization, while at the same diurnal rate, the world loses an
area of the rain forest the size of Manhattan, together with some 100
species of flora and fauna. This apocalyptic state of affairs can barely be
justified opportunistically in tenns of gratifying some popular consumerist
desire, for nothing is more artificial than our admass manipulation of
taste. 107
E. Architects must surrender their Intentionality to the local
community of builders.
Frampton rested the very possibility of progress upon the limiting function of
"rooted mt\king" before "rootless production." As a model for progress, Frampton's
theory had to address the problem of "correct action." In other words, even if one accepts
the model that community value-systems enter architectural objects through pre-reflexive
acts of making, the question remains: how can one judge that the "right" values had been
built? Frampton addressed this question with a naturalist or organicist theoretical
framework. For him, "critical practice" arose organically out of a "connection between
106 Kenneth Frampton, "Avant-Garde and Continuity" in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 ( 1982) pp 21.
107 Kenneth Frampton, "Technoscience and Environmental Culture: A Provisional Critique," in Journal of
Architectural Education, n. 3, v. 54 (February 2(01) p 124.
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the political consciousness of a society and the profession." 108 As such, it would always
be de facto ethically grounded in the set of moral values of that society.
This assertion in tum raises the problem of how the connection between the
architect and his or her community's "set of underlying ethical and spiritual values."I09
How was it to be effected? Frampton asserted that in certain locations in the "margin"
politics were undifferentiated from "rooted culture."IIO In those privileged locations,
every cultural practice was identical to a political expression of the community's values.
Even accepting this unlikely premise as possible, then how could one be certain of the
connection's "authenticity" if, as Frampton asserted, the architect-community rond
occurred at the unconscious level? Was there room for deceitful, ironic, or duplicitous
manipulations on the part of architects? Frampton suggested that one's embrace of
"marginal" or "regional" ways of "making" was an index of the authenticity of one's
connection to a community and its values. I I I Thus, an architect's "regionalism" became
the measure against which to judge, not only "outside" influences, but also his or her
level of political and ettlical commitment. By extension, Frampton established
"regionalism" as the "authentic ground," the limiting concept, of all ethical (and even
possible) architectural practices:
108 Kenneth Frampton, "Prospects for a Critical Regionalism:' in Perspecta: The Yale Architectural
Journal, v. 20, (1983) pp 148.
109 See Kenneth Frampton "Critical Regionalism Revisited," in Critical Regionalism: The Pomona Meeting
-- Proceedings, 00. Spyros Amourgis, (Pomona: College of Environmental Desing~ California State
Polytechnic University, 1991) P 38.
110 Kenneth Frampton, "Prospects for a Critical Regionalism," in Perspecta: The Yale Architectural
Journal, v. 20, (1983) pp 148.
111 Frampton defined a "regional architect" as a "marginal" but "talented individual working with profound
commitment to a particular culture." An important pre -requisite to marginality was to have remained
outside of the international "star rating." This unlikely category includea household names such as Louis
Kahn, Carlo Scarpa, and J0m Utzon. See Kenneth Frampton, "The Isms of Contemporary Architecture," in
Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 ( 1982) pp 81-82.
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Clearly Regionalism intersects with all the other isms of this 'taxonomy'
[Neo-Productivism, Neo-Rationalism, Structuralism, and Populism] so as
to remain potentially open to all of them, but only on the condition that
they are subordinate to the culture of the region itself. Regionalism is thus
enabled to interpret universal culture (of which it is also a part) in tenns of
its own intrinsic base. 112
The politics of Regionalism stemmed from its claim to a more "authentic" model
of production than that on offer in late-capitalism. Frampton understood the presence of
fine craft to be evidence of a society's strong cultu,ral and moral unity. This theory of
identity between the physical, social, and ethical domains allowed him to establish
political differences between ethno cultural groups on the basis of craft. For instance,
Frampton compared Gennano-Swiss "rooted" culture to Aa,glo-American "rootlessness."
As examples of "grounded" politics, he identified arc;titects such as Mario Botta, Luigi
Snozzi, Mario Campi and Franco Pessina. 113 These ''marginal architects," Frampton
wrote, operated in a "cantonal" cultural context where the architect's practice and the
building trade were "undifferentiated." This allegeclly hannonious and unitary culture of
making had been able to "revitalize the language of modern architecture" thanks to the
"filter of a severe constructive poetic."114 "I am alluding," continued Frampton, "to the
exceptional Swiss ability to transfonn ordinary engineering fonn into works of everyday
art. This ability is as much present in Tieino as it is in Gennan Switzerland where it may
be said to have had its origin. This is a quality that contemporary Anglo-American
architecture is almost incapable of achieving." 115
J12 Ibid. P 82.
113 See Kenneth Frampton's IfIn the Lugano Landscape: Five Architectures," in Casabella, n. 534 (April
1987) pp 4-11, and "Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino," in Oppositions, n. 14 (Fall 1978) pp 1-25.
114 Ibid. P 4.
115 Ibid. P 5.
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Fig: In this page, Frampton makes a visual argument about the equivalence
of three buildings, which he claims are part of the same mythic culture of
northern Italy: Gino Valle's house at Sutrlo, near Udlne; a house for a
painter In Tuscany by Leon Krier (1974); and a single family house at
Llgornetto (1975-1976) by Marlo Botta. See Kenneth Frampton, , "Marlo
Botta and the SChool of the Tlclno," In Oppositions, n. 14 (Fall 1978), p 17.
Frampton's nostalgic view of the Swiss "culture of making," as one that remained
impervious to the division of labor, was undermined by the reality of the Swiss building
trade, which relied on underpaid migrant masons and unskilled labor from Spain and
Turkey. What Frampton called "local craft," then, was really a product of the very same
globalizing world markets that he so criticized. Turning his eyes from this diverse socio-
economic reality, Frampton suggested that the Swiss had achieved a "tectonic synthesis"
of industrial construction methods and local craftsmanship. As a physical embodiment of
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the fusion of industrial and human labor, Frampton regarded Swiss architecture as "an
agent of both the realization and the representation of the society and its identity." I 16
Here is the crux of Frampton's understanding of "making": it was the pre-retlexive
creation, conservation, and representation of the "sacred" core of culture, which, to go
back to Ricoeur, was none other than Myth. Frampton's defense of the "constructive
poetic" (from the Greek poiesis meaning creation) as the "filter" of "authentic culture"
summoned making as mythopoesis.
The importance of "proper" making to the collective identity of a socEty can now
be better ascertained. According to Frampton's model "critical practice" reproduce<L
maintained and transmitted the pre-conscious myths bounding individuals into a synthetic
collective. This strong emphasis on the identity of individual and collective undercuts
Frampton's claim that his "critical practice" was in fact a dialectical mediation of
universal and particular. Indeed, Frampton'8 so-called dialectical model was also frozen
and undialectical to the degree that it presupposed the fusionof abstract concepts with
material processes within the category of "making." As further evidence of Frampton's
identity thesis it is important to note that he rarely differentiated between the architect's
intention, the hands-on process of building, and t~.e final work itself. All of these aspects
of the building process were united in ''making,~'as in the following passage:
This observation stresses two essential aspects of Scarpa's method, first
the gestural impulse passing almost without a break from the act of
drafting to the act of making, and second a reciprocity obtaining between
what Frascari characterizes as the techne of logos and the logos of techne;
that is to say, between construing a particular fonn and constructing its
116 K~.nneth Frampton, , "Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino:' in Oppositions, n. 14 (Fall 1978) p 2.
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realization (and then later in the cycle, the moment in which the user
construes the significance of the construction). 117
So far, we have been focusing on Frampton's understanding of "making" as the
mythopoetic kernel of ethics and culture. This passage, however, points to Frampton's
theory of "making" as meaning creation, and requires that we look closer at the relation
he established between myth and meaning. There is an implied symmetry in this citation
between the early stage of the cycle, when Scarpa passes from drawing to nuking
"almost without a break," and the "later moment" of the cycle, when the user grasps the
meaning infused in the structure by"making. n Frampton suggests a continuity in
meaning (logos) between architect and user is that bound together and stabilized by
"making" (techne). This passage by Frampton is a thumbnail of his theory of non-
discursive communication. From its insistence on the immanence of meaning in matter
we can begin to get a sense ofjust how far his theory was from 1970s and 1980s theories
of signification. To understand the precise differences it is important that we analyze
Frampton's theories signification and communication, as well as hose of his
contemporaries, in closer detail.
v. Conclusion
Frampton re-articulated of the central issues of 1970's and 1980s debates into an
extraordinary persuasive theory through which architects could reclaim their status as
"builders of society." His treatment of meaning helps us gauge just how far Frampton's
theory of meaning was from the structuralism he associated himself with -and just how
much further away he was from feminist and post-structuralist displacements of the
I17 Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics ofConstruction in Nineteenth and
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public/private opposition. I 18 Contrary to Frampton~sconception of the aesthetic of
"making," structuralist authors, following Michel Foucault, would have argued that such
non-reflexive immediacy between the laboring body and the values of a community did
not exist. For them the body itself was constructed and understood through discourse.
Furthennore, they would have opposed the underlying assumption in Frampton's
argument that the "origin" of meaning could be "located" in culture, contained within
architecture, and separated from language. In the words of the American philosopher
John Rajchman, one of Foucault's main theses about the relationship of modem culture to
language was that:
The culture in which art is free to take itself as an object in the sublime
transgression of the limits of experience is the culture whose ''fundamental
problems" are "intimately linked" with the "quest ion of the being of
language."I 19
Unlike Foucault, who saw structures of knowledge (i.e. epistemology) to be
opposed to the phenomenological understanding of human existence, Frampton insisted
on the possibility of a type of making indistinguishable from kno wledge and
Twentieth Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995) p 307.
118 For Gayatri Spivak, there was "a certain program at least implicit in all feminist activity: the
deconstruction of the opposition between the private and the public." She was referring to the
deconstructive structure of reversal and displacement. "The shifting limit prevents this feminist reversal of
the public-private hierarchy from freezing into a dogma or, indeed, from succeeding fully is the
displacment of the oppostion itself. For if the fabric of the s~calledpublic sector is woven of the so-called
private, the definition of the private is marked by a public potential, since it is the weave, or texture of
public activity. [... ] Displacing the opposition that it [deconstructive practice] initially questions, it is
always different from itself, always defers itself. [... ] Deconstructive practice teaches one to question all
transcendental idealisms. It is in tenns of this peculiarity of deconstruction then that the displacement of
male-female, public-private marks a shifting limit rather than the desire for a complete reversaL" See
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Explanation and Culture: Marginalia," in In Other Worlds: Essays in
Cultural Politics, (New York and London: Routledge, 1988) p 103.
119 Rajchman is referring here to Foucault's thinking in The Order o/Things, pp 302, 383. See John
Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom ofPhilosophy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) p
23.
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corporeality.120 Not only did Frampton posit epistemology as a non-reflexive embodied
reality, he premised the very possibilit)l of "resistance" and "criticality" on the exclusion
of language from knowledge.
By establishing the aesthetic of "making" as the only possible experience of
human unity in a "broken" existence, Frampton equated it with the "ontological
attributes" and political values of the whole society. In a the identity of meaning, mornls,
and building, Frampton (wittingly or unwittingly) misrepresented the Heideggerian
notion that language constitutes humanity's understanding of Being, to mean that the
non-verbal language of architecture constituted a community's ontological trnits.121
Contrary to the logic of multiplicity that an attelltiveness to marginal practices
would imply, Frampton issued dogmatic statements about what kinds of architectural
forms would qualify as belonging to the aesthetic of "making." To gain access to the
community of Critical Regionalists an architect should design according to the following
principles: First, he or she would design urban "enclaves" -i.e. clearly identifiable fonns
with well defmed inside and outside boundaries. Second~ the fonn of the "enclave" would
be derived from the local traditional (preferably 19th century) urban morphology, the
topography of the local landscape ("the oneiric essence of the site," as Frampton
described it), or the typology of traditional local buildings. Third, this fonn would be
erected preferably by local labor, 'Nhose culture, by virtue of being marginal, would
immediately infuse the structure with the local "political consciousness." Fourth, it would
120 For Michel Foucault9 s position see his "Structuralism and Post-structuralism," in Telos, Vol XVI, n.55,
(Spring 1983) pp 195-211. Frampton identified his position with the tradition of phenomellology in many
of his writings. In relation to his phenomenological and existential conception of the identity between
epistemology and the body see "Architecture in Print: A Dialogue with Kenneth Frampton9 rt in Design Book
Review, n. 8 ( 1986) pp 8-11.
121 See Kenneth Frampton. "On Reading Heidegger," in Oppositions, n. 4 (October 1974), unpaginated.
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be built out of local building materials. Fifth, the "enclave" would express the ''tactile 2Ild
materialist" interior constructive logic of the structure through rich detailing and
craftsmanship that could be appreciated at close range. 122
On the surface, it might appear as though Frampton was really not proposing
anything new. Since ClAM VIII (Hoddesdon, 1951) on 'The Heart of the City,' it had
been common to identify the dense urban fabric of the 19th century core with the human
scale and with civic values, and to associate the urban periphery with either hasty
unplanned development for the sake of economic profit, or with the rational
industrialized erection of "inhuman" mass housing. Frampton was consciously
continuing this convention with his constant calls for a return to dense "enclaves" and his
famous scorn for sprawl as a "non-place urban realm":
The universal Megalopolis is patently antipathetic to such a dense
differentiation of culture. It intends, in fact, the reduction of the
environment to nothing but pure commodity. As an abacus of
development it consists of little more than a hallucinatory landscape in
which nature fuses into instrument and vice versa. Regionalism would
seem to offer the sole possibility of resisting the rapacity of this tendency.
Its salient cultural precept is 'place' creation; its general model is the
'enclave' --that is, the bounded urban fragment against which the
inundation of the place-less, consumerist environment will find itself
momentarily checked. 123
Similar arguments in pro of dense urban environments had been put forth in the
late 1970s and 1980s by architects such as O.M. Ungers and Leon Krier. Like Frampton,
they appealed to Heidegger's notion of raunl, understood as place, to oppose the more
Modernist and abstract notion of architecture as the art of shaping "universal space."
122 Kenneth Frampton, "Prospects for a Critical Regionalism:' in Perspecta: The Yale Architectural
Journal, v. 20, (1983) pp 147-162.
123 Kenneth Frampton, "The Isms of Contemporary Architecture," in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 (
1982) p 82.
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However, under the semblance of displacing the notions typically associated with
"center" towards various dimensions of marginality, Frampton put into practice a
complex discursive mechanism of "tokenism," to use Gayatri Spivak's tenn: "The
putative center welcomes selective inhabitants of the margin in order better to exclude the
margin. And it is the center that offers the official explanation; or, the center is defined
and reproduced by the explanation that it can express." 124
Frampton asserted "critical practice" (be it under the guise of Critical
Regionalism or Tectonics) as the putative center of architectural exegesis and meaning
precisely by negating marginality. If, as Spivak pointed out, "what inhabits the
prohibited margL~Df a particular explanation specifies its particular politics," 125 then
Frampton's demotion of theory and surface as marginal and irrelevant to "critical
practice" had three objectives: flTsl, it tacitly affmned his own intellectual practice as
neutral and universal; second, it repressed the possibility of other public "expressions" of
architecture, be they built or printed; and third, it invited the repressed margins into the
center at the price of exacting from them the language of central ity.
124 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Explanation and Culture: Marginalia,n in In Other Worlds: Essays ill
Cultural Politics, (New York and London: Routledge, 1988) p 107.
125 Ibid. P 106.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: EXTENSIONS INTO THE PRESENT
Unlike art histoty, architectural histoty has not achieved sufficient distance from
itself and its subject matter to critically assess its changing conceptions of avant -gardism
during the second half of the twentieth century. Too often architectural historians have
borrowed basic assumptions about the avant-garde from modernist art discourse. In the
1970s it was common to find echoes in architectural discourse of Clement Greenberg's
1939 definition of avant-garde art as a type of fonnalist autonomy from politics and
culture that was opposed to 'kitsch' art, which was in tum seen as subservient to
commodified forms of popular culture, politics, or academicism. The problem of course
was that architecture could never claim this type of aesthetic autonomy from "reality" as
neatly as art, and thus seemed to always fall short of pure avant-gardism. Some so-called
"paper architects," like Joan Hejduk, sought refuge in the academy from the vicissitudes
of client relationships. Others, like Christian Norberg-Schulz and Kenneth Frampton,
found independence from building in newfound careers as historians. Coexistent with
Greenberg's notion was a competing view of the architectural avant-garde, also borrowed
from art, which defined it as concomitant with the radical and progressive transfonnation
of society. This was the view espoused by Emesto Rogers, Enrico Peresutti, and Charles
Moore who regarded their building practice as inextricably oound up in a continuous
revolution of society and culture.
Yet, it would be mistaken to portray the architectural scene of the second half of
the 20th century as two monoliths. The aim of this dissertation was to argue that these
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unsullied definitions do an injustice to the fl uidity and impurity of architectural discourse
during the Cold War. Each chapter described an important renegotiation between the
poles of aesthetic purity and social engagement, through which! the tenns of architectural
avant-gardism were redefined into what I have been calling the anti-avant-garde. What
distinguished this group was that they believed they had found the origin ofboth aesthetic
"authenticity" and social cohesion in experiences prior to reflection. For them, the
architectural avant-garde had found architecture's value to reside only in one pole to the
detriment of the other, say emphasizing fonnallanguage at the expense of social utility or
vice versa. Thus, the accusation that the avant -garde was "uprooted" from "true"
progress runs as a common thread from the writings of Rogers to those of Moore, and
from Norberg-Schulz to Frampton.
It is important to emphasize that the anti-avant-garde was not alone in its attempt
to reconcile the bipolar model of avant-gardism. Critics and historians of the 1970s
recognized that behind every effort to claim the autonomy or dependence of architecture,
there was an attempt to establish the parity of contemporary practice to the high water
marks of either classical or modem architecture. Dominance over architectural discourse
became premised upon discovering (or inventing) the terms of trans-historical
equivalence. Hence the emergent centrality of historians in this period, and of their
competing claims to avant-gardism. In other words, this was a period of renegotiation
and redefinition of the avant-garde, in whi<:h it was by no means clear what types of
practices fell under the aegis of the tenn.
Take Mario Gandelsonas for instance, one of the editors of the American critical
journal of architecture Oppositions, who's principal claim to avant-gardism was his
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writing practice.! Although he did not share the anti-avant-garde's belief in the liberating
power of immedia~eaesthetic experience, he also searched for a key to compare the value
of contemporary architecture to the standards of the past. Gandelsonas described the
architectural scene of the late 19608 and early 1970s as split between "neo -rationalism"
and "neo-realism," which he defined each respectively as claims either for the
"autonomy" or "dependence" of architecture from history and culture.2 Gandelsonas
used these categories to sift through the architects who were deemed avant -gardists in
1976, situating the young Eisenman, Hejduk, and Rossi on the side of "neo-rationalism,"
and Venturi on the side of "neo-realism." But no sooner did Gandelsonas divide
contemporary practice, he tried to re-synthesize it by claiming that roth tendencies were
poles of a more "fundamental dimension of meaning," which he called "neo-
functionalism." Not unlike Gandelsonas, Kenneth Frampton also argued that although
contemporary production was divided between Uautonomous" avant-garde and
"dependent" populist architects, there was a common root of all architecture, which he
called "Regionalism.,,3
What then makes an architect or author part of the anti-avant-garde? The anti-
avant-garde distinguished itself through its theorization of pre-reflexive eAp'.:rience as a
touchstone of universality and trans-historicity. My thesis is that this was, in effect, an
extension of a modem intellectual position, and that therefore the anti-avant-garde was
I Mario Gandelsonas (b. 1938), made his mark on American architectural culture as an editor of
Oppositions. He maintained a building practice with Diana Agrest, mostly centered in their native
Argentina. Their projects are collected in Agrest, Diana, Agrest and Gandelsonas ~. works (New York:
Princeton Architectural Press, 1995). See also Banco de /a Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina: Head
Office, 1968 : Liniers Branch, 1969 : Retiro Branch, 1970 t Global architecture series n. 64, (Tokyo:
A.D.A. Edita. 1984).
2 Mario Gandelsonas, uEditorial: Neo-Functionalism," in Oppositions, n. 5 (Summer 1976), pp 1-2.
3 Kenneth Frampton, tiThe Isms of Contemporary Architecture," in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52
(1982), p 77.
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not "PostmodemU as it claimed to be. Indeed, modem historians from Heinrich Wolfflin
to Siegfried Giedion and Christian Norberg-Schultz used the criterion of immediate
experience to evaluate the relative worth of old and new buildings. Aesthetic experience
of this sort was for them the key to breaking away with "dead" academicism and infusing
"life" into the world of architecture. This ethos of liberation was contingent on the belief
that aesthetic experience was already meaningful prior to reflection. Only then could it
constitute a type of "pure" knowledge, untainted by history, politics, or culture. Only
then could those experiences carry the "revolutionary" creed of Modernism, by
forwarding its myths that aesthetic creation had an essential origin, and that by tapping
into that source architects could create works that would be radically outside of culture.
If aesthetic experiences uninhibited by thought were pivotal for theorizing the
historical emancipating programs of modernism, then it could be argued that the
intellectual fonnation described in this dissertation was indeed simply the avant -garde,
and not its nemesis. But this would miss the fact that avant-gardism was, and continues
to be, a tenn in dispute. I argue that by (he 1970s the dominant defmition of the
architectural avant-garde (in Western intellectual academic circles) was no longer
modem, but properly post-modem. Thus, extensions of modemist ideology assumed an
antagonistic posture with regards to neo-avant-garde formations. By the 1970s, journals
like Oppositions (New York), Arquitecturas His (Barcelona), Architese (Zurich), and
Lotus (Milan) propounded a structuralist methodology in historical analysis. They cast
doubt on the modernist understanding that the meaning of modernism was rooted in
either a radical break with history, an aesthetic alterity to bourgeois cultuml fonns, or a
pure expression of the architect's innocent vision. In confli ct with these essentialisms,
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the early writings of AIdo Rossi, Vittorio Gregotti, Mario Gandelsonas, Alan Colquhoun,
and others put forth a structuralist model of signification which denied any pennanent or
"original" connection between signifier and signified, arguing instead that meaning was
generated as a function of difference within an established system of relations or
~~context" -cultural, social, aesthetic, political, etc.
The architects and historians that I have studied, and grouped together under the
appellation of the anti-avant-garde, remained coo1l1litted to reading architecture within a
modernist conceptual framework, which required them to continuously evince an
essential source of meaning for buildings. Ernesto Rogers trusted that architectural fonns
were called forth by an "original" life -world, which he called tradition. These fonns were
supposedly experienced immediately by architects who were "in touch" with tradition as
new and meaningful syntheses of traditional fonns a.!1d new construction techniques.
Charles Moore ascribed a similar synthesizing power to "poetic images," which he
believed to be pre-reflexive experiences of humanity's collective creative history that
flashed within the architect's "soul." Christian Norberg-Schulz thought the "aletheic
image" to be an immediate visual disclosure of Truth, which sprung forth from natural
topographies and "gave" architects "authentic" fonns to use in buildings. For Kenneth
Frampton, the Tectonic was a realm of the aesthetic that functioned as t he secular
collective equivalent to individual experiences of spiritual purification. Frampton's
promise was that the Tectonic could be experienced immediately, and that it could
therefore re-unite individuals at a pre-reflexive level with their cultural "mythic roots,"
thus bringing together communities which shared a taste fer certain "poetics of
construction."
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Like most of their forward thinking contemporaries, anti-avant-gardists believed
themselves to have broken free of Modernism. One must acknowledge that they were
instrumental in bringing down the fonnal restrictions on the use of non -modem
vocabularies and spatial distributions. However, from the perspective of the claims they
made about the liberating power of pre-reflexive aesthetic experiences, they in fact
extended the universalizing ideology of modernism into the late twentieth century.
Moreover, this ideology continues to exercise its sway in the present, under guises no
longer identified with phenomenology, in efforts to mask the unwieldy lack of clarity of
history and theory with various images of closure.
Taking into account the coexistence of modernist and postmodemist positions
during the 1970s, the received understanding of that period's intellectual formations
splinters and is re-arranged into new groupings. Kenneth Frampton shared much more
with Charles Moore and Emesto Rogers than he did with Alan Colquhoun, and John
Hejduk had more in common with Christian Norberg-Schulz than he ever did with Peter
Eisenman. I have focused on tracing the intellectual academic history of only one such
modernist group, which cohered around an intellectual debt to phenomenology.
I have given special attention to the particular circumstances that drew individual
authors to phenomenology in order to demonstrate that they did not turn to philosophy to
question their assumptions about architecture, but rather to add credibility to their
modernist preconceptions. Emesto Rogers's early rationalist belief that utility was the
source of architectural fonn would have seemed uncritical after World War II, when
other Left wing European intellectuals were criticizing the emergent Western consumer
societies for fostering only those aspects of human life that were "useful" to furthering
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the capitalist system. Therefore, Rogers gave utility a greater sense of social and political
engagement by availing himself ofEnzo Paci's phenomenology. Rogers argued that
utility was at the source of every authentic "tradition," a tenn he substituted for Paci's
mondo della vita (life-world). Charles Moore was schooled in the 1950s, the period
when the "crumbling of ideals" in the political and professional spheres replaced
modernist utopian desires to bring about revolutionary social change. In the United
States, McCarthyism placed heavy limitations on the political aspirations of architecture.
Moore salvaged his modernist revolutionary fantasies by turning them inward and
cl~.iming that architecture could serve to refonn and elevate the soul. In the 19708, when
the changing protocols of the academy required greater intellectual accountability Moore
embraced Gaston Bachelard's notion of "poetic images," understood as epistemological
breaks, to give greater credibility to his claims. Christiatl Norberg-Schulz began
seriously reading Martin Heidegger only in 1974, while teaching at MIT, where
phenomenology was on the lips of mathematicians and cognitive scientists. From his
early student years, Norberg-Schulz shared his mentor Siegfried Giedion's belief that a
new architectural practice would occur hand in hand with the advent of a new historical
epoch. Later at MIT, he identified Giedion's conviction with Heidegger's similar
pronouncements, and began trying to teach architects about how immediate or aletheic
experiences of the world would eventually usher in a new era of innocence. Kenneth
Frampton was part of a postwar generation of disaffected European Marxists, influenced
by social historian E.P. Thompson and the British New Left, that wanted to create a space
for grassroots moral dissidence against the exploitation of workers by roth the capitalist
and communist Cold War blocks. Throughout his academic life, Frampton believed
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architectural practice should give a voice of those "below" by allowing room for workers
to express their habitual construction techniques. Frampton found later confIrmation for
his project in the work of phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur, through which he construed
local building practices in universalizing existential terms the "mythic origin" and unique
source of cultural meaning.
Even though each of these authors eventually attained international recognition, it
is important to emphasize that the discursive dynamics that led each of them to
phenomenology were not the same. Emesto Rogers produced his most influential
theoretical work in Italy during the 1950s, whereas the other protagonists of this study
made their mark frrst in the United States during the 1970s. Rogers came in contact with
phenomenology through the serendipity of personal relationships. His collaborations
with Paci grew out of their shared Marxist and liberal values. They sublimated in the
aesthetic dimension the revolutionary aspirations of other Italian partisans, satisfying
with a new architecture their frustrated desire to see the birth of a new socialist society
after the war. The bridges Rogers and Paci built between their respective disciplines
were extraordinary in their time. By the 1970s, however, interdisciplinary connections
were common in the humanities and social sciences, especially in North Atlantic cultures.
Architectural history and theory, as weD as literary theory, c',~J:ural studies, and art theory
found it essential to their progress to establish a dialogue with philosophy. As
postmodemist thought moved each of these disciplines to challenge the hierarchies of the
Western tradition, intellectuals had to confront the philosophical roots of their disciplilles.
In architecture, Hegel and Kant were unavoidable, and so were their major interpreters,
such as Marx, Heidegger and Habennas. The absence of philosophical schooling resulted
442
I
I
in the prevalence of autodidacticism, for better of worse. Although one must recognize
the importance of these ''theory'' approaches to philosophy, they often focused only on
aspects of the philosophy in a manner that de-historicized the works. TIle
compartmentalized approach to philosophy undennined the project that theory portended;
namely, establishing a common meaningful language with which !o discuss issues across
disciplines, and thus engage in a pursuit of enlightened freedom that remained
accountable.4
1be type of de-historicized &pproach to phenomenology of 19708 architects alid
historians was not entirely accidental. I have suggested that the extraoJdinary success of
phenomenology in North American architectural circles can be considered an artifact of
McCarthyism. In academic circles of the late 19508 and early 19608, McCarthyism
4 Many contemporary critics have pointed out the problems of a de-thecrized history and a de-historicized
theory, but only few have ventured to answer them with new methodologies. In architecture. Mart
Jarzombek's Critical Historiography, which I discuss in the introduction to this dissertation, is to my
knowledge among the rare exceptions. In the tradition of phenomenology, American philosopher John
McCumber has suggested a method to get "Philosophy out of the Ditch," as he entitled hi s account of it in
chapter 5 of Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 2(01). McCumber's proposal is of interest in relation to Jarzombek's.
To summarize, McCumber proposed that philosophizing be a project of dissassembling and re-assembling
the history of thought into new and ever-more comprehensive, or universal, narratives, in order to "open
up" possibilities for the future. In essence he proposed a reconciliation of Hegel's method of attempting
rational transparency, or "a single explanation of many things," such as cultural memory, (p 147) and
Heidegger's hermeneutics, where interpretation moves forward precisely when description fails.
McCumber called "Nobility" the double Hegelian quality required of66narrative links": first. that they place
our description into the intrinsic temporality of narration; and second, that they exhibit rational
transparency. He used the term uDiakenicity' to refer to the Heideggerian method of~~demareating"
narrative links in the present. "Diakenicity." in other words, was a way ofdeconstrueting present narratives
by recognizing the irreducibility of entiti~:5 t::;jthered by the narrative to the narrative itself. In McCumber's
language, a set of beings is udiakenically" gathered. and therefore open to new interpretations when: "1)
none of them is adequately understood apart from the others; 2) none grounds or explains the others; 3) no
yet more baK:c phenomenon can ground, or explain, all of them together." (p 158)
McCumber thus snggested a rather enticing method for recovering ethics without making standard truth
claims, a way to value the past in realtion to the present. His method was to k~p us from repeating or
closing the past. Maintaining the past open also meant keeping the task of present geared towards opening
new possibilities for the future. As McCumber synthesized it:
In sum, when we recount a historical development not from a timeless, selfless standpoint
but guided by the knowledge that we ourselves are among its results. we see it not as a set
of ethically neutral events but as fa set of gains and losses. The standard with reference to
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discouraged interdisciplinarity, and encouraged strands of scholarship that posited their
disciplinary isolation as evidence of their claim to objective truth. In philosophy tllis
propelled Analytic philosophy to the mainstream, where it safely claimed to he
autonomous from culture and history in its pursuit for eternal truths. 5 Architectural
education "adjusted" to McCarthyism with two different yet equivalent sublimations of
the modernist emphasis on social revolution: one emphasized change through .Juter
"quantification," as in objective research, and the other stressed architecture's ability to
refonn the individual's inner "spiritual" self. In essence, both of these strands afftrmed
architecture's autonomy from culture and history in order to maintain a modernist
conception of the arciljtectural object. Cultural pressures coming from outside the ivory
tower also buttressed the academic demotion of architectural inquiries into other
intellectual disciplines. During the booming 1950s building market, the popular press as
well as <;ultural institutions worked to equate modernist fonns with the American "good
life," and with the new international supremacy of US corporate organizations, while
carefully repressing theoretical speculations that might alienate the middle class
consumer.6
which we identify a historical development as either a gain or a loss for us is what I call
'narrative link.' (p144)
5 This is the principal claim of John McCumber's book Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the
McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2(01).
6 For a study of the function of the popular press and cultural institutions in disseminating a de-theorized
grass-roots version of modern architecture in the United States see Mark Jarzombek, "Good-Life
Modernism and Beyond: The American House in the 1950s and 19605," in The Cort'ell Journal of
Architecture, n. 4 (Fall 1990), pp 76-93. Jarzombek·s article must be read in relaticJn to William H. Jordy·s
1972 study of the dissemination of Modern architecture in the United States during the 1930s and 19405.
Jordy placed less emphasis than Jarzombek on mass culture -35 a determining factor in this process of
dissemination. Jordy argued that the international style became domesticated, vemacularized, diversified,
and adapted to popular taste on account of: I) the establishment and popularization the avant-garde
architecture, which lead to the loosening of canonical tenets, and to attempts to incorporate iralages of
"home" into architecture. As examples of this trend Jordy presentlXl the work of Le Corbusier in Chile and
the Riviera, where he attempted to suoordinate tt.e machine to the "traditional," and the work of Alvar
Aalto who adapted modernism to Finnish nationalist imagery. 2) The domestic problems in America, which
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The restraint of dissenting moral and socio-political dimensions within
architectural education began to alienate many students during the 19605. The events of
May )968 brought to the foreground the general inadequacy of discourse in American
architecture schools. The new generations of students, avid for specific knowledge,
rejected the formulaic claims ~bout the autonomy of architecture. They sought to fill the
theoretical vacuum by looking to the social sciences, and other expanding disciplines like
philosophy, in search of a consciousness of the nature of forces of change,and of the
breadth of the cultural field that architects needed to appropriate if they wanted to take
part in any significant cultural debate.? Phenomenology, which had remained peripheral
to philosophy departments through the 1950s and 1960s on account of its mingling in the
worlds of literature, psychiatry, psychology, and politics, 8 became popular in the late
lead to a turning inwards in the 30s. 3) The rise of theorists like Lewis Mumford, who advocated the
indigenous. 4) The geography of the US, which is wlidespread and lead to diversity, according to Jordy. 5)
The influence of F.L. Wright and his antagonism towards the modem movement. 6) t"rhe activity of the
building industry. 7) The increased circulation of consumer magazines. 8) Finally, European architects,
argued Jordy, were interested in assimilating American modernity because of its technological advances.
See William H. JordY9 "The Domestication of the Modem: Marcel Breuer's Ferry Cooperative Dormitory at
Vassar College," chap. 3 in American Buildings and their Architects, Volume 5: The Impact ofEuropean
Modernism in the MidwTwentieth Century, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
For an examination of the role of corporate culture and business procedures in the formulation of claims
about the ability of modem architecture to provide identity to both corporations and their subjects see
Reinhold Martin, "Computer Architectures: Saarinen's Patterns, IBM's Brains," in AlUious .""odernisms.o
Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, 00. Sarah Williams Golhagen and Rejean Legault,
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp 141-163.
7 Jean-Louis Cohen has argued that a similar discursive apathy existed in the 19608, albeit for different
reasons, at the Ecoles de Beaux Arts in Paris. The new educational syst~m dep~oyed in France in 1969
helped to bring inter-disciplinary preoccupations to architectural education. See Jean-Louis Cohen, La
Coupure Entre Architectes et Intellectuels.o Ou us EnJeignements de 1'1talophilie, (Paris: L'Ecole
d'architecture Paris-Villemin, 1984), P 48.
8 In Apostles of Sarlre.o Existentialism in America, 1945 wJ963, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1999), Anne Fulton argued that the openness with which Sartre engaged non-philosophical
disciplines (say, in his Marxist literary and journalistic work in Europe) accounted for his reception a4i
"soft" by mainstream American philosophers, who were then mainly concerned with producing logical
statements about "objective" truths in the manner of the sciences and linguistics. Phenomenologists in this
country internalized the ethos of incompetence ascribed to them by the dominant philosophical culture of
the 1950s. The social CJld academic history of phenomenology in the United States is marked by its self-
image as an "outsider" movement. of this view can be found rai1ging from institutional to personal
histories. In The Primal Roots ofAmerican Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native
American Thought, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p 159. Bruce
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1960s precisely for its inter-disciplinary openness. The academic legitimacy of
phenomenology benefited enonnously from the endorsement of architecture and other
disciplines. They actively sought to participate in architectural culture, often contributing
to the historiographical erasure of their discipline by presenting only discrete aspects of
phenomenology, and tending towards the prescriptive instead of the descriptive when
publishing in architectural journals -a tendency which continues to this day in the work
of Edward Casey and others.
Coetaneous with these 1970s inter-disciplinary openings, the question of the
architect's responsibility to society became a central issue of debate in architectural
discourse. This presented a serious problem in the ongoing redefmition of avant-gardism.
What social service did the avant-garde architects really provide? The claim of architects
such as the Smithsons, that they saw above the crowd and could "elevate" the self-
awareness of people, seemed awfully elitist.9 It was too "top down" for the 1970s. And
Wilshire, a member of the first generation to complete Ph.D.s in phenomenology within the American
university system, recounted that as a young academic he felt that he had no place in the maingream of
philosophy:
After the defense of my dissertation at New York University in 1966, I was walking with William
Barrett in Washington Square. His voice sh,fted to another level, and I sensed that something that
had been left uilsaid for years was about to be said. Within this aura, !t surfaced --as if out of a
rising globular skin of smooth and shining ocean water a great back would appear. 'You know,
Bruce, one can lose one's job for being a phenomenologist." Phenomenology, of course, I knew.
The history of the New School for Social Research is also enmeshed in the second rate complex of
American phenomenologists, given that it was one of the few institutions outside of the Catholic un~versity
system that was hospitable to phenomenology. When in 1978. an accrediting committee of the State of
New York voted to rescind the New School for Social Research's accreditation, the phenomenological
community decried it as an instance of intellectual discrimination. Although the committee apparently
pointed out deficiencies in the curriculum and in the administration, phenomenologists were convinced the
real grounds for the rescission was that the school was too far removed from the interests of mainstream
American philosophy. See John McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy
Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2(01), P 51.
9 Sarah Williams Goldhagen gives a good account of the Smithson's claim to be raising the self-awareness
of people through their architecture in ttFreedom's Domiciles: Three Projects by Alison and Peter
Smithson," in Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture. 00. Sarah Williams
Golhagen and Rejean Legault, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp 75-96. In this article Goldhagen
holds that the Smithson's were indirectly influenced by Sartre's existentialism through the work of Jean
Dubuffet, although they never actually read SartTe or new much aoout his work. Borrowing from Martin
446
yet, modern avant-gardism had been historically premi4ied precisely on the myth of the
architect's sharpened sense of society's relation to the future. He or she was said to live
literally outside or "before his or her time." The anti -historicism of the modem avant-
garde architects was the basis for claims about the aesthetic integrity of their work.
Architects like Mies van der Rohe identified their freedom from history with the pursuit
of an aesthetic "purity" impenneable to mass culture. This apparent turning inwards,
together with an ideology of self-assured superiority, allowed them to establish their
work as the very benchmark of culture. The upshot during the McCarthy period was that
this inwardness also allowed architects to keep the anns length relation~hip to politics
necessary to get public commissions during the 1950s and 1960s in the Uni ted States.
The ideology of aesthetic purity, so perfected by Clement Greenberg in art,
remained a pillar of architectural history during the 1970s. As late as 1976, renowned
American historians like William H. Jordy were praising ~1ies's "minimalism" as a
search for the "objective truth" of the times. 10 This view came under the fire of Marxist
Jay, Goldhagen claims that Sanre's notion of authenticity put into question ocularcentrism and emphasized
the haptic. This is somewhat of a contentious claim. given that it is a highly interpretative extrapolation
from Sartre's philosophy which came only in the 19908. Nevertheless, Goldhagen claims that it was this
understanding of Sartre as a haptic-oriented thinker that led the Smithsons to believe that the rough
treatment of materials could force people to see their environments in new and more Uauthentic" ways.
10 See William H. Jordy, nThe Laconic Splendor of the Metal Frame: Ludwig Mies Van der Rohe's 860
Lake Shore Apartments and His Seagram Building," Chapter 4 in American Buildings and their Architects,
Volume 5: The Impact ofEuropean Modernism in the Mid-Twentieth Century, (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1972). In this essay, William H. Jordy defended Mies's philosophy of "less is
more" and "almost nothing" on the grounds that it was a way of confronting the "facts of technology" and
to derive from them "truth" in architecture. Jordy argued that in a period dominated by technology, modem
architecture could only be of consequence if it faced up to the "truth of its time" (p 252). The "objectivity"
of Mies"s architecture came., according to Jordy, from his ability to make simple elements speak or perfonn
functionally, asthet\cally, and symbolically (Jordy gave the eX~'11ple of the I beam, pp 242-244). Jordy also
argued that there was a transcendent or timeless el~ment in Mies's ability to reduce architecture to
"minima,'" which "although constantly in change, are so elemental as to be perceived by the intellect as
immutable" (p 241). The argument put forth by lardy about transcendence moved from a discussion of
elements (Le. I beams) to a description of all of Mies' buildings as being "essentially" prototypes of a
single mental construction, or "expressions of the same Building" (p228 & 251). Jordy saw Mies as
emblematic of a modern synthesis between a Baukunst of Hellenic origin, and a Formkunst of Renaissance
origin (p276)
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historians like ?\1anfredo Tafuri, who argued that the anti -historicism so central to the
modem defmition of avant-garde had its own historicity. The avant-garde, claimed
Tafuri, was in crisis because, on the one hand, it could no longer sustain the claim that it
was outside of history, and on the other hand, it could not retain an absolute aesthetic
autonomy for its object. I I Rising doubts about the insularity of the object were
intensified by structuralist theories of signification, which placed importance of the role
of the observer (or reader) in the creation of meanings. The accusation that modernism
was ossified and "academic," leveled by critics like Reyner Banham, became
commonplace by the 1970s. 12 Architectural historian James Ackennan later recalled that
period as a time when it was no longer possible to believe that the avant-garde could be
Uprogressive," or that it could in any way advance "knowledge of the unknown.,,13 The
feeling that the avant-garde had abdicated all social and ethical responsibility led to
nostalgic revivals of so-called "historical avant-gardes," such as the Soviet
constructivists, as evidence of a last "organic" union between architecture and
progressive politics. 14
11 See especially Chapters one and two in Manfredo Tafuri's Theories and History ofArchitecture. trans.
Giorgio Verrecchia, (New York: Harper and Row, 1979).
12 Reyner Banham, Theory and Design in the First Machine Age, 2nd. 00., (New York and Washington:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p 327.
13 James Ackerman, "On New and Old Histories of Art," lecture presented at MIT, Department of
Architecture, History Theory Criticism Section, on 11/15/2000.
14 See, for instance, issue number 10 of Oppositions (Fall 1977) which included translations of 19205
reviews of Tatlin '8 Monument to the Third International by Soviet avant-gardists like Nikolai Punin and
A.A. Sidorov. In addition, and explicatory introduction by Kestutis Paul Zygas was included~ There was
also a review by Eric Dluhosch of Hungarian architectural historians lin Kroha'5 and lin HrUza's 1973
book about the Soviet architectural avant-garde entitled SovetskiJ Architektonicka Avantgarda. The
nostalgic revival of the Soviet Avant-Garde was also present in the work of architects such as Bernard
Tschumi, who tried to revive its aesthetics, and Rem Koolhaas. who attempted to borrow concepts such as
"social condenser" from the early Soviets. See Rem Koolhaas, Delirious New York: A Retroactive
Manifesto for Manhattan, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), and compare it to the description of
"social condensers" in Anatole Kopp, Constructivist Architecture in the USSR, (London: Academy
Editions, New York: 51. Martins Press, 1985), pp 70-123. In both cases, revolutionary architecture is
premised on its ability to provide place of exemption from the nonnalcy of the present where the
"radicality·' of the future can be "freely experienced~"
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One of the principal arguments of this dissertation was that anti-avant-garde
authors gave new life to the modernist myth of an organic unity between the architect and
the "progressive" forces of society, without sacrificing aesthetic purity. In fact, they
pushed the notion of an uncorrupted aesthetic to the extreme, deeming that even
"thought" could contaminate it. Their cunning genius resided in identifying social
progress with the collective pursuit of such "clean" experiences, and in holding out the
possibility that architects could create anticipatory environments where people could get
a foretaste of "unencumbered" experiences. In that sense, the architectural audiences of
Norberg-Schulz, for instance, believed that to the degree that their buildings achieved the
aesthetics of the Aletheic Image, they were helping prepare society, by "bestowingU the
"gift" of immediate experience upon people one by one, for the coming of a new era
when everyone would be "free." The problem, of course, was that free from the
continuously changing appearances of subjects and objects, the Aletheic Image became
reflexive, evidence of an aesthetic purity that floated beyond anyone's grasp, but that was
given as the rule and measure of authentic existence. The more architects sought Truth in
their own experiences, the more these appeared foreign and contaminated by their own
"consciousH presence. The liberating power of immediate aesthetic experiences withdrew
before their eyes behind an ever-receding mystical horizon, which I like to call a "blind
spot," borrowing from Tafuri.
The purpose of this dissertation was to show how that "blind spot," for which
there is no documentation, is the foundation of Norberg-Schulz's Aletheic Images,
Moore's "'Poetic Images," Frampton's Tectonics, and Rogers's Tradition. In other words,
I attempted to demonstrate that they bear the hallmark of ideological concepts. Their
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broad acceptance made them seem transparent, innocuous, and natural, when they are
everything but. They were re-articulations of an unfolding modernist discourse on
architecture, which carried with it a powerful set of assumptions about the stability of
both subject and object. In general, the anti-avant-garde projected the myth of a unifying
identity onto the plane of an idealized aesthetic experience that it equated with Truth.
The strong momentum of modernist discourse allowed anti-avant-garde historians and
architects to persevere without ever having to fully account for the intellectual positions
on which their arguments about architecture were premised.
Even though the invocation of phenomenology by the anti-avant-garde gave the
semblance of an intellectual inquiry, analysis was always directed outward, so to speak,
towards the accepted closure of the architectural object or subject, and never inward,
towards its own muddy discursive code. This pennitted, if not encouraged, partial
engagements with phenomenology that instrumentalized the philosophy into an operative
theory of practice. Modernist historians and architects read phenomenology according to
their own ends, as evidence that their aesthetic creations sprung from an essential origin
beyond the problems and contradictions of modem life. It is in this sense that I spoke of
phenomenology as a "theoretical mask" for the anti-avant-garde.
By the mid 1980s, a rift was apparent within architectural discourse concerning
the function and character of phenomenology. The influence of Jacques Derrida's
reflections on phenomenology moved a new generation of architects and theorists to
engage the philosophy in a more comprehensive manner. As they delved deeper into the
complexities of phenomenology, they found it difficult to reconcile it with the
"theoretical" mask of the anti-avant-garde, which insisted "essences," understood as a
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unified and unifying identities. Some architects reacted by "dropping" phenomenology
and "theory" altogether to claim that they were "just practitioners." But, it was in a sense
too late. No longer buttressed by the social and political acquiescence to McCarthyism
that characterized the mid-century American life, the anti-avant-garde could no longer
hide behind its cult of innocence. "While identifying Heidegger's thought with such
figures as Norberg-Schulz is easy, " argued architectural theorist Stephen Perella, "the
[architectural] practitioners of phenomenological positions would never identify
themselves as SUCh.,,15 More learned in the basic readings of Enlightenment philosophy,
the 1980s generation of newly minted Ph.D.s in architectural history, theory, and
criticism turned phenomenology against its architectural "mask."
The debate was framed by the question of meaning in architecture, which had
been at the center of architectural theory since the 1970s. Especially in the pedagogy of
design, architects had generally associated "words" with variously defined architectural
"images," which were taken to possess some "stable" culturnl meaning. 16 By the mid
1980s, architects began to question the ability ofculture, history, nature, or immediate
experience to stabilize meaning. They took issue with attempts to "fIX" any context,
arguing that to insist on definitive boundaries (such as an "essential" cultural identity)
was to perpetuate what they thought was the foundational myth of Modernism: namely,
15 Stephen Perella, "Form; Being; Absence [Editorial]:' in f·orm, Being, Absence: Architecture and
Philosophy, 00. Stephen Perella. (Brooklyn, N.Y. : School of Architecture, Pratt Institute; New York. N.Y.
: Distributed by Rizzoli International Publications, 1988), pp 84-87.
16 I am using Uimage" here to refer to the various 1970s definitions of the relationship between architectural
form and meaningful language. For instance: Moore's upoetic image,'" which founded meaning in
communal bodily experiences; Alexander's "pattern language," which based it on the "archetypal
environmental needs" of societies; or Rossi's Utypology," which rested it on the fungibility of form as
mnemonic referent. During the late 1970s, these different definitions were variously applied to the
pedagogy of the design studio, as can be appr(.~iated for instance in Language in Architecture: Prodeedings
of the 68th ACSA Annual Meeting~ eel. John Meunier, (Washington. D.C.: Association of Collegiate
Schools of Architecture, 1980).
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the existence of a single controlling principle of the universe -be that truth, reason, or
God. Two correlative arguments followed from this modernist myth, which were in tum
opposed by post-structuralist architects: 1) the existence of an "essential origin" or logos
to aesthetic expression (such as the architect's "spirit"), and 2) the ability of any entity to
exist outside of a context (such as a radical architect working completely outside his or
her culture and time). Against these Modernist principles, post -structuralist architects
emphasized the impossibility of either radical difference or radical sameness, and begun
searching for "non-foundational" ways to think about architecture.
The 1980s thus witnessed a second reception of phenomenology. Stephen Perella
and Hilde Heynen, for instance, argued that earlier readings of phenomenology, such as
that of Frampton and Norberg-Schulz, had failed to grasp the complexity of the
philosophy and confused pars pro totO. 17 Perella crafted the Pratt Journal ofArchitecture
into a forum for displacing these earlier "foundational/consetvative" readings, and
instituting a "non-foundational" approach to phenomenology and deconstruction. In
order to make clear the dividing lines of the debate, Perella divided the journal's second
17 In his editorial to Form. Being. Absence: Architecture and Philosophy, Perella argued for a U non-
foundational," progressive and uphenomenoJogical" revision of the I970s "foundational/conservative"
appropriation of phenomenology in architecture: UA body of architectural thought has been affected by an
historicized account of Heidegger held largely in academia. The foundational/conservative Heideggerian
influences in architectural theory which this journal seeks to displace, may be found in the work of such
theorists as Christian Norberg-Schulz, Kenneth Frampton, and Alberto Perez-G6mez, who are influenced
by Heidegger. Each maintains that Heidegger offers an account of a return to an origin, and each argues for
architectural practices informed by natural context, regionality, or personal authenticity. In each case the
manifold of a context becomes reified as a fixed concept which is then employed in the service of
arguments for harmoniousness, semi-autarchical resistance, or poetic dwelling. The question to be put to
these writings is whether or not Heidegger's "later" thinking is allowed to inform the "earlier" in such a
way that reification becomes problematic.'" See Form, Being. Absence: Architecture and Philosophy 00.
Stephen Perella, (Brooklyn, N.Y. : School of Architecture, Pratt Institute; New York, N.Y. : Distributed by
Rizzoli International Publications. 1988). p 85.
Hilde Heynen made the same differentiation between an early and late reception of phenomenology in
"Worthy of Question: Heidegger's Role in Architectural Theory," in Archis, n. 12 (December 1993), pp 42-
49. See also her critique of "early" architectural appropriations of phenomenology, which follows the
lines of Adorno's objections to Heidegger. entitled "Architecture Between Modernity and Dwelling:
Reflections on Adorno's Aesthetic Theory:' in Assemblage, n. 17 ( 1992), pp 79-91.
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volume in two parts, with the proponents of phenomenology on one side, and the
challenging advocates of deconstruction on the other, including John Knesl, Peter
Eisenman, and Mark Wigley.
Inspired by Denida, Wigley suggested that the superficialit}' with which
Postmodem architects had engaged phenomenology was an index of their subservience to
cultural conventions aoout hierarchy, structure, and solidity. More importantly, Wigley
questioned the authority of philosophical discourse over architectural discourse, arguing
that the acceptance of the primacy of philosophy over the object served to preserve
received ideas about the stability of meaning. Given the cultuml contract on which
discourses were premised, Wigley intima~ed that avant-garde architects could regain a
critical function with regards to culture by exposing the inconsistencies and "disquieting
aspects" within their own discourse.l~ Wigley dispensed (or mther'displaced' and
'deferred') the notion that any "foundational" meaning of the architectural object could
be attained outside of discourse, in say, immediate experiences such as those revered by
the anti-avant-garde.
The emphasis on discourse as a critical tool also drew some architects to Michel
Foucault. For instance John Knesl, professor of architectural design and theory at
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, denounced the "spiritualization" of architecture by the
anti-avant-garde as an attempt to resurrect the classical ideal of unity. There was no
truth, he argued, in the promises lIlat postmodem architecture could embody meanings
that would "ground" human spirituality and result in individual fulfillment. These
arguments were for him founded on a specious notion of identity as closure, a correlate of
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which was the equally erroneous idea that meanings were ideal entities. Following
Foucault, Knesl argued that meanings were artifacts of power relations "and the
corresponding signifying systems, to organize the practices by which it [power] must
work to maintain itself.,,19 For Knesl, the possibility of resisting power was contingent
upon one's capacity to critique both identity and its systems of signification precisely as
institutionalizations of po\ver. If one ignored this fact, if one operated under the delusion
that identity was an a-historical constant, then one was operating in complicitous
agreement with the power establishment. Knesl accused posbnodem architects of this
very thing. He believed that by spiritualizing architecture they were trying "to restore to
the powers and conditions of today, the legitimation provided by the great classical
metaphysical referents: man, nature, and history.,,2o
Whereas Wigley attempted to rethink the discursive relation between
phenomenology and architecture, Knesl clung to the primacy of philosophy, arguing tha.t
a better understanding of phenomenology would yield a more critical attitude with
regards to experience -Le. an understanding of experience as a mediated phenomenon.
Knesl believed that the spiritual (alternatively referred to as the metaphysical) could not
be entirely ignored. Modernism had already attempted the "subjugation" of spirit by
matter, and had consequently been unable to account for it when it irrupted as
"irrationality" and "violence." Overlooking the fact that Foucault understood his
genealogical epistemology to be opposed to the phenomenological understanding of the
18 Mark Wigley, "The Architectural Displacement of Philosophy." in Form; Being: Absence: Architecture
and Philosophy: Pratt Journal ofArchitecture, v. 2,00. Stephen Perella. (New York: Rizzoli International
Press, 1988), pp 4-8, 95-99.
19 John Knesl, "The New Objectivity of a Critical Late Modernism," in Pratt Journal ofArchitecture:
Architecture and Abstraction, 00. Peter Franck et. aI., (Brooklyn. N.Y .. : School of Architecture" Pratt
Institute; Distributed by Rizzoli International Publications, 1985), P t7.
20 Ibid. P 17.
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immediacy of knowledge, Knesl tried to reconcile the two schools.21 Even though his
attempt was unsuccessful, it is important as an index of the continued strength of
phenomenology in architecture. In theorizing a new agenda for the avant-garde in the
mid 1980s, architects simply could not ignore pheoomenology.
As phenomenology came under the closer scrutiny of architectural theorists and
historians, some phenomenologists (many of them teaching at the State University of
New York, Stonybrook) also shifted allegiances, and began, in one way or another, to
withdraw their support of the anti-avant-garde. Thus, Don Ihde, Dean of the School of
Humartities and Fine Arts, and professor of Philosophy at SUNY Stonybrook, spoke to
architects about a "new" phenomenology, which he tried to differentiate from the popular
architectural understanding of it as an increased attention to materials and methods of
constructiono Ihde argued that traditional phenomenology's "variation theory" (as in
Husserl's thematizing of essential structures through idetic variation) prefigured
postmodemism insofar as it also elevated "imaginative praxis" above mere perception. 22
When the anti-avant-garde lost its hegemony within architectural discourse in the
late 19808, phenomenologists sought to maintain their architectural standing by actively
promoting the neo-avant-garde. For instance, philosopher Edward Casey, also a
professor at SUNY Stonybrook 9 was among the most vocal sponsors of the American
21 Knesl described Merleau-Ponty's "body-consciouness" as Foucault's "body.... The Ubodily:' argued
Knesl, was at once the realm of subjective experience (where distinctions between material and conceptual
categories occurred), and the locus where Power materialized. But in assimilating Foucault to Merleau-
Ponty, Knesl unwittingly cast power outside of the realm of relations and into a type of metaphysical
otherness. To be critical of power9 architects had to challenge the known environments, reach deep into the
"bodily" change its current structures from within. "Critical design has to develop the special relation that
architecture has to the body which it surrounds and to which it speaks imperceptibly." (p 22) See: Ibid. p
17.
22 Ihde claimed that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty premised their philosophies on "material variations" or
bOOBy searches for "multi-stable" structures of existence. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for him
extended Husserl's "imaginative" eidetic variation method. See Don Ihde, "Phenomenology and
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neo-avant-garde. In his book The Fate ofPlace: A Philosophical History Casey argued
that place, was not a fixed thing with a steadfast essence (as Norberg-Schulz might have
argued). Rather, Casey argued that place emerged out of, or became "implaced," as part
of an unfolding, dynamic processes of "embodiment,,,2j a phenomenon he identified with
the architecture of Peter Eisenman, and Bernard Tschumi. Casey claimed this "non-
foundational'· understanding of place was present in Bachelard's writings on the "poetic
imagination.,,24 Although Casey felt compelled to footnote Charles Moore's and Kent C.
Architecture," in Form; Being: Absence: Architecture and Philosophy: Pratt Journal ofArchitecture, v. 2,
00. Stephen Perella, (New York: Rizzoli International Press, 1988), pp 63-67.
23 Casey traced the mooem understanding of implac:ement as embodiment to Immanuel Kant. Although
Kant's most significant contribution to the history of philosophy is considered to be his formulation of the
transcendental subject, Casey argued that in an early essay entitled the "Ultimate Ground of the
Differentiation of Regions in Space" (1786), Kant had treated human subject as a distinctively bodily
subject. Kant arrived at an awareness of how the human body was productive of orienting relations by
demonstrating the existence of a set of phenomena that could not be explained through Leibniz's
mathematical analysis of space in terms of magnitude and shape. To give a concrete example of Kant's
reasoning, Casey enumerated the series of factors that make our hands appear to be images of one another,
although they are entirely different. Even though our left and right hands are equal in tenns of magnitude
and shape, they cannot be substituted for one another --3 fact that can be quickly ascertained by trying to fit
a left-hand glove in your right hand. (p 205)
The fact that the body is structured in two distinct sides granted it a singular power of orientation for both
Kant and Casey. Kant further clarified the body's bilaterality by pointing out its non-symmetrical nature,
such as in the frequent dominance of one hand of the other in terms of dexterity and strength. In this essay,
according to Casey, Kant radically extended an earlier claim that only material substances, sensible bodies,
existed usomewhere." He was now making the implacement of material substances contingent upon the
human bcxly, since only insofar as a human body was experienced as bifurcated a-priori, could it perceive
sensible bodies as placed and oriented. Casey derived Ute implicit series Position --Place--Body--Region--
Space from Kant's argument, whereby making the human bOOy assume a mediating position between how
and where things were. Casey thus made the immediate experience not of the world, but of the body, into
the touchstone modem conceptions of place:
Without the body's lopsided two-sided ingressions into particular regions and places, space would
be merely a neutral, absolute block of else a tangled skein of pure relations built up from pure
positions. But as we in fact experience the spatia) world, this world is composed of oriented
places nested in diversely directed regions. For this, we have the lxxIy to thank. And for bringing
all this to our attention, we have Kant hirnself to thank. In his tiny text of 1786 he demonstrates--
for the first time in Western thought-- that the most intimate as well as the most consequential
inroad to place is through the body. ( P LI0)
See Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
University of California Press, 1997).
24 Casey read Bachelard's poetic image as a reconceptualization of the nature of place. Bachelard's
description of how and where poetic images appeared (as reverberations in the soul) called into question,
according to Casey, the Aristotelian conception of place as containment. For Bachelard, the poetic image
was not contained by an envelofing psyche, it appeared at the surface of the psyche. In this model, argued
Casey, the psychic surface gave place by fulgurating with the image it at once received and sent forth. As
Casey explored the correlatives of this new idea of impl2cement, he found it to differ from Aristotle's on
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Bloomer's, Body, Memory, and Architecture (1977) on the analogy between body and
architecture, he did not credit Moore's professional practice for having heralded the
translation of Bachelard's thinking into a coherent set of architectural propositions.
Casey drew an intellectual genealogy that gave historical credence to the notion
that the immediate experience of one's body was the source of place. Begin.1ling witll
Bachelard, Case's intellectual lineage passed through Foucault's "heterotopic sites,"
included the 19808 work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on "smooth and nomad
space," tied in Jacques Derrida's late 19808 collaborations with architects Peter Eisenman
and Bernard Tschumi, and ended with Luce lrigaray's 19908 critique of Aristot~~ through
the sexed female body.
Casey's stitching of archlectural discourse into his history of place was no less
instrumentalizing than the use of phenomenology as a ''theoretical mask" by the anti-
avant-garde. He ignored the long history of intersections between phenomenology and
architecture, in order to identify his own philosophical project with those architects
deemed "avant-gardists" in the late 1990s, namely Eisenman and Tschumi. In other
words, Casey appropriated the "avant-garde" aura of those architects to give a sense of
his own project's progressiveness. But this came at the price of emsing philosophy's
own historiographic self-awareness.
From the perspective of architectural discourse, Casey's selective account of the
intersections between architecture and phenomenology obscures more than it reveals,
given that the various claims made about the "liberating" potential of architecture by
other, more profoun( counts. Most importandy for Casey's argument, Bachelard was not concerned with a
place that perdured, but rather with one that unfolded with, and was fundamentally transformed by the
kinds of things it implaced. This, Casey insisted, was an insight that could only be gained through the
immediacy of bodily experience. See: Ibid.
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architects of the neo-avant-garde are not unlike those made by the anti-avant-garde
twenty years earlier. In the vein of Moore, Frampton, Rogers, and Norberg-Schulz, neo-
avant-garde architects like Bernard Tschumi and Rem Koolhaas continue to uphold a
"purifying" experientialism. Tschumi's "event-space" and Rem Koolhaas's "social
condensers" follow in the tradition of Moore's "places" for community interaction,
insofar as they also premise their "progressiveness" on creating anticipatory spaces where
people may achieve experiences "un-co-opted" by contemporary conceptual frameworks.
The touchstone of these contemporary speculations remains the modernist assumption
that experiences prior to reflection are immediately meaningful.
Casey's suggestion that the emergence of place in Tshumi's architecture is best
understood as a type of Bachelardian embodiment of "intirnate immensity" would have
been more convincing in relation to the work of Charles Moore. 25 Mter all, Moore
25 In pursuing his argument about the body.. Casey pressed Bachelard on the origin of poetic images. For
Bachelard, poetic inlages originated as a stirring in the depths of the soul that then fulgurated at the surface
of the psyche. One of the goals of his Utopoanalysis" was to get at the depths of the psyche .. at the soul, by
carefully describing these images as they appeared at the surface. Casey quickly pointed out that
Bachelard's mcKIel attributed a type of non-spatial extension to the soul with U a special kind of insideness
and its own modalities of surface and depth"(p 288).
If images are originally "im-placed" in the soul, argued Casey. then images should themselves be charged
with the uplacial" attributes of the soul. Casey explained Bachelard's topoanalysis of poetic images as a
description of the soul's placeness. But (and here is the crux of how Casey"s narrative pushes Bachelard
towards the body) alongside this description of the soul as the place where images originated~Casey
presented a paraIJel account where poetic images sprung forth from the body's habits. Thus, the poetic
image of house uis based on bodily habits inherited from one's original home." (p 291) C3St:ty presented a
double origin for poetic images, although he never discussed a4) such, which suggests that he either
considered soul and body to be one and the same, or that he (wittingly or unwittingly) left it up to the
reader to conflate the two..
Whether Casey thought that body and soul were the same is perhaps not as important as the fact that he was
fascinated with how they could be made to bleed into one another. Casey concluded that what was at stake
in Bachelard was a new understanding of interiority that cracked open the (Aristotelian) notion of
continuous boundary inherent in the preposition Hin ..... He "'"as drawn to Bachelard"s topoanal ysis because
he found it to be a concrete description of how the most intimate aspects of experience, such as poetic
reverie, folded the outer world in themselves and leaked out into it. For Casey.. following Bachelard, to
dwell "in" a place wa.c; to be uimplaced:" This meant that one simultaneously found oneself "out'" in that
undetermined ambience" and recognized that un(de)limited expanse uconcentratcdU within. These aspects
of being in a place came together in the phenomenon of what Bachelard called "intimate immensity:" The
importance of this phenomenon, for Casey was that it served as the key to surmount the modem ··tyranny·"
of infinite space. The immensity of space could now be absorbed into place through a greater attunement
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played a bigger role in disseminating Bachelard in architectural circles. In addition,
Moore's conception of the unfolding nature of place was as "dynamic" or more than any
put to date by Bernard Tschumi or even Rem Koolhaas. Moore, Koolhaas and Tschumi
spoke of place in highly eroticized terms as an instrument for setting in motion the
"operations of seduction and the unconscious.,,26 Indeed, even though their discourse
shared fundamental features, each architect produced artifacts that sought aesthetic
paternity in different moments of the past. 27 During the 1970s, Tschumi and Koolhaas
remained caught in a fetishistic adulation of constructivist fonns, exploiting the nostalgic
belief in an organic union between the Soviet avant-garde and the Russian revolution,28
Moore encouraged licentious distortions of classical fonns, often reflecting upon the
to the experiencing body. As he boiled it down: "implacement entails embodiment, and vice versa." (p
340). See: Ibid.
26 The quote is from Bernard Tschumi's 'The Pleasure of Architecture," which appeared in Architectural
Design, n. 3, v. 47 ( 1977), pp 214-218.
27 The fundamental discursive similarities between contemporary neo-avant-garde and anti-avant-garde, in
terms of their unsubstantiated claims about the emancipating function of aesthetic experience, are obscured
by the belief of certain philosophers, architects and historians that formal differences between buildings
must signify ideological discrepancies. They don't. The evidence weighs against those who insist on a
transparent correspondence between matter and concepts. Again and again, academic discourse proves to
be semi-autonomous from the artifacts it ponends to interpret. This is one of the principal lessons of Mark
Jarzombek's Critical Historiography. A similar position, although far less nuanced, has also been put forth
by historians of postwar architecture like Sarah Williams Goldhagen. See her "Coda: Reconceptualizing the
Modern" in Anxious Modernisms: Experilnentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, 00. Sarah Williams
Golhagen and Rejean Legault, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2(00), especially p 319.
28 This connection has been entirely internalized and taken for granted by Koolhaa'i's apologists. Arie
Graafland's Architectural Bodies, 00. Michael Speaks, (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 1996), for instance, is
a pseudo-Deleuzian attempt to link Koolhaas. Eisenman, and Libeskind to Le Corbusier and Soviet
constructivism. Koolhaas's reading of the New York Downtown Athletic Club (Starret, Van Vleck and
Hunter, 1931) in Delirious Ne~1/ York is.. for Graafland, evocative of the Soviet notion of "social
condensers.'" For Graafland, Koolhaas's understanding of architecture as a "social-condenser" was an
accurate diagnosis of the needs of mooem metropolitan culture. Graafland believed that to bypass the
conventions of society it sufficed to turn architecture into an enveloping reality concentrating bodily
interaction. Graafland's found confirmation for this belief in postmodern authors such as DeJeuze and
Guattari. Jameson. Virilio. and Baudrillard. The fact that Graafland submitted his own criticality to the
post-modern canon, serves as illustration of the persistent call for communal corporeal experience within
architectural discourse to this day. Predictably, Graafland claimed that what was most valuable in
Koolhaas's reconstruction of a program for the DAC was that it illustrated how architecture could
"connect" and "intensify" corporeal experiences. For Graafland, this principle of connectivity was a
promise of new freedoms, an opinion about Koolhaas' work that has been repeated ad nauseam. For
example, see Alejandro zaera Polo, "Finding Freedoms: Conversations with Rem Koolhaas," in £1
Croquis, v. 53, (Madrid: EI Croquis Editorial, 1992). p 14.
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con, entions of practice with cutting criticism and humorous irony. 29 But each of them
used aesthetics as an instrument to pursue the same goals~ I'"mely, to validate themselves
in relation to the changing politics of academic discourse, of what was "in" and "out,"
and to influence (if not control) the direction of advanced practice. The operation of
eliminating unwanted realities from their work in the name of clarity is not unlike what
Casey did to the history of contacts between architecture and phenomenology. They are
both procedures of historiographical erasure which give in to the historical momentum of
disciplinary discourses.
Judging from these recent attempts to re-write the history of multiple intersections
between phenomenology and architecture, it would seem that concealment of is the price
of academic standing. Discourse speaks through the author, dragging him or her towards
its conventions, and therefore also towards its accepted distortions of truth, its ideology.
In the absence of a proper critique of its aesthetic practices in the interstices of other
disciplines, phenomenology continues to help perpetuate the various crises it claims to
cure.
If this dissertation has taught me anything, is that any attempt to advancJ
knowledge must remain accountable to itself and verifiable by others. A self-reflexive
29 It must be noted that Moore's architecture was also valued for Hintensifying" communal corporeal
experiences. Architectural critic James Steele" insisted that Moore's 1960s reasoning about how to create
public life in the United States, continued to be relevant lessons in the 1990s. he argued that Charles
~1oore's career had been a long search for ways of combating "placelessness" by creating communities.
One of Moore's characteristic design strategy was to create large rooms within enclosed compounds where
communal interaction (or rtsocial spontaneity" a'i Steele called it) could safely take place. In the case of
commercial projects these rooms turned into internal open air streets" such as in Plaza las Fuentes
(Pasadena~ CA, 1985), or enclosed arcades. In Steele's estimation. these projects were not entirely
successful because Americans preferred air conditioning to walking in the heat. Moore's more successful
communities. argued Steele. were his religious "walled compounds" such as the Nativity Catholic Church
(Rancho Santa Fe" CA9 1985) and the 51. Matthews Episcopal Church (1979-! 983). See James Steele.
"Charles Moore: Place~ Placelessness and the Res Publica," in AD: Architectural Design" Profile 98, n. 7-8,
v. 62 (1992), pp 93-95.
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critique of latent ideologies cannot move forward if it remains blind to its own
investigative biases. This means that new knowledge cannot be established on purely
empirical grounds, through critiques of ideology on the basis that it makes claims about
cognition that are independent from material justifications. This is especially tnle in the
case of architectural discourse which, being partly autonomous from the artifacts it
portends to interpret, is always making claims about cognition that overshoot reality. 30
For me, any attempt to ground cognition (be it in disciplinary, political, or class
consciousness) is dependent on a self-reflexive critical practice which must necessarily
stand watch over reifying its own thinking into ideology.
I have tried to expose how social and academic thinking is distorted by discourse.
Precisely for that reason, I cannot safely claim to be outside of that distortion. Instead, I
have tried to keep my work in check through self-critique. In this regard, this dissertation
resembles Marxist critique. However, Marxism's preoccupation with the ideological
contingency of cognition kept it from addressing the empirical as an epistenlologicaJ
problem, and from internal debates on proper method. 31 I have tried to remain attentive
to the psychological refractions of the Self involved in the production of knowledge, and
suspicious of its own methods of writing history. Thus, I've tried to both distance and
30 Mark Wigley has argued that architectural discourse is characterized by its transcendence of empirical
reality, and that it is this conceptual "overshooting'" of matter that turns buildings into architecture. In his
exhibition catalogue entitled Constant's NeKt Bahylon: The Hyper-Architecture ofDesire. (Rotterdam: 010
Publishers. 1998). p 55. Wigley wrote:
Architects are theorists. Being fundamentally speculative. architecture is inseparable
from theoretical discourse. It is even theoretical when built Architectural projects never
appear without polemic. Polemic transforms a building into' architecture9 ' not a set of
formal characteristics. It is anyway the theory that highlights the characteristics.
Architects necessarily leave a trail of manifestoes, journals, articles, and books.
31 See Alvin Vi. Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future
of Ideology., (New York: The Seabury Press. 1976), especially Chapter I.
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superimpose the author who tries to drive out ideology to make a clearing for meaning,
and the author who cannot escape being caught in the artifices of discourse.
The mechanism that enables this simultaneous distancing and overlapping is
interdisciplinarity, which allows one to problematize one's own claims to subjectivity and
objectivity by comparing them to those made by different specialized discourses in time.
In essence, this dissertation does not concern itself with answering whether "pure"
subjectivity or objectivity exists. Instead it considers "purity" as one among many
"aesthetics" of subjectivity or objectivity, and provides an aesthetic critique based on a
comparative analysis of how this and other "aesthetics" are put into practice within
different disciplines, over time, in relation to various contexts (the market, intellectual
fashion, social relations, the academy, political climate, and others).
I believe this dissertation differs from traditional architectural history in that it
aspires to both authorial and disciplinary homelessness, although by definition it cannot
achieve either. The crux of its self-critique is that by inhabiting multiple disciplines it
can keep itself from having to protect the vested interests in Uobjectivity" of anyone
discipline, and it can proscribe its own tendency to disappear behind the "subjective" veil
of the authorial Self~ Yet, I recognize that knowledge cannot be advanced in the absence
of these two poles. "Objective" scholarship can elevate Usubjective" undelstanding
beyond mere avant-garde style projections of Self-hood as the ground for truth. In tum,
"subjective'· Self-assertion can elevate "objective" scholarship from fossilized
convention. This dialectical movement serves to advance self-knowledge because both
"subjectivity" and "objectivity" are transfonned in the process.
462
I have tried to trace a nwnber of these transformations by examining how notions
of subjectivity or objectivity were put into practice within the academic history of
architecture, architectural history and phenomenology. I found that all three disciplines
often worked within each other as "aesthetic masks" of "objectivity" and "subjectivity"
respectively, but they seldom were pressed into confrontation with one another. Thus,
established models were perpetuated within each disciplines which gave the semblance of
progress when in fact there was no real advancement of knowledge. To break free from
this stasis, I have tried to put the often de-theorized "objectiven claims of architectural
history into dialogue with the regularly de-historicized "subjective" claims of
phenomenology and architecture. By demonstrating the historicity of phenomenology
and laying bare the psychologizing of architectural history, I have attempted to work
against the historiographical camouflages they enabled in architectural history and
practice. For me, the value of this type of critique is that it is not perfonned from above
but rather from within the discursive and aesthetic practices it addresses. One cannot
pretend to operate from a 'stable' theoretical or methodological framework. On the
contrary, critical method has to adjust to the terrain it moves in.
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...J in Phenomenology.
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~
Norberg-Schulz professor of architecture at the Moore Dean at Yale (until 1970) Death of Emesto Rogers. Nrberg-
faculty of architecture of Oslo. visitng Prof. Frampton Professor at Princeton University Schulz visting prof. Cambridge
Camblidge Univeristy. (1967-1972). Norberg-Schulz keynote at University. meets StJohn Wilson;
RIBA. and lectures at Borromini conference. lectures in Zurich. International
Liverpool. Bristol. Edinburgh. Helsinki. Phenomenological Conference at
>-
·Faglige Congress. Norway.on the problem Waterloo. Ontario.
c¥ of decaying city centers. ·British Society
0
r- for Phenomenology founded at
rJ')
s: Manchester. England.
...J
<~
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1970 1971 1972 1973
Norbera..Sehulz, tlExistence, space, Arnhelm, Entropy and Arl. Norbera-8chull ArchilellUrQ Malnstone, "Intuition and the Springs of
and Arch~teeture." 0'Alfonso, . "Lo Norbera-8chull, Existence, Tardobarocca. Muller I Tht' New ShUeturallnvention." Sloan, The Agt of
SpaDo Vissuto: Significaao di Space, and Architecture. Boudon, Avant-Garde: Issues/or the Art the Avant-Gar.: An Art Chronicle of
PossibiUtl Progeuuale." Clouteau, Sur fespace archilectural : Essai a/the Seventies. 1956-1972. Fnmpton.
>- "On the Visual Perception and d'tpistemolog;e de I'architecture. "Industrialization and the Crises in~ Representation of Space." hue, Architecture."
5 "Approach to Architectural Design.1t
U
Tentorl, Ct'lebrazione di Erneslo N.
IRogers.
Lefebvre, La Revolution Urbaine. Heldeaer, Poetry, Language, Lefebvre, Espace el Politique: u Dufrenne, The PhenonwnoloRY of
Besining of the Journal 01 tM Thoughl. L)'otard, Discours, Droit 0 10 Ville, and La Pensee Aesthetic experience.
;.- British SoeNly for Figure. First Yearbook for Marxiste et /a Ville. Pacl, Th~
e¥ PhenomeRoiogy.First English Phenomenological Research. Function ofthe Sciencts and th~S translation of Husserl's The Crisis Moehllna, Heidegger and the Nazi Meaning ofMan (english trans.)
sa o/the European Scitnces. Party: An Examination. (Ph.D.:c
~ diu.: Northern IUinois University,1971).
~
~
Moore professor at Yale (until Norberg-Schulz lectures in Frampton moves from Princeton Frampton, Eisenman, Ind
t97S). Norbera..ScbuJa Vittone Munich. to Columbia. 1965 to t972 GandellonM found 0".,.",.
conference in Rome with Taluri, Philosophy Workshops on PhenomcnolOU and artUldal
Anderson, MOlon, Wittkower, PhenomenolOl)' at Washington Inteillpnce debates at MIT (since 1967).
Rosal, POl1OlhesL University Norbe...·SChull visiting prof. MIT,
>-
meets Lynch, Kepa, Amhelm, and
~ reads Heidegger. Heidegl« closes hisprivale seminar claiming to come closer
:: to the original pehnomenology than
~ Hu,w:rl.
~
1974 1975 1976
Frampton, "On Reading Arnehim lecture at Cooper Union Norberg-Schulz, liThe Phenomenon of
Heidegger." Norberg-8chulz "The Dynamics of Architectural Place". Relph, Plac~ and Placelessness.
Meaning in Western Architecture Form." Tschumi, "Questions of RothscbUd, Forms and their Meaning in
(Italian). Tafuri, ''L'Architecture Space: ...:' Alexander, The Western Art. Scott, "Pictorial and Sensual
)of dans Ie Boudoir." Moore, "After a Oregon Experitr.ent. Space." Tscbumi,"Architecture and~
~ New Architecture." Burger. Transgression." Taturi, Architecture and
rJ") Theory ofthe Avant-Garde Utopia, and '"European Graffiti: Five x
:E (english trans. 1984) Five = Twenty-five." Frampton,u
~ "Consb1lCtivism: The Pursuit of an ElusiveSensibility.tt[-[i
<
Edie, "Phenomenology in the Gadamer, Truth and Method
United States (1974):'
)of
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Norberg-8cbulz visiting prof. Moore Professor ofachiteeture at Death of Heidegger (t889-1976). Peter
MIT; lectures at Harvard. Chicago, the University of California at Lo.~ Cook's "An Net Rally": Maurice Culot
PittsbW'g; board of directors of Angeles until t985. Norberg- presents architecture as "community action. tt
Lotus International. Scbulz planning consultant in Norberg-Schulz dP..an School of Architecture
Khartoum with Portoghni. Oslo (until 1911)
)of
~
~
tn
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1977 1978 1979
Moore and Bloomer, Body Memory architecture. Tuan, Space and Veea, "Un Filosofo e 11Architettura: INorberg-Schulz G"n;us Loc;:
Place: The Perspective ofExperience. Jenks, The Language ofPost- Enzo Pad." de Carlo, "Body, Memory Pat'saggio. ambi~nle.
Modern Architecture. Broadbent, 'The Language of Pas1· Modem and Fiasco." Culot and Krier, tllbe architl!clIura. and "Kahn,
Architecture: A Summcry." Lerup, Building the Unfinished: Architecture Only Path for Architecture." Frampton, Heidegger and the Language of
>- and Human Action. Arnehim The Dynam;l-'s ojArchitectural Form. "Mario Botta and the School of the Architecture:t Tafuri, Theories~ Tschumi, lThe Pleasure of AIchirecture:1 Pacey A Sense o/What is Real: Ticino," and A Synoptic View of the and History of
~ The Arts and Existential Man. Maxwell, 'Tofuri I Culol! Krier: The Role Architecture of tile Third Reich." Architecture. Tafuri and DaI Co,
:c ofIdeology." Moore, "Charles Moore On Post-Modernism." Frampton, Zimmerman, "Architecture and the Modern Architecturt'. Adorno,~ 110n Nikolai Miliutints Sotsgorod: The Problem of Building Socialist Cities.1t Technological Culture." "Functionalism Today."
~ Tafuri, 'The Dialectics of the Avant-Garde: Piranesi and Eisenstein:' Alexander., The Timeless Way of
~ Alexander,A Paller" Language. Building.
<
Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology.11 Marcuse and
Olafson" "Heidegger's Politics: An Interview:' Bronner, "Martin
>- I Heidegger: The Consequences of Political Mystification."
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Norberg-Schulz lecture bruxelles, Bristol, Edinburgh, Munich, Venice,
florence, Rome, Urbino, Paris.
><~
Eo-
c.n
s:
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c.n
Dufrenne, Main trends in aesthetics
and the sciences ofarl. Levinas, De
L'Existence aL'Ex;stant
Norberg-Schulz visiting prof. U. of Norberg-Schulz visiting prof. U.
Dallas; Doctor Honoris Causa Unversity of Dalla.,,; Lectures in Rome,
of Hannover; lectlL~ in Naples, Aorence, Lubeck, Berkeley, and
London, Braunschweig, Karlsruhe. LA where he meets Moore and
Stuttgan, Numberg. Filson. Moursund, teaches
Spatial Composition at the
University of Oregon.
1980 1981 1982 1983
Frampton, Modern Architecture: A Critical Steele, The Sense ofPlace. Moneo. "The contradictions of Architecture as Perez-Gomez Archi'ecture and
History; Perez-Gomez, La Genesis y Hammer, "Architecture and the History" TafOO, "Architecture and Poveny." 'he crisis ofModern Science.
Superacion del Func;OnaUS"IO en Arquitectura. Poetry of Space." Thiel, Visual Frmnpton, "Avant-Garde and Continuity," "Place, Frampton "Prospects for a Critical
Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci : Towards a Awareness and Design. Tzonis Production and Architecture: Towards a Critical Regionalism." Harries,
>- Phenomenology ofArchitecture. Meiss, and Lefaivre, tiThe Grid and the Theory of Building," fThe Satus of Man and the HThoughts on a Non Arbitrary~
0 Elements ofArchitecture: From Form to Place. Pathway:f Status of His Objects: A Reading of the Human ArchitectureH
E- Moore, uHwnan Energy. ff Alexander builds Linz Condition.It ThUs-Evensen Archetypes inCI)
i Cafe. Architecture. Portoghesi, Postmodern:
U
~ L'architettura nella Societd f'ust-Industriale .
~ Payol, Le Philosophe et L'Architecte.
r-
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Dufrenne, nEye and Mind. fI Vatimo, IfAbitare Viene Priffi8 Ji Construire Vattimo and Rovatti, II Peflfiero
(Dwelling Comes Before Building). tf Schutz, Life Debole. Ihde, Existential
>-
Forms and Meaning Structure. Spiegelberg, The Tec"n;c.~
0::: Phenomenological Movement: A Historical
0
t- Introduction.
~
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Norberg-Schulz visting professor at U. of Norberg-Schulz lecture in Basle~ Norberg-Schulz fellow at Dallas Institute of Culture; Norberg-Schulz, honorary award
Cincinnati; lectures in Naples, Rome~ Hanover, ZUrich, Aachen. Rome, lectures in dublin. Chicago. Dallas, Lausanne, Siena, AIA; lectures in Linz~ Genova.
Munich, Zurich. Norberg-SchulzYeter Dusserldorf, Dortmund, Bonn. Stockholm, Genova. Moore lectares at Yale. Barcelona. New York, S.
Collins,\\'iebenson,Creese, Stern, Rykwert, Frampton lectures at Yale. Francisco. "ConDict Conlerenceft
Anderson: Symposium ffHistory in Architectural in Sydney Participants include
>-
Educationtf Cincinnati, Ohio, May 30 and 31. Kenneth Frmnpton, Helmut Jabo,
£x death of Jean-Paul Sanre (1905-1980) Charles Correa, John Andrews,
0(- Jack Robertson, Denlitri
en
s: Porphyrios. Romaldo Giurgola,
..J Gough Whitlam
<9
~
1984 1985 1986
Norberg-Sebulz, UHeidegger on Norberg-Schulz Arne Korsmo. Seamon and Norberg-Schuiz, /I Mondo
Architecture" and The Concept of Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and deU'Archilellura, 'The Demand for a
Dwelling: On the Way to Figurative Environment: Towards a Phenomenology of Contemporary Language of Architecture."
Architecture, Lyndon, uBeing Person and Wor/d, Rudd, "Architecture and Ideas: Krauss, Richard Serra I Sculpture.
>- Therelt • Filson IIRemembrances and a A Phenomenology of Interpretation." Kockelmans,a:
~ Look at Ethnicity." Holl, 'Teeter Heidegger on ,4rl and Art Works. Bognar, "A
CI':l Totter Principles:' Seamon, Phenomenological Approach to Architecture and itss:
"Heidegger's Notion of Dwelling..:' Teaching in the Design Studio.II Perella ed.,u
~ Buchloh, ''1beorizing the Avant- Architecture and Abstraction.Garde."
r-
~
-<
Kosellec:k, "'Space Experience' and 'Horizon of Ihde, uPhenomenology in America (1964-
Expectation': Two Historical Categories." 1984)."
>-
Zimmerman, 'The Role of Spiritual Discipline in
'"
Learning to Dwell on Earth:'
~
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Place debate Piazza d'ltaJia: with Moore professor at U. of Texas Austin until 1993) Norberg-Schulz knighted into Order of SL
Littlejohn, Baird, RS. Hanies, Olav of the King of NOIWay; keynOle at Aga
Norberg-Schulz, Claiborne, Aidala, Khan symposium in Granada, ROllle
Filson, Eskew, Moor~, Lyndon Cagliari, Naples, Frankfun. Frampton
honorary award AlA. Buildings and Reality
>-
conference at the University of Texas
~ Austin. Present: Michael Benedikt, Roben
0 Mugerauer. Karsten Harries.Eo-
CI':l
:E
-J
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198'1 1988
Anderson, "On Places". Lyndon, "on Places" and "Caring Norberg-Schulz, The ml'aning ofWestern Architecture
about Places" PalIasmaa, . tlContext and Continuity: Universal (english), Roots ofModern Architecture (Japanese and English)
Versus Situational in Architecture." Fram.iJton, "In the Lugano and 'The Two Faces ofPost-Modernism." Flynn, edt
Landscape: Five Architectures." and. "Presence of Myth." Thils- Archilecture and Body. Ihde "Phenomenology and
>- EveDS!o, Archetypes in Architecture, Oslo. Mann (film Architecture." MacLeod, "Phenomenology, Computers and~
f= maker), "A Phenomenological Inquiry Into the Concept of Architeetme." Ihde, ''Phenomenology and Architecture." Vesely,
CI) Hornet II (Ph.D.Diss.: U. of North Caro~ Greensborough). "On the Relevance ofPhenomenology." Wigley, '1be
:c Taluri, The Sphere and the Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architectural Displacement of Philosophy," Perella, ed, Form.U
~ Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s. Being, Absence: Architecture and Philosophy.
~
Cf1
~
Casey, Re~mbtring: A Phenomenological Sludy. Ricoeur ''Towards a Henneneutics of Historical Consciousness."
Lyotard, Heidegger tIles luifs. Mugerauer, Heidegger's
>-
Language and Thinking. Wolin, 'The French Heidegger
&¥ Debate... Zimmerman, "L'affaire Heidegger." Sheenan,
~ "Heidegger and the Nazis." Bourdieu, L'ontologie polilique tk
til
s: Marlin Heidegger.
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Cridcism of Place: symposium held at b~e Architectural Norberg-Scbulz vacations in traditional Norwegian Fann
League of New York. Present: Anderson, canty. Lyndon, "Stabbur" at Minnesjord until 1993; odered Commamler of the
and Me Leod. Norberg-Schulz is jury for Prince of Wales prize Order of the Italian Republic; honorary fellow RIBA. First
at Harvard; lectures in Munich, Rome, New york. Washington. International Symposium on Traditional Dwellings and
Cambridge MA. Stuttgart, London, Paris. Jerusalem. Setdements held at Berkeley in April.
>-~
~
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1989
Sola Morales, "Weak Architecture." Thiis--Evensen, Archetypes of Urbanism. Bolle,
"Wonen, eon omstreden filosofie: Martin Heidegger versus Eisenman, Tigennan en
Levinas." "Heidegger's Cabin at Todtnauberg, Wittgenstein's Cabin at Skojlden." Jenks,
What is Post-Modernism Barbey. "Introduction: Towards a Phenomenology of Home :t
> Grauman ''Towards a Phenomenology of Being at Home." Norberg-Schulz, "The
~ Prospects ofPJuraJism". Sauzet, "Sensory Phenomenology as a Reference for the
~ Architectural Project." C.R. Mann HChildrens' Activities in Health Care Waiting Room
:t Environments: A phenomenological Investigation" (Master's Thesis: University of
~ Missouri, Columbia). de Sola Morales, "Weak Architecture:'
~
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Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (english trans).
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Moore honorary Topaz award AINACSA. Norbeg-Schulz lectures in Rome, Noter
Dame U.• Clemson U., Texas A&M, Munich, Basel, Liechtenstein, Lund, Qulu, Ascoli
Piceno. Pomona Meeting Olil Critical Regionalism at the California State Polytechnic
University.
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1990
Hays, "The Structure of Architectural Phenomenology:t Condon, "Phenomenological
approaches to Landscape, Place and Design". Mugerauer, Post-Structuralist Planning
Theory. Ludy, Film: uPlaces for the Soul: the architecture of Christopher Alexander."
First issue of Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology Newletter edited by
Seamon and Boschetti.
*Harvard-GSD Symposium on Architectural Research, Part I: Theoretical and
Epistemological Dimensions Panelists: S.Anderson, MIT: A. Colquhoun, Princeton;
Hillier, University College London: Lerup, UC Berkeley: Perez..Gomez. McGill;
John Whiteman, Chicago Institute for Architecture and Urbanism. -EDRA
(Environmental Design Research Association) symposium on Phenomenological
Approaches to Landscape and Place. Ieluded EAP Network mHting. Present:
Patrick Condon. Mugerauer, Seamon.. *CoIumbia Exhibition + Book "The History
of History in American Schools of Architecture" Death of Herben Spiegelberg ( 1904-
1990) . Norberg-Schulz lectures in Rome. London. Pr~ Tenlo.
1991 1992
Norberg-Schulz, "the New Tradition." Wigley, nHeidegger's House: The Violence of the Domestic." Dilnot,"The
Denton, ''NOles on Bachelard's Inhabited Decisive Text: On Beginning to Read Heideggers 'Building, Dwelling,
Geometry." Anderton, "Architecture for AU Thinking". Stefanovic, ''The Experience of Place: Housing Quality From a
Senses." Plomer, Phenomenolgy, Phenomenological Perspective." Heynen, "Architecture Between Modernity and
)ot Geometry and Vision. Dwelling: Reflections on Adorno's Aesthetic Theory." Mangan., "Alfred Schutz's
t:¥:
~ Phenomenological Theory of Meaning: With Some Conunents on the Meaning of
en Space." Perez-Gomez, Polyphilo, or, The Darlc Forest Revisited: An Erotic
:E Epiphany ofArchitecture. Harries, "Context, Confrontation. Folly."
tJ
~ Borradori, "The Italian Heidegger: Philosophy, Architecture and WeakThoughL"
~
~
Lefebvre, The Production ofSpace(trans).
Lyotani, Phenomenology. Janicaud, Le
>-
tournantthioiogique de to
~ p',enominologie fran,aisE.~
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Norwegian television makes film about
Norberg-Schulz. Symposium
"Arcbitecture, Ethics, and Technology"
organized in November by AlOOno Perez-
Gomez at the Canadian Centre for
>-
Architecture, Montreal. Exhibition: First
tX AINACSA exhibition on Environmentally0
Eo- Conscious Architecture, AlA National
C'-l
:2 Convention in Washington.
3g
C'-l
1993 1994 1995
Hillier, "Specifically Architectural Theory: A Partial Account..." Stefanovic, . "Temporality and Architecture: A Phenomenological Norberg-8chulz, "Jorn Utzoo and
Norberg-Schulz, nUDe Vision Poetique. U Snyder, "Building. Reading of Built Fonn." Mugerauer, Interpretations on Behalf of the Importance of the Primitive."
Thinking. and Politics: Mies. Heidegger. and the Nazis." Heynen, Place. HolI, "Questions of Perception: Phenomenology of Frampton, Studies in T~('ton;c
"Worthy ofQuestion: Heidegger's Role in Architectural Thoery". Architecture." and "Archetypal Experiences in Architecture." Perez- Culture. HoIl, "Pre·Theoretical
~ Mugerauer. Overcoming Barriers to Understanding in Research and Gomez 'The Space of Architecture: Meaning as Presence and Ground." Baird. The Space of
~
~ Practice; Place and the Politics ofIdRntity. Dwelling. Seeing, and Representation.It and Architecture. Ethics. and Technolog. Appearance. Mugerauer,
rI} Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology. Crowther,Art Pallasmaa, tlArchiteeture of the Seven Senses.,t Second volume of Interpreting EnvironJJaJts:
sa and Embodiment: From Aesthetics to Self-Consciousness. Wigley, SUNY series on Environmental and Architectural Tradition, Deconstruction.
U
~ The ArchitecturR ofDeconstruction. Guattarit "Space and Corporeity." Phenomenology Henneneutics
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Death ofCharles l\loore. Norberg-Schulz consultant for remodelling Death of Tafuri ( 1935·1994). Norberg-Schulz named Grand Norberg&hulz gold medal of the
of Oslo Royal Palace; lectures in Rome. Dusseldorf. Officer of the Order of the Italian Republic; Lectures in Rome. French Aademie d'Architecture;
Berlin. lectures in Rome. Paris.
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Frampton, "Universalism and/or Norberg-Schulz, De L'art du Lieu Strohmayer, "The Event of Space: Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat : A
Regionalism: Untimely reflections a LIM du Vecu. Sennett, The Geographic Allusions in the History of Sound in the Arts
on the Future of the New." Senses Search of Place in the World. Phenomenological Tradition."
of Place. Graaftand, Architectural Krell, itA Malady ofChains:
).4 Bodies. PaJIasmaa, The Eyes of the Husserl and Derrida on the Origins
~ Skin: Architecture and the Senses. of Geometry ...... Harries, The~
tn Harries, "Lessons of a Dream" Ethical Function ofArchitecture.
:E Hayden, The power ofPlac~.
U
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Casey, The Fate o/Place: A Body and Flesh: A Philosophical
Philosophical History, Derrida, Reader
).4 Adieu d Emmanuel Levinas , and
t:t: Cosmopolites de tous les pays,
~ encore un effort!
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Dea1h ofOuistian Norbera-
Schulz. Dea1h of Bnmo Zeyl
(1918·2000)
>cg
0
~
r.I)
:c
...J
:sg
r.I)
